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Abstract
As a result of globalization, the accounting profession has become increasingly aware of the need to
establish a single set of accounting standards that would be valid in the international arena. Recent
events highlight the timeliness of this study, which provides an empirical measurement of International
Accounting Standards Committee (lASC) progress throughout its harmonization history. The purpose
of this article is twofold: first, a new measure of the advances achieved through formal harmonization
and second, to use this methodology to evaluate the lASC achievements all through its standard-setting
activity. Our results prove that the lASC has made great progress in regard to the level of harmony
achieved through the accounting standards it has issued or revised. Nevertheless, we conclude that the
LASC needs to continue working towards greater formal harmonization. Our study also indicates
research directions that could advance the study of formal harmonization. This specific area of research
has generally been disregarded in the existing literature, a trend we would like to see reversed,
considering that its application can provide valuable insight for standard-setting processes, especially
now that the accounting community is so conscious of the need to advance the harmonization process.
© 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
As a result of the growing importance of financial globalization, the accounting profession
has increasingly become aware of the need to establish a single set of accounting standards
that would be valid in the international arena. In 1995, the International Accounting
Standards Committee (lASC) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) agreed to develop and promote a single set of accounting standards. This would
allow large companies to obtain financial resources in the most developed capital markets
without having to prepare reconciliations to other national accounting standards or disclose
new information. Shortly after the abovementioned agreement was signed, the European
Union (EU) issued a formal Communication stating its intent to align EU harmonization
efforts with those of the lASC (see European Communities Commission, 1995).
In May 2000, the IOSCO completed the assessment of 30 lASC standards, including
their related interpretations ("the LASC, 2000 standards"). In the subsequent resolution
(see IOSCO, 2000), the IOSCO encouraged its members to permit incoming multinational
issuers to use the lASC standards in the preparation of their financial statements for cross-
border offerings and listings, supplemented^ where necessary to address outstanding
substantive issues at a national or regional level, or to use waivers of particular aspects
of lASC standards without requiring further reconciliation under exceptional circum-
stances. Again, shortly after this IOSCO resolution was approved, the European Com-
mission issued another Communication on 13 June 2000 (see European Community
Commission, 2000), in which it outlines a strategy for future financial reporting in Europe.
It states that, before the end of the year 2000, the Commission will present a legislative
proposal to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament to introduce the
International Accounting Standards (IAS) requirement for the consolidated accounts of
the EC companies listed on regulated markets. This requirement would come into force in
2005 at the latest.
Despite conflicting political interests, it seems we are now much closer to achieving the
lASC's main objectives." Fulfilling the lASC's ambifious aspirations— to become the
international standard-setter— depends on the degree of success it has achieved, so far, in
its harmonization efforts through the issuing of IAS.
' Those supplemental treatments are as follows: (a) reconciliations of certain items, (b) additional disclosures,
and (c) specifying particular interpretations in cases where the lASC is silent or unclear.
" The objectives of the lASC, as set out in its Constitution, revised in 1982 are (a) to promote worldwide
acceptance and observance of the IAS it formulates, and (b) to work generally for the improvement and
harmonization of regulations, accounting standards, and procedures relating to the presentation of financial
statements. Nevertheless, in the context of the restructuring process undertaken by the lASC, its objectives have
also been revised and set out as follows: (a) to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high-quality,
understandable, and enforceable global accounting standards, which require high-quality, transparent, and
comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting, to help participants in the world's
capital markets and other users make economic decisions; (b) to promote the use and rigorous application of
those standards; and (c) to bring about the convergence of national accounting standards and IAS to effect high-
quality solutions.
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This Study, which we beHeve is very timely, provides an empirical measurement of the
progress made by the lASC to date. Since it was formed in 1973, the lASC has tried to
improve its body of accounting standards with a view to promoting the use of the IAS
internationally. Over the last few years, substantial efforts have been made to increase the
comparability and transparency of financial statements. Valuation treatments have been
reduced and disclosure requirements have been extended.
We should first make a distinction between what the existing literature refers to as
"de jure" harmonization, or formal harmonization, and "de facto" harmonization, or
material harmonization. The former term refers to harmonization between regulations and
the latter to harmonization between practices applied by companies, regardless of whether
such practices are affected by regulations. A differentiation should also be made between
the concepts of harmonization and standardization. As is generally accepted, standard-
ization is supposed to lead to a global uniformity, whereas harmonization refers to a
process of increasing comparability and the avoidance of total diversity (see Tay &
Parker, 1990).
Once this preliminary clarification has been made, this article provides a measurement of
the advances achieved through formal harmonization. Next, we apply a methodology we
created to evaluate the lASC achievements throughout the three stages of its standard-
setting activity.
Prior studies on the assessment of accounting harmonization have focused on the
investigation of material harmonization, disregarding the importance of formal harmoniza-
tion. The indexes mostly used in the literature are the I and C indexes, put forward by Van der
Tas (1988). Several authors introduce further improvements or developments to those indexes
and make their own methodological contribution to the debate. For example, the index
proposed by Archer and McLeay (1995), the global concentration index suggested by Garcia
Benau (1995), and the comparability index by Archer, Delvaille, and McLeay (1995). In more
recent years, fiirther contributions have been made to this area of research (see Archer,
Delvaille, & McLeay, 1996; Krisement, 1997; McLeay, Neal, & Tollington, 1999; Morris &
Parker, 1998).
The methodologies developed in the studies mentioned above use the accounting
information prepared by companies to examine the level of harmonization among the
practices and treatments applied, that is, material harmonization. Nevertheless, these
methodologies are not valid for evaluating formal harmonization. The conceptual idea
of those studies, that is, material vs. formal harmonization studies, is substantially
different. Regarding the former, researchers analyze and operationalize the accounting
choices made by companies and calculate the relative frequency for every valuation
method ft-om a certain accounting practice in order to obtain the concentration and
dispersion indexes used in the literature cited above. With the latter, however, research sets
out to evaluate how regulations change through time (i.e., time studies like the one we
present here or transversal studies as published in Rahman, Perea, and; Ganeshanandam,
1996, in which several regulations from different countries are looked into). In this study,
we develop a new methodological approach to measure advances in formal harmonization.
Moreover, this methodology could also be applied to the analysis of the degree of
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harmony or comparability between different regulations at different points in time or
among different countries.
Nonetheless, previous research on material harmonization has partially evaluated, in one
way or another, the effects of formal harmonization on practice. Indeed, we agree with
Rahman et al. (1996) that one of the primary factors that lead to material harmonization is
formal harmonization.^ In fact, should the allowed accounting choices be minimized (if we
concentrate on just one regulation, as we present in this study), or made more similar between
different countries, the financial information provided by the many companies who comply
with such accounting standards would certainly be more comparable. As a result, many more
companies would tend to apply the same accounting system or, at least, there would be far
fewer systems to choose from. Thus, material harmonization (i.e., the majority of companies
applying a common accounting system) would increase as the result of a higher level of
formal harmonization.
Although the literature on formal harmonization is scarce, important contributions have
been made by Adhikari and Tondkar (1992), Lainez Gadea, Callao Gaston, and Jame Jame
(1996), and Rahman et al. (1996). No methodological proposals, however, have so far been
put forward to evaluate the formal harmonization of accounting regulations.
Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) examine 35 stock exchanges' listing requirements as the
source for accounting regulation, and they identify some environmental factors that are
determining factors for such listing requirements.
On the other hand, Lainez Gadea et al. (1996) concentrate on analyzing and quantifying
the existing discrepancies among the information requirements imposed by the stock
exchanges of 13 countries. Their study finds that there are more differences among
periodical reporting requirements than with additional information to be disclosed in the
case of private offerings.
Last, but not least, Rahman et al. (1996) measure the formal harmonization level that
has been achieved between the two "neighboring" countries of Australia and New
Zealand. As their source of "accounting regulation," they analyze the disclosure and
measurement requirements stipulated in accounting standards, legislative requirements, and
stock-listing requirements. They do a multiple-discriminating analysis to identify the
different categories of requirements that achieve higher or lower degrees of harmonization
between the two countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the three main
landmarks in the lASC's history, which allows us to split its harmonization efforts into three
stages. The accounting situation in each of these stages is then used as a basis to evaluate the
lASC's formal harmonization progress. Section 3 presents our methodological contribution
and the research plan for its application to the three stages identified in the lASC's standard-
It should be highlighted that some studies provide a theoretical framework or empirical evidence on the
spontaneous trend to harmonization experienced by large companies, that is, the global players (see Canibano
& Mora, 1999; Huddart & Hughes, 1997; Meek & Gray, 1989; Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995; Taylor-
Zarzesky, 1996).
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setting activity. The results of this empirical study are examined in Section 4. Finally, Section
5 reports the conclusions that may be drawn from this study.
2. Stages in lASC harmonization
In Section 1 , we established the timeliness of this study, due to the new initiatives seen in
the international accounting harmonization process. We devote this section of the study to
presenting the lASC's harmonization history. The three different stages in the history of lASC
we identify here will be used in a later section for our empirical study, which introduces a new
methodology for evaluating formal harmonization.
Three different stages can be clearly identified in the harmonization sfrategy followed by
the lASC, in accordance with the evolution of the characteristics of its harmonizing model.
During the first phase, from 1973 to 1988, the lASC issued 26 generic standards, allowing
multiple options and prescribing only minimal disclosures. In 1988, the lASC became
concemed about the comparability achievements reached with the IAS. This marked the
beginning of a new phase, that is, the second stage, from 1989 to 1995. The LASC reviewed
its current standards and eliminated a significant number of options or showed its preference
for a benchmark freatment, leaving the others simply as allowed treatments. As a result, a
"Comparability/Improvements Project" (lASC, 1990) and a "Framework for the Preparation
and Presentation of Financial Statements" (lASC, 1989) were published. Finally, 21 choices
were eliminated in 10 standards. The third stage began in 1995, when the IOSCO agreed to
endorse the LAS, provided that lASC complete a core set of standards by mid- 1999 (see Van
HuUe, 1997; Zeff, 1998).
According to the core standards program, the lASC has made additional improvements,
further reducing the allowed options. And, great attention has been paid to increasing the
levels of disclosure, as well as to a rigorous compliance with the IAS.
The international debate generated in accounting literature over the new thrust that the
harmonization process has received in recent years should not be ignored. The debate
reflects the power play between the SEC and the lASC. Both institutions are afraid of
losing their clout in the accounting standard-setting process worldwide. Indeed, both the
LASC and the SEC are aware of the fact that the LASC needs the SEC's acceptance of the
lASC is created
Need to advance in terms
of comparability lOSCO-IASC Agreement
1973 1989 1995
Conceptual Framework (1989)
Comparability Project (1990)
Fig. 1. lASC hannonization stages.
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Table 1
Chronology of lASC standard-setting activity
High flexibility Comparability of financial reporting lOSCO-IASC Agreement results
(1973/1988) (1989/1995) (1995 onwards)
• LAS 1-26 • Revised IAS 2, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 21, • Revised IAS 1, 12, 14, 22
22, and 23 (mainly in force in 1995). (in force in 1998), 16, 17, 19, 28, 31
• IAS 27, 28, 29 (in force in 1990), 30 (in force in 1999), 10 (in force in 2000),
(in force in 1991), 31 (in force in 1992), and 32 (in force in 2001).
and 32 (in force in 1996). • IAS 33-39 (mainly in force in 1999).
IAS, in order to ensure the complete success of the IAS. Actually, the lASC is in the
process of a restructuring process and the SEC is maneuvering trying to gain greater
control over the revised lASC structure (see Flower, 1999; Zeff, 2000). In spite of the
lASC's achievements, the accounting literature offers conflicting opinions on the final
outcome of the lOSCO-IASC agreement (see Cairns, 1997 and 1999; Flower, 1999 and
1997; Hegarty, 1997; Kelly, 1999; McGregor, 1999; Zeff, 1998; lASC, 1998; Zorio &
Garrido, 1999). The SEC has not yet issued a formal response to this momentous decision.
Three important decisions serve as landmarks that divide the lASC's history into three
different stages of the overall harmonization process, as shown in Fig. 1
.
We base our to study of the lASC standards, both issued and revised, on the three different
stages mentioned above."^ In the next section, we apply our methodological proposal to
measure "de jure" harmonization on the IAS treatments that correspond to each of the three
stages (see Table 1).
3. Measurement of formal progress by the lASC
In Section 2, we presented the background and basis for this article. Our descriptive
analysis of the lASC's harmonization efforts, divided into three phases, outlines a trend, from
a set of highly flexible standards to a comprehensive body of accounting standards that would
guarantee comparability and transparency. We shall try now to evaluate the development of
the lASC's standards, from its beginnings to the present.
In discussing formal harmonization through the lASC, we focus on the IAS without
considering whether such treatments are accepted or not by other regulatory authorities, such
as stock exchanges worldwide. This is because the lASC endeavours to have its standards
finally accepted, in the long run, without reconciliations or any exceptions imposed by the
stock exchanges. In fact, according to the International Federation of Stock Exchanges
(Federation Internationale des Bourses des Valeurs, or FIBV) and the Federation of Euro-
^ The period of enforcement of the standards does not coincide with the dates of the landmarks above, because
there are necessary transitory periods between the approval and effective date of each standard.
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Asian Stock Exchanges (FEAS), nowadays, the stock exchanges seem to adopt just two kinds
of positions toward the IAS: (a) those that require reconcihation to national GAAP by listed
foreign companies,' and (b) those that accept IAS for hsted foreign companies^ or even for
local companies.
Therefore, if the lASC is to fiilfil its aspirations, the IAS should be accepted by stock
exchanges much as they are presented. This means that, in view of the present situation,
reconciliations to national GAAP should be eliminated. As already mentioned, the United
States is the most powerful force in this regard. However, apart from countries like the United
States, which require reconciliation to domestic standards, the IAS, as they are currently
outlined, are accepted as the basis for the financial information that must be filed in the stock
exchanges of certain countries. Moreover, it should be highlighted that IAS 1 states that only
companies that fully comply with the lASC standards can state the use of IAS in their
financial statements. We expect, therefore, that when the lASC^ declares that such stock
exchanges accept the IAS, with no exceptions, then listed companies using IAS should not
have to make any accounting changes as a result of their listing status.
Hence, we shall now focus on the IAS to provide evidence on the formal harmonization
progress achieved by the lASC, disregarding any other requirements that might be imposed
by the stock exchanges. Future studies could extend our discussion of formal harmonization
by including not only the accounting regulations regarding valuation treatments, but also
disclosure requirements imposed by accounting regulations or even by stock exchanges or
other regulatory entities.
3.1. Sample
The sample used in our empirical analysis comprises those accounting treatments included in
the IAS that have been modified during the lASC's existence. Such accounting treatments were
especially conflictive at some specific moment in time. As a result, standard-setting efforts have
been made to address these issues and reach a consensus. As we hope to prove, this has
gradually led to a considerable improvement in terms ofthe accounting harmonization process.
^ The stock exchanges that require listed foreign companies to provide reconcihation from IAS to local GAAP
are those from the following countries: United States, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Korea, Finland, Hong Kong,
Poland, and Spain.
The stock exchanges from the following countries allow foreign companies to file financial statements
complying with IAS: Australia, Egypt, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
Though, under certain specific conditions, the countries that follow allow not only foreign companies but
also national companies to file financial statements in accordance with LAS: Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Cayman Islands, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Jordan,
Latvia, Macedonia. Pakistan, Peru, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. See
lASC's website for further information on the conditions that are to be met by national companies from some of
the abovementioned countries to apply IAS.
For more information, see the lASC's webpage on IAS acceptability by stock exchanges.
8 P. Ganido et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 37 (2002) 1-26
After a thorough analysis of the IAS, every concept is assigned four feasible treatments, for
each of the three hannonization stages identified in the lASC life. Following Rahman et al.
(1996), the typology we used to identify the nature of the treatments is as follows: (a) required
treatment: compulsory treatment for all companies complying with IAS, (b) benchmark
treatment: recommended or preferred treatment according to IAS, (c) allowed treatment: not
required or not forbidden by IAS, (d) forbidden: not permitted by IAS.
The procedure for assigning numerical values was undertaken by one coder, who studied
the changes introduced in the standards, developing the idea conveyed by the Statement of
Intent (see lASC, 1990). In fact, we used this document to identify the main changes
introduced in Stage 2, thus leaving no place for any kind of subjectivity. Changes introduced
in the third stage were easily identified because the new standard highlights the recent
changes in shaded text with the deleted text of former IAS both shaded and scratched-out
(see, for instance, IAS 8, 16, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32 in lASC, 1999). We also
examined the lASC's press releases and information published in its website very carefully to
ensure we did not ignore or miss any change being implemented in existing accounting
treatments. Hence, all changes should be reflected in our coding procedure. We paid special
attention to the most conflictive ones, carefully considering all of the documents published by
the lASC. A certain degree of subjectivity might well be inherent in the website information,
such as press releases that ignore little changes and quotations, that are not clearly indicated
in the IAS Bound Volume (lASC, 1999), could have been missed. We believe there is just a
very small chance that this could have happened, and even if it did, that information would be
highly unlikely to modify the results and conclusions herein presented.
Following the division shown in Table 1, the three stages have been called "High
flexibility" (1973-1988), "Comparability of financial reporting" (1989-1995), "lOSCO-
lASC Agreement results" (1995 onwards). These three stages have been denoted as Stages
"A," "B," and "C," respectively, in the tables and formulae shown in the following sections.
As previously mentioned, Stage A is characterized by the high flexibility allowed by IAS;
Stage B represents a new period where concerns for a higher degree of comparability
materialize in the reduction of alternative treatments; and Stage C's main feature is a high
standard-setting activity in order to complete the core standard program agreed with the
IOSCO. It should be noted that previous empirical studies also operationalize the impact of
lASC standards, dividing the lASC's history into three different stages (see, for instance,
Harris, 1995; Harris and Muller, 1999).
Appendix A shows the analysis of the treatments included in the IAS, with regard to 20
selected accounting concepts (see, for instance, Epstein & Ali Mirza, 2000). As already
explained, the subset of corresponding IAS should constitute the whole population of
accounting concepts whose valuation treatments have been modified along the lASC's life.
It could seem to be a rather small sample, yet its size is restricted by the fact that we need to
have a clear reference for each accounting concept throughout the three stages of the lASC's
history. Some very interesting accounting issues have been addressed by the lASC in recent
years, which did not exist prior to regulation (for instance, IAS 33 "Earnings Per Share").
In fact, it should be remarked that apart from the 20 accounting concepts included in our
sample, changes requiring higher disclosure (see Appendix B) have also been detected with
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regard to the harmonization stages in five IAS (IAS 1: "Presentation of Financial State-
ments," IAS 7: "Cash Flow Statements," IAS 14: "Segment Reporting," IAS 32: "Financial
Instruments: Disclosures and Presentation," IAS 33: "Earnings Per Share"). However, since
our methodological approach cannot be applied to them, these formal changes have not been
taken into account for our evaluation. The harmonizing criteria that we develop next is not
focused on the fact that companies are required to disclose more financial information, but on
the fact that alternative accounting treatments are reduced.
The empirical analysis of the level of formal harmonization reached by the lASC,
throughout the three stages of its life, is based on the 20 concepts we identified and selected,
following the coding procedure explained above. The basic idea is to find an indicator or a
measure of the gradual reduction of alternative treatments over time.
To do so, we use Stage C (IOSCO-lASC Agreement results) as the period ofreference, since
it is the one that shows further harmonization with regard to the accounting concepts included in
the sample. As is shown in Fig. 2, which presents the percentages of alternative treatments
(required, benchmark, allowed, forbidden), there has been a rise in compulsory or required
treatments (7.69, 28.95, 34. 15) and forbidden treatments (2.56, 23.68, 31.71). This rise leads to
a more rigid set of standards and, therefore, increases formal harmonization. Afterwards, we
shall use a second period of reference, which we call the "Ideal harmonization situation."
3.2. Methodology
The methodology used is based on two different indicators to measure the degree of the
lASC's formal harmonization efforts. Since Stage C is the highest harmonization period, then
- 60,00 11
B Required
Benchmark
DAI lowed
n Forbidden
1^ t
High flexibility Comparability
lASC Stages
Fig. 2. Alternative accounting treatments in lASC stages.
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Table 2
Groupings of IAS in our sample
Balance sheet Income statement
Inventories
Changes in accounting policies
Development costs
Research costs
Events after the balance sheet date
Dividend/Profit distribution
Construction contracts
Income taxes
Property, plant, and equipment
Revenue
Post-employment benefits
Changes in foreign exchange rates
Uniting interests
Positive goodwill
Negative goodwill
Borrowing costs
Contingent liabilities
Intangible assets
Financial instruments
Financial assets
the first indicator is calculated by taking Stage C as the reference period (lOSCO-IASC
Agreement results). The second indicator will be obtained by constructing an "Ideal
harmonization period" as the period of reference, which is denoted as Stage D. We call it
"Ideal" because we develop Stage D by declaring that just one treatment is required for each
concept and no alternative treatments are allowed. All the other treatments considered in
Stages A, B, or C must therefore be forbidden.
It should be pointed out, however, that this concept of standardization does not mean a
better accounting situation. The closer we get to this "Ideal harmonization period," the higher
the level of harmonization that will be achieved.
Since each accounting standard has four alternative treatments (see Appendix A), each one
can be defined as a vector:
A,,Ba,C,; k= 1,2,. ..,20
where the subscript k denotes the accounting concept and A, B, C states the lASC accounting
stages defined in Secfion 3.1. For instance, the first concept, "Inventories," is, for each
period, respectively: A, =(0,4,0,0), B, =(0,2,1,1), and C, =(0,2,1,1).
Either indicators, or measures, are based on the Euclidean distance for any pair of
elements.'^ Let X and Y be two vectors defined as A'=(.vi,jC2,. . .^xj) and Y^{y],y2,. . .,yj).
In Appendix C, several distance measures different from the Euclidean one are used.
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The Euclidean distance (or norm) for any pair X,Y \s then defined as:
1 1/2
d{X. Y) =
3.2.1. Measure I (basis period: Stage C)
The steps for building Measure 1 are as follows:
1
.
The Euclidean distances for all the vectors corresponding to A and B stages to Stage C
are calculated, that is:
^(A,.Ca), ^(B,,Ca-); /r=l,2,...,20
in which A/^, B/^, and C^r. are elements from J x 1 vectors, where J denotes the number of
accounting alternatives, that is, J= 4 in our case. To abbreviate, the above Euclidean distances
are denoted as (^/'„, where m = A,B and n is the basis period, that is, n = C. Three different
kinds of indicators will be obtained. The first, which contains all the standards of the sample,
is called the "general indicator." Furthermore, the 20 concepts have been split into two
groups: the concepts from the Balance Sheet (12 concepts) and the ones from the Income
Statement (8 concepts)," which can be seen in Table 2, and which obtain the corresponding
Balance Sheet indicator and Income Statement indicator.
2. Let
H
where D^ represents our formal harmonization measure taking Stage C as a reference, and H
is the number of standards that make up our measure or indicator, that is, general indicator,
Balance Sheet indicator, or Income Statement indicator.
Note that for D^, = 0, then m reaches the frill harmonization with respect to Stage C.
3.2.2. Measure 2 (basis period: Stage D)
Another harmonization measure is based on constructing an "Ideal harmonization period,"
denoted as Stage D (see Table 3), which allows only a single accounting treatment,
specifically, the "required" one. The other treatments are classified as "forbidden" ones in
each IAS in the sample.
The number of overall treatments corresponding to each accounting concept in Table 3 is
obtained through Stage C, for instance, "Inventories" has four treatments: FIFO, weighted
average cost, LIFO, and base-stock formula. Since Stage C is temporarily the nearest one to
Stage D, then C will be the reference stage for obtaining Stage D.
See Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985).
" Our split is based on the lASC classification (see the "lASC Insight" quarterly newsletter, March 1999).
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Table 3
Ideal harmonization period (Stage D)
Stage D
Required Benchmark Allowed Forbidden
Inventories 3
Changes in accounting policies 1
Development costs
Research costs
Events after the balance sheet date 2
Dividend/Profit distribution
Construction contracts
Income taxes
Property, plant, and equipment
Revenue
Postemployment benefits
Changes in foreign exchange rates
Uniting of interests
Positive goodwill
Negative goodwill 2
Borrowing costs
Contingent liabilities
Intangible assets
Financial instruments
Financial assets 1
This second indicator, D^,, is obtained in the same way as the first one but in this case,
m=A,B,C and the reference period is n = D. Also, m would now achieve a complete
harmonization with regard to Stage D when D^ = 0.
4. Analysis and results
In this section, we look into the values obtained once the methodological approach
presented above has been applied to our sample. It should be emphasized that, in accordance
with the objectives of this study, these values explain the progress achieved by the lASC in
terms of formal harmonization.
The lower the values, the higher the harmonization level achieved, and vice versa (i.e., the
higher the figures obtained, the less important the advance made in comparability). As already
explained, two groupings of indicators have been calculated, as follows (see Tables 4 and 5).
Table 4
Formal harmonization indicators (the 'lOSCO-IASC Agreement results" stage is the period of reference)
Stages General Balance sheet Income statement
A-C
B-C
41.27
14.04
25.41 15.86
11.04 3.00
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Table 5
Formal harmonization indicators (the "ideal harmonization situation" stage is the period of reference)
Stages General Balance sheet Income statement
A-D 46.29
B-D 22.47
C-D 15.40
29.40
17.47
11.99
16.89
5.00
3.41
The first grouping of indicators takes Stage C (IOSCO-lASC Agreement results) as its
period ofreference and it measures the progress made from Stage A to C and from Stage B to C.
It consists of two general indicators, one for each stage. In addition, we have split the 20
concepts identified in the sample as they are considered to have an effect, mainly, on the
Balance Sheet or on the Income Statement, and we have applied our methodological proposal
to this new division.
With regard to the general indicator, we must highlight an important advancement from
41.27 to 14.04. It means that the distance from Stage B to C (14.04) is lower that the distance
from Stage A to C (41.27), so considerable progress has been made regarding formal
harmonization through international standard setting. This accomplishment is perhaps due to
the increase in comparability of financial information, attained through the publication of the
Conceptual Framework in 1989 and the Comparability Project in 1990.
The indicators for Balance Sheets and Income Statements also indicate an improvement in
the situation. The former has decreased from 25.41 to 11.04 (the distance to comparability
gets shorter), the more homogeneous magnitudes being those that refer to inventories,
changes in accounting policies, uniting of interests, and posidve goodwill. The latter, shows
the progress accomplished in Income Statements, with values ranging from 15.86 to 3.00.
More precisely, there has been a substantial reduction of altemative freatments with regard to
development costs, construction contracts, income taxes, and revenues. An improvement has
also been seen in research costs, postemployment benefits, and borrowing costs.
The second grouping of indicators takes Stage D ("Ideal harmonization situation") as a
hypothetical period of reference. It evaluates the progress made in the three stages identified
within the lASC's standard-setting activity to Stage D, that is, from Stage A to D, from Stage
B to D, and from Stage C to D. Once again, it consists of three general indicators, three for the
Balance Sheet and three for the Income Statement (one value for each Stage A, B, or C to D,
as can be seen in Table 5).
The general indicator shows an advance, in terms of comparability, along the three stages
considered (46.29, 22.47, 15.40), since the distances gradually decrease. The Balance Sheet
indicator presents a similar pattern to that of the general indicator (29.40, 17.47, 11.99) and
the same could be said for the Income Statement indicator (16.89, 5.00, 3.41).
Furthermore, the harmonizing evolution of some other IAS, which has been revised during
the lASC's history, could also be taken into consideration, although they have not been
included in our sample, since they rely on other sorts of financial standard-setting activities,
that is, the disclosure requirements shown in Appendix B. The harmonizing criteria with
regard to these standards would be focused on the idea that more requirements of this kind
would increase transparency, and probably better comparability of financial information.
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In this regard, we have observed that in certain cases, more disclosure requirements are
included in the IAS (for instance, with regard to segment reporting), in other cases, new
information is to be disclosed by companies (e.g., EPS ratio, the cash flow statement, and
information on financial instruments) and an item that seems particularly important from our
point of view, full compliance with the IAS and a declaration of this fact on the company's
annual report.
To sum up, our methodological approach has revealed that the lASC has made great progress
toward formal harmonization through the accounting standards it has issued or revised during
its existence.'" Nevertheless, this study also points to the need for the lASC to continue
working towards greater formal harmonization, extending its standard-setting concerns by
issuing new standards that address the projects on its current agenda (e.g., agriculture,
insurance, extractive industries, emerging markets, and discounting, among others).
5. Conclusions
The LASC has improved its body of standards with a view to promoting its use in the
intemational arena by greatly reducing the number of alternative valuation treatments allowed
and increasing the comprehensiveness of its standards. This paper has introduced a new index
that allows for the measurement of formal harmonization over time.
The formal harmonization measurement proposed herein focuses on a new methodological
approach based on the notion of Euclidean distance. The merits of this new methodology are
twofold. First, it is an appealing measure because it is simple and easily interpretable, and
second, it represents an improvement over the methodological approaches used in previous
studies because they could not be used to evaluate an increasing harmony obtained through
the reduction of accounting valuation treatments. Different distance measurements have been
calculated for the vectors in a sample with two reference periods, a real and a hypothetical
one, in order to verify resuhs and provide more robust empirical evidence.
As a result, we can state that the lASC has achieved important accomplishments in the
comparability of financial information, through its IAS. In the two groupings of indicators
calculated, a reduction in distances can be observed, which confirms the success of formal
harmonization achieved by the lASC. Euclidean distances equal to zero would indicate
total comparability.
One limitation of the study might well be that the selection of the accounting concepts
included in our sample could imply an unavoidable dose of subjectivity, which we tried to
minimize, as explained in Section 3.1. A thorough analysis of the "2000 lASC standards,"
would show that there have been many changes as a result of the lASC standard-setting
activity. But for our study, we have isolated the aspects that, from our point of view and in the
view of lASC's press releases and related publications, have provided conflicts and, therefore,
have dominated the organization's harmonizing efforts.
'^ Appendix C shows similar results when applying distance measures different from the Euclidean distance.
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We should also point out the fact that the methodology proposed herein required a
particular period of reference to calculate distances. Potential problems have been minimized
by using two reference periods, that is, (a) Stage C (lOSCO-IASC Agreement results), which
we believe has achieved a rather important harmonization level; and (b) Stage D ("Ideal
harmonization situation"), which suggests a rather objective harmony reference situation.
This 'Tdeal harmonization situation" is Utopian and might well be undesirable, since it would
finally converge with the standardization concept described in the introduction of the paper.
The research methodology presented in this study, which we believe is a new and timely
contribution to intemational accounting harmonization literature, opens up several directions
for researchers. For example, it can also be used to measure the level of harmony achieved in
issuing different regulations or the evolution of comparability over time when applied to
regulations from different accounting and stock exchange bodies.
We would also like to point out that the empirical evidence provided by this study highlights
the important efforts towards global compatibility undertaken by the lASC. The rapid ex-
pansion of global markets and the consequent need for a single set of viable accounting
standards that would be valid in the intemational arena makes research in this area especially
valuable. We hope that further studies will shed further light on the formal harmonization
process that is of concern to the academy and the accounting profession all over the world.
Last, but not least, it could be argued that, since intemational equity markets seem to be
operating at a reasonably high level of efficiency on the basis of "de facto" harmonization, the
incremental value-added contribution of "de jure" harmonization to the cost-efficient flow of
goods and capital, internationally, is rather low. Nonetheless, we strongly disagree with such
an opinion. There are still many companies that do not cross-list in the most developed capital
markets of the world because of reconciliation requirements to local GAAP (see, for instance,
Cochrane, 1994; Cochrane, Shapiro, & Tobin, 1996; Fanto and Karmel, 1997). We are
referring here, of course, to the reconciliation to the USGAAP that the SEC has imposed on
foreign companies.
Given that the SEC's decision to eliminate reconciliations by the IAS to the USGAAP
depends partially on the level of comparability of financial statements prepared in compliance
with the IAS, ' ^ research on the level offormal harmonization is highly valuable. This is because
formal harmonization may lead to higher material harmonization, as explained in Section 1
.
Moreover, as regulations gradually converge,'"* and a higher level of harmony is achieved,
the accounting burden on companies considering cross-listing will undoubtedly be reduced
and more companies will actually cross-list. This should then lead to a higher level of
informational and allocational efficiencies in the intemational equities markets.'^
In order to consider accepting the IAS, the SEC requires that they must be of "high quahty"; in other words,
they must result in comparability and transparency, and provide for full disclosure (reproduced in SEC, 1997).
As previously stated, the new third objective of the lASC is "to bring about convergence of national
accounting standards and IAS in order to achieve high-quality solutions." Further research on formal
harmonization could evaluate lASC achievements in this regard.
Research in this area is in a rather different realm (based on financial reporting and capital market reactions)
from that of intemational accounting harmonization. See, for example, Pownall and Schipper (1999) for a review
of empirical studies of this kind.
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Appendix A. IAS treatments in lASC stages
Required treatment: compulsory treatment for all companies complying with IAS.
Benchmark treatment: recommended or preferred treatment according to IAS.
Allowed treatment: not required or not forbidden by IAS.
Forbidden treatment: not permitted by IAS.
Stage A Stage B Stage C
Inventories (IAS 2)
required
benchmark 4 (base-stock formula, 2 (FIFO, weighted- 2 (FIFO, weighted-
FIFO, LIFO, weighted- average cost) average cost)
average cost)
allowed 1 (LIFO) 1 (LIFO)
forbidden 1 (base-stock formula) 1 (base-stock formula)
Changes in accounting policies (lAS 8)
required
benchmark 2 (adjust opening 1 (adjust opening 1 (adjust opening
retained earnings. retained earnings) retained earnings)
income of the
current period)
allowed 1 (income of the
current period)
1 (income of the
current period)
forbidden
Development costs (IAS 9)
required 1 (recognize as assets
if certain conditions
are met)
1 (recognize as assets
if certain conditions
are met)^
benchmark 2 (recognize as
assets, expenses)
allowed
forbidden
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Research costs (IAS 9)
required 1 (expenses) 1 (expenses)^
benchmark 1 (expenses)
allowed
forbidden
Events occurring after the balance sheet date (IAS 10)
required 1 (adjust financial 1 (adjust financial 1 (adjust financial
statements if the events statements if the statements if there is a
constitute new events constitute new breach of the going
evidence from facts evidence from facts concern principle)
that already existed that already existed
on the closing date, on the closing date.
irrespective of whether irrespective of
or not the going whether or not the
concern principle is going concern
respected) principle is respected)
benchmark
allowed 1 (adjust financial
forbidden 1 (adjust events of
evidence arisen after
the closing date)
1 (adjust events of
evidence arisen after
the closing date)
statements if there
is not a breach of the
going concern principle)
1 (adjust events of
evidence arisen after
the closing date)
Proposal of dividends distribution (IAS 10)
required 1 (disclose in the notes)
benchmark 2 (adjust as liability, 2 (adjust as hability.
disclose in the notes) disclose in the notes)
allowed
forbidden 1 (adjust as liability)
Construction contracts (IAS 11)
required 1 (percentage 1 (percentage
of completion) of completion)
benchmark 2 (percentage
of complefion,
completed
contract method)
allowed
forbidden 1 (completed 1 (completed
contract method) contract method)
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Income taxes (IAS 12)
required 1 (liability method) 1 (liability method)
benchmark 2 (liability method,
deferral method)
allowed
forbidden 1 (deferral method) 1 (deferral method)
Property, plant, and equipment (IAS 16)
required
benchmark 2 (measure at 1 (measure at 1 (measure at
historical cost. historical cost) historical cost)
revalued amounts)
allowed 1 (revalued amounts) 1 (revalued amounts)
forbidden
Revenue— transactions involving the rendering ofservices (IAS 18)
required 1 (percentage 1 (percentage
of completion) of completion)
benchmark 2 (percentage
of completion,
completed
contract method)
allowed
forbidden 1 (completed 1 (completed
contract method) contract method)
Retirement benefits (IAS 19)
required 1 (accrued benefit
valuation methods)
benchmark 2 (accrued benefit 1 (accrued benefit
valuation methods, valuation methods)
projected benefit
valuation methods)
allowed 1 (projected benefit
valuation methods)
forbidden 1 (projected benefit
valuation methods)
Recognition offi)reign exchange gains and losses on long-term monetary items (IAS 21)
required 1 (income of the 1 (income of the
current period) current period)
p. Garrido et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 57 (2002) 1-26 19
Recognition offoreign exchange gains and losses on long-term monetary items (IAS 21)
benchmark 2 (income of the
current period,
defer and recognize
in income of
future periods)
allowed
forbidden 1 (defer and 1 (defer and
recognize recognize in income
in income of of future periods)
future periods)
Unitings ofimterests (IAS 22)
required 1 (pooling of 1 (pooling of
interest method) interest method)
benchmark 2 (pooling of
interest method,
purchase method)
allowed
forbidden 1 (purchase method) 1 (purchase method)
Positive goodwill (IAS 22)
required 1 (asset) 1 (asset)
benchmark 2 (asset, adjust
to shareholders
equity)
allowed
forbidden 1 (adjust to 1 (adjust to
shareholders shareholders
equity) equity)
Negative goodwill (IAS 22)
required 1 (deferred income,
the amount exceeding
the nonmonetary
assets is income
of the current period)
benchmark 3 (deferred income, 1 (allocate over
allocate over nonmonetary assets)
nonmonetary assets.
adjust to shareholders
equity)
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Negative goodwill (IAS 22)
allowed
forbidden
1 (deferred income)
1 (adjust to
shareholders equity)
2 (adjust to
shareholders equity,
allocate over
nonmonetary assets)
Borrowing costs (IAS 23)
required
benchmark 2 (expense,
recognize as part of
the cost of an asset)
1 (expense) 1 (expense)
allowed 1 (recognize as 1 (recognize
part of the cost as part of the
of an asset) cost of an asset)
forbidden
Contingent liabilities (IAS 37)
required 1 (liability, expense)^ 1 (liability, expense)^ 1 (disclose in
the notes)
benchmark 1 (disclose in the 1 (disclose in the
notes to the accounts notes to the accounts
whether conditions whether conditions
are met to recognize are met to recognize
as liability/expense)*^ as liability/expense)''
allowed
forbidden 1 (liability, expense)
Intangible assets (IAS 38)
required 1 (historical cost)'^ 1 (historical cost)*^
benchmark 1 (historical cost)
allowed 1 (revalued amount)
forbidden
Hedging operations with financial instruments (IAS 39)
required
benchmark
allowed 1 (accounting
for hedging
operations is
allowed)
forbidden
p. Gairido et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 1-26 21
Financial assets (IAS 39)
required 1 (fair value, unless
under certain
circumstances,
where value at
cost will be used)
benchmark 2 (market value, 2 (market value.
value at cost value at cost
if lower than if lower than
market value)'* market value)''
allowed 1 (value at cost)
forbidden
^ Treatment included in IAS 38, Intangible Assets.
^ Treatment in the original IAS 10, Contingencies and events after the balance sheet date.
'^ Treatment in the original IAS 9, Research and development costs.
^ Treatment in the original IAS 25, Accounting for investments.
Appendix B. lASC disclosure requirements
Disclosure
requirements Stage A Stage B Stage C
Compliance No explicit
with IAS (IAS 1) regulation.
Statement of source Required,
and application
of funds (IAS 7)
Cash flow Not required.
statement (IAS 7)
Segment Listed companies
reporting and companies
(LAS 14) with significant
activity segments
must disclose
segmented
information.
No explicit
regulation.
Not required.
Required.
Listed companies
and companies
with significant
activity segments
must disclose
segmented
information.
Companies
applying IAS,
must do so
completely and
state so in the
annual accounts.
Not required.
Required.
Companies with
quoted shares or
debenture loans
must disclose
segmented
information
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Disclosure
requirements
for segment
reporting
(IAS 14)
Information on
each segment
will be provided
with regard to
sales, income,
assets, and the
basis of
intersegment
transfer pricing.
Information on
each segment
will be provided
with regard to
sales, income,
assets, and the
basis of
intersegment
transfer pricing.
One of the bases for
segmentation is primary,
the other is secondary.
The following should
be disclosed for each
primary segment:
• revenue (extemal
and intersegment
shown separately);
• operating result
(before interest and taxes);
• carrying amount
of segment assets;
• carrying amount
of segment liabilities;
• cost to acquire
property, plant,
equipment, and
intangibles;
• depreciation
and amortization;
• noncash expenses
other than depreciation;
• share of profit or loss
of equity and joint
venture investments;
• the basis of
intersegment pricing
The following should
be disclosed for each
secondary segment:
• revenue (extemal and
intersegment shown
separately);
• carrying amount
of segment assets;
• cost to acquire
property, plant,
equipment,
and intangibles;
• the basis of
intersegment pricing.
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Financial
instruments
(IAS 32)
No explicit
regulation.
No explicit
regulation.
EPS (IAS 33) No explicit
regulation.
No explicit
regulation.
Disclosures:
• Terms and
conditions.
• Interest rate risk
(repricing and
maturity dates,
fixed and floating
interest rates,
maturities).
• Credit risk
(maximum exposure
and significant
concentrations).
• Fair values of
financial instruments.
• Assets below
fair value.
• Hedges of anticipated
transactions.
Required.
Appendix C. Some distance measures different from the Euclidean one
Let Z be a J X 1 vector defined as:
Z = (z7,...,zy) = {xi -yi,...,xj-yj)
where A'=(x,,X2,.
.
.,xj), F=(>'i,>'2,. .
.,yj)
The distance or norm for any pair X,Y \s defined as:
\Ai = {\zir+...^\zjr)p\1Ip p>l
where
|
H] denotes the absolute value. For different values of p, we get different distance
measures or vector norms (see Lancaster & Tismenetsky, 1985); specifically for/? = 2, the
Euclidean distance is obtained. Other alternative well-known measures are:
l.||Z||,=|z,| + ... + |zJ
2. ||Z||^ = max{|zi|,...,|z,|}
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Next, the above measures are applied to our sample obtaining the following results:
Stages General Balance sheet Income statement
P-^ P-^ oc p=\ P^ OC' p=\ p^oo
A-C 64 33 40 20 24 13
B-C 23 10 18 8 5 2
A-D 72 38 46 24 26 14
B-D 39 15 30 12 9 3
C-D 28 9 22 7 6 2
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Abstract
Since 1990, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) has required Japanese firms to disclose
segment data in annual financial statements. Using a survey instrument, we examine whether Japanese
analysts find these segment disclosures to be useftil. Our study finds that analysts perceive that
segment data aid them in forecasting consolidated sales and net income. However, results also show
that analysts are concerned that Japanese firms do not define segments meaningfully and consistently
and are arbitrary in the allocation of common costs. Further, the analysts do not believe that the
usefulness of segment data improves when it is audited. These results have implications for investors
in Japanese stocks and accounting policy bodies, such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Segment disclosures; Japanese financial reporting; Financial analysts; Segment reporting
1. Introduction
Consolidated financial statements involve the aggregation of information about various
subunits of the firm into a single financial report. Often, subunits of a firm are in different
industries with significantly different sales and eamings growth rates. Because the process of
aggregation can hinder analysts in their evaluation of a firm's performance, many countries
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require firms to provide financial information about their subunits (segment data). Studies
show, however, that firms are generally opposed to disclosing segment data because they are
concemed that these disclosures provide proprietary information to their competitors.
The practices of international firms regarding segment reporting have come under much
criticism because users believe that firms disclose only coarse segment data. Saudagaran and
Meek (1996), for example, state that while five intemational organizations and 30 countries
have strongly endorsed segment reporting, the quality of those required disclosures has been
less than adequate. Japanese firms' opposition to disclosing segment data has been widely
reported in the academic and business press (see Ozu & Gray, 1997). For several decades,
Japanese firms refused to list their stocks on American exchanges because they opposed
providing the segment data required of them by the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Not until 1990, and only with much debate, was the Japanese Ministry of Finance
(MOF) able to mandate some degree of segment reporting for Japanese firms.
Examining the quality of segment information disclosed in Japanese financial statements is
important to US and global investors that have made significant investments in Japanese
firms. According to the US Department of Treasury, purchases and sales of Japanese stocks
by US investors amounted to US$153 billion in 1997. The total value ofUS direct investment
(private enterprises owned or controlled by US investors) in Japan amounted to US$35.6
trillion as of December 31, 1997.' The quality of segment disclosures in Japanese financial
statements also has implications for accounting policy bodies such as the US SEC. Under the
Integrated Disclosure System (IDS), annual reports and filings of Japanese firms with the
SEC may contain segment data generated according to the Japanese MOF rules, not US
GAAP. Therefore, two important policy issues for the SEC are whether US firms are at a
competitive disadvantage because Japanese firms are permitted to list their stocks on US
exchanges using a set of rules that allow fewer disclosures of segment information than
GAAP does and whether US investors are being provided with misleading segment data to
base significant investment allocation decisions. Saudagaran and Biddle (1994) conclude that
the SEC's segment reporting rules do, in fact, create a double standard."" Our study throws
light on these issues by examining the usefulness of Japanese segment data as required by the
Japanese MOF.
Our main findings are that Japanese financial analysts perceive that Japanese segment
data contain useful information for forecasting consolidated sales and net income.
However, results also show that Japanese analysts believe that significant problems exist
regarding Japanese segment reporting. Specifically, analysts are concemed that firms do not
meaningfully and consistently define segments. Also, analysts do not find that the auditing
of segment data makes it more useful. The remainder of this study is organized as follows:
a summary of relevant literature followed by a description of the data, empirical results,
and conclusion.
' See The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998 published by Hoover Business Press.
" Because US accounting standards on segment reporting are the most stringent standards in the world
(Radebaugh & Gray, 1997), US companies are said to be at a competitive disadvantage when compared to
Japanese firms.
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2. Review of the literature
2.7. International studies on the usefulness ofsegment reporting
Several studies have found that segment data in US financial statements provide investors
with useful information. Baldwin (1984) and Fried, Schiff, and Sondhi (1992) found that US
analysts' forecasts of consolidated net income significantly increased in accuracy following
the disclosure of business segment data by US firms. Collins (1976) has also shown that time
series forecasts of consolidated net income of US firms improved with the use of business
segment data. Similarly, Balakrishnan, Harris, and Sen (1990) found that geographic segment
disclosures by US firms have information content.
There has been little empirical work on the usefulness ofsegment disclosures offirms in other
countries. Emmanuel and Gray (1977) found that segments are defined very "coarsely" by UK
firms, making segment performance comparisons among different firms nearly impossible. On
the other hand, Prodhan (1986), Prodhan and Harris (1989), and Roberts (1989) found that
segment disclosures of UK firms do contain usefiil information. Aitken, Czemkowski, and
Hooper (1994) examined business segment disclosures of Australian firms and reported that
these disclosures have information content. This study contributes to the literature by providing
some of the first evidence on the usefulness of Japanese segment disclosures.
2.2. US pressure to require Japanese segment reporting
For Japanese firms, segment reporting constituted a major hurdle when it came to listing on
US exchanges (Balakrishnan et al., 1990)."^ Japanese firms believed that disclosing segment
information would place them at a competitive disadvantage (Balakrishnan et al., 1990; Choi &
Stonehill, 1982). Whether to allow Japanese firms to list on US exchanges was a source of
conflict between the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which stood to gain
substantial revenues from Japanese firms that would list their stocks on its exchange. Efforts
were made to allay the fears ofJapanese companies about the information that would be required
in segment disclosures in order to entice them to list. A US law firm retained by the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce advised the Chamber that segment reporting did not require sensitive
disclosures about individual products and profits in different areas (Balakrishnan et al, 1990).'*
In 1982, the SEC, under pressure from investors, adopted the IDS for foreign firms. Under IDS, several
regulations with regard to listing were relaxed. Foreign firms wishing to list on US exchanges could, for example,
satisfy listing requirements by disclosing segment data mandated under their own GAAP.
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce retained a prominent US law firm (Sullivan and Cromwell) to examine
whether listing and capital issue requirements in the US would be relaxed for Japanese firms. Balakrishnan et al.
quote a 1985 report {Report to the Keidanren on Segment Reporting by Japanese Companies) to the Chamber
from Mr. Grant of Sullivan and Cromwell who states that:
Industry segment reporting does not require disclosing profits by individual products, and U.S. companies
have shown the way in combining different operations into broad segments which do not disclose sensitive
information. Geographic segment reporting does not require showing profit in different areas that can be
compared when products are manufactured in Japan and sold abroad.
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The Japanese MOF began to consider mandating segment reporting for Japanese firms once the
Chamber of Commerce reassured them that segment disclosures did not have to be "fine"
(Balakrishnan et al, 1990).
The SEC, at the 1987 MOF-SEC Round Table Conference, pressured the MOF to require
segment disclosures by Japanese firms. In the late 1980s, the US demand for segment
disclosures from Japanese firms was a key item that was included in the Japan-US Structural
Impediments Initiative. The objective of this Initiative was to search for ways in which the US
trade deficit could be reduced. Ozu and Gray (1997) argue that the MOF was persuaded by the
developments. Also, despite widespread opposition by Japanese firms, the MOF mandated
reporting ofbusiness segment data for all years beginning on or after April 1, 1990. Because of
the strong opposition by Japanese firms and because of reassurances that reported segment
data did not have to be "fine," it appears important to test whether or not Japanese segment
reports do, in fact, contain usefiil information for users of Japanese financial statements.
2.3. Incremental segment disclosures by Japanese firms
The MOF began requiring that segment data be disclosed in 1990, with increasing
disclosure requirements in 1995 and 1997. For fiscal years starting April 1, 1990, disclosure
of sales and income by segments was required along with export sales. Audits of segment
data were required for fiscal years beginning April 1, 1993. Assets, depreciation, and capital
expenditures by business segment had to be disclosed for fiscal years beginning April 1,
1995. Most recently, disclosure of sales, operafing income, and asset investment by
geographic region was required for fiscal years starting April 1, 1997."
In defining a segment, the Japanese standard states that firms should consider the type of
product, manufacturing process, and marketing regions.^ Disclosure of segment information
is required if (a) segment sales (including intergroup sales) exceeds 10% of total firm sales or
(b) if segment operating revenue (loss) is greater than 10% of total firm operating revenue
(loss) fi"om all segments having operating revenues (losses).^ If export sales exceed 10% of
total sales, such sales must be reported, but not by country. Once specific segments are
identified, the firm must continue to report data on these segments for a while— the Japanese
standard does not state a definite period of time that this reporting must continue.
Compared to US standards, Japanese standards require fewer segment disclosures:
Japanese firms are not required to report major customers by segments and Japanese
standards require only 50% of total sales/operating income be shown by reportable segments;
^ There was much stronger opposition by Japanese firms to disclosing geographical segment information (Ozu
& Gray, 1997). Japanese firms, therefore, were not required to make geographical segment disclosures immediately.
'' The discussion summarizes segment-reporting rules under the Securities and Exchange Law set by the MOF
in consultation with Business Accounting Deliberation Council.
^ Finns are allowed to combine outside sales with intragroup sales and transfers in applying these conditions.
The firm may use a different measure of profit or loss instead of operating profit or loss in cases where the former
is a better indicator of firm performance. The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) has
issued several guidelines for the preparation and audit of segment information. We thank Fumito Kogomori of the
JICPA for his information.
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the US standard is 75%. Because Japanese standards contain only a 50% standard, their
financial statements are able to disclose a fewer number of segments. Japanese and US firms
also differ in their practice of disclosing segment data. Unlike US firms, which report
segments by organizational structure, Japanese firms generally disclose segment data
according to major industry grouping that can result in far greater aggregation of financial
data and loss of information content.^ Finally, of concem is whether the quality of the audit
function in Japan is as high as that in the US. Low-quality monitoring by auditors increases
managerial opportunities for "garbling" of segment data.
If segment reports of Japanese firms contain "garbled" data, the affected parties would
include investors, creditors, and accounting policy bodies such as the US SEC, which permits
Japanese firms to list on US exchanges with segment data mandated by the MOF. For these
parties, an important question is whether or not segment disclosures of Japanese firms have
information content.
2.4. Prior surveys on segment reporting in Japan
In 1987, while the MOF was in the process of developing segment reporting standards, it
sent a survey to 683 companies (preparers of financial statements) and 219 financial
institutions (users of financial statements) requesting their opinions on segment reporting.
Seventy-six percent of the firms responding were opposed to having a segment reporting
standard because the firms believed that segment reporting would reveal sensitive information
to their competitors, thus putting them at a competitive disadvantage, especially with regard
to overseas trading.^ The greatest opposition by firms was to the disclosure of geographical
segment data, which firms believed would lead to allegations of dumping practices and
increased transfer-pricing taxation. Firms also argued that requiring simultaneous disclosures
by both line of business and geographic area would be too demanding on them. Despite
overwhelming firm opposition, the MOF under pressure fi"om mainly the US (see Section 2.2)
mandated segment reporting for years beginning on or after April 1, 1990.
The MOF survey revealed several areas of conflict between financial statement preparers
and users. In contrast to the widespread opposition by companies to reporting segment data,
96% ofusers stated that segment information should be mandated. There were also differences
on important issues relating to segment definition and allocations of common costs.
On the issue of how segments should be defined, most firms (60%) responded that
judgement of directors should be an important factor in defining reportable segments. Users,
however, were concerned that segments may not be defined meaningfiilly if segment
definition was based on management's discretion. Users were concerned that comparability
across firms would be lost. About 50% of the users wanted the MOF to require that the
Japanese SIC (JSIC) code be used as a basis for business segmentation. Similarly, on the issue
Under SFAS 131, US firms use a management approach that requires firms to disclose data according to
segments used in decision making by the chief operating officer.
Other reasons cited in the survey were that it was costly to produce segment information and that it may force
some managers to focus on the short-term.
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of geographic segments, 50% of the responding firms wanted the MOF to require geographic
segment data for two broad geographic segments: Japan and overseas. By contrast, 52% of
the users surveyed believed that geographic segment data should be provided by country and
region. Users in the survey also expressed the concern that the allocation of common costs
would make segment information less meaningfiil.
Ozu and Gray (1997) showed that, throughout this debate, the MOF had to confront
dramatically different views of users and preparers on important issues relating to segment
reporting. While users were constantly concerned about consistency and comparability, the
MOF realized that firms were very hesitant to disclose any segment information whatsoever. In
the end, the MOF took the side of the firms on three important issues, namely geographic
segment reporting, how a segment is to be defined, and how common costs are to be allocated.
On the issue of geographic segment data, the MOF compromised with firms and required
that firms need only disclose geographic data by region for fiscal years beginning on or after
April 1, 1997. Therefore, from 1990 to 1997, firms had to report sales in only two categories:
those made in Japan and those overseas— hardly data rich in information content. The MOF
also concluded that the use of the JSIC code would make segment reporting too rigid and less
meaningful when compared to the approach that took into account management's judgment.
On the issue of allocating common costs, the MOF decided that common costs could be
allocated among segments in a way that directors regard most appropriate. ^° Since segment
reporting went into effect, our study examines Japanese financial analysts' views on these
issues in an attempt to gauge if the concerns expressed in the 1987 MOF study still exist.
hi July 1991, following the adoption of segment reporting, the Commercial Law Center
(CLC) surveyed 970 listed Japanese firms on segment reporting practices used by these
firms. '^ Two problems were immediately noted: First, because 3\% of the 548 firms that
responded did not disclose any segment data, it was apparent that many Japanese firms were
hesitant to disclose segment data and were able to avoid doing so by inappropriately using the
discretion given to management under the standards for identifying business segments (Ozu
& Gray, 1997). Second, the survey found that among the firms that did disclose segment data,
about 55% did not define their segments meaningfully. However, Ozu and Gray (1997) state
that it would be premature to conclude from this initial survey that segment reporting in Japan
has failed. They believe that Japanese firms will eventually advance and disclose meaningfiil
segment data in the fiiture.
Our study examines the usefulness of segment data 7 years after the CLC study. It may be
that in the 7 years since the 1991 survey, Japanese firnis may have overcome their initial
hesitancy about disclosing meaningful segment data. Our study differs from the 1991 CLC
study in two other significant ways: First, unlike the CLC study, which surveyed firms, we
survey financial analysts (users). Second, in 1991, not all aspects of the segment reporting
standard were in effect. In contrast, our survey incorporates views of analysts regarding
"new" segment disclosures not required to be reported until 1995 and 1997.
Alternatively, rather than trace costs to segments, Japanese firms can choose to disclose the total common
costs in a separate column.
The CLC is a research corporation that collects data on issues relating to commercial law and justice.
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3. Survey data
In October 1998, surveys were mailed to all Japanese chartered financial analysts (CFAs)
who were listed as members of the AIMR. The AIMR was selected because there is no
comparable institute of financial analysts in Japan and because obtaining membership as a
chartered financial analyst is considered presdgious by Japanese analysts. Questionnaires
were sent in English and Japanese. Of the 170 quesfionnaires mailed, 53 responses (31%)
were returned. Of these, three were received in Japanese. The survey contained 1 5 questions
that had to be rated by the analysts on a ordinal scale from 1 to 5. The scale also included the
response "0," "Do not know." There were also three open-ended questions and concluded by
asking several biographical-type questions such as the number of years of experience as an
analyst and a description of firms the analysts followed.
Fifteen responses came firom Japanese financial analysts that were employed by foreign
financial institutions, such as Merrill Lynch (hereafter foreign company analysts) and the
remaining 38 responses were from analysts employed by Japanese firms, such as Nomura
Securities (hereafter domestic company analysts).'" A distinction is made between these
groups because conversations with analysts in Japan suggested that these two groups were
likely to differ in their use of segment data (see also Secfion 4.6). Conroy, Fukuda, and Harris
(1997) also argue that analysts employed by foreign (Western) and domestic securities houses
in Japan differ in expertise and professional development. They argue that foreign securities
houses in Japan attract the best Japanese analysts because these houses pay higher salaries.
This suggests that foreign company analysts are likely to be more efficient in their use of
segment data for forecasting. However, Conroy et al. also point out that domestic securities
houses have closer ties with Japanese firms. They find that domestic company analysts are
able to exploit their informational advantage by producing superior forecasts. To the extent
that domestic company analysts have access to "inside" information about firms' segments,
their use of publicly available segment data for forecasting is likely to be less. From a policy
perspective, it is important to know if domestic company analysts have an unfair informa-
tional advantage over their foreign company counterparts.'"
The mean number of Japanese financial analysts employed in the survey respondent's
institution was 20 and 45 for foreign and domestic company analysts, respectively. Domestic
and foreign company analysts in our sample have about the same number of years of
experience— about eight. Foreign company analysts responded that they follow an average
of 30 firms a year in one country per region, while their domestic company counterparts
follow an average of 24 firms in three countries per region. The survey also showed that firms
' The domestic company-analyst group includes a few surveys where the analyst did not indicate the
institution of employment. Deleting these observations from our sample did not change our results.
A decreased use of segment data in annual financial statements by domestic company analysts is consistent
with either of the following explanations: (1) domestic company analysts have inside access to segment data and/
or (2) domestic company analysts are less efficient in their use of segment data. Our data, however, do not allow us
to determine which is the explanation.
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that were followed by the analysts come from a wide range of industries and vary in size and
degree of diversification.
4. Analyses of results
4.1. The usefulness ofsegment data for predicting consolidated sales and net income
All the tables in this section show the percentage of domestic and foreign company
analysts that selected one of the six possible responses (0-5). In addition, the means and
standard deviations of the responses from analysts of each group as well as both groups
combined are presented. Because market share and sales growth are most important to
Japanese investors, we first examine whether analysts find segment data to be useftil for
forecasting consolidated sales.
Table 1 (Panel A) shows that both groups of analysts (foreign and domestic company) find
segment data to be useful for predicting consolidated sales. Both groups consider segment
sales and segment operating income to be most useful for making sales forecasts. Specifically,
by combining the "useftil" categories— i.e., 3 (useful), 4 (very useftil), and 5 (extremely
useftil)— we find that 79% (87%) and 69% (86%) of domestic (foreign) company analysts
find segment sales and operating income data to be useftil for predicting consolidated sales.
While export sales is considered to be useful (45% of domestic and 74% of foreign company
analysts), it is ranked last in terms of predictive ability by both groups.
However, Panel A also shows that fewer domestic company analysts find segment data
useful compared to foreign company analysts. This might be because foreign company
analysts have more experience in the use of segment data or that domestic company analysts
are more skeptical about the usefulness of segment data. This point is discussed in Section
4.2. Panel A also indicates that domestic and foreign company analysts differ most in the way
they rate the useftilness of export sales (45% vs. 74%) and assets and depreciation and capital
expenditures (57% vs. 80%).
Table 1 (Panel B) shows that both groups find segment data useful for predicting
consolidated income. Segment operating income is considered to be the most important
predictor of future consolidated profits {11% of domesfic and 93% of foreign company
analysts). As before, fewer domestic company analysts rate all types of segment information
to be useftil in forecasting consolidated net income when compared to foreign company
analysts. Also, consistent with Table 1 (Panel A), domestic and foreign company analysts
differ most in the way they rank the usefulness of export sales (39% and 74%, respectively)
and assets, depreciation, and capital expenditures (62% and 86%, respectively).
We examine whether the mean responses of foreign company analysts were significantly
higher than corresponding mean responses of domestic company analysts. Our univariate tests
[parametric / and/or nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW)] shown in Table 1
(Panels A and B) reject that there are no statistically significant differences in the use of (1)
segment assets, capital, and depreciation expenditures and (2) export sales by foreign and
domestic company analysts for predicting consolidated sales and income. Table 1 (Panels A
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and B) also presents results of a multivariate test of differences in mean responses of foreign
and domestic company analysts for predicting consolidated sales (Wilks' X= 0.83 1 , F= 2. 1 79,
Prob.>F= 0.086) and consolidated income (Wilks' X= 0.849, F= 2.088, Prob.>F= 0.097).'^
Overall, results show that segment data are useful for predicting sales and net income.
Another finding of this study is that more foreign company analysts rely on segment data when
compared to domestic company analysts. The percentage (about 60%) of domestic company
analysts who find segment data useful (ex-post) is also not as high as the percentage (about
96%; ex-ante) who indicated on the MOF 1987 survey that they thought they would find
segment information useful. In Section 4.2, several reasons why domestic company analysts
may have been disappointed with segment disclosures of Japanese firms are examined.
4.2. Segment definition and common cost allocation
Table 2 (Panel A) presents important issues raised by Japanese analysts in the 1987 MOF
survey. As discussed in Section 2.4, those analysts were most concerned about segments being
meaningfully and consistently defined and common costs being arbitrarily allocated among
segments. Combining the "agreement" categories— agree, 4 and absolutely agree, 5—we
find that 67% (73%) of foreign company analysts agree that Japanese firms define industry
segments (Japanese and export sales) consistently from year to year. While most foreign
company analysts agree that there is consistency in segment definition, only 54% of these
analysts agree that firms trace financial data to business segments objectively and a
disappointing 43% agree that companies define export sales meaningfully. Further, only
20% of foreign company analysts disagree that Japanese firms deliberately misallocate
common costs to segments.
The survey results show that domestic company analysts are even more skeptical of the
integrity of segment disclosures than are foreign company analysts. Domestic company
analysts who agree that firms are consistent in their definition of segments and export sales are
less than half the proportion of foreign company analysts. Less than one-third as many
domestic company analysts agree that firms trace items objectively to segments as compared to
foreign company analysts. Twenty-five percent more foreign than domestic company analysts
agree that firms are consistent in their definition of Japanese and export sales. Finally, 29% of
domesfic company analysts disagree that firms deliberately misallocate common costs.
Table 2 (Panel A) presents univariate tests (/ and MWW) that show that there are statistically
significant differences between the two groups on questions relating to (1) consistency of
segment definition over time and (2) objectivity used in tracing sales, operating income, etc., to
segments. Table 2 (Panel A) also shows results of the multivariate test of differences in mean
responses of foreign and domestic company analysts (Wilks' X= 0.780, F= 2.594,
Prob.>F= 0.038). These results support and provide an explanation for findings in Section
Unlike the univariate tests above, our multivariate procedures jointly test for significant differences in the
use of any of the segment data sources by foreign and domestic company analysts. The test statistic used is Wilks'
X, which for two groups has an "exact" F distribution with p(n —p— \}df, where/? is the number of variables and
n the total number of observations (Johnson & Wichem, 1982).
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Table 3
Disclosures that would make segment reporting more useful: domestic vs. foreign company analysts
Domestic company analysts (« = 38)
How useful has the
following information
been to you in predicting:
Somewhat Very Extremely
Do not Useless useful Useful useful useful
know(O) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Mean S.D.
Sales?
* Disclosure of sales, operating
income, and asset investment by
geographic region
Net income?
• Disclosure of sales, operating
income, and asset investment by
geographic region
• How useful would the disclosure of
sales by major customers be?
30
n
43 27
73
2.892 1.149
I
..
I
32n
28 32 27 5 2.865 1.228
I 6. I
3 69
1 1 n
3 20 61 8 3.500 1.202
* Significant at the .01 level.
** Significant at the .05 level.
4.1 that a smaller proportion of domestic company analysts found segment data to be useful.
The data indicate that analyses of segment trends as well as comparability across firms, both
major issues mentioned in the 1987 MOF survey, still pose problems for analysts.
4.5. Utility of audit function with regard to segment data disclosures
In Hght of the findings above, an interesting question is what are analysts' views on the
usefulness of audited segment data. Because the audit of segment data was not required
until April 1, 1993, a unique opportunity for examining the useftilness of the audit function
was possible.'^
Combining "useful" categories (survey responses 3,4, and 5), Table 2 (Panel B) shows
that only 27% (40%) of foreign company analysts view audited data as useful for forecasting
consolidated sales (net income). Audited data have even lesser utility to domestic company
' Because no new segment disclosures were mandated in that year, we ask analysts to rate the useftilness of
the audit ftinction independent of the firms' segment data disclosures.
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Foreign company analysts (« = 1 5)
Both groups Tests of
(« = 53) differences in means
Do not Somewhat Very Extremely
know Useless useful Useful useful usefiil MWW
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. /-value value
53
7 7
7 20
1 1
''
33 20
86
33
40
" ''
33 13 27
73
80
20 33 47
100
3.133 1.356 2.962 1.204 0.61 0.45
3.333 1.291 3.000 1.252 1.20 0.98
4.267 0.799 3.717 1.150 2.70* 2.21**
analysts for predicting consolidated net income and only 32% (29%) of domestic company
analysts view audited data as usefiil for forecasting consolidated sales (net income). Both
groups of analysts, therefore, agree that the requirement that segment data be audited did not
generally make it more useful for predictive purposes. ^^ This finding suggests that auditors
are not perceived by Japanese analysts as effective in preventing the "garbling" of segment
data documented in Section 4.2, which, coupled with an infant segment reporting standard,
could result in very negative results for investors and creditors relying on these data.
To explore conditions facing analysts, we asked them three open-ended questions. Because
fewer analysts responded to our open-ended questions and because there were no readily
apparent differences between domestic and foreign company analysts on these issues, we
combine responses of both groups and report only on the more significant findings. ' ^ The
first open-ended question that the Japanese analysts were asked was "what did they believe
could be done to improve segment disclosures of Japanese firms." An overwhelming 76% of
'^ Differences in means of the two groups are not statistically significant using both t and MWW tests.
'^ Percentages do not sum to 100 on the open-ended questions because only significant reasons are reported.
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Table 4
Usefulness of alternative sources of segment information; domestic vs. foreign company analysts
How useftil have you
found the following as
a source of segment
information?
Domestic company analysts
Prior to 1991 (n=38) 1991 and after (n = 38)
Do not Somewhat Very Extremely Do not Somewhat Very Extremely
Know Useless useful Useful usefijl useful know Useless usefiil Useful useful useful
(0) (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
. Voluntap. firm
disclosures
People within
the firm
Trade journals
29
I I
II 11
25
I I
II 14
SO
I I
22 28
i
"1
30 24 5
1 59 t
28
i I
25
t
22
53
6
t
11
11
1
11
1 22 t
16
I I
5 11
17
i I
6 11
46
30
I I
46
t 76 t
45
28
1 I
39 6
1 73 r
6
1 1
22 6
t 28 t
analysts (/7 = 25) believe that segment data would be of greater use if management defined
segments more meaningfully and consistently. Of these, 16% suggest that Japanese firms use
the approach of IAS 14, while 12% suggest that the firms adopt the US approach by defining
segments according to the firm's internal structure (i.e., SFAS 131). Interestingly, 12% of
analysts believe that segment reporting would improve if stockholders would increase
pressure on management to report quality data.
The second open-ended question that Japanese analysts were asked was to "describe
characteristics of Japanese firms that the analysts believe intentionally distort segment data."
Only 29% of the analysts {n = \l) believe that Japanese firms do not intentionally distort
segment data. Of the 71% that do, 42% believe the reason is to garble/hide a firm's true
economic condition, while another 12% believe the reason is that traditional Japanese firms
with "old style" management intentionally do not report quality segment data.
While the discussion above suggests that Japanese analysts are less than satisfied with
segment disclosures, they also believe that there are certain types of firms that do report
reliable segment data. The third open-ended question asked analysts to "describe character-
istics of Japanese firms that they believe report segment data reliably." Analysts (;7 = 38)
believe that these firms are those with (1) significant overseas operations (34%), (2)
significant international investor following (34%), and (3) a concern for their stockholders'
interests (18%).
4.4. Additional disclosures that would make segment data more useful
The survey had two questions where analysts were given the opportunity to suggest (on a
scale of 0-5) changes for improving the quality of segment reporting.
Table 3 shows that both groups of analysts believe that when geographic data are disclosed
it will be highly useful (73% of domestic and 86% of foreign company analysts). The analysts
rank this item's usefulness as high as that of segment operating income and sales (see Table 1,
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Foreign company analysis
Prior to 1991 (n=\5 1991 and after (n = 15)
Do not Somewhat Very Extremely Do not Somewhat Very Extremely
know Useless useful Useftil useful useful know Useless useful Useful useful useful
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
34 27 14
i
"1
1 ~l 1 "1 i i
33 20
46
14 33
1
13
t
33
20
J
7
20
7
27
20 52
t
7
66
7
_J
40
t
33
1
13
27
"1
3321
1
13
33
"1
7
i
7
40
"1
20
i
26
73
"1
7
33
7
27
13
33
1
20 7 7
"1 r
11 13 13
"1
t 40
_J t 40 _J
Panels A and B). While the disclosure of geographic segment data has become mandatory
since our survey, there is no requirement that Japanese firms disclose sales by major
customer. Combining "agreement" categories (survey responses 4 and 5), Table 3 shows
that 89% of domestic and 100% of foreign company analysts overwhelmingly agree that
disclosure by customer would be very useful.'^
4.5. Usefulness of alternative information for predicting consolidated sales and income
Beaver (1989) states that an important role for accounting information is to preempt and
substitute for potentially more costly information available in alternative sources. Our results
indicate that this is not the case. Instead, the analysts we surveyed often turn to information
available from other sources. Segment disclosures appear to be stimulating additional
inquiries by analysts rather than being a substitute for them (see Table 4).
For example, combining "useful" categories (survey responses 3, 4, and 5), we find that
59% (33%) of domestic (foreign) company analysts relied on voluntary firm disclosures prior
to segment reporting being mandated. This increased to 76% (66%) following segment
reporting. This result also was true for other forms of alternative information available to the
analysts.'^ Table 4 shows that, of the different sources of alternative information available,
'^ With regard to usefulness of sales disclosures by major customer, the difference in means of the two groups
is statistically significant. However, with regard to usefulness of geographic segment disclosures, there is no
statistically significant difference in means using both t and MWW tests.
An interesting question for future work is to examine whether the additional inquiries are from analysts
merely seeking management's clarification of "noisy" segment disclosures in financial statements or whether the
inquiries represent analysts' demands, stimulated by segment disclosures, for "new" information. It would also be
interesting to examine the specific types of information that are sought by analysts from alternative sources.
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Table 5
Extent of agreement regarding competitive disadvantage and Japanese segment disclosures: domestic vs. foreign
company anahsts
By revealing sensitive
information, segment Domestic company analysts («
=
= 38)
reporting puts Japanese Do not Absolutely Absolutely
firms at a competitive know disagree Disagree Neutral Agree agree
disadvantage with regard to : (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Mean S.D.
Other Japanese f i rms
11
58
15
16
2.1848
i
50
i i
16 1.136
US firms 13 13
T 58
45
t
13 13 3
t 16 t
2.079 1.260
Significant at the .10 level.
analysts find information from voluntary disclosures to be most useful, then information from
people within the firm, and lastly information from trade journals or other sources.
4.6. Determinants of the use ofsegment data by analysts
We attempted to evaluate if analysts found segment information to be more useful for
certain types of firms. Overall, survey results (not shown) indicate that no one type of firm
was identified by Japanese analysts. Foreign company analysts view segment data to be most
useful for firms with foreign ownership and numerous intemational stock exchange listings.
This result is to be expected since analysts employed by foreign institutions are more likely to
emphasize the intemational characteristics of the firm. Domestic company analysts, however,
rate firm size and horizontal diversification to be the most important firm characteristics for
segment information to be useful. These results also suggest that foreign and domestic
company analysts have different "biases" that affect informafion use and support separate
data analyses for the two groups.
?4.7. Do segment disclosures put Japanese firms at a competitive disadvantage
Finally, we asked analysts whether segment disclosures would place Japanese firms at a
compefitive disadvantage. As discussed, the 1987 MOF survey showed that Japanese
managers were very hesitant to disclose segment data because they believed their firms
would be at a competitive disadvantage as a result of those disclosures.
Financial analysts, however, did not appear to share in this view. Combining "disagree-
ment" categories (survey responses 1 and 2), Table 5 shows that 58% (46%) of domesfic
(foreign) company analysts disagree that Japanese firms that disclose segment data would be
disadvantaged with regard to other Japanese firms. Interestingly, Japanese managers in the
MOF survey were most concerned about their competitiveness with regard to firms overseas.
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Foreign company analysts (« = 15) Both groups,(« = 53)
Tests of differences
in means
Do not Absolutely
know disagree
(0) (1)
Disagree
(2)
Neutral
(3)
Absolutely
Agree agree
(4) (5) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. /-value
MWW
value
46
20
27
34
2.800
2.867
1.207
1.356
2.358
2.302
1.178
1.324
1.70*
1.94*
13
13
46
33
33
i i
27 7
7 20
1.45
1.53
Survey results, however, show that analysts do not appear to distinguish between overseas
and Japanese firms on this issue. Specifically, results show that the same percentage of
analysts disagrees that Japanese firms will be disadvantaged with regard to US competition."^
5. Conclusion
While there have been numerous studies on the information content of segment data of US
firms, there has been little work done on segment disclosures of firms in other countries. This
study provides some of the first evidence on the quality of segment reporting in Japan.
Japanese firms have had a long history of opposition to providing segment data. After much
debate and many compromises, the MOF approved segment reporting for Japan. However,
some have argued that the Japanese segment standard is a token enacted solely to pacify
international bodies such as the US SEC. They argue that Japanese segment data contain little
useful information for investors. Indeed, the first survey by the CLC following the introduction
of segment reporting appears to lend support to this argument. Our study contributes to the
literature by surveying Japanese financial analysts 9 years after the initial CLC survey to gauge
if users of financial statements perceive any change in the quality of segment reporting since
1991. The results of this study have important implications for global investors in Japanese
stocks and accoundng policy bodies. For these groups, we summarize our findings below.
The results of this study show that Japanese analysts have significant concerns relating to
the quality of segment data provided by Japanese firms: these analysts believe these firms do
not define their segments meaningfully and consistently; their allocation of common costs is
arbitrary; and the audit of segment data adds little to the utility of the data. Interestingly, these
Differences in means of the two groups are not statistically significant at the .05 level using both t and
MWW tests.
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are bigger concerns for analysts employed by Japanese financial institutions than analysts
employed by non-Japanese financial institutions. However, despite their concerns and
reservations, Japanese financial analysts find segment data in Japanese reports to be generally
useful for predicting consolidated sales and net income. Further, results indicate that with
new geographic disclosures, segment reporting in Japan should be of even greater usefulness
to analysts.
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1. Introduction
Research is a process by which one acquires evidence to better understand, predict, or
resolve uncertain events. In some cases, research can generate as many questions as it
answers. This discussion presents my questions as well as some of those raised by the
conference participants concerning "Are Recent Segment Disclosures of Japanese Firms
Useful?: Views of Japanese Financial Analysts" by Mande and Ortman. Specifically,
questions pertaining to the paper's motivation, research design, results, and contribution
are discussed.
2. Motivation
Mande and Ortman 's research examines the tensions created by the demand for segment
disclosures by market regulators versus firms' unwillingness to supply segment disclosures.
After reviewing the US capital market literature on the usefulness of segment disclosures,
the authors observe that there has been little empirical research on the useftalness of
segment disclosures of firms domiciled in countries other than the US. They examine the
* Tel.: +1-608-263-7979.
E-mail address: hashbaugh@bus.wisc.edu (H. Ashbaugh).
0020-7063/02/$ - see front matter © 2002 University of Illinois. All nghts reserved.
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usefulness of escalating segment disclosures required by the Japanese Ministry of Finance
(MOF) in response to the US Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) demand for
more segment information from Japanese firms listed or wanting to be listed in the US
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The authors provide a short chronology of the
increasing disclosure requirements of the MOF: the disclosure of sales and income by
segment was required as of 1990; assets, depreciation, and capital expenditures by segment
was required as of 1995; and sales, operating income, and asset investment by geographic
region was required as of 1997. They then discuss the technical differences between US
and Japanese segment disclosure requirements.
My first question is fundamental to all research: What is the relevant standard or set of
standards that mandate segment disclosures for Japanese firms? Authors are responsible for
citing the appropriate references that are necessary for readers to identify and directly
access standards or literature that formulate the research. Complete citations are necessary
for the reader to gain background knowledge that allows him or her to comprehend the
research question.
My second question relates to the chronology of the MOF segment disclosure require-
ments: Is there any evidence that Japanese firms were consistently complying with the
escalating segment disclosures demanded by the MOF during the 1990s? While the presence
of the SEC in the US market suggests that US firms, on average, prepare segment
disclosures and present such disclosures in their annual reports, the authors did not cite
any prior literature or provide evidence to suggest that Japanese firms prepare MOF segment
disclosures. The authors suggest that Japanese firms provide fewer segment disclosures than
US firms due to the technical differences in the countries' disclosure standards, but they
do not provide any empirical evidence to support this claim. If, on average, Japanese firms
are not preparing segment disclosures, i.e., not complying with the MOF requirements,
then the authors are restricted in their ability to draw any inferences on how analysts use
MOF-mandated segment disclosures. In other words, analysts' perception of usefiilness
may be due to a lack of enforcement of segment disclosure standards versus the quality of
the standards.
My last question pertains to the notion that reporting standards are taken as a whole to
produce a set of financial statements: How do the required business segment disclosures
interact with required consolidated financial reporting? Prior research suggests that Japanese
firms do not prepare consolidated financial statements unless they are listed in the US. If the
firm's operations are not geographically dispersed, then a finn's unconsolidated financial
statements are potentially the same as a business segment disclosure. Whether a firm prepares
a consolidated or unconsolidated financial statement may affect the analyst's perception of
usefulness of segment disclosures.
3. Research design
Mande and Ortman use a quasi-experimental research design to investigate the
usefulness of the MOF's segment disclosure requirements. They sent a survey to the
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population of Japanese chartered financial analysts {N= 170) who were listed as members
of the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). The authors state
that the sur\'ey contained 15 questions, and the analysts were asked to respond to each
question on an ordinal scale from one to five, zero, or "don't ioiow." The authors also
state that the survey contained three "open-ended" and several "biographical-type"
questions (specifically, they asked respondents for the number of years of experience
as an analyst and a description of firms that they follow). Fifty-three surveys were
returned. 15 from analysts employed by intemational institutions (e.g., "foreign-company
analysts"), and 38 from analysts employed by Japanese institutions (e.g., "domestic-
company analysts").
As in any quasi-experimental research design, there are issues of internal and extemal
validity that need to be controlled for, or at least considered, in developing and implementing
a survey in order to draw valid inferences from the research. Related to the intemal validity
of the research, conference participants and I questioned the reliability of the analysts'
responses and the potential biases that result from analysts self-selecting to complete the
survey. The questions in the survey were framed as "How useful has the following
information been to you in predicting. . .?" where industry segment sales, industry segment
operating income, etc., were the substitutes for information. The authors did not ask the
survey respondents to interpret "useful." Given that "usefiil" could mean anything from
"helpful" to "necessary as inputs to a prediction model," the survey responses may be
unreliable. Not knowing how the survey respondents interpret "useful" restricts the in-
ferences that can be drawn from the results.
A 31% response rate for a survey is a reasonable response rate. The authors did not,
however, indicate that they sent second requests or collected biographical data on the
respondents that would minimize the concern of biased responses due to selection threats.
It could be that the least-busy analysts, i.e., least competent analysts, responded to the survey.
A second request would have had the potential to increase the sample size, and thereby reduce
the effects of response bias. The authors could also have collected biographic data (such as
analysts' age, other certification, number of reports issued per year, whether they follow
consolidated entities) that would allow the authors to confrol for differences across analysts.
Furthermore, the authors could have considered conducting analyses on nonrespondents to
reduce concerns of validity.
Turning to extemal validity, conference participants and I had concerns related to the
motivation of analysts to complete the survey, which could minimize the generalizability of
the results. The authors did not indicate how, if at all, they motivated analysts to participate in
the survey.
Fully acknowledging that one cannot redo a survey, I suggested that the authors use
multivariate analysis to control for differences between analysts that may bias their responses.
The authors state, "more foreign company analysts rely on segment data than domestic
company analysts," "domestic company analysts are even more skeptical of the integrity of
segment disclosures than are foreign company analysts," and "foreign company analysts
view segment data to be most useful for firms with foreign ownership and foreign listings." I
think that these conclusions are invalid because the authors do not control for cross-sectional
Foreign analysts Domestic analysts
30 24
1 3
87% 79%
74% 45%
67% 32%
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differences between foreign and domestic analysts. Consider the following descriptive
statistics that the authors report:
Number of firms followed on average
Number of countries in which followed
firms are domiciled
Percent of analysts perceiving usefulness of
Segment sales
Export sales
Believe that firms are consistent in their
segment disclosures
I question whether domestic analysts follow non-Japanese firms that may not be subject to
the MOF segment disclosure requirements. It could be that firms followed by domestic
analysts are subject to other countries' segment disclosure requirements, resulting in
inconsistencies in firms' segment disclosure practices. In addition, I question whether foreign
analysts tend to follow US-listed Japanese firms that (1) prepare consolidated financial
statements, which may increase the importance of firms' segment disclosures and (2) are
regulated by the SEC, which results in greater consistency in their segment disclosures. It is
important that the authors acknowledge the potential limitations of their study due to internal
and extemal validity threats.
4. Contribution
Mande and Ortman state that their results have important implications for global investors
in Japanese stocks and for accounting standard-setting bodies. What are the implications for
investors? What are the implications for accounting standard setters? What are the implica-
tions to market regulators? It is important that the authors specifically articulate how the
results of their study affect these financial statement users.
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Abstract
This paper discusses additional issues concerning segment reporting in Japan. Specifically, it
discusses what the relevant segment reporting standards are, enforcement issues, the interaction of
consolidation standards with segment disclosures, survey biases and response rates and the
implications of segment disclosures in Japan for global investors and accounting standard setting
bodies. © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The discussant and conference participants raise several interesting issues with regard to
segment reporting by Japanese firms. These questions relate to the paper's motivation, the
research design used, as well as the results and contribution. We thank the discussant and
participants for their insights. As we see it, there are nine major issues that were raised. We
address each of these issues below.
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2. What are the relevant segment reporting standards?
The Business Accounting Deliberation Council (BADC), an advisory body to the Ministry
of Finance (MOF), mostly sets accounting standards in Japan, which is the agency that re-
gulates Japanese securities, markets. Once the BADC issues a Statement on an accounting
issue, the MOF formally includes the Statement as part of Japanese GAAP. All firms listed on
Japanese stock exchanges are subject to the Japanese Securities Exchange Law of the MOF
and are obligated to comply with the BADC's Statements. Japanese accounting standards,
therefore, are set in the public sector, in contrast to standard setting in the US. A private body
which does play a role in the implementation of Japanese GAAP is the Accounting Standards
Committee ofthe Japanese histitute ofCPAs (JICPA), which issues implementation guidelines
for the BADC's Statements. With regard to the segment-reporting standard, the BADC issued
its standard titled Reporting Standards for Financial Information by Segment on May 26,
1988. On April 1, 1995, the JIC?A issued its Report #1 : Accounting Techniquesfor Disclosing
Segment Information. These publications can be obtained from the MOF and JICPA. However,
because these are written in Japanese, we recommend that English readers obtain the trans-
lation of the standard in TRANSACC: Transnational accounting, which is edited by Dieter
Ordelheide and KPMG and published by Stockton Press, New York, 1995. We also
recommend the English reader visit the web site ~ykawamur/" locator-type="URL">http://
www2g.biglobe.ne.jp/ ~ ykawamur/, which has extensive information on Japanese account-
ing standards.
3. Lack of enforcement versus low-quality segment-reporting standards
While our results show that Japanese financial analysts perceive that there are significant
problems relating to the quality of segment data disclosed by Japanese firms, the discussant
raises the important question of whether such perception is due to the standard being
deficient or due to lack of enforcement. While we do not examine this question, we can
provide some indirect evidence that the quality of the standard by itself is of concern to
analysts. First, in our survey and in our conversations with analysts, we were informed that
the "situation" would greatly improve if Japan adopted International Accounting Standard
(IAS) #14 in place of the current Japanese segment standard. Second, we were able to
examine segment footnote data for Japanese firms on the Nikkei 225 Index for the period
1992-1994. Segment footnote data were obtained from Worldscope Disclosure databases
organized by Disclosure National Research Center, MD, USA. Our inspection of these
reports suggested to us that Japanese firms almost always disclose segment data according to
very broad industry classifications rather than Japanese SIC codes, which is what the
financial analysts wanted firms to use (see also Ozu & Gray, 1997 for more discussion on
this point). However, we acknowledge that these tests do not conclusively prove that the
segment-reporting standard by itself is deficient. Instead, as suggested by the discussant, it
may be that a lack of enforcement is the reason why Japanese analysts expressed significant
concern about the segment disclosures. This being said, we point out that the major objective
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and contribution of this study is to gauge analysts' views on segment disclosures of Japanese
firms. Regardless of whether their concerns arose because of the standard's low quality or
lack of enforcement, or a combination of both, our study's contribution is to suggest to
analysts and investors that they use great caution in utilizing the segment footnote of
Japanese firms for investment analyses.
4. How does consolidation of Japanese financial reports interact with
segment disclosures?
The discussant states that Japanese firms do not prepare consolidated statements unless
they are listed in the US. In view of this, the discussant is concemed that for Japanese firms
not listed in the US, segment data used in conjunction with unconsolidated reports would be
less useful. The discussant's comments with regard to consolidation requirements in Japan are
incorrect. Since 1977, all Japanese firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges (not just those
listed on US exchanges) are required to prepare consolidated financial statements. Speci-
fically, since 1977 (similar to US firms), all Japanese firms are required to consolidate
financial results of subsidiaries when more than 50% ownership exists. Because effective
control in Japan due to keiretsu relationships commonly exists where ownership is less than
50%, the Japanese MOF recently changed its consolidation standards. Thus, since April 1,
1999, the Japanese MOF requires consolidation where effective control exists.
A unique aspect of Japanese financial reporting is that Japanese firms present both parent-
only and consolidated financial statements. There are conflicting results on whether
consolidated financial statements have value-relevance. Ely and Pownall (2001) found that
consolidated financial statement data do not possess incremental information content beyond
those in parent-only statements. If consolidation has no value-relevance, one could argue
whether it is even possible to measure the usefulness of segment information about the con-
solidated entity. Ely and Pownall, however, only examined a small sample of 23 firms. In
contrast to the above study, Sakakibara, Yamaji, Sakurai, Shiroshita, and Fukuda (1988)
found that consolidated net income does have significant information content over and
beyond parent-only net income. To fully appreciate this result, one must understand that if
firms properly applied the equity method, parent-only and consolidated net incomes would be
identical. The fact that consolidated net income has incremental information content over
parent-only net income is because these two incomes are not identical in Japan. Indeed,
Beckman (1998) finds that Japanese firms systematically exclude losses experienced by
subsidiaries in the parent-only statements but must include them in their consolidated
statements. She shows how a comparison of parent-only with consolidated financials could
disclose the magnitude of losses excluded in parent-only statements. If a parent excluded a
loss sustained by a subsidiary belonging to a particular segment, an analysis of the segment
note in the consolidated financial statements could reveal which segment experienced that
loss. Thus, given the practice of excluding losses of subsidiaries in parent-only statements,
the analyses of consolidated statements and the accompanying segment footnote become even
more essential in Japan.
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5. Should the survey respondents have been asked to interpret the term "useful"? Does
not doing so restrict the inferences that can be drawn from the study?
In allowing respondents to select the degree of usefulness a particular type of data were in
their prediction process, we believe that respondents are defining the term useful. The survey
clearly states the particular circumstances under which we wanted respondents to assess the
usefuhiess of several distinct data: in their process of predicting consolidated sales and net
income. We believe we did provide respondents with the opportunity to define the term
"useful" in regard to predicting consolidated sales and net income by allowing them to select
five levels of usefulness as well as "I don't know." We agree that different individuals may
define "extremely useful" differently with regard to their prediction process, but the alter-
native, as we see it, would have been to include in the questionnaire "our" definition of each
degree of usefulness and possibly provide an illustration of each degree of usefulness as it
pertains to the predicting ofconsolidated sales and net income. Analysts sent the questionnaire,
we believe, would have received this negatively. They might not agree with our definitions
and/or illustrations of each degree ofusefulness and either find responding to the questionnaire
confusing or just decide not to respond at all. Lastly, it may be that a 3 1% response rate would
smooth out, on the average, any differences in respondents' perceptions of the term "useful."
6. Is nonresponse bias a significant problem for the study?
Compared to other studies, a 31% response rate is extremely high. Most published survey
studies have less than a 20% response rate. Therefore, we believe that, relatively speaking,
nonresponse bias is a less significant problem for this study. Because of the distance between
Japan and the US, follow-up requests to stimulate a higher response rate are more difficult than
for domestic studies. Extreme time differences make calling a problem. There is always a
language problem, especially with the domestic company analysts. Reply envelopes must have
Japanese postage that is difficult to obtain in the US. In summary, geographic, time, mailing,
and language differences make follow-up requests very difficult. We did separate early replies
from later replies and no statistical difference in replies existed between the two groups.
7. Should more biographical data have been requested to help resolving the nonresponse
bias issue?
To ensure a high response rate, we decided to limit the questionnaire to one page (both
sides). The envelope received by potential respondents only contained a short cover letter, a
one-page (both sides) questionnaire, and a self-addressed, stamped, return envelope. We had
hoped potential respondents would favorably welcome such an approach and our response
rate clearly indicates that. We had to make a decision regarding what were the most critical
items to include and decided that including 23 questions about segment reporting was more
critical than collecting more biographical data. And exceeding the one page, both-side limit
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we believe would have adversely affected our response rate, significantly. Lastly, we were
fortunate to have a Japanese research assistant (RA) who was able to test our questionnaire
when she returned to Japan during breaks. Initially, our questionnaire was longer and in-
cluded more questions and biographical items. All survey studies, we believe, involve trade-
offs. A major goal was a high response rate and to achieve such, we felt we had to limit other
objectives, such as collecting extensive biographical information.
8. Why was the response rate so high in relation to other survey studies?
We have previously addressed most of this issue. Limiting the length of the questionnaire
to one page (both sides) and not asking for professional data that might generate negative
feelings in potential respondents were probably the two major reasons the response rate was
so high. We also included our business school pencil as a thank you (whether they responded
or not). Lastly, an interesting issue for further study would be whether response rates to all
Japanese surveys are significantly higher than similar studies in other countries. There may be
a cultural reason why the response was so high.
9. Could there be inherent cross-sectional differences between "domestic" and
"foreign" company analysts that would bias their responses and limit the
generalizability of the study's results?
First, while we agree there are probably some differences in the types of firms "domestic"
and "foreign" analysts follow, we also believe there are many similarities. While we presume
that "foreign" company analysts are somewhat more focused on Japanese firms listed on US
exchanges, that is not to say these firms are not also of interest to "domestic" company
analysts, but possibly not to the same extent. Also, only a small number of Japanese firms are
listed on US exchanges. Since "foreign" company analysts responding to our survey, on the
average, followed 30 firms, a large number of firms followed by them must include firms not
listed on US exchanges.
We agree with the reviewer that both groups of analysts would probably analyze financial
statements of firms that are not either Japanese or US and thus have footnote disclosure rules
determined by other countries. Thus, analysts in our survey probably study financial state-
ments from firms subject to different countries' segment disclosure reporting requirements.
This situation, however, should not have significantly affected our study. Respondents of our
study clearly understood that we were only interested in footnote disclosures of Japanese
firms subject to MOF segment disclosure rules. We clearly omitted any reference to other
countries segment disclosure rules.
In addition, all Japanese firms, whether listed on US exchanges or not, must prepare con-
solidated financial statements. This means both groups of analysts, "domestic" and "foreign,"
must routinely analyze consolidated reports. So while "foreign" company analysts in our
study found segment information more useful than their "domestic" counterparts, both groups
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must extensively and routinely analyze consolidated reports. Therefore, it is not the differences
in the types of reports analyzed that resulted in the two groups differing in their evaluation of
the usefulness of segment information. Also, even though we agree that foreign company
analysts may follow more Japanese firms listed on US exchanges than their domestic coun-
terparts, this would not cause a difference in the analysis of the two responding groups because
the SEC allows Japanese firms listed on US exchanges to use segment disclosure rules
mandated by the MOF. Therefore, the segment disclosures of US-listed Japanese firms would
be the same as those of non-US-listed Japanese firms.
10. Contribution of study
The results of this study have important implications for global investors in Japanese stocks
and for accounting standard-setting bodies. In response to the discussant's comments, we
discuss these implications. As ofDecember 31, 1999, the value ofUS mutual funds invested in
Japanese stocks was US$8.1 billion. This amount does not include balances of mutual funds
that purchase only Pacific Rim/Global or International Stocks. The balance of US mutual
funds that specialize in Pacific Rim stocks was US$ 1 2.4 billion. We argue that because ofthese
large investments in Japanese stocks, examining the quality of Japanese segment disclosures is
important to US fund managers and investors. Second, because Japanese analysts are more
likely to have better access to private information about segment performance, we also suggest
that those US analysts and investors who are unaware ofthe low quality of segment disclosures
in Japan would be at a distinct economic disadvantage if they relied on publicly disclosed
segment data of Japanese firms. Third, with regard to policymaking, we discussed in the paper
how the SEC had a major role in MOF's adoption ofthe segment-reporting standard. Our study
suggests that the SEC continue to influence the MOF to adopt more rigorous rules and/or step
up enforcement. Finally, our study has implications for SEC policy, which allows Japanese
firms to list on US exchanges using home-country segment disclosures. While we cannot
conclusively prove that US firms suffered negative consequences because US GAAP stand-
ards are more tringent than Japanese standards, we believe that requiring all Japanese firms
that list on US exchanges to adopt US GAAP segment-reporting rules would level the
playing field for US firms.
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Abstract
We investigated 249 Korean seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms during the period 1995-1997 to
determine if the SEO firms manage earnings in the year before a planned issue of seasoned equity
stocks. Using three test methods (accrual difference, correlation, and sign-change), we found that the
Korean firms contemplating SEOs in the following year do manage earnings particularly when their
relative performances have been poor. The results are robust irrespective of control samples. Analysis
of operating performances around SEOs shows that SEO firms tend to increase reported earnings in the
year immediately preceding and the year of SEOs, but no differences were found in operating cash
flows between the SEO firms and the control firms. By using a regression analysis for discretionary
accruals, we found that SEO firms are more likely to manage eamings if the operating performances
are poor and if the offer sizes are relatively large. Association tests between stock returns and
discretionary accruals indicate that the market reacts positively to net income but negatively to
discretionary accruals. The results indicate that the market correctly analyzes the cash flow
implications of the SEO firms' opportunistic use of discretionary accruals. © 2002 University of
niinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Korean accounting standards are generally based on the rules issued by the US Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Before the 1997 financial crisis, however, Korean
firms pursued earnings management practices due to the less stringent financial reporting
envirormient, including lenient audit opinions and a lack of general oversight functions.
Since the 1997 financial crisis, many changes in the Korean financial reporting environment
have been implemented, including the establishment of the Korean Accounting Standards
Board, a private sector standard setting body in 1999; the introduction of mandated outside
directorship and audit committees for listed firms in 2000; an increase in the number of
lawsuits against public auditors; and an increase in shareholders' activism movements.
The potential for abuse in earnings management has become a concern throughout the
world, as so reflected in the literature (see Levitt, 1998; Brown, 1999). Earnings management
occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to
alter financial reports. The objective is to either mislead some stakeholders about the
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that
depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
The incentives to apply earnings management are diverse: income smoothing (Moses,
1987), management compensation (Healy, 1985), ownership control or management buyout
(DeAngelo, 1986, 1988; Perry & Williams, 1994), and political costs (Cahan, 1992; Liberty
& Zimmerman, 1986; Maydew, 1997).
There are studies documenting earnings management by the seasoned equity offering
(SEO) firms prior to or during the period of SEO year (Loughran & Ritter, 1995, 1997;
Rangan, 1998; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). Many SEO firms experience poor operating
performances and poor stock returns after their stock issuance (Loughran & Ritter, 1995;
Rangan, 1998; Spiess & Affleck-Graves, 1995; Teoh et al., 1998). Shivakumar (2000) argues
that earnings management by seasoned equity issuers' may not be designed to mislead in-
vestors, but may merely reflect the issuers' rational response to anticipated market behaviors
at the offering announcements. He argues that SEO firms' earnings management is rational
since investors infer earnings management and rationally undo its effects at equity offering
armouncements. Choi and Paik (1999) investigated operating performances and earnings
management of 236 Korean SEO firms in the 5-year period surrounding the year of SEO
during the period 1991-1995. They document that the discretionary accruals (DA) of the
SEO firms gradually increase and peak during the SEO year and then decrease afterwards.
They also found that the SEO firms usually have poor cash flows and earnings as compared
to the non-SEO firms in the same industries.
This study invesdgates whether SEO firms manage earnings in the year before the SEOs.
We hypothesize that the SEO firms have incentives to manage earnings in the year preceding
the planned equity issues especially when operating performances are relatively poor. There
is no regulation in Korea that requires SEO firms to report positive earnings prior to SEOs.
However, better earnings figures may result in stock price increases at issue. In Korea, the
stock subscription prices of SEOs are determined at 1 -month average prices before the date
of subscription.
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We dichotomized the sample firms into negative cash flows from operations (CFO) and
positive CFO groups based on the assumption that firm operating performances measured in
terms of CFO will affect the firms' accounting decisions. Though all firms may have
incentives to manage earnings when the firms have poor operating performances, the firms
should have stronger incentives to manage earnings when they contemplate SEOs in the
following year.
The development of a proper model to estimate DA is critical to ensure reasonable
empirical results and interpretations. We developed a model that does fit relatively well to
Korean industrial firms during our estimation period 1993-1997.
We used three test methods (accrual difference, correlation, and sign-change) to investigate
whether the SEO firms differ systematically in earning management from the non-SEO firms
during the same period. We also explained the operating performances of the SEO firms in
the year before and after the issue and compared them with the control firms.
The results of the study support the hypothesis that many SEO firms widely employ
income-increasing sfrategies during this time. The degree of earnings management by the
SEO firms is more pronounced when their operating performances are relatively poor. That is,
firms contemplating SEOs in the following year tend to increase reported earnings (NI)
compared to the non-SEO firms in the same period.
An analysis of operating performances in the years surrounding the SEO reveals that the
SEO firms tend to increase NIs in the preceding year and the year of the SEO while CFOs are
not different from the non-SEO firms.
Multiple regressions run on factors driving the SEO firms to manage eamings indicate that
the poorer the operating performance and the larger the offer size, the more likely the firm
will manage eamings when an SEO is contemplated in the following year.
Association tests between cumulative abnormal return and DAs show that the market
reacts positively to net income but negatively to DAs. The results reveal that the SEO firms
employ DAs opportunistically but the market correctly interprets the cash flow implications
of the SEO firms' DAs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Samples and test methods are
described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical results of the eamings management
tests. Section 4 addresses additional issues including the characteristics of SEO firms,
sensitivity analysis, and additional tests. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. Samples and test methods
2.1. Samples
We examine the Korean listed firms that issued seasoned equity stocks from March 1 995 to
December 1997. The sample choice is limited to 1995, the year when reporting the cash flow
statement became mandatory. Financial statements are usually available 2 or 3 months after
the fiscal year ends. The process of issuing SEOs requires about 2 months from the date the
board of directors approves the action to the date of payment. At this time, investors know the
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issue prices based on the 1 -month average stock prices prior to the subscription. The SEO
process is completed when new stocks are issued about a month from the date of payment.
We assume that investors would make their decisions at the date of payment. Therefore, we
confine our test period to March 1995 through December 1997.'
The final sample of 249 firms was selected as follows.
SEOs during the period March 1995 to December 1997 305
Less: Consecutive SEOs since 1995 15
Financial Institutions 28
Unmatchable firms 12
Outliers 1 56
Final sample 249"
We included only the first SEO when a firm had multiple SEOs in the test period. Fifteen
SEOs were eliminated for this reason. Twenty-eight financial institutions including banks,
security dealers, and insurance firms were deleted from the sample since these firms usually
have different firm characteristics than other industrial firms. We compare the earnings-
management practices of the SEO firms with two matched-pair non-SEO samples. The first
confrol sample is matched on calendar year, industry classification, and cash from operations.
We assume the SEO firms will issue additional stocks to finance their requirements for cash
that generally depends on CFO. The second confrol sample is matched on calendar year,
industry classification, and net sales assuming that firm size may explain earnings-manage-
ment behavior of some firms. Twelve firms were eliminated since the companies could not be
properly matched based on our matching criteria.^ Finally, one wholesale firm was deleted
from the sample due to obtaining extreme values for variables standardized by total assets.
The offer size in terms of the increase in capital averages 43.0% (median 38.0%) and
ranges between 2% and 250%.'* In addition, the time lags between the fiscal year-end of the
previous fiscal period to the actual SEO date, which is defined as the date of payment in this
study, averages 8.8 months (median 8 months) and ranges between 3 and 14 months.
' Our study period is not a unique period. We wanted to investigate earnings management for recent SEOs
when cash flow statements are available. In addition, quite a few SEOs are available during the period selected to
assure the robustness of our test results. SEOs after 1997 are very limited as a result of the stock market crash after
the financial crisis.
^ The financial statements for our sample of 249 SEO firms are distributed as follows by each calendar year:
109 in 1994, 82 in 1995, 53 in 1996 and 5 in 1997.
^ We tested whether the matches were proper or not by comparing differences in the matching variables
between the two groups. For the CFO-matched sample, the / ratio for the difference in CFO deflated by the
beginning total assets is only 0.06. For the sales-matched sample, the / ratio for the difference in firm size (natural
logarithm of total assets) is only -0.68.
^ More than 30% of shares are held by outside investors for all listed companies. Initial public offerings
regulations mandate that 30% or more of the shares should be sold to the general public. Individual investors have
all the rights pertaining to shares including voting rights.
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2.2. Earnings management test methods
Yoon (1998) documents that operating performances are a major reason for earnings-
management practices in Korea. Unless firms intentionally delay or frontload the recog-
nition of cash accompanying revenue or expense, CFOs typically represent unbiased
operating performance for the firms. The distribution of CFO statements will provide a
good benchmark to judge earnings management. Therefore, we dichotomize SEO firms into
negative and positive CFO portfolios. We assume that negative CFO firms will have
stronger incentives to manage earnings especially when the firms contemplate SEOs in the
following year.
Three test methods (accrual difference tests, correlation tests between net income and
CFO, and sign-change ratio tests) are used to investigate whether the SEO sample differs
systematically in earnings management from the control samples.
The accrual difference tests examine how accruals (discretionary and total) differ between
the treatment sample and the matched-pair control samples. Based on the earnings manage-
ment hypothesis, the SEO firms should employ income-increasing strategies in the year
preceding the SEOs. Therefore, SEO firms' DAs and total accruals (TA) should be higher
than those for non-SEO firms. The differences should be larger when the SEO firms
experience negative CFO in the preceding year.
The correlation tests examine the correlation coefficients between CFO and NI. Based on
the null hypothesis of no eamings management, we expect to find high positive correlations
between CFO and NI since both of the measures represent operating performances.^
However, when firms manage eamings, we will not necessarily find a strong positive
correlation. We, therefore, hypothesize that the correlation coefficients between CFO and NI
will be low when SEO firms experience negative CFO.
The sign-change tests examine the ratios of observations reporting positive NI when CFO
is negative or vice versa for each CFO portfolio. Negative CFO firms will have strong
incentives to report positive NI figures, while positive CFO firms will not report negative NI
figures under normal circumstances unless the firms are strongly motivated to reduce income
taxes or political costs. Therefore, we expect much higher sign-change ratios among the
negative CFO firms than the positive CFO firms. The sign-change ratio tests are variations of
proportion tests and are nonparametric tests in nature because the magnitude of eamings
management is ignored.
2.3. Estimation ofDAs
TAs are defined as NI less CFO. TA can be decomposed into discretionary and non-DAs.
The discretionary component of TA represents the degree of eamings management. A model
is needed to separate the discretionary component from TA.
It should be noted that NI is the accrual basis eamings and CFO is the cash basis eamings.
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Some early studies including Healy (1985) used a random walk model. Jones (1991)
proposed a seminal model. Then, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995) proposed a modified
Jones model, which has been widely used by many researchers. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan
(1995) proposed a model (KS model) stating that accrual balances will change in proportion
to the changes in revenue, expense and gross property, plant, and equipment.
In this paper, we develop a better-fitting model, based partly on those models discussed
previously, to provide better explanatory power. The model is described below:
TA,,/BTA, = 00 + (3i(AREV„ - AREC„)/BTA,
+ 32(AEXP„ - APAY/,)/BTA,v
+ 33(NCASH,,-i X GPPEGRW„)/BTA„ + £,-, (1)
where TA/, = total accruals = NI„ — CFO/,; REV,, = net sales revenue; REC,, = receivables;
EXP/, = operating expenses excluding noncash expenses; PAY,, = payables; NCASH,, _
i
=
previous period noncash expenses such as depreciation; GPPEGRW,, = rate of growth in gross
property, plant, and equipment; and BTA„ = total assets at the beginning of the current period.
The model posits that TAs will normally depend on changes in cash-sales revenue, changes
in cash expenses and noncash expenses, which in turn depend partly on changes in gross
property, plant, and equipment.
The first explanatory variable, (AREV — AREC)/BTA, was borrowed from the modified
Jones model. The variable represents changes in cash revenues since we subtract changes in
receivables from changes in revenue. The changes in the cash revenues account for the effect
of current accruals and represent the normal or the nondiscretionary portion for revenue. This
variable should capture a firm's tendency to increase NIs by increasing credit sales toward the
end of the fiscal year. In other words, the change in cash sales should not be affected by the
front-loading of credit sales. Therefore, this variable should properly capture a firm's
tendency to increase the front-loading of credit sales.
The second explanatory variable, (AEXP — APAY)/BTA, was adopted from the KS
model. ^ The variable associates current accruals with changes in cash expenses. Management
may utilize not only sales but also expenses in managing NIs. Hence, unless we properly take
into account both cash sales and cash expenses, we may not properly capture the dual aspects
of current accruals. One of the major weaknesses of the modified Jones model is that the first
variable, changes in cash sales, does not have a predicted relationship with TAs. TAs will
have a certain relationship with current accruals. However, it is difficult to predict the
relationship the changes in cash sales will have with TAs. Therefore, the predicted
relationship can be either positive or negative. Sometimes, sales and receivables will be
utilized to manage earnings, whereas at other times expenses and payables can be utilized for
the same purpose. If we include only the first variable in our model, we may in fact capture
^ Rangan (1998) also uses a similar variable.
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the impact of cash expenses on the current accruals because cash revenues and cash expenses
are correlated to a certain degree/
The third variable associates noncash expenses for the current period with noncurrent
accruals. A normal or nondiscretionary level of noncash expense is obtained by multiplying
the previous year's noncash expense by the growth rate of gross property, plant, and
equipment. The third variable will have a negative sign by construction.
To help ensure statistical robustness we used panel data to estimate the DAs made by
combining the financial statements for the listed firms from the period^ 1993-1997.'^ Next,
we estimated the regression coefficients for each of the 28 two-digit industries. We
maintained as many firm-year observations as possible by winsorizing, instead of eliminating,
outliers in order to keep small-member-firm industries in the panel data. We also tried to keep
the winsorization to a minimum level'" to maintain the original data as much as possible.
Discretionary accruals are obtained by subtracting fitted values of accruals (non-DAs)
from TAs as follows:
DA;, = TA„/BTA„ - [bo + b^ (AREV,, - AREC„)/BTA;, + ^2(AEXP/, - APAY,-,)
/BTAy; + Z)3(NCASH,7 x GPPEGRW,7)/BTA/,] (2)
Here, b/, represents the estimated coefficients of 3;^ in Eq. (1). The DAs obtained from Eq.
(2) represent the differences between actual TAs and the expected (nondiscretionary) TAs for
each observation. The DAs are used to test differences between the SEO firms and the
matched-pair non-SEO firms.
In addition, we use TAs for the accrual-difference tests as a complement since TAs should
be free of model-fitting errors. If we use incorrect models in estimating the discretionary
We may have a multicollinearity problem when we include explanatory variables that are correlated. We
need to take into account the trade-off between the adverse effect of multicollinearity and the problems of
omitted variables in this case. Changes in revenues and changes in expenses are highly correlated (Pearson
Product Correlation Coefficient = .953). However, the correlation between changes in cash revenues and
changes in cash expenses decreased significantly (Pearson Product Correlation Coefficient = .838). Furthermore,
when we use both of the variables, we get significant and consistent signs for both of the variables ft-om the
regressions (see the regression results for our model in Table 1.) However, if we omit the second variable, we
get inconsistent regression coefficients. The average adjusted R~ of our model is .324 and the first two variables
show consistent and significant signs most times. However, the goodness-of-fit is much lower for the modified
Jones model (see footnote 11).
We included in the panel data firms in two-digit industry with more than five firms so that we could have 25
observations (5 years times five firms) at least to make our regression results robust.
When cash flow statements are not available, we estimated current accruals by subtracting operation-related
current liabilities (total current liabilities — short-term borrowings — current portion of long-term debt) fi'om
operation-related current assets (receivables + inventories + prepaid expenses). Noncurrent accruals are directly
available fi'om the statement of changes in financial position -working capital basis by subtracfing working capital
fi'om operations fi'om net income.
We winsorized up to 1% of the panel data (about 30 observations) at each end for some key variables. We
did not winsorize the data if it was not necessary.
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models, then we are introducing unwarranted estimation bias into our tests. Unless we get
a reasonable goodness-of-fit for the model, we may not be free from a possible problem
of misspecification.
2.4. Results of the estimation ofDAs
The results of the DA estimations are reported in Table 1 . For convenience, only the t ratios
of the three explanatory variables are shown in the variable column. We did not show the
regression results for the constant term. Since we fitted the model to each industry with 5 -year
Table 1
Discretionary accrual estimation model
Explanatory variables
Adjusted
SIC n xl xl .x3 R^
0500 19 -2.18 2.65 -0.79 .293
1500 220 -5.93 5.97 -0.58 .152
1700 236 -5.84 6.68 -4.03 .203
1800 79 -2.94 3.47 -0.17 .104
1900 52 -5.22 6.76 -0.53 .456
2100 159 -2.99 4.15 -4.90 .231
2300 30 -0.05 2.81 -0.27 .226
2400 443 - 14.39 13.02 -7.01 .420
2500 87 -5.83 6.03 -2.12 .326
2600 135 -8.06 7.56 -3.77 .389
2700 205 -7.82 9.90 -3.17 .364
2800 67 -3.58 4.90 -0.10 .250
2900 132 -9.51 8.49 -2.96 .454
3000 45 -4.15 4.10 -0.49 .285
3100 105 -6.26 6.67 -2.39 .344
3200 301 -6.10 6.68 -5.83 .255
3300 34 -4.60 4.41 -1.29 .506
3400 160 -8.09 7.91 -5.02 .430
3500 25 -3.59 6.73 -1.26 .755
3600 48 -4.64 6.79 - 1.04 .516
4000 49 1.03 -0.93 -3.59 .195
4500 266 -1.76 3.78 -1.05 .063
5000 14 -2.08 1.73 -0.59 .168
5100 146 -5.13 5.59 0.47 .173
5200 45 -5.53 6.67 -1.66 .551
6000 40 -2.06 3.08 -3.39 .293
6100 25 -2.82 2.95 0.18 .253
Other 35 - 1.90 1.72 -2.69 .403
Model: TA„/BTA„ = 3o + 3|(AREV„- AREC,,) / BTA„+(32(AEXP„- APAY„)/BTA„+|-i,(NCASH„ , x GPPEGRW,,)
/BTA„+£„.
Explanatory variables .rl, .v2, and .v3 represent (AREV,,- AREC„)/BTA,„ (AEXP,, - APAY„)/BTA,„ and
(NCASH,, . 1 X GPPEGRW„)/BTA,„ respectively. To make the table compact, only t ratios are presented for
each explanatory variable and the constant terms are not shown.
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Table 2
Comparative descriptive statistics of the treatment and control samples
Percent
Samples and variables Mean Median S.D. Maximum Minimum ei Q3 positive
SEO firms DA 0.0152 0.0077 0.0862 0.3957 -0.2259 - 0.0360 0.0584 55
TA 0.0060 -0.0101 0.1118 0.4420 -0.3438 -0.0632 0.0608 46
NI 0.0402 0.0227 0.0691 0.6244 -0.1576 0.0099 0.0508 94
CFO 0.0342 0.0279 0.1253 0.7759 - 0.3607 - 0.0284 0.0978 63
CFO matched DA - 0.0059 - 0.0090 0.0743 0.2504 -0.3836 - 0.0427 0.0283 43
non-SEO firms TA -0.0184 -0.0240 0.0900 0.3524 -0.2384 -0.0750 0.0299 39
NI 0.0152 0.0154 0.0732 0.5443 -0.3586 0.0029 0.0377 79
CFO 0.0336 0.0321 0.1140 0.6850 - 0.2806 -0.0289 0.0950 64
Sales matched DA -0.0081 -0.0110 0.0678 0.2923 -0.3143 - 0.0433 0.0275 43
non-SEO firms TA -0.0314 - 0.0343 0.0910 0.2135 -0.4102 - 0.0826 0.0263 36
NI 0.0103 0.0135 0.0558 0.2524 -0.3267 0.0030 0.0314 77
CFO 0.0340 0.0361 0.0984 0.5852 -0.3568 - 0.0252 0.0861 68
panel data, the number of firm-year observations for each industry varies from a low of 14 to
a high of 443.
The results reveal that the model fits well in general. Adjusted R~ range from a low of .063
(SIC 4500: construction) to a high of .755 (SIC 3500: other transportation vehicles). The
goodness-of-fit of the model is much better than that of the modified Jones model. '
'
Furthermore, individual explanatory variables show consistent signs and overwhelming
significance. That is, changes in cash revenues, (AREV — AREC)/BTA, have negative rela-
tionships with TAs. The results are statistically significant for 26 out of 28 industries. Changes
in cash expenses, (AEXP — APAY)/BTA, have positive relationships with TAs. The frequency
of their statistical significance is as high as the changes in cash revenues. The results indicate
that we are better off by including not only changes in cash revenues but also changes in cash
expenses to measure the nondiscretionary nature of current accruals. Finally, noncash expenses
that are intended to capture the nondiscretionary nature of noncurrent accruals also have
negative relationships with TAs. Approximately half of them are statistically significant.
2.5. Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table 2. Two accrual proxies (DA and
TA) for the SEO firms are on average greater than those of the matched-pair non-SEO firms.
In the case of the modified Jones model, the adjusted R" were much lower than our model and the
explanatory variables have either very low explanatory power or inconsistent signs. Of the 28 industry-model
regressions, only two have the adjusted R~ greater than .2, five between .1 and .2, and the remaining 21 have
virtually no power at all. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the two important variables was very limited.
(AREV — AREC)/BTA had 20 posifive signs (six of them statistically significant) and eight negative signs (two of
them statistically significant). GPPE/ BTA had 24 positive signs (13 of them statistically significant) and four
negative signs (nonsignificant). Therefore, the modified Jones model exhibited little explanatory power in
explaining total accruals in Korea, especially during the period of 1993-1997.
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Accordingly, the NI of the SEO firms are greater than those of the non-SEO firms. However,
there seems to be little difference in CFOs between the SEO firms and non-SEO firms.
The ranges between the maximum and the minimum values for DA, TA, and NI indicate
that they are skewed somewhat toward the positive for the SEO firms relative to the control
firms. The proportion of positive figures for each variable also indicates the possibility of
earnings management by the SEO firms. Though the proportion of positive CFO is similar
(63% vs. 64% and 68%), the proportion of positive NI is much higher for the SEO firms than
for the non-SEO firms (94% vs. 79% and 77%).
3. Results of earnings management tests
3.1. Results of accrual difference tests
Tables 3-5 present the empirical results for the earnings-management tests. Each test is
conducted for the two subportfolios of negative CFO and positive CFO and the total sample.
Even though we have a large enough sample size to justify parametric tests, we conducted
both parametric and nonparametric tests for both accrual difference tests and correlation tests
to enhance the robustness of the test results.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of the accrual-difference tests between the SEO
firms, and the CFO-matched control firms. Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of the same
test between the SEO firms and the sales-matched control firms. The results clearly indicate
that both the DAs and TAs are higher for the SEO firms than for the non-SEO firms especially
when their CFOs are negative. When CFOs are negative, the differences in accruals are
positive and statistically significant for all the test metrics. When CFOs are positive, the
differences in accruals between the SEO firms and the non-SEO firms are not significant or
are weakly significant though the accruals are consistently higher for SEO firms than for the
non-SEO firms.
The results of accrual-difference tests, both the t tests and the Mann-Whitney tests,
strongly and consistently support the hypothesis of earnings management by the SEO firms
relative to the non-SEO firms.
The magnitude of the income increases for the SEO firms in the preceding year is
significant. As shown in Table 2, NI and CFO for both samples of the matched-pair non-SEO
firms account for only about 1.5% or less and about 3.4% of the beginning total assets
respectively. However, the negative CFO firms' DA and TA amount to 10.9% and 10.5% of
the beginning total assets, respectively, when the firms contemplate SEOs in the following
year. This does indicate that the magnitude of income increases by the SEO firms in the
preceding year is material.
3.2. Results of correlation analysis
Table 4 shows the results of the correlation analysis between NI and CFO. The upper line
shows the Pearson Product Correlation Coefficients with t ratios. The lower line presents the
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Table 3
Results of the mean difference tests
Panel A: Comparison with CFO-matched control sample
Panel A-1 Mean difference test
CFO-matched
CFO
SEO firms
n Mean S.D.
non-SEO firms
Difference
t
ratio
P
Accruals n Mean S.D. value
DA — 93 0.1091 0.0818 89 0.0663 0.0725 0.0428 3.74 .000
+ 156 -0.0122 0.0774 160 -0.0206 0.0616 0.0084 1.07 .143
Total 249 0.0331 0.0984 249 0.0104 0.0777 0.0227 2.85 .002
TA - 93 0.1050 0.0865 89 0.0560 0.0754 0.0490 4.08 .000
+ 156 -0.0530 0.0787 160 -0.0598 0.0682 0.0068 0.82 .208
Total 249 0.0060 0.1118 249 -0.0184 0.0900 0.0244 2.69 .004
Panel A-2. Mann-Whitne>' test
CFO-matched
CFO
SEO firms non-SEO firms
W valueAccruals n VIedian n Median P value
DA — 93 0.0524 89 0.0268 9416 .011
+ 156 -0.0151 160 -0.0215 26,028 .109
Total 249 0.0077 249 - 0.0090 66,553 .006
TA - 93 0.0759 89 0.0477 9805 .000
+ 156 - 0.0444 160 -0.0513 25,597 .284
Total 249 -0.0101 259 - 0.0240 66,049 0.015
Panel B: Comparison with sales-matched control sample
Panel B-1: Mean difference test
Sales-matched
SEO firms non-SEO firms
Difference
t
ratio
P
Accruals CFO n Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. value
DA 93 0.1091 0.0818 80 0.0679 0.0690 0.0412 3.59 .000
+ 156 -0.0122 0.0774 169 -0.0255 0.0573 0.0133 1.75 .040
Total 249 0.0331 0.0984 249 0.0045 0.0752 0.0286 3.65 .000
TA 93 0.1050 0.0865 80 0.0594 0.0609 0.0455 4.04 .000
+ 156 -0.0530 0.0787 169 -0.0630 0.0653 0.0100 1.24 .108
Total 249 0.0060 0.1118 249 - 0.0237 0.0857 0.0297 3.32 .000
Panel B-2: Mann -Whitney test
Sales-matched
CFO
SEO firms
n Median
non-SEO firms
W valueAccruals n Median P value
DA — 93 0.0911 80 0.0586 9222 .001
+ 156 - 0.0064 169 - 0.0206 26,939 .074
Total 249 0.0238 249 0.0028 67,762 .000
TA - 93 0.0759 80 0.0512 9173 .001
+ 156 - 0.0444 169 - 0.0570 26,375 .263
Total 249 -0.0101 249 -0.0308 66,546 .006
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Table 4
Results of the correlation tests between CFO and NI
SEO firms CFO-matched non-SEO firms Sales-matched non-SEO firms
Correlation Correlation
CFO n coefficient n coefficient
Correlation
n coefficient
93 .0284 (r = 0.27), 89 .4184 (f=4.30), 80 .4208 (/ = 4.10),
-.1402 (r=- 1.35) .1727 (r= 1.64) .2055(^=1.85)
+ 156 .6203 (r=9.81), 160 .6044(^=9.54), 169 .5001 (r= 7.46),
.4631(^ = 6.48) .4727(^=6.74) .3714 (r=5.17)
Total 249 .4605(^=8.15), 249 .6147(^=12.25), 249 .4964(^= 8.99),
.3224(r=5.35) .5428(^=10.16) .4481 (r=7.88)
Upper line: Pearson Product-Correlation Coefficients (/ ratios).
Lower line: Spearman Rank-Correlation Coefficients {t ratios).
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients with t ratios. As indicated earlier, the two operating
performance indicators should exhibit a high positive correlation unless firms manage earnings
to a considerable degree. A low correlation between the two indicators will, therefore, imply the
evidence of earnings management practices.
The correlation analysis indicates that the SEO firms with negative CFO in the preceding
year manage earnings so significantly that the correlation coefficient between the two
variables is only .028 {t ratio of 0.27) for the Pearson Product Correlation and —.1402
{t ratio of — 1.35) for the Spearman Rank Correlation. Li contrast, the correlation coefficient
between the two performance indicators is significantly positive for the SEO firms with
positive CFO.
For the non-SEO firms, the correlation coefficients between the two performance
indicators are positive and significant. The Pearson Product Correlation Coefficients are
not so different across CFO portfolios. However, the Spearman Rank Correlation shows that
the correlations become weaker when their CFOs are negative for the non-SEO firms even
though they are still statistically significantly positive.
The correlation analysis is also consistent in showing that the SEO firms with negative
CFO manage earnings more heavily than the non-SEO firms with negative CFO in the same
calendar years.
3.3. Results ofsign-change analysis
Table 5 reports the results of the sign-change analysis. As discussed, the sign-change tests
are nonparametric tests in the sense that the results are not affected by the existence of
extreme observations. Based on the fact that TAs would normally be negative because of
noncash expenses such as depreciation, retirement benefit expenses, and others,'" we expect
'^ For the sample firms of this study, the average noncurrent accruals relative to beginning total assets are very
similar at - 0.061 1 for the SEO firms and - 0.0623 for the non-SEO firnis. Furthermore, the third quartiles are
also negative at - 0.0336 and - 0.0380, respectively, for SEO firms and non-SEO finns. Therefore, noncurrent
accruals are in general negative.
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Table 5
Results of the sign-change ratio tests
SEO firms CFO-matched non-SEO firms Difference test
0.596 0.318 7.59 .000
0.100 -0.055 -1.31 .101
0.277 0.092
0.625 0.289 6.80 .000
0.166 -0.121 -2.85 .022
0.313 0.053
No. of Ratio of No. of Ratio of z P
CFO n sign-changes sign-changes n sign-changes sign-changes Difference value value
Panel A: Comparison with CFO-matched control sample
93 85 0.914 89 53
+ 156 7 0.045 160 16
Total 249 92 0.369 249 69
Panel B: Comparison with sales-matched control sample
93 85 0.914 80 50
+ 156 7 0.045 169 28
Total 249 92 0.369 249 78
that there should be a few firms reporting net losses even if their CFOs are positive, provided
that the firms do not manage earnings. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that firms would be
reluctant to report net losses when their CFOs are positive or slightly negative especially
when the firms contemplate SEOs in the following years.
The results of the sign-change tests also strongly support the hypothesis that firms planning
SEOs in the following year heavily manage earnings when their CFO is negative. The sign-
change ratios show extremely contrasting results among the comparative groups of firms.
Almost all (85 out of 93 or 91.4%) of the SEO firms with negative CFO report positive
eamings in the preceding year. This means that almost all of the negative CFO firms
apparently manage eamings to report positive eamings. In contrast, only a few SEO firms
with positive CFO (seven out of 156 or 4.5%) report negative eamings. Even though the
proportion of change is also high for the non-SEO firms when their CFOs are negative,'^ the
difference in sign-change ratio between the two groups when their CFOs are negative is
statistically significant (0.318 with a z value of 7.59 when compared with the CFO-matched
control sample, and 0.289 with a z value of 6.80 when compared with the sales-matched
control sample). For the positive CFO portfolios, the differences of — 0.055 (a z value of
— 1.31) when compared with the CFO-matched control sample and — 0.121 (a z value of
— 2.85) when compared with the sales-matched control sample are less significant than for
the negative CFO portfolios. These results are generally consistent with the earnings-
management hypothesis that SEO firms will try to avoid reporting net losses when their
CFOs are positive in order to carry out their SEO plans in the following years.
In summary, the results of the three tests strongly indicate that the firms with negative CFO
manage eamings very heavily when the companies contemplate seasoned-equity offerings in
the following year. The strong test results may not be surprising because the SEO firms
should have strong incentives to increase NIs to successfully carry out their SEO plan when
'^ Assuming that other noise factors are averaged out, the negative CFO alone affects about two-thirds of firms
that adopt income-increasing strategies. Any additional increases in the sign-change ratio for the SEO firms can be
attributed to SEO plans.
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their CFOs are negative. With negative NIs, the firms may have a difficult time persuading
potential subscribers to participate in any subscription. The firms would get lower cash
inflows from any equity issues due to the relatively low stock prices.
4. Additional issues
4.1. What types offirms issue seasoned equity stocks?
We examined how SEO firms differ fi^om the non-SEO firms in general. For this, we
compared the SEO firms with the non-SEO population during the study period. The non-SEO
firms include all the industrial firm-year observations with financial statements information
available during the period 1993-1997. Comparisons of some key characteristics are
summarized in Table 6.
There is no statistically significant difference in CFO between the SEO firms and the entire
population of non-SEO firms. However, TAs of the SEO firms are significantly higher than
those of the non-SEO firms {t ratio of 5.56), thereby increasing NIs significantly higher than
the non-SEO firms {t ratio of 6.25).
There seems to be no sizable differences in debt ratios (total liabilities/total assets) and the
size between the SEO firms and the non-SEO firms. However, the SEO firms are faster growing
firms both in terms of total assets {t ratio of 5.16) and revenue {t ratio of 5.30) as compared to
the non-SEO firms. In addition, the SEO firms seem to pay offdebts with stocks. The change in
debt ratio is lower for the SEO firms than for the non-SEO firms {t ratio of — 2.30).
4.2. Sensitivity analysis
4.2.1. Third control sample
The SEO firms appear to grow faster than the non-SEO firms. We decided to select a
third control sample that is matched to the test sample on the basis of the growth rate of total
assets in addition to calendar year and industry classification. We replicated the three tests
Table 6
Characteristics of the SEO Firms in comparison to the non-SEO firms
SEO firms Non-SEO population P value
Variables (n = 249) (« = 2971) t ratio (two-sided)
CFO/BTA 0.0342 (0.1253) 0.0465 (0.1225) -1.48 .138
NI/BTA 0.0402 (0.0693) 0.0114 (0.0775) 6.25 .000
TA/BTA 0.0060(0.1118) -0.0351 (0.1122) 5.56 .000
Total liabilities/total assets 0.6808 (0.1518) 0.6989 (0.2200) - 1.73 .084
Size (log ()f total assets) 18.7881 (1.3967) 18.8758 (1.3705) - 0.95 .342
Change in debt ratio -0.0005 (0.0671) 0.0100 (0.0953) -2.30 .022
Change in size 1.0118 (0.0010) 1.0081 (0.0010) 5.16 .000
Revenue growth 0.2140(0.2412) 0.1302 (0.2191) 5.30 .000
Mean (standard deviation).
S.S. Yoon. G. Miller / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 57-78 71
(TA difference, correlation, and sign-change ratio). The results are very similar to the results
reported in Tables 2-4. Mean difference tests for TAs between the SEO firms and the
growth-matched control firms show that the TAs of the SEO firms are much higher than
those of the growth-matched control firms {t ratio of 2.10 for the negative CFO portfolio,
2.22 for the positive CFO portfolio, and 2.46 for the total sample). The correlation between
CFO and NI is much higher for the growth-matched control firms than for the SEO firms.
The Pearson Product Correlation Coefficients are .4182 (r = 4.29), .5982 (r = 9.38), and .5577
(r= 10.50) for the negative CFO portfolio, the positive CFO portfolio, and total sample,
respectively. Finally, the results of the sign-change ratio tests also reveal that the sign-change
ratios are much higher for the SEO firms than for the growth-matched control firms
especially when CFO is negative. The sign-change ratio for the negative CFO portfolio is
0.753 for the growth-matched control firms and it was significantly lower than the ratio of
0.914 for the SEO firms (z = 3.76). However, the sign-change ratio of the growth-matched
control firms is higher than the ratio of the SEO firms when CFO is positive, but the
difference is not statistically significant (z = — 1.43). This indicates that the SEO firms tend
to report more positive earnings than the non-SEO firms when they contemplate equity
issues in the following year irrespective of their CFO performances.
4.2.2. Entire population for non-SEO firm-year observations
We also replicated the three tests using the entire population of the non-SEO firm-year
obser\'ations (2971 observations) during the study period. We get even stronger results
supporting the eamings management hypothesis of the SEO firms when we compare them
with the entire population of the non-SEO firms. As shown in Table 6, the TA difference
between the SEO firms and the entire population of the non-SEO firms is highly significant at
f=5.56. In addition, when CFO is negative, the Pearson Product Correlation Coefficient
between CFO and NI for the non-SEO population is .1988, while it is .0284 for the SEO firms.
However, when CFO is positive, the coefficient for the non-SEO population is .4678, which is
lower than the SEO firms' coefficient of .6203. The sign-change ratios also support the
earnings-management hypothesis for the SEO firms. When the CFO is negative, the sign-
change ratio for the SEO firms is 91.4% while it is 59.4% for the non-SEO population. When
CFO is positive, the ratio is 4.5% for the SEO firms and 1 5.4% for the non-SEO population. The
differences for the sign-change ratios between the two groups are all statistically significant.
4.3. Additional tests
In this section, we compare operating performances of the SEO firms with the CFO-
matched control firms around the SEOs. In addition, we investigate the main factors related to
the SEO firms to managing eamings before the firms issue seasoned equity stocks. Finally,
we investigate how investors react to eamings management of the SEO firms.
4.5.1. Operating perfi)rmance around seasoned stock issues
We examined both NI and CFO as performance indicators around the 5-year window
centered at the year of SEO and compared them with the CFO-matched control firms. For
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reference, TAs (TA) are also compared. Beginning total assets deflates them. Control firms
were matched based on cash from operations in the year preceding SEOs. Therefore, by
construction, there should be no difference in CFO in year — 1
.
Table 7 reports the results of both t tests (Panel A) and Mann-Whitney tests (Panel B). The
two tests show qualitatively the same results. SEO firms' CFO are significantly greater than
Table 7
Operating performance comparison around the year of SEOs
Panel A: Mean difference test
Year relative
to SEO year
SEO firms
Observed Mean S.E.
CFO-matched control firms
ifference t ratioObserved Vlean S.E. D P value
CFO -2 233 0.0847 0.0076 233 0.0628 0.0071 0.0219 2.13 .034
-1 249 0.0325 0.0073 249 0.0323 0.0069 0.0002 0.01 .988
246 0.0107 0.0071 243 0.0125 0.0066 --0.0018 -0.19 .849
1 238 0.0180 0.0070 237 0.0207 0.0071 --0.0027 -0.27 .787
2 223 0.0321 0.0076 222 0.0331 0.0073 --0.0010 -0.09 .927
NI -2 233 0.0295 0.0041 233 0.0226 0.0034 0.0069 1.30 .195
-1 249 0.0371 0.0032 249 0.0132 0.0040 0.0239 4.63 .000
246 0.0247 0.0040 243 0.0050 0.0056 0.0197 2.87 .004
1 238 -0.0016 0.0065 237 -0.0122 0.0070 0.0106 1.12 .264
2 223 - 0.0203 0.0081 222 -0.0166 0.0082 --0.0037 -0.31 .754
TA -2 233 -0.0551 0.0068 233 - 0.0403 0.0060 --0.0148 -1.65 .103
-1 249 0.0058 0.0071 249 -0.0184 0.0057 0.0242 2.67 .008
246 0.0145 0.0074 243 - 0.0049 0.0065 0.0193 1.97 .049
1 238 -0.0196 0.0079 237 - 0.0324 0.0074 0.0127 1.17 .241
2 223 -0.0557 0.0091 222 - 0.0498 0.0079 --0.0059 -0.49 .622
Panel B: Mann -Whitney test
CFO matched
Year relative
to SEO year
SEO firms control firms
W valueObserved Median Observed Median P value
CFO -2 233 0.0876 233 0.0689 57,539 .031
-1 249 0.0279 249 0.0321 61,863 .870
246 0.0105 243 0.0226 59,089 .450
1 238 0.0127 237 0.0225 56,121 .727
2 223 0.0328 222 0.0262 50,249 .702
NI -2 233 0.0223 233 0.0169 56,938 .082
-1 249 0.0227 249 0.0154 68,641 .000
246 0.0163 243 0.0113 64,184 .012
1 238 0.0105 237 0.0084 58,674 .174
2 223 0.0085 222 0.0096 49,180 .686
TA -2 233 - 0.0605 233 -0.0491 51,185 .026
- 1 249 -0.0101 249 - 0.0240 66.049 .015
246 0.0082 243 -0.0152 64,160 .013
1 238 -0.0158 238 - 0.0279 58,386 .244
2 223 - 0.0455 222 - 0.0420 49,011 .597
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Other firms in year — 2.'"^ There is no difference in CFOs, however, between the SEO firms
and the matched control firms in the year of SEO and the following years.'''
In contrast, NIs are significantly higher for the SEO firms in the year preceding and the
year of SEO than for the matched-control firms. This is supported by the significantly greater
TAs for the SEO firms than for the CFO-matched control firms in the 2 years. '^
The findings, unlike some of the prior studies, reveal that there is no real difference in
operating performances between the SEO firms and the CFO-matched control firms. Prior
studies document underperformance of SEO firms in the years following SEOs. For our
study, the SEO firms tend to increase NIs in the year prior to and in the SEO year.
4.3.2. Earnings management inducing factors
After we confirmed the earnings-management practices by the SEO firms, we then
investigated the factors that influence the DAs. A multiple regression approach is used to
identify the important factors that relate to earnings-management practices. We reviewed prior
studies to design the multiple-regression analysis. The three most commonly cited variables
are firm size, debt ratios, and CFOs. These three variables are hypothesized to have a negative
relationship to the discretionary accruals. CFOs are expected to be a major determinant for
discretionary accruals. If CFOs are poor, then firms may have incentives to increase NIs. On
the other hand, if CFOs are good, then firms may have incentives to reduce NIs in order to
reduce political costs and/or tax expenses. Some additional factors may motivate the SEO
firms to manage earnings. We believe that the offer size and the time lag between the fiscal
year-end and the month of SEO may influence the degree of eamings management. We
hypothesize that the larger the offer size, the more is at stake for the SEO firms. Con-
sequently, these firms are more likely to employ earnings-management strategies. Further-
more, the shorter the time lag between fiscal year-end and the date of the SEO, the more like
managers may be to choose income-increasing accounting strategies. In sum, we expect the
degree of eamings management for the SEO firms to be associated positively with the offer
size and negatively with the time lag. Therefore, we can set up a regression model as follows
to explain the variability of the DAs for the SEO firms (Eq. (3)):
DA,7 = ao + ai SIZE,, + aiLEV/, + asCFO,, + a4lNC,7 + asLAGy, + vy, (3)
DA is defined in Eq. (2). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the beginning total assets. CFO is
cash fi-om operations scaled by the beginning total assets. INC is the offer size measured in
''*
It is not clear whether good operating cash flows led the SEO firms to plan SEOs.
'^ Even though operating cash flows decrease drastically around the SEO year, the cash flows tend to increase
2 years after SEOs. The decrease in operating cash flows may partly be attributable to the 1 997 Korean financial crisis.
"^ The total accruals can be compared to the total accruals of US SEOs. According to Teoh et al. (1998), total
accruals over beginning total assets average 0.0027, 0.0269, 0.0392, — 0.0063, and — 0.0450 over the 5-year
period centered at the SEO years. They are - 0.0551, 0.0058, 0.0145, - 0.0196, and - 0.0557 for the Korean
SEO firms. Therefore, we cannot say, in general, that management of Korean firms have more flexibility and
discretion than the management of US.
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Table 8
Results of the analysis of earnings management inducement
Variables Coefficient Standard errors t ratio P value Adjusted /?"
.629Constant 0.1835 0.0566 3.24 .001
SIZE - 0.0039 0.0031 -1.24 .217
LEV -0.0856 0.0286 -2.99 .003
CFO - 0.6636 0.0325 - 20.43 .000
INC - 0.0229 0.0126 1.82 .070
LAG -0.0005 0.0012 -0.40 .686
Model: DA „ = afl + a,SIZE„ + a2LEV„ + a3 CFO,, + a4lNC„ + Q5LAG,, + e„.
terms of the rate of capital stock increase as a result of the SEO. LAG is the time lag between
the fiscal year-end and the month for the SEOs.
The multiple-regression results are reported in Table 8. The regression results reveal that
the DAs are heavily dependent on and negatively associated with CFO. The results are
consistent with Yoon (1998) that CFO is the major determinant of earnings managements by
Korean firms. The results also indicate that DAs are negatively associated with the debt ratio.
The debt ratio is inconsistent with the general expectation that highly levered firms will tend
to increase NIs. Furthermore, the offer size is slightly positively related with the DAs. This is
consistent with our expectation that the higher the offer size, the more likely a firm is to
increase NIs. Ex ante, both firm size and the time lag are expected to have negative
relationships with accruals. Perhaps the SEO firms focus on increasing NIs given all other
factors. Irrespective of their size, the firms may focus on the best accounting choices that will
help the firms successfully carry out their SEO plans. In addition, the SEO firms plan their
SEOs well in advance so that management may make their accounting policy choices in the
year preceding the SEOs. Hence, the time lags would not affect their accounting choices.
4.3.3. Stock market reactions to DAs
Because some managers may use DAs opportunistically, we examined how the stock
market reacts to DAs. Rational investors may react negatively to DAs. Investors could react
to DAs positively or neutrally if accrual earnings regarded as superior measures of firm
performance than cash flows because they mitigate timing and mismatching problems
inherent in measuring cash flows over short intervals (Dechow, 1994; Subramanyam,
1996). Furthermore, investors may also react positively to DAs if they are functionally
fixated on NIs by failing to unscramble the cash flow implications for DAs. ' ^
Subramanyam (1996) provides two alternative scenarios related to the pricing of DAs. In
the first scenario, the market is rational and prices the DAs because it improves the ability
'^ Traditionally, more shares are held by individual investors than by institutional investors in Korea. When a
firm goes public in the Korea Stock Exchange, they are required to provide at least 30% of outstanding shares to
the general public. These may lead some observers to believe that the Korea Stock Exchange may not be as
efficient as other established stock markets such as the New York Stock Exchange.
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of earnings to reflect the economic value of the firm. In the second scenario, DAs may
distort earnings because DAs are evidence of mispricing, i.e., investors are functionally
fixated on earnings. He documents that the market prices DAs positively, indicating that the
first scenario is supported.
Another possible scenario is that if DAs distort earnings, investors will correctly reflect the
distortion so that they will react negatively to income-increasing strategies. We argue that the
SEO firms will use DAs opportunistically and, hence, if investors are rational they should react
negatively to DAs. To test our hypothesis, we run the following regression model (Eq. (4)):
CAR, = oo + aiZ) + a2NI, + (I2.D * NI, + o^DA, + asD * DA, -f e, (4)
CARs are market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns measured as geometric annual
returns. It is measured over a 12-month period ending 3 months after the fiscal year end of the
preceding year of SEOs. The 12-month retum is believed to reflect the information content of
fmancial reporting for the year preceding SEOs. Z) is a dummy variable taking on the value of
1 for SEO firms and for non-SEO firms. We assume that the SEO firms, therefore, utilize
DAs more opportunistically than the non-SEO firms. We expect that investors will pay more
attention to the SEO firms. That is, investors will react to the SEO firms' NIs more sensitively
than to the non-SEO firms. Since prior studies document that investor reaction to NIs is
generally significantly positive, we include NI as the control variable together with DA, the
main variable in our study. '^ The dummy variables should capture the differences in mean
cumulative abnormal retums and the regression coefficients on the two explanatory variables
between the treatment sample and the control sample.
The results of the analysis of the stock market reaction to DAs are presented in Table 9.'*'
The regression analysis indicates that the market reacts positively to net income but
negatively to DAs. The results imply that the market correctly interprets the cash flow
implications of the SEO firms' DAs even though the SEO firms employ DAs opportunisti-
cally. Furthermore, the market reacts more sensitively to the SEO firms than to the non-SEO
firms. The regression coefficients of NI and DA for the non-SEO firms are not statistically
significant even though the variables show the expected signs. However, the coefficients are
highly significant for the SEO firms. For example, the SEO firms' regression coefficient of
' We admit that Subramanyam's approach to regress retums on earnings and its components is appropriate.
We rephcated his approach and the resuhs are quahtatively similar to the ones reported in our study. Even though
discretionary accruals are components of earnings, the correlation coefficients between NI and DA are modest at
.2425 for our sample. They are much weaker than the ones between CFO and DA at — .4839 for our sample.
Therefore, we decided to use NI as the control variable and, fiirthermore. the explanatory power is highest when
we use NI.
'^ The sample size was fiirther decreased to 424 firms (201 SEO firms and 223 non-SEO firms). Seven firms
were dropped because of stock retum data unavailability (five for the SEO firms and two for the non-SEO firms).
Forty-three SEO firms were found to have increased their capital stock either before the firms went public or
within 1 year after their initial public ofiFenngs. These SEO firms were also dropped in the analysis. Finally, 24 of
the non-SEO firms were matched with the SEO firms before they went public and. therefore, dropped in the
analysis. Financial statements are available on the KJS-FAS database even before they are listed on the Korean
Stock Exchange.
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Table 9
Results of the market reaction analysis to discretionary accruals
Variables Coefficient Standard errors t ratio P level Adjusted R'
.075Constant 0.0287 0.0313 0.92 .359
D - 0.0474 0.0494 -0.96 .338
NI 0.6716 0.6088 1.10 .271
D*NI 3.6330 1.1179 3.25 .001
DA -0.2271 0.4819 --0.47 .638
D*DA -1.6471 0.6264 -2.63 .009
Model: CAR, = cYo + aiD + a-i NI, + a ,D*NI, + a4DAi + asD*DAi + £ I-
— 1.8742 for DA is much stronger than that of — .2271 for the non-SEO firms. Similarly, the
regression coefficient of NI increases from .6716 for the non-SEO firms to 4.3046 for the
SEO firms. This implies that investors pay more attention to the SEO firms than to the non-
SEO firms and react more sensitively. Apparently some firms opportunistically make use of
DAs to make the firms look relatively better in the year preceding their SEOs. The market,
however, reacts rationally by discounting the DAs. In other words, the market rewards the
SEO firms more favorably if their operating performance is good, probably because they also
see the growth potential for the SEO firms. The market penalizes the firms more severely if
their operating performance is bad and the firms seek to fool investors by favorably painting
their performance. ~° Therefore, the SEO firms' opportunistic utilization of DAs, by the
negative CFO subgroup firms does not appear to have been rewarded by the stock market.
Another question may arise related to who benefits from or who is hurt by the earnings-
management behavior of the SEO firms. From the results of the association test, one might
conclude that the SEO firms manage earnings in vain or that the market penalizes the SEO
firms. Any conclusions must be evaluated carefully. Obviously, the SEO firms would manage
earnings in the preceding years of SEO in the hope that the practice would help the firms
carry out their SEO plans. Some may argue that SEO firms' earnings management is rational
since investors infer earnings management and rationally undo its effects at equity-offering
announcements (Shivakumar, 2000). Others may argue that investors are temporarily fooled
by the earnings-management practices and penalize the SEO firms when they later find out
about the practices (Teoh et al., 1998). Both arguments could be true. Some SEO firms may
manage earnings to carry out successfully their SEO plans when the firms need cash and
equally attractive alternatives are not available. Maybe the firms do not believe that investors
can see through the earnings management activities thoroughly even though the stock market
can be collectively efficient.
^° The mean CAR values for the SEO firnis are - 0.0285 for the negative CFO subgroup and 0.1213 for the
positive CFO subgroup. The difference in mean CAR between the negative CFO subgroup and the positive CFO
subgroup is statistically significant at a t ratio of - 2.32. The mean CAR for the non-SEO firms are 0.0192 for the
negative CFO subgroup and 0.0434 for the positive subgroup. The difference in mean CAR between the two
subgroups of CFO is not significant at a t ratio of — 0.35 for the non-SEO firms. This indicates that the average
CAR are clearly dichotomized depending on the performance measured in tenns of CFO for the SEO firms.
However, the average CAR value of the two CFO subgroups is not different for the non-SEO firms.
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5. Conclusions
We investigated 249 Korean SEO firms during the period 1995-1997 to determine whether
firms manage earnings in the year preceding a planned seasoned equity issue of stocks.
We developed a model to estimate DAs. In developing the model, we attempted to include
the variables that have both ex ante relationships with non-DAs and high explanatory powers.
The results indicate that our model has a much better goodness-of-fit than other commonly
used models including the modified Jones model.
Based on three test methods (accrual difference, correlation, and sign-change ratio), we
document that the Korean firms contemplating seasoned equity issues in the following year
manage earnings, particularly when their relative performances are poor. When firms have
plans to issue seasoned equity stocks in the following year, virtually all of the negadve CFO
firms increase NIs to such an extent that their NIs become positive. The results consistently
support the earnings-management hypothesis for the negative operating-cash-flow firms
irrespective of test methods and control samples.
However, unlike some prior studies investigating operating performances of SEO firms
surrounding the year of SEO, the SEO firms for our study did not perform poorly in the
periods following SEOs as compared to non-SEO firms. This indicates that although the SEO
firms may manage earnings to successfully implement their SEO plans, these firms may still
perform adequately in future years.
We regressed the DAs on some variables to identify the factors that drive firms to manage
earnings. Our regression analysis reveals that CFO is the major determinant for earnings-
management practices. Offer size also affects the earnings management for the SEO firms.
Our association tests between cumulative abnormal returns and DAs indicate that the
market reacts positively to net income but negatively to DAs. The results imply that the
market correctly sees the cash flow implications of the SEO firms' DAs. The market reacts
more sensitively to the SEO firms than to the non-SEO firms, implying that investors pay
more attention to the SEO firms than to the non-SEO firms. Even though firms opportunisti-
cally make use of DAs to make them look better in the year preceding their SEO, the market
is not fooled and reacts rationally by discounting the DAs.
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, the modified Jones model, which was
proven by many prior studies to be a good model in estimating DAs, was found to have a
serious misspecification problem in Korea. The relative goodness-of-fit problem clearly needs
to be closely studied empirically in future studies.
Second, the SEO firms in general employ earnings-management practices. However, we
did not examine which vehicles were most often used in managing NIs. An additional study is
needed to explore the most frequently used vehicles for earnings-management practices.
Third, the stock return performances for SEO firms after the issuance of their SEOs are
not examined in this study. Future research may be needed to analyze stock performance
after the SEOs.
Fourth, we limited our study to the SEO firms after the introduction of the cash flow
statements in the Korean Accounting Standards to minimize the measurement errors. Future
studies can extend our study by augmenting the study period.
II
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1. Introduction
In this study, the authors examine whether managers of a sample of Korean firms, which
undertake seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), use discretionary accruals to increase reported
earnings prior to the SEO. To measure the discretionary portion of accruals, the authors
modify the Jones models of discretionary accruals. Using matched-pair comparisons, they
measure the relative distribution of discretionary accruals. They further partition the sample
into firms with good and poor operating performance (where positive operating cash flows
proxy for good performance and negative operating cash flows proxy for poor performance).
They report evidence supporting their hypothesis, that managers record income-increasing
discretionary accruals in the year prior to the SEO, and provide evidence of firm character-
istics associated with greater use of income-increasing discretionary accruals (e.g., firm size
and operating performance). Finally, they report a negative relation between contempor-
aneous market-adjusted retums and discretionary accruals after controlling for net income.
2. Motivation
Earnings management using discretionary accruals has been examined in some depth in the
prior literature. Further, Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) examine
abnormal accruals around SEOs in the US market. This paper extends the literature by
examining the same issue in a sample of Korean firms. While such an extension is potentially
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interesting, the authors do not explain what we learn by replicating prior studies in this
setting. To make a more meaningful contribution, the authors should explain the unique
characteristics of their Korean sample or of the Korean capital market and provide reasons
why the results using a sample of Korean firms would be expected to differ from those using
the sample of US firms in prior studies. For example, the authors find that the nondiscre-
tionary accruals models used in the prior literature do not fit the data for their sample. We
believe that this is an important observation and it would be interesting to determine whether
this is due to differences in economic circumstances, accounting treatments, or managerial
incentives. The authors could use their expertise and experience to help readers to understand
the limitations of applying the (unmodified) Jones model in other settings. Currently, the
authors merely mention this finding in a footnote, as a justification for using their modified
model. The reader is left wondering whether this model is designed to be a general im-
provement over the Jones model or is specific to their sample.
3. Discussion of methodologies
3.1. Estimation ofdiscretionary accruals
The authors begin by developing a new empirical model for estimating expected accruals
by combining portions of the modified Jones (1991) and the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan
(1995) models. They regress total accruals on change in cash revenues, change in cash
expenses, and the level of noncash expenses, all scaled by net assets. This model incorporates
both revenue and expense components as predictors of the level of total accruals. In addition,
the model replaces the level of fixed assets, as used by Jones, with lagged depreciation
modified by the growth in fixed assets. As is typical, the model is estimated within years and
within industry classifications.
The Jones ( 1 99 1 ) model has been justifiably criticized for potential misspecification error
when explaining the variation in total accruals for US samples (Dechow, Sabino, & Sloan,
1998; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1997). Given the
similarities between the Jones model and the model used in this paper, the authors should
explore their model's potential misspecification of nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary.
For example, their expected-accruals model achieves an average R" of only .32. Therefore,
using this model, almost 70% of the variation in total accruals is interpreted as discretionary.
Table 2 reports that mean discretionary accruals are 1.5% of total assets and that the standard
deviation is 8.6% of total assets, implying that approximately one third of the managers use
their discretion to increase earnings by more than 5% of total assets. This is greater than the
average net income for these firms. While this is similar to the findings in other discretionary
accruals papers (e.g., Xie, 2001), the authors should acknowledge that the residuals are only
rough proxies for managerial discretion.
Dechow et al. (1998) find evidence that the Jones (1991) model is most likely to mis-
identify income-increasing earnings management for finns with unusually low cash flows.
Partitioning on cash flows is precisely the partitioning used in this paper. Therefore, the
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authors should address the possibiUty that the low-performance bias found by Dechow et al.
may also afflict the model used in this paper. The misclassification issue is important because
it affects the interpretation of results.
3.2. Tests of earnings management
The authors provide evidence of earnings management using three tests of abnormal
accruals across matched samples. First, they compare the mean discretionary accruals of the
SEO firms and the matched non-SEO firms. They perform tests on the differences for the full
sample and for the operating performance subsamples. Second, they compare the correlation
between reported net income and cash flows for SEO and non-SEO firms. Third, they use a
nonparametric sign test and compare the frequency of opposite signs for net income and cash
flows across the SEO and non-SEO firms.
We are somewhat concerned about the matched-pair design because the economics of the
matching firms differ in at least one fundamental way from those of the sample firms: The
sample firms all need to raise capital and the matched firms do not. Managers access the
capital markets to meet economic needs that, in turn, affect income. Moreover, firms
experiencing little growth and firms with short operating cycles should have the highest
correlation between cash flows and earnings, while firms with the highest rate of growth and
firms with longer operating cycles should have lower correlations (Dechow, 1994). Given the
likelihood that a large portion of the measured discretionary accruals is due to measurement
error rather than managers' manipulation of accounting numbers, differential economic
factors may be the source of the differences in the level of measured discretionary accruals.'
3.3. Stock market reactions to discretionary accruals
The authors attempt to provide evidence on the degree to which stock prices react to
discretionary accruals. Specifically, the authors predict that "under the efficient market
hypothesis, the market will react negatively to discretionary accruals" if managers use
discretionary accruals opportunistically. They estimate the following regression in an attempt
to test this prediction:
CAR/ = ao + aiA + a2NI/ + asANI, + a4DA, + asADA, + z
where Z), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation is an SEO firm, NI is net income,
DA is their estimate of discretionary accruals, and returns are cumulated over a 12-month
window. Based on the results from estimating this regression, the authors claim that (1) the
market reacts "negatively" to discretionary accruals; (2) the market correctly interprets the
cash flow implications of discretionary accruals in that the coefficient on DA is more negative
for SEO firms; (3) investors "pay more attention" to SEO firm earnings and discretionary
The authors' additional analysis controlling for past asset growth provides some assurance that the results are
not driven by differential growth rates. Given the importance of differential growth, this partitioning should
probably be incorporated into the paper's main analysis.
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accruals and react "more sensitively"; and (4) the opportunistic use of discretionary accruals
by SEO firm managers is not rewarded by the stock market.
We believe these conclusions are based on a misinterpretation of the estimated coefficients.
When interpreting the regression results, it is important to remember that discretionary
accruals affect both NI and DA. In addition, the coefficients associated with the indicator
variables represent the incremental coefficient for SEO firms as compared with non-SEO
firms. Consequently, the overall price effect from US$1 ofDA is (0^2 + a4) for non-SEO firms
and (a2 + 0^3 + a4 + as) for SEO firms. Similarly, the overall price effect from US$ 1 of NI is
(a^ + as) for SEO firms. Below is a table, based on the results in Table 9, containing
estimated overall price response coefficients associated with NI and DA;
Non-SEO firms SEO firms
Price response to NI 0.6716 4.3046''
Price response to DA 0.4445'' 2.4304''
0.6716 + 3.6330.
0.6716-0.2271.
0.6716 + 3.6330-0.2271-1.6471,
Given these coefficients, we reexamine the paper's stated findings.
The market reacts "negatively" to DA. This conclusion is incorrect. The price-response
coefficients associated with DA are positive for both groups of firms.
The market correctly interprets the cashflow implications ofdiscretionary accruals in that
SEO firms have a more negative coefficient on DA. Based on the authors' maintained
assumption that SEO firms opportunistically manage accruals, this conclusion is not correct.
The market values discretionary accruals of SEO firms more positively than non-SEO firms.
Either market participants misinterpret SEO firms' discretionary accruals or managers of SEO
firms do not opportunistically manage discretionary accruals.
Investors "pay more attention " to SEO firm earnings and DA and react "more
sensitively. " Long-window-retums tests cannot tell us anything about the degree to which
investors attend to the information contained in earnings—only the degree to which changes
in prices are associated with the components of earnings. The results show that returns are
more highly associated with SEO earnings and discretionary accruals than with equivalent
amounts of non-SEO earnings and discretionary accruals. This can be interpreted as evidence
that market participants expect SEO earnings and discretionary accruals to be more persistent
than non-SEO earnings and accruals. This resuh is the opposite of what one would expect if
managers of SEO firms practice earnings management, and leads us to suspect that the SEO
firms are in very different economic circumstances than the non-SEO firms. As such, it would
be interesting to compare the subsequent realized-eamings growth for SEO firms and non-
SEO firms.
The market does not reward the use of opportunistic discretionary accruals by SEO firm
managers. The regression results clearly contradict this conclusion. The overall coefficient on
DA is positive for both groups and even more positive for the SEO group. In fact, the results
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are exactly what we would expect if investors see discretionary accruals as measuring firm
performance with error. This could either happen because the discretionary accruals are
themselves informative or because the expected-accruals model misestimates the amount of
managerial discretion.
In sum, the four conclusions drawn by the authors are not supported by the results of the
regression when those results are properly interpreted. What conclusions can be drawn from
the results? First, the market values the earnings of SEO firms much more highly than non-
SEO firms. Second, the market values DA of SEO firms much more highly than those of non-
SEO firms. Third, the market discounts the value of DA as compared with NI, but still places
significant weight on DA. Finally, the significant coefficient on DA for SEO firms as
compared with non-SEO firms casts doubt on the study's central finding of opportunistic
earnings management prior to SEOs. These results are consistent with market participants
expecting the earnings of SEO firms to grow at a faster rate than earnings of non-SEO firms.
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1. Introduction
This discussion tries to avoid any overiaps with the discussion by Chambers and Myers.
The paper by Yoon and Miller investigates whether Korean firms making seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs) during the 1995-1997 period manage earnings in the year preceding the
one in which they contemplate making the SEO. The authors rely primarily on prior U.S.
literature and models that have performed reasonably well using U.S. data to develop and test
their propositions. The results of their study are generally not consistent with this prior U.S.
evidence, particularly the goodness-of-fit performance of the modified Jones model (Dechow,
Sloan, & Sweeny, 1995), and the operating performance of the SEO firms in the periods
following SEOs (see, for example, Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998).
This discussion of the paper focuses on two main issues: (a) additional discussion of the
accounting literature that focuses on the motivations and characteristics of firms that manage
eamings to obtain external financing at the most favorable terms, and (b) suggestions for how
this paper and future multicountry research that investigates issues already investigated in one
country could possibly make a greater contribution to the theory and literature by examining
relevant institutional differences between the respective countries. The discussion also briefly
comments on the interpretation of the results of the Korean SEO firms' operating per-
formance in the periods following SEOs, and the Korean stock market reactions to discre-
tionary accruals.
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2. Accounting literature
The earnings management literature has long maintained that the desire to obtain external
financing at the most favorable terms creates incentives for management to manage eamings
(e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Jiambalvo, 1996). For example, Dechow et al. (1995, p. 1) present
evidence that "an important motivation for eamings manipulation is the desire to attract
external financing at low cost." SEOs thus create excellent incentives; such firms want the
market to pay as much as possible for the securities to be issued. And the stronger the incen-
tives, the more likely some forms of eamings management will occur. Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) also find that firms with poor economic performance have greater, and possibly
different, incentives to manage eamings than firms exhibiting strong economic performance.
Dechow et al. (1995) also find that controlling for financial performance is important to
examining earnings-management behavior. Consistent with this literature, Yoon and Miller
hypothesize and present evidence that Korean SEO firms manage eamings in the year pre-
ceding the year in which they contemplate SEOs, especially when their operating performance
is poor or the offer-size is large.
Other relevant literature suggests there are additional factors that influence eamings man-
agement behavior. For example, McNichols, Wilson, and DeAngelo (1988) and Kinnunen,
Kasanen, and Niskanen (1995) present evidence that eamings-management behavior differs
across industries. Dechow et al. (1995) also identify ownership as a relevant characteristic:
firms that manipulate eamings tend to be closely held. Carlson and Bathala (1997) also report
on ownership differences and firm income-smoothing behavior. However, apart from footnote
25 stating, "traditionally, more shares are held by individual investors than by institutional
investors in Korea," Yoon and Miller do not provide any evidence about the ownership of the
Korean SEO firms.
Another possibly relevant empirical finding is that of Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993),
which finds little evidence of eamings management prior to initial public offerings. Whether
the same evidence holds for Korean initial public-offering firms could be of some interest in
explaining the inconsistent results for Korean SEO firms.
3. Institutional differences between the United States and Korea
Similar studies undertaken in different regulatory and financial reporting environments
would likely make a greater contribution to the literature if important institutional differences
could be identified. This is particularly so when the results obtained are different from the prior
research. Yoon and Miller (footnote 12, p. 13) find that the modified Jones model (Dechow et
al., 1995), which has performed reasonably well in estimating discrefionary accmals in many
prior studies undertaken in the United States, exhibits little explanatory power in explaining
total accmals of Korean SEO firms during the 1993-1997 period. However, their paper does
not elaborate on any of the accounting or other relevant differences between the Korean and
U.S. financial-reporting environments during the period of their study that could possibly
explain this inconsistency. It alludes (p. 1) only to the "less stringent financial-reporting
1
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environment including lenient audit opinions and a lack of general oversight functions," and
discusses some "notable changes" after the 1997 financial crisis.
There are two ways that differences in these respective U.S. and Korean financial reporting
environments could contribute to explaining differences in the explanatory variables and
consequent performance of the test models in such studies. First, there are likely differences
in the interpretation and implementation of the accounting rules and standards that could
result in "more liberal" revenue recognition, amortization, provision, write-off, etc. practices,
together with auditor concurrence, in Korea. Second, there are some particular differences in
the accounting standards that would likely result in significant differences in some of the
model variables. For example, the practice of permitted discretionary revaluation of non-
current assets (banned in the United States by the SEC since 1933), affects the reported
amounts of the variables "noncash expenses such as depreciation," "rate of growth in gross
property, plant and equipment," and "total assets at the beginning of the period." Some
empirical examination of the extent to which such differences affect the explanatory varia-
bles could possibly explain differences in the performance of the modified Jones model in
the two countries.
4. Additional remarks
The study was undertaken in the period preceding the Asian financial crisis, a period of
very high growth in reported firm incomes and stock prices. It is possible that the inconsistent
empirical fmding that Korean SEO firms did not perform poorly in the periods following
SEOs as compared to U.S. firms that experience poor operating performance after the stock
issuance is attributable to this factor, rather than Korean SEO firms' ability to "manage
eamings to successfully implement their SEO plans, . . . [and] still perform adequately in
fiiture years" (p. 29). Similarly, this pre-Asian financial crisis time period of the study implies
that caution must be exercised in interpretation of the (consistent with U.S. evidence) finding
that the stock market reacts positively to net income but negatively to discretionary accruals.
5. Conclusion
The authors' motivation for this study is to investigate whether Korean SEO firms manage
eamings in the year preceding the issue of seasoned equity stocks. The study relies on prior
U.S. literature and test methods, but subsequently finds inconsistencies in the explanatory
power of the modified Jones model used in many prior U.S. studies and in some of the em-
pirical results. From an academic-accounting viewpoint, the paper could possibly make a
greater contribution if the authors focused on identifying institutional differences between the
U.S. and Korean financial-reporting environments, particularly those accounting differences
that relate to the explanatory variables in the models used. Similarly, caution should be exer-
cised in the interpretation of the results, and the paper in its present form would be of limited
use to practitioners and regulators.
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We acknowledge the invaluable comments from Dennis J. Chambers and James N. Myers
of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Trevor Wilkins of the National
University of Singapore. We also acknowledge helpful comments from the participants of the
Illinois International Accounting Summer Conference held in June 2001.
Now, we will respond to the reviewers' comments one by one. However, their comments
are not incorporated in the paper since we were asked by the editor of the journal to reply to
comments in a separate reply rather than to revise the paper.
Wilkins (2002) suggests additional prior studies to be relevant for the paper Specifically,
he suggests that such studies as Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993), Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), and Jiambalvo (1996) are relevant prior studies.
He also suggests that earnings-management behavior differs across industries (Kinnunen,
Kasanen, & Niskanen, 1995; McNichols & Wilson, 1988) and that ownership is a relevant
factor in earnings-management studies (Carlson & Bathala, 1997; Dechow et al., 1995). We
agree that those are proper prior studies. In addition, Yoon, Wee, Baik, and Miller (2001)
document that IPO-related stringent regulations prevent Korean IPO firms from managing
eamings prior to the IPO year
Both sets of comments suggest that we should explain the unique characteristics of the
Korean sample and provide reasons why the results using a sample of Korean firms would be
expected to differ from the results using the sample of US firms in prior studies.
As described in the paper, the Korean accounting standards basically adopt the US GAAP.
However, there are some nontrivial differences in accounting standards between the two
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countries. For example, asset revaluation accounting, pension accounting, and foreign
currency transaction accounting are notable differences. Until the year 2000, Korean firms
had been allowed to revalue operation-related assets using replacement costs. This could result
in relative overstatement of total assets of the Korean sample. Pension accounting is not
adopted in Korea. Instead, periodic allowance for one-time retirement benefit payments is
used. Accounting for foreign transaction gains and losses was subject to politicization. For
some firms, its impact on financial position and operating performance was enormous. For
example, firms were required to include foreign transaction gains and losses in net income
until 1995. However, in 1996, they had been allowed to bypass the income statements. In
1997, firms were even allowed to capitalize them as deferred assets. Now, the foreign
transaction gains and losses are required to be included in the income statements.
Furthermore, Korean firms are believed to have followed more liberal revenue recognition,
amortization, provision, and write-off practices even though the accounting standards are
seemingly as rigid as the US GAAP in most of the specific standards.
Because of institutional differences between the US and Korean accounting environments,
the variables used in the study may be slightly different from the US samples. For example,
most of the variables used in this study might be understated since total assets of some
Korean firms are relatively overstated as a result of discretionary asset revaluations.
Specifically, the main variables of interests in this study like NI (net income), CFO (cash
fi'om operations), TA (total accruals), and DA (discretionary accruals) might be understated to
a certain degree because of the standardization by the total assets. GPPEGRW (growth rates
of gross property, plant, and equipment) may also include the impact of asset revaluations.
Lastly, one of the major components of NCASH (noncash expenses) is the allowance for
retirement benefit payments since the allowance is mostly unfunded liabilities in Korea. Ifwe
do not take into account the effect of the allowance for the retirement benefit payments, we
may underestimate the noncurrent accruals.
We think the model used in the study can be justified in terms of both theoretical
improvement and better fit to the Korean data. Even though the modified Jones model has
been widely used, it has also been criticized for potential misspecification error even for US
samples (Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1997). The modified Jones model uses change variables for
total accruals (dependent variable) and the change in cash sales (proxy for current accruals) and
level variable for GPPE (proxy for noncurrent accruals). Improper matching between the
dependent variable (a change variable) and GPPE (a level variable) may explain the poor fit of
the modified Jones model. In addition, it does not take into account the fact that current
accruals are composed of operation-related current assets and current liabilities as well. In
addition, the size variable ( 1 /total assets) in the modified Jones model is not supposed to covary
with total accruals by construction since it is the byproduct of standardizing a constant term by
total assets. Therefore, development of a better-fitting model may be justified. Furthermore,
differences in economic environments such as managerial incentives, regulations, and
accounting standards may justify the development of a proper model to fit Korean data.
Chambers and Myers (2002) asked us to explore our model's potential misspecification of
nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary and acknowledge that the residuals are only rough
proxies for managerial discretion. Given the similarities between the modified Jones model
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(1995) and the model used in this study, we admit that our model is not without mis-
specification errors. Our model's average /•" is only .32. Hence, about 68% of total variation in
total accruals are not explained by the explanatory variables and interpreted as discretionary.
Even though our model's explanatory power is much greater than that of the modified Jones
model, we still suffer from potential misspecification errors. Therefore, we admit that the
discretionary accruals of our study are still rough proxies for true discretionary accruals. This
partly justifies the use of total accruals as a complement in studies of this nature.
Chambers and Myers (2002) and Wilkins (2002) suggest that we reconsider the design and
interpretations of the stock market reaction to accruals. Wilkins suggests that caution be
exercised in the interpretations of the fmdings that the stock market reacts positively to net
income but negatively to discretionary accruals. Chambers and Myers argue that we
incorrectly attempt to provide evidence on the degree to which stock prices react to discre-
tionary accruals. They ask that both model and interpretations should be properly modified.
They suggest that we use NIBDA (net income before discretionary accruals) instead of NI
(net income). We agree that their suggestion is reasonable. While our original model focuses
on NI and DA, their suggestion focuses on the elimination of possible misinterpretations
caused by the double inclusion of discretionary accruals both in NI and DA. When we follow
their suggestions, we get the following results for Table 1
.
The revised regression analysis indicates that the market reacts positively both to NIBDA
and to DA. The results imply that the market fails to correctly interpret the cash-flow im-
plications of the SEO firms' discretionary accruals when the SEO firms employ discretionary
accruals opportunistically, since investors are expected to respond negatively to discretionary
accruals if the market is fiilly efficient.
The regression coefficients of NIBDA and DA are statistically significant for the SEO
firms but not so for the non-SEO firms. This implies that the market values SEO earnings
much more highly than non-SEO earnings. Likewise, the market values DA of SEO firms
much more highly than that of non-SEO firms. For example, the SEO firms' regression
coefficient of 2.4303 for DA is much stronger than that of 0.4444 for the non-SEO firms.
Similarly, the regression coefficient ofNIBDA increases from 0.6716 for the non-SEO firms
to 4.3046 for the SEO fums. Furthermore, DA response coefficients are discounted as com-
Table 1
Results of the market reaction analysis to discretionary accruals
Variables Coefficient Standard errors t ratio P-level Adj. ;-
Constant 0.0287 0.0313 0.92 .359 .075
D - 0.0474 0.0494 -0.96 .338
NffiDA 0.6716 0.6088 1.10 .271
D X NIBDA 3.6330 1.1179 3.25 .001
DA 0.4444 0.6272 0.71 .479
DxDA 1.9859 1.1527 1.72 .080
Model: CAR, = a<, + a.D + a2NIBDA, + a^D x NIBDA, + a4DA, + a^D x DA, + £,.
NIBDA is net income before discretionary accruals, which is defined as NI less DA. All the other variables are as
defined in the paper.
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pared with NIBDA. The significantly positive and yet relatively discounted (as compared
with NIBDA coefficient) DA coefficient for SEO firms implies that the market reacts in a
partially rational but also partially inefficient manner by discounting the discretionary ac-
cruals but with wrong signs. In other words, if the market is perfectly efficient, it will
negatively react to discretionary accruals. However, the market reacts positively to discre-
tionary accruals and yet the response coefficients are much lower than the earnings-response
coefficients. This may imply that the market casts doubt on the opportunistic earnings
management of SEO firms.
Therefore, we get different regression results from the results reported in the paper. More
specifically, the coefficient on DA changed from negative significance to positive significance
for SEO firms. The reason for the change in sign of the coefficient comes probably from the
double inclusion ofDA both in NI and in DA, which in turn causes a multicoUinearity problem
and distortion of the coefficient. Therefore, caution must be exercised in designing and
interpreting stock price reactions to accruals.
Chambers and Myers (2002) ask that we address the possibility that the low-performance
bias found by Dechow, Sabino, and Sloan (1998) may also afflict the model used in this
paper. We agree with them in that the low-performance bias can affect our results.
Chambers and Myers (2002) also suggested that we incorporate the comparison between
SEO firms and growth-matched firms into the paper's main analysis. We decided not to
incorporate the third control sample test into our main results partly because the paper is
already fairly voluminous as is and partly because we are supposed to reply to comments rather
than to rewrite the paper
Once again, we acknowledge the invaluable comments by Chambers and Myers (2002)
and Wilkins (2002). Their comments are all relevant and deserve to be incorporated at a
later date. We hope this reply will help readers understand the main theme of our paper
as presented and fill any missing links or blanks that we might have left unanswered in
the paper.
We also express our thanks to Professor Abdel-khalik and The Center for International
Education and Research in Accounting.
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1
Abstract
This paper investigates whether Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
altered their voluntary accounting disclosure behavior over the period of the 1 990s. It implicitly tests
for whether the collapse of Japan's "Financial Bubble" in the late 1980s altered the incentives of
Japanese managers to be more forthcoming about corporate information. Previous research on
Japanese disclosure practices highlights the "secretive" nature of Japanese managers and suggests that
cultural preferences strongly discourage disclosure. Our findings suggest that Japanese disclosure
practices are sensitive to economic conditions. © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Empirical study; Financial disclosure; Japanese companies
1. Introduction
The Japanese economy in the 1990s was subjected to recessionary pressures that were
unprecedented in the post-WWII period. In particular, large-scale capital losses among
Japanese banks and other financial companies, as well as the collapse of Japanese asset
prices, including stock prices, contributed to a significant contraction in the ability (and
willingness) of Japanese companies to raise capital in domestic capital markets. As a
consequence, an increasing number of Japanese companies turned to foreign companies as
equity-based partners, or sold assets and operating businesses to foreign investors.' Japanese
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ron.singleton@wwu.edu (W.R. Singleton), steven.globerman@wwu.edu (S. Globerman).
By way of illustration, foreign direct investment inflows into Japan in 1994 totaled approximately US$1.9
billion. They totaled close to US$5 billion in 1999 (Phillips, 2000). Developments related to inward FDI in Japan
are discussed in Globerman and Kokko (1999).
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companies seeking foreign capital faced strong competition to attract and retain that capital
given the very strong performances of American and European stock markets over the period.
In light of an increased reliance on foreign capital, one might expect Japanese companies
to undertake initiatives to improve the "marketability" of their debt and equity securities in
intemational capital markets. One potential initiative is to "improve" disclosure practices as
they are relevant to foreign investors. There is some theoretical and empirical support for the
assertion that increased disclosure, in circumstances characterized by asymmetric information
between company officials and potential lenders and investors, can reduce a company's cost
of capital." All other things constant, one might expect Japanese companies to incur
additional costs associated with improved disclosure to the extent that any resulting favorable
impacts on capital costs are expected to exceed the additional costs associated with altering
historical disclosure practices.
It seems likely that the profound and widely publicized industrial and financial problems
experienced by Japan in the 1990s would have increased the perceived "nonsystematic" risks
associated with investing in Japanese assets. For example, news of recession and corporate
bankruptcies arguably increased perceived bankruptcy risks across a range of Japanese
industrial sectors. Moreover, foreign investors may have perceived an even greater risk of
Japanese companies holding back economic "bad news" from foreign investors during the
1990s than during the boom times of the 1970s and 1980s. That is, concerns about
opportunistic behavior related to asymmetric information are likely to have grown during
the 1990s.
It therefore seems plausible that Japanese companies may have seen it in their economic
self-interest to alter their disclosure practices during the 1990s. Raskins, Ferris, and Selling
(2000) assert that as an increasing number of large Japanese companies place more emphasis
on foreign equity markets for meeting their capital needs, they will be subjected to more
stringent disclosure requirements. The plausibility of this development is tempered by at least
two considerations. One is that financial analysts' report and other sources of information
about Japanese companies may be sufficiently informative and forthcoming about the
eamings prospects of those companies such that "additional" disclosure by the latter would
have little impact on their costs of capital.^ Put in other words, the informational efficiency of
markets in which Japanese corporate assets are traded may not have been significantly and
adversely affected by economic developments in the 1 990s, and, as a consequence, corporate
incentives to disclose may have been little changed from earlier periods. A second
consideration is that reduced needs for financial capital, given reductions in planned
investment levels, may have mitigated the pressures of increasing costs of capital facing
Japanese companies.
The broad purpose of this paper is to examine whether the "voluntary" disclosure of
Japanese companies changed over the 1990s. In this context, it addresses a relatively narrow
^ See, for example, Botosan (1997), Drake and Peavy (1995), Krishnan. Sankaraguruswamy, and Shin (1996),
and Sengupta (1998). For a contradictory argument, see Penno (1997).
^ In this regard, Botosan (1997) finds for a sample of US companies that there is no association between her
measure of disclosure level and the cost of equity capital for firms with high analyst following.
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aspect of a much broader issue: how have Japanese institutions changed over recent years in
the face of increased global competition for final outputs, as well as for inputs such as
skilled labor and financial capital? For several samples of Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)-
listed companies, we evaluate, using statistical analyses, whether voluntary-disclosure
practices changed systematically from the late- 1980s to the late- 1990s. Our evidence
supports the conclusion that voluntary disclosure increased when comparing the later period
to the earlier period.
This finding is a contribution to the literature, which currently provides relatively little
evidence on the stability of disclosure practices over time. Moreover, our finding contradicts
assertions in the literature that Japanese disclosure practices are relatively rigid and
insensitive to capital market pressures. A broader inference suggested is that economic
circumstances can influence financial "reforms" in Japan.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of corporate disclosure
practices in Japan, including a review of academic research on those practices. Section 3
describes the approach we have taken to idendfy changes in disclosure practice during the
1990s. Section 4 analyzes the data described in the preceding section to determine whether
voluntary-disclosure practices of Japanese firms have changed over time. Section 5 offers a
summary and conclusion.
2. Disclosure practices in Japan
A number of studies have directly or indirectly focused on accounting and related
disclosure practices of Japanese companies. Most notably, Cooke (1991, 1992) examines
firm-specific characteristics of disclosure among survey samples of Japanese companies. In
the process, he notes earlier studies that point to a strong resistance among Japanese
companies toward disclosure, per se. He ascribes his own relatively low-survey response
rates to the fact that ". . .the Japanese are inherently secretive and corporations are unwilling
to supply accounts to non-shareholders...'"^ Conversely, Choi, Frost, and Meek (1999),
while agreeing that Japanese companies are generally reluctant to disclose information, argue
that the traditionally low disclosure levels of Japanese firms are due to managers'
perceptions that the costs of additional disclosure are greater than the benefits. In this
regard, they are proposing the hypothesis that cultural influences can be significantly
modified by economic incentives.
Several features of Japanese culture have been cited in the literature as contributing to
limited disclosure. One is the keiretsu ownership structure of Japanese industry. In this
structure, "insiders" are major sources of financing and are well informed about the earnings
prospects of keiretsu partners. Hence, a strong linkage between public disclosure and
favorable access to capital allegedly does not exist (Morck, Nakamura, & Shivdasani,
See Cooke (1991, p. 178). For an earlier study pointing to the reluctance of Japanese companies to disclose
information, see McKinnon and Harrison (1985).
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2000). However, Cooke (1996) finds that companies within a keiretsu with a main bank or
main company monitor do not disclose less information than other companies in their annual
reports. A second feature discussed in the literature is the alleged reluctance of Japanese
borrowers to disclose negative information to outside lenders and investors (Lincoln, 1999).
A third is an allegedly less-demanding attitude toward corporate financial reporting on the
part of Japanese shareholders as compared to, say. Western shareholders (Haskins et al., 2000,
p. 339).
To the extent that 'inherent" secrecy of Japanese managers is a durable determinant of
corporate disclosure practices in Japan, the dramatic change in that country's economic
environment over the 1 990s, as described above, might be expected to have little impact on
the voluntary-disclosure practices of Japanese businesses. On the other hand, to the extent
that segmented and wealthy domestic capital markets shielded Japanese companies from the
need for large-scale involvement with international lenders and investors, disclosure practices
may not have been so much culturally based, as tied to a relatively small estimated payoff to
disclosing more information.'
In fact, research efforts examining specific determinants of disclosure behavior of Japanese
companies obtain results that are not substantially different from those obtained for
companies headquartered in other countries. For example, the single most important
determinant of variations in voluntary disclosure among Japanese companies is size (Cooke,
1991, 1992). This is a ubiquitous finding in the disclosure literature.^ Another finding is that
Japanese companies listed on multiple stock exchanges disclose more information than
companies listed only on the TSE (Cooke, 1992). This relationship has also been identified
for non-Japanese companies. For example. Gray, Meek, and Roberts (1995) find that
intemationally listed US and UK multinadonal companies voluntarily disclose more informa-
tion in their annual reports than domestically listed multinational companies, ceteris paribus.
This similarity between Japanese and non-Japanese companies in terms of the main
determinants of disclosure practice belies the notion that cultural differences render Japanese
disclosure practices completely idiosyncratic; however, cultural differences discussed earlier
could still result in generally lower levels of disclosure in Japan, other things being constant.
A focus on whether and how Japanese corporate disclosure practices changed over the 1990s
would provide an additional perspective on the strength of cultural influences. In particular,
an indirect finding that pressures to integrate more closely into world capital markets were
associated with increased information disclosure would be consistent with an interpretation
that accounting practices are influenced by global economic imperatives, insofar as Japanese
management is concerned.
^ There is abundant evidence that companies using international capital markets engage in significantly more
voluntary disclosure than their counterparts that raise capital primarily in domestic markets (see, for example, Choi
& Levich, 1991; Cooke, 1991; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Meek & Saudagaran, 1990; Saudagaran & Meek,
1997). A number of these studies point out that participation in international capital markets encourages increased
disclosure, primarily of financial information.
'' See, for example, Foster (19S6), Frost and Pownall (1994a), and the studies reviewed in Meek et al. (1995).
^ See Lincoln (1999) for examples of culturally specific disclosure practices in Japan.
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In fact, there have been few studies examining the stability- of disclosure behavior over
time, particularly for Japan. Botosan (1997) references several non-Japanese studies and
concludes that firms' disclosure policies appear to remain constant over time. Cooke (1991)
suggests that the need for Japanese companies to raise considerable sums of money from
international capital markets in the late 1980s may have encouraged increased disclosure, but
he does not formally test this hypothesis. Our study differs from previous studies in its focus
on the stability of Japanese company disclosure practices over time. Given the significant
change in Japan's economic environment over the 1990s, a focus on this period provides a
relatively strong test of the temporal stability of disclosure practices in Japan.
In the following section, we describe our sample selection and the methodology employed
to test whether Japanese companies did, in fact, significantly alter their disclosure practices in
response to the economic pressures of the 1990s.
3. Sample selection and methodology
3.1. Disclosure instrument and scores
Various methods have been used in the literature to measure the extent of a firm's
disclosure.*^ For purposes of this study, the disclosure index developed by Botosan (1997) is
used. It was chosen principally because the measurement categories more closely reflect
voluntary-disclosure behavior for the sample firms of this study than do the instruments in
other studies. For example, the focus of Botosan's index is on voluntarily disclosed
information with high predictive value as opposed to disclosure of various historical
accounting issues for regulatory purposes. In addition to the focus on voluntary disclosure,
the reliability and validity of Botosan's disclosure instrument is the most rigorously tested of
those cited in the literature. A copy of the instrument used to measure the disclosure score for
each firm is attached as Appendix A.
The major components of the index are classified into the following five categories:
background information, 10- or 5-year summary of historical results, key nonfinancial
statistics, projected information, and management discussion and analysis of operations.
Disclosure items can be both quantitative and qualitative. Points for each individual firm (J)
are awarded for specific disclosure items within each category (z) for a given sample year (t).
Hence, the final disclosure score (DISC/,) measures the total points awarded for disclosure by
the (J) firm in time period (0-^ The maximum DISC score using this instrument is 127— the
total value of the disclosure items.
* See, for example, Botosan (1997), Cooke (1991, 1992), Frost and Pownall (1994a), Gray et al. (1995),
Sengupta (1998). Also, Marston and Shrives (1991 ) provide an extensive analysis and discussion of the limitations
and use of disclosure indices.
The points and scores assigned treat each disclosure item equally; i.e., they are unweighted. However, since
there are more disclosure items for some categories of information than for others, Botosan's (1997) instrument
implicitly weights information categories differently.
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The disclosure index score is based upon information in eacli firm's annual report to
shareholders. Specifically, annual reports were reviewed to determine whether or not to
award points for the disclosure items identified in Appendix A. Although the armual report
is not the only source or means of disclosure, as noted by Knutson (1992), it is typically
the most important source of information for most analysts. In addition, Lang and
Lundholm (1993) noted a high, positive correlation between annual-report disclosure and
disclosure in other sources (such as press releases or regulatory filings). The annual reports
for our sample of firms are the English-language version for each firm. Disclosure by
Japanese firms in the English language further qualifies the revealed disclosure as
"voluntary," since Japanese firms do not have to translate materials into English for
Japanese regulatory purposes. Moreover, reporting in English might be seen as a direct
attempt to reduce asymmetric information problems with potential foreign investors and/
or customers.
The annual reports for each sample firm were obtained from the TSE. Each annual report
was analyzed and assigned points by one of the authors. The same author assigned scores for
all firms for internal consistency. The scores from each annual report constituted the
disclosure score (DISC/,) for each firm for a given year.
3.2. Sample firms
Our sample firms were randomly selected from a stratified sample of firms listed in the
Nikkei 225 Index. The Nikkei 225 Index includes 225 of the major firms hsted on the
"first section" of the TSE. We excluded firms in industries that are highly regulated,
for example, banking, insurance, and securities, since their levels of disclosure will be
primarily conditioned by regulatory practices. We also excluded service-related firms that
are less likely than their manufacturing counterparts to compete in international input
and output markets. The sample firms are therefore drawn primarily from manufacturing-
related industries.
Three overlapping, albeit not identical, initial samples were created. Their characteristics
are summarized in Table 1, and encompass 109 firms for 1996-1998, 113 for 1993-1995,
and 48 for 1989.' These sample sizes are comparable to those of other disclosure studies."
Since these samples are not identical in terms of the identities of the included firms,
changes in the calculated disclosure indices over time may reflect changes in the
composition of firms across the samples, rather than any "uniform" influence of time,
per se, on disclosure behavior. This would be true if individual firms differ in their
disclosure practices for reasons unrelated to characteristics "held constant" by our statistical
analysis, described below.
While admittedly somewhat arbitrary, we select 1989 as a year representative of Japan's financial and
economic bubbles encompassing the second half of the 1980s.
" Sample sizes of firms for related studies are as follows: Botosan (1997), 122; Cooke (1991), 48; Cooke
(1992), 35; Frost and Pownall (1994b), 93; Gray et al. (1995), 116 US, 64 UK; Sengupta (1998), 103.
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Table 1
Summary of sample selection procedures
Time period
Firms in Nikkei Index
Less firms in regulated, specialized, or service-related
Available for selection
English-language annual report not issued or incomplete
Total
Sample classified by industry:^
Chemicals (4)
Electrical machinery (11)
Foods (1)
Glass and ceramics (2)
Machinery (8)
Nonferrous metals (2)
Pharmaceuticals (4)
Precision instruments
Pulp and paper
Rubber
Steel
Textiles (2)
Transportation equipment (7)
Total sample
^ The number of firms in the homogeneous sample is parenthetically noted for each industry.
We attempt to hold constant the influence of the identities of firms in our time-series panel,
at least in part, by developing an identical sample of firms for each of the three periods. This
sample consists of the subset of firms for which annual reports were available for each time
period. Focusing on this sample implicitly holds constant interfirm differences that may
influence disclosure behavior. That is, it implicitly holds constant the influences of differ-
ences in disclosure behavior that are related to a firm's identity and that do not change over
time. Forty-one firms had annual reports available for each of the three time periods. The
sample of 41 firms is henceforth referred to as the "homogeneous sample."
For the overlapping samples of nonidentical firms (henceforth, "heterogeneous samples"),
changing industry mixes might influence overall disclosure behavior to the extent that
propensities to disclose differ across industries.'" A number of studies have identified
industry disclosure effects (Botosan, 1997; Cooke, 1992; Sengupta, 1998).'^ If the industrial
1996-1998 1993-1995 Pre- 1990
225 225 225
78 78 78
147 147 147
38 34 99
109 113 48
15 16 5
16 16 11
10 10 1
8 7 3
13 14 9
8 9 3
5 5 4
3 3
4 3 1
1 2 1
4 5 1
9 10 2
13 13 7
109 113 48
'"" The homogeneous sample implicitly holds constant the influences of "industry mix," since no firm's
industrial classification changed over the sample period.
' In a (unreported) statistical analysis, we also identified differences in the propensities of firms in different
industries to disclose for any given time-period sample. These unreported results are available fi"om the authors
upon request.
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mix of firms varied across our three sample periods (for the heterogeneous samples), we
would presumably need to account explicitly for industry affiliation in our subsequent
analysis. However, any such analysis is unnecessary, since the industrial compositions of our
heterogeneous samples did not change across our three time-period samples.'"* Put in other
words, the unchanged industrial mix of firms for our three time-period samples ensures that
industry mix does not affect the change in disclosure behavior over time, which is our focus
of interest.
3.5. Time periods
Analysis of the question of the temporal stability of firms' disclosure practices re-
quires a sample time period. Given the time consuming and costly nature of the data
collection process, the sample consisted of discrete years instead of a continuous time
series. Our implicit assumption is that changes in disclosure are not reversible and
proceed relatively deliberately, such that the observed changes between discontinuous
years do not mask significant (and possibly contradictory) unobserved changes between
nonsample years. Partitioned time periods to capture disclosure behavior have been used
in related studies (e.g., Sengupta, 1998) of the incentive elfects of disclosure on the
firm's cost of capital.
Three specific time periods are selected to represent different economic environments in
Japan: 1996-1998, 1993-1995, and 1985-1990. The pre-1990 period was characterized as
the "Bubble" economy and was represented by relatively high economic and asset-price
growth rates compared with the rest of the decade, as well as relatively abundant domestic
sources of capital. The 1993-1995 period saw an "Adjustment" in Japan's economy as it
began to experience bankruptcies, business failures, and extensive losses in the stock and real
estate markets. For example, bankruptcies in the Tokyo area increased 106% between 1989 and
1995 (source of calculadons, Teikoku Data Bank, 1998). A major recession and economic
restructuring marked the 1996-1998 period, referred to as the "Current" period. Firms faced
increasingly competitive global-product markets, while a banking crisis forced many firms to
seek capital outside Japan. The three time periods arguably reflect three distinctive economic
environments faced by Japanese firms, although the trend over the entire period was arguably
one ofJapanese companies facing stronger incentives to integrate into global financial markets,
as well as to increase sales in foreign markets.'^ To the extent that increased disclosure
improves access to foreign capital, Japanese companies' incentive to disclose information
could be expected to increase over the 1990s.
A finding would provide further support for our hypothesis that increased disclosure by
Japanese companies did indeed lower their cost of capital. We are unaware of any specific
''' Using chi-square tests, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of sample fiiTns by industrial
classification is identical when comparing each paired time period.
'^ These periods were also convenient in the sense that the pre-1990 period is comparable with Cooke (1991)
and the 1993-1995 relatively comparable with Botosan (1997); thus, the sample has benchmark studies for
comparative purposes.
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Studies providing such a link.'^ However, there is anecdotal evidence supporting the
existence of a Hnkage between disclosure and the cost of capital. For example, one article
discusses the experience of Fuji Bank. Executives at Fuji Bank had long insisted that their
bank's problems were not as bad as critics suggested. Nevertheless, the media seemed
convinced it was hiding problems, and its shares were leading the market down. In late
September 1998, the bank decided that it needed to be more forthcoming in its disclosures. In
particular, it disclosed that it had US$19.3 billion in "gray area'' loans, i.e., assets that did not
fit the narrow regulatory definition of bad loans but were ones that prudent investors would
want to know about. The bank hired the US accounting firm, Emst & Young, to check its
books and vouch for the accuracy of the bank's accounting. Fears of hidden losses seemed to
vanish. Its shares recovered and the premium paid over other banks for funding all but
disappeared (Sapsford, 1999).
Data were collected for one year for each time period. The specific years selected were
1989 (for the ''Bubble" period), 1994 (for the "Adjustment" period), and 1998 (for the
"Current" period). When annual reports for specific companies were not available for the
specific year, the next closest preceding year was used, with 1987 as a cut-off year. While it is
possible that the use of average-disclosure-index values for two or more years of any
subperiod might eliminate purely transitory variations in "equilibrium" disclosure behavior,
the individual years chosen are sufficiently separated in time as to capture meaningful
changes in disclosure behavior over the decade of the 1990s.
4. Disclosure behavior and determinants
In this section, we report observed changes in disclosure behavior over time for our
heterogeneous and homogeneous samples. We also identify the factors that seem to be
associated with any observed changes.
4.1. Temporal shifts in levels of disclosure
Table 2 reports mean disclosure scores in each period for the heterogeneous samples,
where the sample firms are stratified by industry. Simple comparisons of the average
disclosure index values of the heterogeneous samples across the various time periods (the
first row in Table 2) suggest that voluntary disclosure increased consistently over time.
Specifically, the average value for DISQ, increased fi-om 22.3 (the "Bubble" years) to 23.8
(the "Adjustment" period) to 28.6 ("Current" period). The increase in disclosure values
between the first two time periods (Bubble and Adjustment) is modest, and a difference of
means test indicates that the average disclosure index values are not significantly different
fi-om each other. However, the differences between the average disclosure index values in
We are currently examining the statistical relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital for our
sample of Japanese companies.
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Table 2
Mean disclosure scores by industry classification (standard deviations in parenthesis)
Time period
Industry n 1996-1998 n 1993-1995 n Pre- 1993
Heterogeneous samples 109 28.6 (10.2) 113 23.8 (7.3) 48 22.3 (7.0)
Chemicals 15 27.3 (11.2) 16 20.8 (6.4) 5 19.6 (4.4)
Electrical machinery 16 31.8 (8.6) 16 26.4 (6.7) 11 27.2 (6.2)
Foods 10 33.5 (9.5) 10 24.1 (7.8) 1 33.0 (-)
Glass and ceramics 8 23.1 (11.3) 7 18.4(6.1) 3 19.3 (1.5)
Machinery 13 22.5 (6.4) 14 21.6(5.1) 9 16.3 (6.2)
Nonferrous metals 8 33.8 (12.6) 9 25.6 (7.0) 3 20.7 (3.1)
Pharmaceuticals 5 35.4 (7.2) 5 27.4 (5.7) 4 27.0 (5.6)
Pulp and paper 4 26.8 (6.3) 3 17.7 (8.7) 1 18.0 (-)
Steel 4 24.8 (7.9) 5 30.4 (5.0) 1 ll.O(-)
Textiles 9 27.9 (12.3) 10 24.1 (6.0) 2 20.5 (9.2)
Transportation equipment 13 28.1 (11.5) 13 24.9 (9.5) 7 23.6 (5.4)
Homogeneous sample 41 30.9 (9.2) 25.8 (6.9) 22.8 (7.0)
The samples for precision instruments and rubber are not reported as they were comprised of three or fewer firms.
the Current period and both prior periods are significantly different at conventional
significance levels.' '' These observations are further illustrated by the pattern for individual
industries. In most cases, disclosure scores in the current period are higher than in the two
preceding periods. Disclosure behavior change is somewhat less consistent industry-by-
industry between the Bubble and Adjustment periods, although, the small sample sizes for
many of the industries make it difficult to infer whether the observed differences are
statistically significant. '
^
The average DISC/, values for each time period for the homogeneous sample is reported at
the bottom of Table 2. The results again indicate consistently increasing disclosure over time
similar to the sample results reported for the heterogeneous samples. Paired sample
comparisons of the mean disclosure scores (for the identical 41 firms) indicate significant
differences between successive paired time periods. Thus, the average disclosure scores for
all firms in the homogeneous sample indicate significant increases in disclosure over the
selected time periods.
Strictly speaking, the use of a parametric difference of means test may not be appropriate as the three panels
are not strictly independent. Specifically, there are some identical firms in each panel. Nevertheless, the disclosure
index for any firm is a random variable over time. Moreover, the disclosure index values are normally distributed
in each sample year. The results of relaxing the assumptions for parametric tests and using a Wilcoxon signed
ranks nonparametric test are that the relative ranks of all time periods were significantly different from each other
(including the first two periods).
As discussed above, since the industry mix of firms is relatively constant over time, our conclusions with
respect to overall changes in disclosure behavior should not be sensitive to differences in the disclosure practices
of specific industries.
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4.2. Analysis oj temporal shifts holding determinants constant
The summary evidence presented to this point suggests that voluntary disclosure increased
over time for various subsets of Japanese manufacturing companies, as well as across the
Japanese manufacturing sector as a whole. A remaining issue to consider is whether the
change in disclosure behavior reflects changes in underlying "determinants" of disclosure
not implicitly held constant by the composition of our samples, or whether disclosure
behavior increases even after the underlying determinants are held constant. Even within the
homogeneous sample, the characteristics of firms may be changing in a way that "encour-
ages" increased mean disclosure. For example, it has been widely observed that larger firms
disclose more information than their smaller counterparts. Therefore, if our sample of
homogeneous firms grew larger, on average, over our sample time period, disclosure could
be expected to increase independently of any hypothesized pressures related to changing
economic conditions in Japan.
The determinants of voluntary disclosure most often and consistently identified in the
literature are firm size, equity market listing, and category of industry. Assets are usually the
best indicator of firm size in empirical studies. Hence, we use asset size as a measure of
changing firm size over time. Since all firms in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous
samples were selected fi"om the Nikkei 225, market listing in the home country is implicitly
held constant over time. Moreover, none of the sample firms that were listed (or unlisted) on
US stock exchanges changed their foreign-listing status over the sample period. Thus, market
listing was effectively held constant through sample selection. Since firms were consistently
classified to a given manufacturing industry over the time period considered, industry effects
are also effectively held constant.
In other studies, the ownership structure of Japanese companies has been found to
influence investment behavior and stock-price valuations in complex ways (Morck et al.,
2000). However, as noted earlier, Cooke (1996) found that main company ownership within a
keiretsu has no influence on a company's disclosure practices. Moreover, it is likely that
ownership structure was relatively stable over time for our sample of large companies. In the
event, we did not collect sufficiently detailed data on ownership to permit us to incorporate an
ownership variable into our statistical analysis.
To hold firm size constant while examining changes in disclosure behavior over time, we
rely upon regression analysis (ordinary least squares). Specifically, we employ two pooled
(over time) cross-sections: the 41 -firm (homogeneous) sample and the heterogeneous sample
of Japanese manufacturing companies. The cross-sections are pooled for the three sample
time periods for each sample. The estimating equation is given as Eq. (1):
DISCy, = a + Z?) InASSET/v + biTlMEt + Cp (1)
The dependent variable is defined as above. Values for ASSET are fi-om each company's
annual report or fi-om the Japan Company Handbook (various years). The natural log
specification is used to mitigate potential problems of heteroscedasdcity. The TIME variable
is a dummy variable taking a value of zero for our first time period, a value of unity for the
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second time period, and a value of two for the third time period. This specification embodies
the assumption that incentives to disclose increased in a linear fashion over our three time
periods. Hence, the dummy variable should have a positive sign.
Since the summary data reported in Table 2 suggest that incentives to disclose may not
have increased in a uniform fashion over the sample period, we also use an ahemative
specification for the TIME variable. Specifically, separate time regimes are identified. One
dummy variable (TIME2) takes a value of unity for all sample observations in Period 2 and
zero otherwise. A second (TIME3) takes a value of unity for all sample observations in Period
3 and zero otherwise. The base period is therefore the "Bubble" period whose influence is
Table 3
Regression results
Panel A : Heterogeneous sample
DISC„ = Z),lnASSET„ ^.TIME, eA\)
Coefficients 23.9 3.40
Standard error 0.3 39
t statistic -4.55 8.75
P value .000 .000
Adj. /?- = .277 F= 52.25 (prob. .000)
No. of observations = 128
DISC„ = a + ^ilnASSET,
Coefficients -22.6 3.40
Standard error 5.3 0.39
t statistic -4.28 8.74
P value .000 .000
3.17
0.63
5.03
.000
Durbin- Watson statistic = 1.77
h.JlME. + b{YlME^ en (2)
F=36.18 (prob. .000)
1.14
1.30
0.88
.380
Durbin-
5.72
1.31
4.38
.000
Watson statistic = .79
No. of observations = 128
Panel B: Homogeneous sample
DISC„ = ^ilnASSET,, h{l\ME, + e„(l)
Coefficients - 19.4 3.11
Standard error 8.1 0.59
/ statistic -2.39 5.24
P value .019 .000
Adj. /?- = .297 F=26.39 (prob. .000)
No. of observations = 121
DISQ,= a + A 1 InASSET,
Coefficients ~ 19.5 3.16
Standard error 8.13 0.60
t statistic -2.40 5.30
P value .018 .000
3.06
0.78
3.95
.00
Durbin- Watson statistic = 1.94
/7.TIME. /),T1ME, e„ (2)
1.67
1.56
1.08
.283
6.09
1.56
3.93
.000
F= 17.97 (prob. .000) Durbin- Watson statistic = 1.96
No. of observations = 121
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implicit in the constant term. If disclosure does increase uniformly over time, the coefficients
of TIME: and TIME3 should be positive. The estimating equation is therefore:
DISQ = « + /)i InASSET,, + Z):TIME2 + ^3TIME3 + e/, (2)
The results of estimating Eqs. (1) and (2) for both the heterogeneous and homogeneous
samples are presented in Table 3. The results are fairly robust, with a similar general story to
tell across the samples. Namely, voluntary disclosure increased significantly over time. More
specifically, the insignificant t statistics for the TIME2 coefficients in both the homogeneous
and heterogeneous samples corroborate our earlier inference that there was a modest increase
in disclosure comparing the Bubble and Adjustment periods, with the main increase in
disclosure coming after the adjustment period. It is noteworthy that the regression coefficients
are virtually identical in the homogeneous and heterogeneous samples. This resuh suggests
that firm-specific infiuences, such as ownership differences, are not exerting a significant
influence over time on the disclosure behavior of our heterogeneous sample of firms.
5. Summary and conclusion
This study examines whether disclosure on the part of Japanese firms increased over the
1990s. For three specific time periods, disclosure indices are constructed for different samples
of TSE-listed firms. Statistical analysis indicates that average voluntary disclosure increases
for our samples when comparing the initial and end time periods. This finding is statistically
significant for both our heterogeneous sample and our homogeneous sample of firms. While
disclosure is also modestly higher in the middle time period compared to the initial time
period, the difference is not statistically significant in either the heterogeneous or the
homogeneous sample.
Our basic findings are consistent with suggestions found in the literature that economic
incentives tied to changing capital-market conditions will alter traditional disclosure practi-
ces, even in Japan. Specifically, they are consistent with the notion that cultural factors
contributing to relatively limited voluntary disclosure on the part of Japanese companies are
mutable in the face of economic incentives.
Whether the return ofmore robust economic conditions in Japan will stall or even reverse the
trend towards more disclosure is an open question; however, policymakers in other countries
might draw some comfort from the fact that large Japanese firms apparently acknowledge the
managerial imperatives created by global competition for customers and financial capital.
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Appendix A. Disclosure index scoring sheet
Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital (Christine A. Botosan, Accounting Review,
vol. 72, no. 3, July 1997)
Company Name:
Report Type: Annual report/lO-lc/Summary annual report
Year end:
Background Information: Qual. Quan.
a. A statement of corporate goals or objectives
is provided.
b. A general statement of corporate strategy
is provided.
c. Actions taken during the year to achieve the
corporate goal is discussed.
d. Planned actions to be taken in future years
are discussed.
e. A time frame for achieving corporate goals
is provided.
f Barriers to entry are discussed.
g. Impact of barriers to entry on current profits
is discussed.
h. Impact of barriers to entry on future profits
is discussed,
i. The competitive environment is discussed,
j. The impact of competition on current profits
is discussed.
k. The impact of competition on fiiture profits
is discussed.
1. A general description of the business is provided,
m. The principal products produced are identified,
n. Specific characteristics of these products
are described,
o. The principal markets are identified.
Specific characteristics of these markets are described.
Summary of historical results: 10 or Fewer than
more years 10 years
a. Retum-on-assets or sufficient information to
compute retum-on-assets (i.e. net income, tax rate,
interest expense and total assets) is provided.
b. Net profit margin or sufficient information to
compute net profit margin (i.e. net income,
tax rate, interest expense and sales) is provided.
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c. Asset turnover or sufficient information to
compute asset turnover (i.e. sales and total assets)
is provided.
d. Retum-on-equity or sufficient information to
compute retum-on-equity (i.e. net income and
stockholders equity) is provided.
Yes No
e. A summary of sales and net income for at least
the most recent eight quarters is provided.
Key nonfinancial statistics: Amount
a. Number of employees.
b. Average compensation per employee.
c. Order backlog.
d. Percentage of order backlog to be shipped next year.
e. Percentage of sales in products designed in the
last five years.
f Market share.
g. Dollar amount of new orders laced this year.
h. Units sold.
i. Unit selling price.
j. Growth in units sold.
k. Rejection/defect rates.
1. Production lead-time.
m. Age of key employees.
n. Sales growth in key regions not reported as
geographic segments,
o. Break-even sales US$.
p. Volume of materials consumed,
q. Prices of materials consumed,
r. Ratio of inputs to outputs.
s. Average age of key employees.
t. Growth in sales of key products not reported as
product segments.
Projected information: Pos., Neg. Qual. or
or Neutral Quan.
a. A comparison of previous earnings projections to
actual earnings is provided.
b. A comparison of previous sales projections to
actual sales is provided.
c. The impact of opportunities available to the firm
on fiiture sales or profits is discussed.
d. The impact of risks facing the firm on future sales
or profits is discussed.
Pos., Neg. Qual. or Wgt
or Neutral Quan.
Qual. or Prod seg. Tot.
Quan. firm
Qual. or Total firm
Quan.
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e. A forecast of market share is provided,
f A cash flow projection is provided,
g. A projection of capital expenditures or R&D
is provided.
h. A projection of future profits is provided,
i. A projection of future sales is provided.
Management discussion and analysis: (explanations
for changes must be provided)
a. Change in sales.
b. Change in operating income.
c. Change in cost of goods sold.
d. Change in cost of goods sold as a percentage
of sales.
e. Change in gross profit.
f. Change in gross profit as a percentage of sales.
g. Change in selling and administrative expenses,
h. Change in interest or interest income.
i. Change in net income.
j. Change in inventory.
k. Change in accounts receivable.
1. Change in capital expenditures or R&D.
m. Change in market share.
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1. Introduction
This study examines recent changes in levels of voluntary disclosures of certain large
Japanese corporations. The authors selected those firms on the Nikkei 225 Index that are also
listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and examine voluntary disclosures of
these firms over three time periods: (1) 1985-1990, (2) 1993-1995, and (3) 1996-1998.
They found that voluntary disclosures of the Japanese firms sampled generally increase over
the three time periods and concluded that changing market conditions alter traditional dis-
closure practices in Japan. Their findings contradict some claims that Japanese disclosure
practices are unaffected by pressures from capital markets.
2. Contribution of tlie paper
In the 1990s, Japan began to experience a long and severe recession. Prior to the 1990s,
Japan had only experienced a few short recessions in the early 1970s and 1980s that were
related to global oil crises. When confi-onted with a long recession of extreme magnitude in
the 1990s, Japanese managers were forced to adopt new strategies to cope with the economic
turmoil affecting their firms. There was enormous pressure on Japanese managers from
capital markets and the domestic press to provide more information about their firms. Prior to
the 1990s, Japan was known for its secretive culture (Cooke, 1991). As a result, Japanese
financial reporting generally lacked transparency. Popular belief was that Japanese firms were
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more concerned with and operated for the benefit of their employees and creditors and not
their stockholders (Aoki, 1994). Given this situation, an interesting question was how Ja-
panese firms would respond to the dramatic changes in economic conditions in the 1990s.
The authors explored this question and demonstrated that Japanese managers responded
positively to pressures fi^om capital markets by voluntarily disclosing more information about
their firm. This finding is of great interest to policy-makers and global stockholders, despite
the fact that out of a possible 127 points, Japanese firms only scored about 28 points, which
indicates that Japanese managers are still not forthcoming in disclosing significant value-
relevant information to investors.
3. Evaluation
3.1. Culture versus changing economic conditions affecting voluntary disclosures
The authors correctly argued that levels of voluntary disclosures are influenced by: (1)
country-specific cultural forces and (2) prevailing economic conditions. It follows that changes
in country-specific culture and/or changes in economic conditions can cause changes in levels
of voluntary disclosures. The authors, however, argued that their results showed that increases
in voluntary disclosures by Japanese firms are only due to changes in Japan's economic con-
ditions and not due to changes in culture. This assertion by the authors was not supported by
their study for the following reasons. First, the authors did not examine whether in fact
Japanese culture has remained unchanged over their sample period. Given that their sample
spans 1 3 years ( 1 985 - 1 998), it is unlikely that there have been no changes in Japan's business
culture. Second, changes in economic conditions in turn affect and cause changes in country-
specific culture. For this reason, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to separately evaluate
the effects of changes in culture and economic conditions on levels of voluntary disclosures.
For example, a cultural feature cited by the authors as contributing to limited disclosures is
keiretsu ownership.
In recent years, however, there has been a gradual erosion of the relationship between
keiretsu partners due to pressures fi^om Japanese capital markets, which goes to show how
changing economic conditions can also affect culture.
3.2. Increases in voluntary versus mandatory disclosures
The authors used a survey instrument that was designed by Botosan (1997) to measure the
extent of voluntary disclosures ofUS firms. There are at least two related concems here. One is
whether a survey instrument designed for US firms by Botosan is best suited for use in Japan.
Given that there are significant differences in cultural and institutional arrangements between
the two countries, it seems unlikely that this would be the case. The authors' contribution to the
literature would have been more significant had they designed an instrument that took into
account the uniqueness of Japan's business environment. Two, in the 1990s, the Ministry of
Finance issued mandates at an unprecedented rate. For example, since April 1 , 1990, Japanese
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firms have been required to disclose business segment data (Mande & Ortman, in press). After
1997, geographical segment data were required. With these new mandates, one should expect
more disclosures in annual reports about gross margins according to lines of business, reve-
nues by product, and according to region. Since Botosan's instrument contains questions about
these disclosures, it is not clear whether the increased scores found by the authors are due to
increases in voluntary or mandated disclosures. Similarly, a question relating to profit forecasts
by Japanese firms could provide skewed results. In recent years, all Japanese firms on the First
Section have been required to provide profit forecasts. Here again using Botosan's survey
instrument in Japan would result in biasing voluntary-disclosure scores upwards.
3.3. Methodology
The authors used a regression model that allows them to measure shifts in the average level
of voluntary disclosures over the three time periods using intercept dummies for each time
period. However, the authors only obtained data on voluntary disclosures for 1 year in each of
the three time periods. The authors could have reduced measurement error in their voluntary
disclosure metric by obtaining several years of data for each time period and by averaging the
disclosure scores over those years. By using only 1 year of data in each time period, noise in
the voluntary disclosure metric increases and reduces our confidence in the authors' results.
4. Future research and conclusion
The authors argued that Japanese firms have increased the amount of voluntary disclosures
in financial reports because of their increased reliance on foreign capital.
The authors could have supported their conjecture by examining whether firms with high
levels of voluntary disclosures in the 1 990s were indeed more successful in raising equity or
debt capital in foreign markets whether the percentage of foreign ownership in Japanese firms
had increased and whether the number of exchange listings on foreign stock markets had
increased in recent years. The authors could also have explained voluntary disclosures of
Japanese firms that experienced losses during the 1990s. Roughly 15% of firms on the First
Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange experienced losses in the 1990s (Mande, Wohar, &
Ortman, 2001). Clearly, firms experiencing losses face different economic incentives com-
pared to other firms and one would expect significant differences in both the quantity and
quality of voluntary disclosures across these groups of firms (Brown & Higgins, 1999). These
additional tests would have provided additional insights and increased confidence in the
authors' assertions that changes in economic incentives altered disclosure strategies of
Japanese managers.
Overall, this paper makes a significant contribution to the literature on Japanese financial
reporting. It documents that in recent years Japanese managers responded positively to
changes in the economic environment and to pressures from capital markets by voluntarily
disclosing more information about their firm. These findings will undoubtedly be of great
interest to policy-makers such as the SEC and the lASC, as well as to foreign investors.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates tlie evolution of voluntary accounting-disclosure behavior of
Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over three specific time periods,
representing different economic environments: (a) 1985-1990 (labeled the "Bubble"
period), (b) 1993- 1995 (labeled the "Adjustment" period), and (c) 1996-1998 (labeled
the "Current" period). The average voluntary disclosure increased when comparing the
"Bubble" to the "Current" periods. These results are interpreted as consistent with the notion
that cultural factors hindering voluntary disclosure by Japanese firms are in fact mutable in
the face of economic incentives. The results are in line with an economic, rather than a
cultural relativism, theory of disclosure in Japan. Basically, as argued in the international
business literature (Basu & Miroshnik, 2000), cultural relativism is not to be taken as a fixed
phenomenon. In the long run, people and countries, irrespective of their culture, are
compelled to adopt similar industrial attitudes and behaviors in order to comply with the
imperatives of industrialization, economic growth, and globalization (Kelly et al., 1987;
Riahi-Belkaoui, 1994). This competing hypothesis, known as the convergence hypothesis,
maintains that basically, managerial beliefs are correlated with stages of industrial devel-
opment (Harbison & Myers, 1959). The results of this study on the changing nature of
financial reporting in Japan appear to be in support of the convergence hypothesis. The three
periods chosen in this study represent different stages of industrial development, economic
growth, and globalization, leading the disclosure practices in Japan to converge to disclosure
practices in the US and similar developed economics.
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The discussion of the merits of the paper focuses on two main issues: (a) the choice of an
efic rather than an emic approach to the study of disclosure behavior in Japan, and (b) the
lessons and suggestions for future research on the subject.
2. Etic versus emic approach
The etic approach takes the perspective of the researcher as the important factor for
the production of scientifically positive theories about the causes of sociocultural
differences and similarities. Basically, it examines behavior from outside the system,
using a structure created by the analyst and criteria considered absolute or universal
(Berry, 1969, 1980).
The emic approach studies behavior and practices from within the cultural system,
centering on the native, that is, the insider's view of reality and using criteria relative to
internal characteristics (Berry, 1969). Pelto (1970) indicates that there is an "embedded
emicism" in most cross-cultural research with a focus on creative viewpoints, meanings,
and interpretation.
This study of the changing nature of disclosure in Japan relies on an etic approach. The
authors rely on a disclosure index developed for the US environment by Botosan (1997) to
measure the voluntary disclosure changes of Japanese firms and to infer from the results a
proof of the economic-relativism theory of disclosure or, as suggested here, the "conver-
gence" hypothesis.
An emic approach to the same research question would require the development of a
disclosure index from within the Japanese disclosure environment, using criteria relative to
the Japanese disclosure philosophies to measure voluntary disclosure in Japan.
Under the emic approach, the disclosure index would have included information and
innovations dictated by the specific Japanese environment and disclosure philosophies. For
example, a resource-based view of the firm, prevalent in the Japanese view of the world,
favors the disclosure of information on strategic intangible assets. Similarly, a stakeholder
view of the firm would favor the disclosure of information that can be used for the
determination of the net value added—the wealth created by the firm before distribution to
the various stakeholders (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1999).
3. Lessons and suggestions for future research
In addition to the adoption of the emic approach, fixture research on the subject may benefit
from the following lessons and suggestions:
1 . The present study does not test the exclusionary theory of corporate disclosure, in which
information is disseminated within a group but specifically excludes those outside the
group (Cooke, 1993). Basically, whether there is association between keiretsu
classification and the changing nature of disclosure by Japanese firms is an interesting
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research question. Previous research made a distinction between horizontal and vertical
keiretsu. It may be easily hypothesized that the increase in disclosure observed in this
study is much lower for firms belonging to a horizontal keiretsu.
The present study investigates size as a possible determinant of the changing disclosure
score, which is consistent with intemational accounting research on the subject. Other
determinants that have not been included in this study and may need to be considered in
future research on the subject include: leverage, industry, type, level of multinationality,
and type of diversification strategy, to name only a few (Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978;
Wallace & Gemon, 1991).
The study tests the changing nature of financial disclosure in Japan by examining
disclosure practices during and following the "Bubble" period. It implicitly tests
whether the collapse of Japan's "Financial Bubble" in the late 1980s altered the
incentives of Japanese managers to be forthcoming about corporate information. A true
test is to measure the disclosure score prior to the "Bubble" period. A lower pre-
"Bubble" disclosure score will be indicative of an improvement in financial disclosure
in Japan, which is independent of the effects of the "Bubble."
The items included in Botosan's (1997) index do indeed reflect voluntary information
with high predictive value. Yet, they do not reflect the new scope of intemational
accounting disclosure with experimental and innovative disclosures in the areas of
value-added reporting, employee reporting resource-based view of reporting, and social
accounting, to name only a few. Inclusion of items reflecting this new scope of
intemational disclosure would provide for a stronger test of the changing nature of
disclosure in Japan.
The use of the English rather than the Japanese language version of the annual report
may have introduced a disclosure bias. Japanese firms may have tried in their English
version to comply with conventional reporting and disclosure, leaving innovative
Japanese disclosures in the Japanese language version. A comparison of the contents of
a sample of English and Japanese language reports is needed to investigate the potential
existence of a disclosure bias.
The study selected one year for each time period rather than relying on an average
disclosure score for each period. The individual years chosen are sufficiently separated
in time as to capture meaningful changes in disclosure behavior. A replication of the
study with the choice of a different year for each period (from the one chosen in the
study) would provide a control test. Even then, it is hard to justify that a single year is a
reasonable proxy for the whole period. There may be other factors at work in that one
year that make it fundamentally different from the rest of the period.
4. Conclusion
This study shows an evolution of voluntary disclosure by Japanese firms following the
collapse of Japan's "Financial Bubble" in the late 1980s. The results are viewed as being in
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line with the economic theory of disclosure. In my comments, the results are instead viewed
as supportive of the convergence hypothesis. An emic approach to the same research question
is also viewed as preferable to the etic approach adopted in the study. In addition, some
suggestions are made to serve as a guide to future research on the same subject.
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In responding to the comments of our reviewers, we will first focus on several points that
both reviewers touch upon, and then consider some points that were made separately. First,
both reviewers criticize our use of Botosan's well-known disclosure instrument and suggest
that a more "uniquely Japanese-specific" instrument would have been preferable. Clearly, the
design of any such instrument is problematic, since even specific Japanese companies are
likely to be characterized by "uniqueness" in certain meaningful dimensions. Perhaps more
to the point, if increased disclosure on the part of Japanese companies is motivated to a
significant extent by a greater perceived need to access global sources of capital, then the use
of a disclosure instrument that is more "international" in its context is arguably more
appropriate. As a practical matter, Japanese companies increasingly are raising financial
capital in Anglo-American capital markets— the largest capital markets outside of Tokyo. In
this context, it is precisely increased disclosure of information targeted to investors and
lenders in those markets, and in their language, that is to be expected. Botosan's disclosure
instrument is still, arguably, the preferred tool for assessing disclosure designed to influence
intemational investors and lenders.
Both reviewers also criticize the use of a single year's data to measure disclosure in each of
our three time periods. While we can readily agree that the use of a disclosure index averaged
over several years would reduce the likelihood of measurement error, it is less clear that
measurement errors are contributing to any bias in our results. Indeed, if measurement errors
are random from year-to-year, they should not systematically bias our disclosure values either
upward or downward. We have no reason to believe that measurement errors are system-
atically related to time.
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Professor Mande argues that we are not entitled to conclude that increases in voluntary
disclosure by Japanese companies are only due to changes in Japan's economic conditions
and not due to changes in culture. In fact, we would agree had we claimed what Professor
Mande suggests we claimed. However, our conclusion was more modest and is summarized
quite accurately by Professor Riahi-Belkaoui. Namely, cultural factors hindering voluntary
disclosure by Japanese firms are, apparently, mutable. Certainly we cannot claim that
economic changes are solely responsible for changes in disclosure behavior. We infer that
economic factors likely played a role, given that there were dramatic changes in Japan's
economic environment, and that those changes are coincident in time with changes in
disclosure. Certainly cultural characteristics of the environment may also have changed.
Indeed, as Professor Mande notes, economic changes may have even contributed to cultural
changes. In which case, of course, separate identification of economic and cultural influences
on disclosure behavior would be impossible as a practical matter. Our relatively modest
inference does not discount the role of culture. It merely suggests that Japanese business
behavior is not predestined by corporate culture at any point in time.
Professor Mande also argues that disclosure in our sample might not be purely voluntary
since at least two new accounting mandates were issued during the time period of our sample
that may have affected disclosure practices. One such change required Japanese companies to
disclose geographical segment data after 1997. Another required Japanese companies to
disclose business segment data after April 1, 1990. In fact, neither change should be expected
to affect disclosure behavior using the Botosan index, since none of the disclosure items in
the index are directly related to line-of-business or line-of-country disaggregation. In a related
comment, the time frame of the mandated disclosure of projected information does not
coincide with the voluntary disclosure items in the Botosan instrument, thus a bias is not
introduced. Also, as noted by Choi, Frost, and Meek (2002), the projection information is
provided to regulators but rarely disclosed to shareholders. Thus any disclosure would still be
considered as voluntary in nature.
Finally, both reviewers make a number of valuable suggestions for fiiture research. In
particular. Professor Riahi-Belkaoui suggests that a review of Botosan's instrument in light of
recent innovations in accounting practices would be useftil. Indeed, such a review would be
useftil not only for studies focusing on Japan but also for cross-country comparisons of
disclosure behavior more generally. Professor Mande suggests that a follow-up focus on
whether changes in disclosure enhanced the ability of our sample firms to raise international
capital would strengthen our basic conclusions. We agree and indicated in our paper that this
issue is, indeed, a focus of our fiiture research.
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Abstract
This study provides evidence based on data collected from 65 US and 34 Hong Kong companies
regarding current implementation of value chain cost analysis. The findings indicate significant
differences in cost systems of companies in these two regions under value chain fi"amework. The US
manufacturing firms have invested more of their resources in upstream activities than have their Hong
Kong counterparts, but this observation did not hold in the service industry. Overall, however, the
results support a positive link between the percentages of cost and degrees of cost tracing, particularly
for upstream activities, for firms in both regions. Implications of this study in cost management for the
US and Hong Kong companies are also discussed. © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
KevM'ords: Value chain analysis; Cost management; Global competition; Hong Kong; Cost tracing; Upstream and
downstream activities
1. Introduction
In today's global business environment, companies face significant competition and are
under tremendous pressure to improve their productivity. To cope with these challenges,
corporate managers have gradually become customer-driven and have focused on delivering
quality products at competitive prices. In the past decade, many management tools have been
introduced and implemented to improve operational efficiency and to enhance corporate
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competitiveness. Of these tools, Porter (1985, p. 33) suggests that the value chain analysis,
which involves "disaggregating a firm's operations into strategically relevant activities in
order to understand the behavior of costs and potential sources of differentiation," can be an
effective means of optimizing the use of limited resources. Many researchers have expanded
upon Porter's framework to explain how value chain analysis can be an important managerial
tool (e.g., Hergert & Morris, 1989; Shank & Govindarajan, 1992, 1993; SMAC, 1996). Using
field research. Shank and Govindarajan (1993) conclude that value chain analysis is useful in
understanding how a firm is positioned in its industry. Once the value chain is fully
articulated, strategic decisions can be made more easily based on a clear understanding of
the firm's competitive advantages as shown by the factors in the chain.
The value chain is a sequence of business activities that add value (utility) to the products
or services provided by an organization to its customers. ' How a firm undertakes these value
chain activities can affect its profit in two ways. First, managing these activities effectively
may improve the firm's cost structure and profitability (Gadiesh & Gilbert, 1998). Second, the
mix of value chain activities could affect customers' satisfaction with the products and/or
services provided by the firm (Artto, 1994; Boer, 1996; Shields & Young, 1991; Susman,
1989) and, hence, indirectly increase the firm's revenues and profit. Thus, the first step in
managing value chain activities is to understand how a firm allocates its resources to value
chain activides. This information is crucial, because a proper mix of activities (i.e., trading off
across activities) could affect a firm's total revenues and costs. For example, more emphasis
on research and design could increase the cost at an early stage of the product. On the other
hand, it may reduce the costs of downstream activities," such as marketing and customer
services. Based on the distribution of costs among different activities, managers can then
determine the optimal mix of value chain activities and evaluate whether they are allocated
properly to support different products and customers (Boer, 1996; Foster, 1996; Foster &
Gupta, 1994; Foster, Gupta, & Sjoblom, 1996; Innes & Mitchell, 1995). A cost structure that
is well managed through value chain analysis can also enhance customers' satisfaction.
Through a detailed articulation of the company's important activities, value chain analysis
provides managers with valuable insights into the company's competitive advantages and
disadvantages, enabling them to develop strategies to enhance customer satisfaction.
There are reasons why we conduct a comparative study of value chain implementation
between the US and Hong Kong companies. According to Whitley (1992), many changes in
the United States economy since 1970, coupled with the rise of the economy in many Asian
sectors of the world economy, have encouraged a growing interest in conducting comparative
studies of business organizations in US and Asia. Since management accounting practices
could vary significantly among countries and can be society dependent (Kristensen, 1997),
' Seven value chain activities are used in this study. Six of these value chain activities (research and
development, design, production, marketing, distribution, and customer service) are categorized based on the
literature of Homgren, Foster, and Datar (1997, p. 3) and SMAC (1996, p. 4). The last activity, namely "overall
administration," is added based on Porter's (1985) discussion.
" In this study, we define upstream activities as activities from the initiation of R&D to the completion of
manufacturing processes. Activities after production are defined as downstream activities.
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there is increasing recognition of the importance of carefully investigating management
accounting and control systems in different economies/regions. Moreover, the predominant
management tools that are being applied in the West may not necessarily fit well into the
business models followed by companies in the East. For example, Whitley (1999) argues that
management control systems may be closely associated with cultural norms. This is an
important factor to be considered, since managers with different cultural backgrounds may
have different values and approaches in dealing with trust and authority, and these mores may
drive owner-manager relations, commitment, and risk sharing. Since most empirical cost
management studies have been focused on US companies (e.g., Magretta, 1998), a
comparative study would help both academicians and practitioners to gain in-depth
understanding of how value chain practices are implemented in a developed country vs. in
a newly industrialized economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Background information related to the
Hong Kong business system and its national firm characteristics is provided in the next
section, followed by a literature review and hypotheses development. Next, we discuss the
research design and data collection processes before presenting research findings. The last
section summarizes and concludes the study.
2. Hong Kong business system and society
As one of four little Asian dragons and a newly industrialized economy (NIE), Hong
Kong has experienced substantial economic prosperity since the late 1 970s. During this time
span. Hong Kong has successfully built itself as the financial and trading center of Southeast
Asia. The major portion of Hong Kong's economic growth is derived from real estate, light
manufacturing, tourism, entertainment industries, and international trade. While Hong
Kong's economy appears to resemble a Western economy in many aspects, it has some
unique business characteristics that distinguish it from those of Western countries in today's
global economy.
First, the ownership structure in Hong Kong differs significantly from that of US
companies. For instance, most Hong Kong companies are controlled by a few major
shareholders who are actively involved in their firm's daily operations (Whitley, 1992).
On the other hand, major US companies have a broader investor base and are run by
professional managers.
The second business characteristic of Hong Kong enterprises is the hands-on management
philosophy. Since the size of Hong Kong companies is generally smalf and the firms are
usually under sfrong family control (Chaessens, Djankow, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Tam, 1990), it is typical for the management to exercise a hands-on
management philosophy. As management centralizes the decision-making, non-family
According to Sit and Wong (1988), small- and medium-sized enterprises employing under 200 people
constituted 98.9% of manufacturing firms in Hong Kong and employed 73.4% of total manufacturing labor force.
126 C.J. Chang. N.-C.R. Hwang / The International Journal of Accounting 37 (2002) 123-140
managers have limited impact on major decisions, particularly those decisions with financial
implications. According to Redding (1990), the owners/managers often maintain a high level
of secrecy and tend to distance themselves fi-om employees. On the other hand, US
management professionals tend to rely on established goals, policies, and procedures of
their firms. Delegation of power is very much a norm, and managers are held accountable for
the success, as well as the failure, of the firai's operations.
The third attribute of the Hong Kong business system relates to management's risk
attitude. As part of Chinese society, the cultural roots of Hong Kong managers are close to
those of traditional Chinese. In general. Hong Kong managers are more risk averse than US
managers (Chow, Kato, & Shields, 1994; Chow, Shields, & Chan, 1991; Hofstede, 1980,
1991). Therefore, the concerns, strategies, and solutions to business problems, including
whether to adopt a management control system, which are considered by the Hong Kong
corporate management, could differ considerably from those of their US counterparts
(Whitley, 1999).
Another aspect related to business operations in Hong Kong is its laws and regulations.
Regulation of business in Hong Kong tends to be less extensive and less stringent than in
Western countries such as the United States (Whitley, 1992, p. 224). For instance, there are no
regulations in Hong Kong that allow regulatory agencies to examine companies' cost
structures and to determine whether companies engage in monopoly pricing. Furthermore,
Hong Kong's government has not yet established formal policies, as have been implemented in
more developed nations, to assure a fair competition among companies in the same industry.
In sum, the aforementioned attributes affect all the relationships within the Hong Kong
society— among individuals, institutions, and the social/business structure. They also create
a distinctive Hong Kong business system and firm characteristics that are unique within the
global economy. As a result, different business strategies could be consciously developed by
Hong Kong firms to capitalize on their comparative advantages: service-oriented, transporta-
tion-friendly, and relatively inexpensive, skilled labor (Whitley, 1992). While attempting to
yield a high level of productivity and stay competitive. Hong Kong managers may want to
consider new management tools that can help their firms achieve operational goals. Of these
tools, we have chosen to examine how value chain analysis is currently implemented in major
Hong Kong enterprises.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
Several recent studies have addressed the importance of value chain analysis in manage-
ment accounting practices. For instance, Boer (1996) emphasizes the significance of
developing models that maximize firm value by incorporating all the costs of product
development, production, and marketing that add value to the firm's products or services.
Booth (1997) also points out the usefulness of value chain analysis in providing crucial
insight into a company's competitive position. In addition. Shank and Govindarajan (1992)
stress that the starting point for cost analysis is to define an industry's value chain activities
and then to assign costs, revenues, and assets to the various value-adding activities. They
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believe that such activities are the building blocks with which firms in an industry can create
products that buyers find valuable. Therefore, Shank and Govindarajan conclude that
implementing value chain analysis would assist firms in reaching decisions that achieve
better product differentiation and create price leadership. Clearly articulating upstream and
downstream value chain activities would help the management better understand the strengths
and weaknesses of their company's operations.
Recently, Donelan and Kaplan (1998) have also indicated that whether a firm can sustain
and strengthen its competitiveness depends on the ability of its managers to differentiate the
firm's products/services from those of its competitors. Accordingly, it is desirable for
corporate managers to fully apply value chain analysis to assist their companies in
differendadng their products and achieving a high level of customer satisfaction. To expand
upon these earlier studies, we examine and compare the value chain analysis implementation
related to the operating costs distribution in each value chain activity/category, then explore
the relationships between value chain costs and degree of cost tracing in the US and Hong
Kong companies.
3.1. Cost structure by value chain activities
In general, before establishing a cost structure and allocating resources to value chain
activities, managers need to explicitly consider the business environment and the firm's
position among local and international competitors (Gadiesh & Gilbert, 1998). Some
managers may find it beneficial for the firm to focus on product design, while others may
strengthen their competitive edge by emphasizing marketing and customer services (Carr &
Tomkins, 1996; Cooper, 1996). As Boer states in his 1996 study, it would be favorable for
firms that operate in a rapidly changing environment to shift their attention more toward
upstream activities to gain advantages in product differentiadon. In addition, Whitley (1992,
1999) indicates that the applications of management accounting systems and controls may
vary due to differences in the societies. These differences may derive fi^om the overall
business environments. For example, companies in a developed country, such as the United
States, possess more advanced technologies and also pay higher levels of compensation than
companies in a newly industrialized economy. Concerning the US companies, product
differentiation appears to be a valuable strategy to sustain competition and maintain
profitability. On the other hand, companies in a newly industrialized country, such as Hong
Kong, are well situated in an environment that relies on import and export business, and they
usually focus more on product distribution and customer service than on product differenti-
ation (Wallace, 1 990). Therefore, it is likely that firms in an advanced economy, such as US,
would invest more resources in upstream activities such as research and development and/or
product design. On the other hand, companies in a newly industrialized market, such as Hong
Kong, could adopt a strategy that focuses more on the downstream activities. Accordingly, we
hypothesize a main effect of business environment (i.e., country):
Hypothesis la: US companies allocate more operating costs to the upstream value chain
activities than Hong Kong companies do.
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Hypothesis lb: Hong Kong companies allocate more operating costs to the downstream
value chain activities than US companies do.
In addition to the effects of overall business environments on the choice of value chain
analysis implementation, we also predict a potential industry effect. As suggested by Whitley
(1992, 1999), the selection of management control systems may depend on differences
among industries, not just among societies. For distinct industries, the level of competition,
specific comparative advantages, and the nature of operations could differ significantly.
Given their limited resources, one would expect corporate management to evaluate carefully
its own operation before committing to any new management system. Therefore, compared
to companies in the manufacturing industry, service firms may place less emphasis on
upstream activities, such as research and development, product design, and production. Since
companies in the service industry are, in general, concerned about providing valuable
services to customers to maintain their comparative advantages, they may pay more attention
to downstream activities, including establishing marketing channel, developing product
distribution logistics, and providing high-quality customer services. Thus, we hypothesize
an industry effect:
Hypothesis 2a: Firms in the manufacturing industry allocate more operating costs to
upstream value chain activities than those in the service industry would allocate.
Hypothesis 2b: Firms in the service industry allocate more operating costs to
downstream value chain activities than those in the manufacturing industry would
allocate.
3.2. Relationships between value chain costs and degree of cost tracing
Managers could design a cost system that allows them to trace actual costs incurred among
the value chain categories. Since establishing such a cost-tracing system can be expensive, it
is reasonable to assume that a firm would explicitly consider both costs and benefits before
designing such a system, hi other words, if a particular value chain cost is high, a firm may
find it beneficial to engage in a detailed cost-tracing exercise, and if the cost is low, less
detailed cost tracing may be required. Thus, if the cost-tracing system were properly
managed, one would expect a positive correlation between the percentage of operating cost
in each category and the degree of cost tracing for that category. To test this line of thought,
we explore both the direction and the magnitude of the relationship between these two
components in the studied firms.
Two statistics are worth examining regarding the degree of cost tracing. A positive
correlation between the magnitude of operating costs and the degree of cost tracing in the
category indicates a possible causal relationship between these two elements, while a
significant correlation coefficient supports the notion that management probably should
explicitly consider a cost-benefit relationship when designing a cost system. Since US
companies in our study are professionally managed and operate in a much more competitive
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business environment, we expect them to focus more on upstream value chain activities/
Accordingly, we predict that:
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive correlation between the magnitude of costs and the
degree of cost tracing in upstream value chain activities for US companies.
On the other hand, as we discussed in the prior section, most Hong Kong companies are
owned by a limited number of shareholders who are also actively involved in the firm's daily
operations. These managers tend to be quite sensitive to operational issues, particularly those
with financial implications. Due to their hands-on management philosophy, we expect Hong
Kong owners/managers to be very interested in establishing a cost system that will allow
them to trace all value chain cost categories and assist them in making resource allocation
decisions. Therefore, we predict that:
Hypothesis 3b: There is a positive correlation between the magnitude of costs and the
degree of cost tracing in value chain activities, both upstream and downstream, for
Hong Kong companies.
4. Research design and data collection
4.1. Research instj-iiment
The research instrument was adopted and revised from Hwang, Chow, Lin, and Shields
(1999). The survey has two sections. The first section contains questions pertaining to the
nature of the firm and the annual sales of the responding companies. Additional questions
regarding each respondent's current position and years of experience in that position are also
included. The second section of the questionnaire makes inquiries about the firm's current
value chain cost analysis practices. As stated in the previous section, there are three major
points in the study. We first explore whether the business environment (i.e., country) and the
industry are important factors in implementing value chain analysis. Then, we examine the
respondent firms' cost structures according to value chain activity categories. Finally, we
investigate the relationships, both in direction and magnitude, between operating costs and
the degrees of cost tracing for each category.
4.2. Data collection processes
Questionnaires were sent to 357 San Diego and 145 Hong Kong companies that had at
least USSl million annual sales for 1996. After identifying the mailing addresses of the firms
to be surveyed, the questionnaire was sent to the personal attention of the chief executive
Since the overall administrative cost is used to support all the activities in the value chain, we do not include
this cost in either the upstream or the downstream activities in our analyses.
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officer (CEO) of each company, along with a formal letter explaining the purpose and nature
of the study. The letter requested the CEO to direct the questionnaire to the person most
knowledgeable about the firm's costing system. A postage-paid return envelope addressed
directly to one of the authors was enclosed with each questionnaire. A total of 65 (18.21%)
San Diego companies and 34 (20.45%) Hong Kong companies returned the questionnaires,
giving us a total of 99 companies in the study.'
5. Results
In this section, we first present the descriptive information of the responding firms. Then,
we conduct multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) to test the population means of all
value chain activities concurrently. The purpose of conducting MANOVA is to divulge the
main effects of the business environment (i.e., country) and industry on the value chain
analysis implementation in the United States and Hong Kong. Then, we report the dis-
tribution of annual operating cost across value chain activities by country (United States vs.
Hong Kong) and by industry (manufacturing vs. service). Furthermore, according to the
classification of value chain activities into upstream and downstream activities, we then
investigate whether the companies in the United States have allocated more resources to
upstream activities than were allocated by their Hong Kong counterparts. Finally, the
correlation between percentage of operational costs and the degree of cost tracing in each
category are presented.
5.7. Descriptive information
Industries represented by the responding companies include manufacturing, construction
and design, communications, financial services, health care, hospitality/travel, accounting and
legal services, retail, and software. The average annual sales of US and Hong Kong
companies are US$1 15.6 million (ranging from US$1 million to US$2 billion with a standard
deviation of US$273 million) and US$66.4 million (ranging from US$10 million to US$535
million with a standard deviation of US$101 million), respectively. Most of the individuals
who completed the survey hold relatively high positions in their companies. Among the US
respondents, 29 (44.6%) are chief financial officers, 21 (32.3%) are controllers, and 15
(23.1%) hold other high-level posifions. For Hong Kong companies, the respondents include
one chief financial officer (2.9%), 13 (38.2%) controllers, and 20 (58.8%) others in high-level
positions. On average, respondents from both countries have similar longevity in their
companies, with 7.1 years (standard deviation is 7.4 years) for US participants and 6.9 years
(standard deviation is 3.6 years) for their Hong Kong counterparts. Thus, we expect that the
" Whenever responses are obtained from only part of the sample, there is the potential for the respondents to be
nonrepresentative of the sample as a whole. Survey studies often assess the severity of this problem by comparing
the answers in early vs. late responses. We did not conduct such a comparison because all of the responses were
received within a 3-week window.
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Table 1
Overall MANOVA results
Source Mean square F value P value
Country (C) - 0.795 3.285 .004
Industry (I) 0.694 5.599 .001
Countr>' X Industry (C X I) 0.795 3.271 .004
respondents have sufficient knowledge of their firms' current costing practices to provide
informative answers.
5.2. Overall results
Since our interest is to understand how US and Hong Kong companies implement value
chain analysis, we first explore the resource allocation issue by examining all seven cost
categories concurrently using MANOVA with the business environment (i.e., country) and
industry^ as the independent variables. In Table 1 , the overall results of MANOVA indicate
that both country and industry are important factors affecting how resources were allocated
among value chain activity categories (F= 3.285, P< .004; F= 5.599, P< .001, respectively).
In addition, we found a significant interaction in effect between country and industry
variables (see Table 1).^
MANOVA results in Table 2 provide detailed information regarding the resource allocation
among different value chain activities. As shown in Table 2, concerning the country factor,
the results indicate that costs distributed were significantly different in US and Hong Kong
companies for research and development, production, marketing, and overall administration
cost (F= 5.359, 3.991, 4.352, 6.470; P<.023, .049, .040, .013, respectively). Regarding the
industry effect, the costs distributed to research and development, production, customer
service, and overall administration cost were significantly different between the manufactur-
ing and the service companies (respectively, F= 10.417, 5.117, 4.354, 11.847; P<.002, .026,
.040, .001). Both analyses indicate that there are significant differences in the cost allocations
among value chain activities of companies in the two economies.
5.3. Cost distribution among value chain activities
In this section, we report descriptive findings on cost distribution among value chain
activities by dividing the responded companies, first based on country, and then on industry.
The details of the cost distribution among value chain activities for US and Hong Kong
companies are listed in Panel A of Table 3. The means (standard deviations) of cost
distribution among the value chain activities are as follows for US companies: research
Due to the small sample size of this study, we divided the responding firms into service and nonservice
(e.g., manufacturing) categories to test the industry effect.
In a later section, we will discuss this interaction effect based on additional data analyses.
132 C.J. Chang, N.-C.R. Hwang / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 123-140
Table 2
MANOVA results by country and industry
Source Country Industry
Value chain activity Mean square F value P value Mean square F value P value
1 Research and development 1505.11 5.359 .023 2926.04 10.417 .002
2 Design 5.46 0.050 .823 109.56 1.009 .318
3 Production 2248.38 3.991 .049 2883.06 5.117 .026
4 Marketing 317.90 4.352 .040 245.27 3.357 .070
5 Distribution 32.51 0.319 .573 8.17 0.080 .778
6 Customer service 358.31 2.481 .119 628.40 4.354 .040
7 Overall administration 2377.64 6.470 .013 4353.28 11.847 .001
and development, 14.05% (24.32%); design, 6.52% (12.63%); production, 36.67% (26.69%);
marketing, 8.58% (7.72%); distribution, 6.17% (12.11%); customer services, 6.93%
(13.02%); and overall administration, 21.18% (22.33%). On the other hand, for Hong Kong
companies, they were as follows: research and development, 6.25%) (5.31%); design, 6.04%
(4.76%); production, 33.16% (20.68%); marketing, 11.69% (10.27%); distribution, 5.91%
(4.50%); customer services, 9.66% (10.75%); and overall administration, 26.47% (14.97%).
Referring to Panel B of Table 3, we examine the firms' operating-cost distribution across
value chain activities by industry (manufacturing vs. service). The results show that
Table 3
Distribution of annual operating costs across value chain activities
Panel A: By countr>'
Country United States (%) Hong Kong (%)
Value chain activity Range Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D.
1 Research and development 0-95 14.05 24.32 0-20 6.25 5.31
2 Design 0-80 6.52 12.63 0-15 6.04 4.76
3 Production 0-84 36.67 26.69 0-84 33.16 20.68
4 Marketing 0-30 8.58 7.72 1-50 11.69 10.27
5 Distribution 0-80 6.17 12.11 0-15 5.91 4.50
6 Customer service 0-85 6.93 13.02 0-60 9.66 10.75
7 Overall administration l-IOO 21.18 22.33 6-60 26.47 14.97
Panel B: By industry
Industry Manufacturing (%) Service (%)
Range MeanValue chain activity Range Mean S.D. S.D.
1 Research and development 0-95 18.21 25.21 0-17 3.16 4.47
2 Design 0-80 8.00 13.35 0-20 4.38 5.22
3 Production 0-84 36.94 22.87 0-84 33.70 26.97
4 Marketing 0-50 8.46 8.57 0-30 11.08 8.85
5 Distribution 0-25 5.52 6.11 0-80 6.76 13.51
6 Customer service 0-26 5.61 6.00 0-85 10.58 16.73
7 Overall administration 4-70 18.31 12.85 1-100 28.62 25.49
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manufacturing companies in our sample invested more resources in upstream value chain
activities. For example, on average, manufacturing companies allocated 18.21% of their
annual operating cost in research and development. However, R&D costs service companies
only 3.16% of their operating expenditures. Similarly, the manufacturing companies also
invested more than the service companies in product design (8.00% vs. 4.38%). Comparing
the cost allocations for the downstream activities of companies in the two industries, we
found that the service companies focused more on marketing than did the manufacturing
firms (11.08% vs. 8.46%). A similar observation can also be made for customer service
activities. The results indicate that customer service activities consumed, on average, 10.58%
of the service companies' total annual operating cost, while the manufacturing companies
spent only 5.61% to provide service to their customers.
5.4. Test ofHI
Excluding the overall administration cost category, which provides services to the entire
value chain activities, we further group research and development, design, and production
activities as the upstream activities, and marketing, distribution, and customer services as the
downstream activities. We then analyzed the value chain cost distributions by comparing the
US and Hong Kong companies and found some notable differences. Recall that Hla predicts
that US companies allocate more resources to upstream activities (i.e., research and
development, product design, and production) than their Hong Kong counterparts do. To
test Hla, we conduct a t test to compare the means of the two groups' operating costs in the
value chain categories. The results indicate that US firms, as a whole, did allocate more
resources to the upstream activities than did their counterparts (? = 2.427, /*< .017). Regarding
downstream activities, the mean percentage of cost allocated by the Hong Kong companies
(27.25%) is greater than that ofUS companies (21.68%). Although the direction is consistent
with our prediction (Hlb) that Hong Kong firms usually allocate more resources to
downstream activities than US firms, the difference in these two regions is not statistically
significant (?= 1.555, P< .124) (Table 4).
5.5. Test ofH2
Recall that in H2a, we predict manufacturing companies will allocate more resources to
upstream activities than those companies in the service industry. Using the same grouping
method, we conduct a t test to compare the means of the two industries' upstream operating
Table 4
Comparison of upstream vs. downstream operating costs by country
Country United States (%)
Mean S.D.
Hong Kong (%)
/ StatisticsValue chain activity Mean S.D. P value
1 Upstream activities
2 Downstream activities
57.23 28.05
21.68 20.60
45.46 19.72
27.25 14.60
2.427
1.555
.017
.124
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Table 5
Comparison of upstream vs. downstream operating costs by industry
Country
Value chain activity
Manufacturing (%)
Mean S.D.
Service (%)
Mean S.D. t Statistics P value
1 Upstream activities
2 Downstream activities
64.15 19.74
19.58 14.12
41.23
28.41
27.73
22.56
4.445
2.279
.001
.026
costs in the value chain. The results show that the manufacturing firms in our sample
allocated more resources to the upstream activities than those companies in the service
industry (r = 4.445, P<.001). Regarding downstream activities, the means (standard devia-
tions) of cost percentage allocated by service-oriented companies and by manufacturing firms
are 28.41% (22.56%) and 19.58% (14.12%), respectively. The difference between the two
groups' downstream costs is statistically significant (/ = 2.279, P<.026) (Table 5).
5.6. Test ofH3
Recall that H3a predicts a positive correlation between the magnitude of costs and degree
of cost tracing in upstream value chain activities for US companies. To explore the existence
of the relationship, we compute Spearman's correlations between the percentage of operating
cost in each value chain category and the degree cost. The results are presented in Panel A of
Table 6. They show significant correlations of two elements, R&D and design activities, at a
\% level (respectively, r = .740, .533; P<.001, .001).^ These results are consistent with our
prediction that there is a significant correspondence between the magnitude of operating costs
and degree of cost tracing in upstream value chain activities for US companies.
Using the same analysis, the level of correspondence between costs and cost tracing in
each value chain category of the Hong Kong companies is also studied. Panel B of Table 6
illustrates all statistical results and shows significant correlations between magnitude of costs
and degrees of cost tracing for R&D, product design, and production (respectively, r=.576,
.537, .571; P<.001, .002, .001) in upstream activities. Furthermore, the results also show
positive correlation coefficients {P value) in the following value chain categories for the
downstream activities: marketing, .331 {P< .064); distribution, .424 (P< .015); and customer
service, .304 (P< .091). The results are consistent with our prediction in H2b. That is, there is
a positive correlation between the percentage of cost allocated to value chain activities and
cost tracing, both upstream and downstream, for Hong Kong companies.
5. 7. Additional analysis on the interaction effect
Given the findings of the significant interaction effect between country and industry
(see Table 1), we conduct additional analyses to examine this effect. Table 7 reports the
results of cost comparison by country and industry. Before carrying out statistical analyses,
Pearson correlation analyses provide results similar to those of Spearman correlation tests.
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Table 6
The correlation (P value) between percentage of operating cost and degree of cost tracing by value chain
categories (non-parametric Spearman's correlation)
Panel A: US sample 65 firms)
Research and Customer Overall
Value chain activity development Design Production Marketing Distribution service administration
1 Research and .740
development
2 Design
3 Production
(.001)
.533
(.001)
.122
4 Marketing
5 Distribution
(.359)
.077
(.569)
.335
6 Customer service
(.023)
.254
7 Overall
(.064)
-.111
administration (.381)
Panel B: Hong Kong sample (34 firms)
Research and Customer Overall
Value chain activity development Design Production Marketing Distribution service administration
1 Research and .576
development
2 Design
3 Production
(.001)
.537
(.002)
.571
4 Marketing
5 Distribution
(.001)
.331
(.064)
.424
6 Customer service
(.015)
.304
7 Overall
(.091)
.352
administration (.048)
we calculate the relative proportions of operating cost spent on upstream and downstream
activities by excluding overall administration cost from the denominator.*^ Then, we conduct
separate t tests to examine the difference in cost allocation between manufacturing and
service companies. As reported in Table 7, the results indicate that US manufacturing firms
Relative proportion of annual operating cost spent on upstream activities = (sum of relative cost spent on
upstream value chain activities) divided by (total annual operating cost spent minus overall administration cost).
(I
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Table 7
Comparison of operating costs by country and industry for upstream activities
Country United States (%)
Mean S.D.
Hong Kong (%)
t StatisticsIndustry Mean S.D. P value
Manufacturing
Service
84.17 14.95
59.45 29.33
65.98 15.99
47.72 32.96
4.310
0.927
.001
.377
indeed spent more of their resources for upstream activities than did their Hong Kong
counterparts (r = 4.310, P<.001). However, we do not observe a significant difference
between service companies in the two regions (? = 0.927, P<.377). An examination of
expenditures for downstream activities by manufacturing and service companies yields, as
expected, identical statistical results to what we found for upstream activities, so they are not
repeated in Table 7. In addition, ANOVA results using the relative expenditure in upstream
activities as the dependent variable also reveal significant main effects of country and
industry (F=7.442, P<.008; F= 15.32, P<.0001, respectively). Thus, the results for the
main effects confirm the analyses performed above. However, the interaction effect is not
significant (F= 0.346, P<.558).
Three points regarding these research findings are worth noting. First, a wide range of cost
distribution (with a rather large standard deviation) within each value chain activity suggests
that the sampled firms face different circumstances and/or have elected to emphasize different
segments of their value chains. This observation is consistent with the notion that different
firms in different countries and industries may decide to focus on different aspects of their
operations. Second, it appears that US manufacturing firms in our sample tend to allocate
more resources to upstream value chain activities, while the Hong Kong companies may have
chosen to focus on downstream activities. Finally, corporate managers in both the United
States and Hong Kong seem to understand the distribution of their operating costs to the
various value chain activities and have paid considerable attention to tracing them.
6. Summary and conclusion
Whether a firm has competitive advantages depends on how it generates revenues and
controls costs (i.e., improves its profitability) while enhancing its customers' satisfaction.
During the past two decades, many cost-management techniques have been introduced to
domestic and foreign corporate managers. Industries are beginning to acknowledge the
benefits of value chain cost analysis in strengthening a company's competitive position. To
manage value chain activities effectively, corporate managers must be thoroughly familiar
with the firm's cost structure and need to analyze the relationship of its value chain costs to
the degree of cost tracing.
Survey findings from 65 US and 34 Hong Kong firms indicate that the degree of value
chain implementation may be contingent upon the country and industry of the studied
company. Overall, companies operating in an advanced economy, such as the United States,
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may invest more resources in upstream activities than are invested by companies in a newly
industrialized economy, such as Hong Kong. However, this significant difference in cost
allocation between the United States and Hong Kong is found in upstream, not downstream,
activities. Further analyses suggest that this difference exists only in the manufacturing
industry. Regarding the service industry, US and Hong Kong companies allocate similar
percentages of costs to operate their value chain activities.
The observation of a significant industry effect is just as we expected. Manufacturing firms
in both the United States and Hong Kong allocate more funds to their upstream activities than
service firms do. Similarly, service firms allocate more funds to downstream activities than
their counterparts do. Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates that there is a relationship
between percentages of operating costs for each activity and the degree of cost tracing for that
activity within firms' existing cost structures, particularly for upstream activities, among
companies in both economies.
As with other empirical studies, our study leaves several questions unanswered. First, the
nature of the business environment in which the firm operates is likely to determine how
it can compete. For example, companies that produce products with relatively short lives
(e.g., telecommunication equipment) may be more willing to allocate a large portion of their
resources to research and development than are those firms that primarily supply a
commodity for other companies. Therefore, it would be meaningful to examine this issue
and to investigate whether the industry and/or product type contributes to the adoption of
value chain analysis implementation.
Second, it is important to determine whether implementing value chain activity analysis
would enhance corporate profits short term and/or long term. As we discussed in the prior
sections, the value chain analysis could be used as a strategic tool in cost management. The
benefits of its implementation to the corporate bottom line, however, may not be immediately
available. Therefore, it would be beneficial to conduct future studies of firms in different
regions to examine the relationship between the level of value chain analysis implementation
and its impacts on companies' short-term and long-term profitability.
Third, the smaller firm size and a higher level involvement in daily operations by owners/
managers of Hong Kong companies, compared to US companies, may affect the adoption of
new management-control systems. According to our empirical results. Hong Kong managers
appear to be acdvely pursuing new tools to assist them in strengthening their competitive
position. Although this finding is consistent with the competitive nature of the Hong Kong
business environment, readers need to be cautious in interpreting this finding. Since this is
one of the earliest studies to relate the business environment to the adoption of management-
control systems, more research needs to be conducted before conclusions are drawn.
Fourth, the levels at which companies in the United States and Hong Kong adopt value
chain analysis may be driven by some unidentified factors. While there is no obvious link
between the adoption of value chain analysis and firm culture factors, studies to determine
whether such a link exists could yield additional insights into why managers adopt/do not
adopt value chain analysis as part of their management practices.
Fifth, the survey questionnaire first asks the respondents to indicate the proportion of
expenditures applied to each value chain component, followed by the degree of cost tracing
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for these components. Due to the nature of the research inquiries, a potential demand effect
may exist. While there was no direct indication of such an effect or of how a demand effect
may affect our research findings, readers need to be aware of this potential limitation and to
interpret the research findings carefully.
Finally, the level of correlation between the percentage of operating cost and the level of
tracing in the value chain activity category should be carefully interpreted. For instance, the
degree of cost tracing may result in different levels of controllable expenditures or in different
numbers of products/clients manufactured/serviced among companies. Since we did not ask
the respondents to specify the controllability of cost in each value chain category or what
management systems (e.g., JIT or ABC) their firm has adopted, it is somewhat unclear
whether these factors may have affected the company's rationality in allocating their
resources in tracing operating costs.
hi sum, the research findings of this study sheds light on how US and Hong Kong firms
that responded to our questionnaire are currently implementing value chain analyses in their
cost-management systems. Based on the results of this study, two observations, in particular,
deserve more attention. As companies analyze their value chain costs, it is important to
examine the entire value chain activities rather than to focus on a particular component. This
analysis approach would help management better allocate limited resources. The other
observation is that it may be necessary for firms to make a concerted effort to discover
how to take full advantage of value chain analysis to gain competitive advantages. As stated
by Kaplan (1995), the rapidly changing environment creates ample opportunities for
management accountants to make contributions to their companies. Since corporate managers
are required to deliver quality products and services that meet customers' expectations, an
effective design and implementation of value chain analysis would assist management in
deciding product mixes, choosing production alternatives, determining prices, selecting
distribution channels, and providing services to enhance customer satisfaction. By playing
active and leading roles, management accountants can participate in the formulation and
implementation of firms' cost management strategies.
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Capsule commentaries
Miller European Accounting Guide edited by David Alexander and Simon Archer, Aspen
Law & Business, Gaithersburg, NY, fourth edition 2001, xvii +1,712 pp.; US$159.00
This valuable reference work, the third edition of which was reviewed in Vol. 35, No. 2
(2000) of this journal, has been revised at a time of fast-moving developments on the inter-
national accounting scene. The same 27 countries are covered: the 15 member states ofthe EU,
plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the three Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Belarus, and the Russian Federation.
Several new authors appear in this edition, notably the new authors of the chapters and
appendix on the UK and Ireland. The chapters on these two countries are now placed next to
each other, out of alphabetical order, and are followed by a lengthy appendix that reviews the
similar stock exchange regulations and accounting pronouncements in the two countries. All
told, some 14% of the volume is taken up by the treatment of the many regulations and
standards in the UK and Ireland.
The allocation of space to cover some of the countries is unexpected. France requires only
3 1 pages of text, which is less than the number of pages devoted to Hungary (5 1 ) and the
Netherlands (73).
Most of the chapters are usefully illustrated with a reprinted company annual report, ren-
dered both in the country's language and in English.
In their introductory chapter, the authors provide some insightful perspective. One remark
is worth quoting: "The impression created by [the SEC's predominant role in lOSCO's
'endorsement' of the lASC's core standards] and the SEC's Concept Release is that, in effect,
the SEC has taken the lASC firmly under its wing. . ." (p. 13).
This volume continues to justify its cost.
Significant differences in GAAP in Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States:
An analysis of accounting pronouncements as of January 2001 Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants, Toronto, 2000, v+150pp.
This is the third edition of a useful guide to the differences in GAAP among the NAFTA
countries and Chile, which is in line to join NAFTA. It has been published on behalf of the
AFTA Committee for Cooperation on Financial Reporting Matters.
0020-7063/02/$ - see front matter © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
PII: 80020-7063(02)00132-2
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It begins by highlighting the major areas of difference and then traces the recent progress
in ehminating differences. A major section is devoted to a comprehensive survey of the major
differences in GAAP among the four countries, which is complemented by sections that focus
on the differences that affect the income statement and the balance sheet.
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The ValueReporting Revolution: Moving Beyond the Earnings Game
by Robert G. Eccles, Robert H. Herz, E. Mary Keegan and David M.H. Phillips, Wiley,
New York, 2001, xvii +349 pp.
The ValueReporting^^ Revolution is the product of a team effort. Heading the team are the
authors who, as the Foreword explains, are "three accountants and a former professor,"
Robert Eccles, who "is not a trained accountant but a bit of a closet one." All are associated
in one way or another with PricewaterhouseCoopers, owner of the ValueReporting trademark
and the copyright to the book. The authors are generous in their praise of the many supporting
team members— the "action guys," other "extremely talented people" (of both sexes) with
"many ideas," all mentioned in the Foreword and credited with helping make the book what
it is.
Tlie Structure. The book has six parts, comprising a prologue, 1 6 chapters and an epilogue.
The titles are worth spelling out because they encapsulate the contents and the message. Part
1 , titled Preparing for the Revolution, consists of the prologue, "A Manifesto for the Second
Revolution" and Chapter 1, "Common Sense." (We are told on page 5 that the First
Revolution was in performance measurement.) Part 2, A Survey of the Battlefield, contains
Chapters 2-6: "Where Has All the Value Gone?", "Analyze This," "The Earnings Game,"
"The False Prophet of Earnings" and "Inside the Exciting World of Accounting Standards."
Part 3, Battles that Must Be Won, contains Chapters 7-9: "Out, Out Damned Gap!", "Risky
Business" and "There Is No Alternative: The Story of Shell." Part 4, How Sweet It Is,
comprises Chapters 10 and 11, "To the Victor Go the Spoils" and "Can You See Clearly
Now?" Part 5, Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, comprises chapters titled, "Get on
Board", "Standard Setters" and "Should You See an Analyst?" Part 6, Nothing Can Stop Us
Now, rounds out the book. It contains the 15th and final chapter, "Send Lawyers, Guns, and
Money" plus the Epilogue, fittingly titled "A Call to Arms."
The message. Corporate financial reporting is broken. "The corporate reporting model has
failed" (opening phrase, p. 3.) It has not kept pace "with extraordinary changes in how
executives manage their companies— in strategy, organization, technology, and human
resources" (p. 3). The market is obsessed (p. 69) with accounting earnings to the point
where "managers, analysts and shareholders ... are trapped in a short-term earnings game"
(p. 4). Managers' efforts are misdirected toward the earnings game when they should be
creating value. The obsession with earnings is dysfunctional because financial information,
particularly the bottom line, is increasingly irrelevant in today's economy. The accounting
0020-7063/02/$ - see front matter © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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model, which produces most of the financial information, copes poorly with intangibles—
US balance sheets, for example, omit intangible assets created by "R&D, information
technology, marketing, branding, and customer loyalty programs" (p. 55)— yet their
importance is growing. Neither does the reporting model cope at all well with risk, focusing,
if at all, on the downside when there is an upside to risk as well. Managers "manage" their
firms' earnings to report as favorably as they can. Sell-side analysts do not say clearly what
they believe, although for now they might whisper it for the benefit of the favored few within
earshot. And analysts and managers interact in a way that distorts whatever value an earnings
signal may have contained in the first place. Pity the poor investors. They get garbled signals,
at best. In any event, they do not get the information about value drivers and risk, which they
need and want (see especially Chapters 7 and 8). The stock market suffers from short term-
ism and excessive volatility. Companies do not drive their assets as hard as they might, and
they pay too much for their capital. Ultimately, the cost is borne by the community.
What's to be done? Revamp performance reporting. Managers must embrace a "new
philosophy of performance measurement based on integrating leading indicator nonfinancial
measures with financial ones" (p. 5). They should focus on the really key (equals "few,"
p. 18) drivers of value, those for which a cause-effect relationship can be demonstrated and
which can be measured meaningfully. Managers should use the drivers to create value and to
collect data on their experience. The data should be analyzed to "prove [to the managers] that
they have identified all of their key performance measures . . . and most important, that
they've actually created real value" (p. 6). Shareholders are major stakeholders but there are
others, too. Reports should address social and environmental responsibilities, as well as the
economic ones. In a nutshell, insofar as it is feasibly possible, all of the key drivers and
performance measures that are used internally to manage a company should be reported
publicly, comprehensively, transparently and truthfiilly in real time, so that the market can
properly price listed stocks. Managers should interact continuously with the market and other
stakeholders to ensure they have got their reporting right and that the public does not suffer
from a distorted view of the company's activities and affairs. It is not a quick fix. But
substantial benefits can be won, especially by those who move first.
What are those benefits? Chapter 10 lists five: "increased management credibility, more
long-term investors, greater analyst following, improved access to new capital, and higher
share values." Walter Kielholz of Swiss Re adds a sixth: "if more members of his senior
management team committed to targets and reported on results to the market, Swiss Re would
produce a higher shareholder value" (p. 200), which we would expect if companies were to
achieve higher returns from better management (through improved strategic focus and
control, and improved operational control; p. 13), and if better informadon and greater
credibility lead to lower investment risk. Surveys of US executives, sell-side analysts and
institutional investors, and across 14 countries, revealed a great deal of consensus about the
relative importance of the benefits of greater disclosure (see Chapter 7).
So what are we waiting for? Why does it not all happen now? Much of the responsibility
for any inertia is said to lie with company executives, and sell-side analysts and their
employers, the investment banks. Company executives "instinctively oppose reporting on
new dimensions of performance. They feel the costs outweigh the benefits" (p. 103). They
Book reviews 147
"don't want to start a new game until all the players agree" (p. 104). Chapter 10 deals with 10
common reasons (excuses?) that executives give for not disclosing more: "the market cares
only about earnings" (but the evidence indicates the market wants far more than it gets); "we
already report a lot of information" (but is it the right information?); "once we start reporting
something, we can't stop" (yes, you can, but you will need to explain why); information is
costly (but you need the information to manage your business anyway; how much more does
it cost to tell others?); "the market always wants more" ("simply not true"); "bad numbers
will hurt our stock price" (yes, but better numbers will have a positive effect); some measures
are unreliable (look for others that are); our competitors will learn too much (maybe they
know already; and if they do not, they cannot adapt their own strategies overnight just to
benefit from your own disclosures); our customers and suppliers will hold us to ransom (but if
they benefit from the relationship, they will stay); and "we'll get sued" (yes, that is a risk,
and the regulators need to look at it.) Sell-side analysts have no incentive to change because
they are locked into the earnings game. Institutional investors help preserve the status quo
because, while they "want more information . . . they want it all to themselves" (p. 104).
Information of the kind advocated in this book is irrelevant to day traders because of their
short-term horizon, and to momentum investors because they trade on the past rather than on
the future. The big picture looks to me like a systemic problem, and we need a circuit breaker.
Enter the executives.
The "success of the ValueReporting Revolution depends on . . . executives taking the
initiative" (p. 110). And where better to start than the top? "[T]op executives must take the
primary responsibility. They must insist that senior business unit managers clearly articulate
their business models and define the measures that will be used to evaluate performance . .
.
Corporate executives should assess business unit performance against them. The board of
directors . . . should ensure that investors get the information on these measures . . . the board
must make sure it has the information it needs" (p. 239).
Chapter 1 1 sketches out this latter part of the process in the form of a simplified model of
how firms can develop the content of their disclosures. It will require leadership, but first
movers will gain a competitive edge. How reporting standards for an industry could evolve
from a market-driven process is summarized on page 257. A company-led, industry-based
consortium of companies, consultants and other interested parties is the key. "Real
regulators" would ensure that all companies eventually adopt the standards. Professional
accounting firms can help develop (and later, audit) the key nonfinancial performance
measures, but if they do not adjust to the new order, their future is so bleak it could take
the government to bail them out (p. 272)! Security analysts will need to be transparent about
relationships with the companies they analyze. Company-generated information that is more
value-relevant and equally accessible to all stakeholders will make the analysts' role as
information intermediary less necessary and allow them to concenfrate on more accurately
pricing the stock.
Impressions. The style is unashamedly and appropriately populist. It is an easy read, with
few blemishes. I did find that the self-congratulatory tone of the introduction wore a bit thin,
as did the hyperbole and word play in places. But that is personal. There is a handy selection
of references to the accounting research literature on the declining value relevance of
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earnings, nonfinancial indicators of value, bias in sell-side analysts' forecasts and recom-
mendations, and the balanced scorecard approach to management and reporting. Do not look
for references that question the book's foundation, namely, the alleged declining relevance of
financial reporting: Why mute the sound of the clarion? It is not particularly deep on analysis.
For instance, while it acknowledges that proprietary costs limit voluntary disclosure,
essentially they are dismissed. Some questions go begging. If feedback from users is
important to the disclosure process, does it matter if they do not agree on whether a particular
item of information is best generated by the company or by the users themselves? What about
the rogues, rascals, storytellers and plain liars who exploit the information disadvantage of the
"great unwashed," who then turn to the politicians and regulators to "do something"? And it
states (p. 78): "For the spirit to change. The Earnings Game will have to become The Value
Game"— but that is the last sentence of the section, and the reader is left wondering just how
the two games will differ.
What, then, is the book's contribution? Apart from the matters already discussed, it
certainly raises the awareness of serious external reporting issues. An example is Chapter 7's
informative analysis of communication gaps between the views of companies, analysts and
investors about which performance measures are "particularly important in making sound
investment decisions." There are some excellent illustrations of good corporate practice, such
as Metapraxis' business driver analysis, Swiss Re's search for more effective performance
measures (such as "embedded value"), Cisco System's analysis of the upside as well as the
downside dimensions of risk, the development of the Sears Phoenix Team's business model
and what to me was a very interesting chapter on Royal Dutch Shell's efforts to practice
"sustainability" and to report transparently on outcomes ("to create long-term economic
value . . . sustainability says that companies must also create social and environmental value"
(p. 163). Finally, it speculates on future developments and delivery systems, such as the
Internet and XBRL.
The market? Anyone concerned with corporate reporting to financial (primarily equity)
markets— public company directors, CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, executives, investment bankers,
portfolio managers, financial analysts, investors, professional accounting firms, information
intermediaries and regulators— will find this book to be provocative. As J. Frank Brown
claims in his preface, "if it succeeds in stirring further thought and action, it will have served
a good purpose."
Philip Brown
Department ofAccounting Finance
University of Western Australia
Nedlands, WA, Australia
Tel: +61-8-9380-2899
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Corporate Financial Accounting and Reporting
by Tim Sutton, Financial Times/Prentice Hall, Harlow, Essex, England, 2000, xiii+754 pp.
The harmonization of accounting standards is one of the most significant accounting issues
that researchers and practitioners will discuss in this millennium. The globalization of
business affects our comprehension of what should be considered as relevant accounting
knowledge today. As part of the globalization movement, increasing focus is placed today on
the international aspects of accounting. As physical and economic boundaries between
countries disappear, enterprises will need more people possessing a broader view on
accounting practices. Consequently, in deciding on the content of a program in international
accounting for future managers and accountants, one of the main questions for professors and
instructors is how the diversity related to international accounting issues should be taught.
Evidently, the relevant questions are usually like these: What topics should be included, and
what kind of course textbook is needed? There are probably many right answers to these
questions, and there are many ways of organizing international accounting courses. Tim
Sutton provides his version of a textbook for an international accounting course in his
Corporate Financial Accounting and Reporting. In his choice of topics, he gives advice on
what should be the focus for an introductory accounting course.
The textbook is usually an important element in an accounting course. It should therefore
be carefully selected based on judgments of both the book's objectives and its content. The
objectives of Sutton's book are clearly stated and well communicated to the readers. The
book is presented as an introductory financial accounting textbook that aims at universal
applications in business administration courses at a variety of levels offered by European
universities and business schools. Postgraduate and undergraduate students studying inter-
national business and finance are listed among potential readers. The book is, however, not
explicitly oriented to future professional accountants but rather to future managers. Thus, by
taking the user approach, the author intends to provide students with an understanding of
companies' published financial statements. The book also aims to give a comprehensive
coverage by including a wider international approach to accounting issues.
The book consists of 20 chapters grouped into three main parts. Part 1 covers the
"foundations of accounting." In this part, the author makes extensive use of a pedagogical
"trick" that may contribute to a better understanding of accounting by students, i.e.,
examining typical "accounting fallacies" associated with both particular accounting
concepts and accounting in general. Students for whom accounting is a relatively new
subject can thus learn how to grasp important accounting concepts as well as comprehend
the content of financial statements and annual reports. Numerous examples and exercises
help the student gradually build up an understanding of the double-entry technique, as two
of the six chapters in this part are devoted to the topic of handling accounting entries and
accrual adjustments. Students who have previously taken accounting courses may use Part
1 not only as a reinforcement but also as a means of learning more about the peculiarities
of financial statements in some European countries.
Part 2 is the longest and examines "the house of accounting." This part is oriented to
advanced students, and in 11 chapters the main components of financial statements are
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discussed and analyzed quite deeply. The focus is on assets, liabilities, and equity; revenues
and expenses; and taxes and employment costs. In this part, the author adopts another
pedagogical approach to present and discuss accounting issues. In each chapter, readers are
introduced to the most common accounting practices that they, as future managers, may
encounter in companies drawn from different European and non-European countries. This is
often illustrated by references to a European country's specific accounting practices. Because
many internationally oriented companies are required to follow European Union Directives or
international accounting standards (IAS), several of the chapters in the second part refer to
accounting solutions grounded in the relevant European Directives or IAS. Significant
differences between US GAAP and IAS are also pointed out. Different accounting practices
related to accounting disclosures and financial statement analyses are also illustrated by
including figures from actual companies.
The final part is entitled "Perspectives." This part consists of three chapters that focus on
cash flow statements and on ways of analyzing financial statements. Readers are provided
with examples and illustrations to learn more about the relationship between profitability,
earnings, and cash flow. The last two chapters of the book synthesize knowledge about
financial statements gained during the course. The focus is on the context of the statements as
represented by the interaction between the company and its competitive environment. The
author's presentation and explanation of financial statement analysis is richly illustrated by
the inclusion of real-world data from the financial statements of the Carlsberg Group, a major
European beer producer based in Denmark. Practical problems that investors certainly will
face when analyzing financial statements are extensively treated.
In my judgment, the language used in this book is easy to understand for readers who do
not have English as their native language. The presentations are clearly developed. Together
with the glossary of accounting terms and concepts, the book will certainly help a non-
Anglophone audience understand both the fundamentals of accounting and, in addition, some
of the more complicated issues in accounting. Readers will also benefit from the mostly up-
to-date references to accounting standards and some of the recent, relevant accounting
literature. The author has also opted to treat some interesting specialized topics in several of
the chapters, e.g., accounting for foreign operations (pp. 467-477). Many examples and the
end-of-the-chapter problems also provide opportunities for students' self-study.
Any textbook writer is confronted with the dilemma of achieving comprehensive coverage
of the subject matter, while at the same time keeping the volume to a reasonable length. The
modular design of Sutton's book might be a solution to some aspects of this dilemma, but
there can be a limit. By dividing several of the chapters into both "core issues" and
"specialized topics," he has enabled the teacher and class to select the desired course content.
Based on the balance between the depth of issues presented and the range of topics covered,
the book seems to be most suited for introductory or even specialized courses in international
accounting at the graduate level. In particular, international MBA students at the graduate
level may benefit considerably from the way in which the accounting topics are presented in
this book. I fear, however, that undergraduate students would be intimidated by the girth of
the book. And even if they were required to read only half of book, they would certainly, and
quite fairly, question why they have to buy the entire book.
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Even though the book is heavily driven by the needs of financial statement users in its
focus on interpreting and understanding companies' financial statements, its methodological
premises are quite mainstream. The book gives fruitful insights into the problems of
accounting harmonization, but it builds on a regulatory accounting model and has a positivist
orientation. It lacks a broader perspective on intemational accounting issues highlighted fi*om
alternative accounting schools of thought, such as the interpretative paradigm of accounting
(e.g., accounting as a social construction) or even the critical perspective on accounting. It is,
therefore, in my opinion, not especially suitable for postgraduate accounting courses. Such
perspectives could have been introduced in Part 3, "Perspecdves." Even for a textbook for
the graduate level, I think it would have been advantageous to include discussion of the
political dilemmas in setting accounting standards, and of the tensions and conflicts between
the several interest groups. I would have much appreciated a discussion of how standards are
developed and of the factors that influence this development.
In sum, the book is well worth reading, and undoubtedly, the author has extensive
experience working on the subjects presented. The book lives up to its stated objectives,
perhaps with the exception of its suitability to undergraduates. This book will undoubtedly
make its readers sensitive to the diversity in financial reporting practices, and that there are no
universal solutions to accounting problems but rather some accepted ways of dealing with
them. This book ably provides its main intended audience, the future managers, with the
opportunity to leam in depth about both the evident and hidden problems of accounting
harmonization. One hopes that such knowledge will make them more aware of accounting
"problems" when engaging in intemational business.
Anatoli Bourmistrov
Bode Graduate School of Business
Bode, Norway
Tel: +47-755-17-673
Fax: +47-755-17-268
E-mail address: anatoli.bourmistrov@hibo.no
PII: 80020-7063(02)00129-2
Contemporary Issues in Accounting Regulation
Edited by Stuart McLeay and Angelo Riccaboni, Kluwer, Norwell, MA, 2001, xii+211 pp.
Contemporary Issues in Accounting Regulation is a further contribution to the literature
on accounting regulation fi^om the productive group of researchers connected to the
University of Siena and Stuart McLeay. There are 1 1 papers, 3 of them having already
been published elsewhere when the book went to press. The authors come fi"om seven
European countries.
1 52 Book reviews
The first paper, by Colasse and Standish, concerns the struggle between the state and the
market to control French accounting. The authors see accounting as part of the property
arrangements in a society; they identify the "Versailles syndrome" of extensive consultation,
and they comment on the particularities of the French approach to standardization. There are
extensive details of government bodies founded from 1941 to 1997; and post-war standard-
ization is examined after dividing it into four periods. As usual for these authors, there are
many details and a clear theme, and the whole makes a good read.
The second paper focuses on accounting regulation in Greece. It is not made clear why the
four pages of noncommercial history are relevant, but the following pages on state and private
capital provide helpful background. There is a Delphic reference (p. 51) to the translation into
Greek of Australian accounting rules, and some other statements are also hard to fathom. For
example, there are two references (pp. 49 and 52) to the adoption of the accounting plan in
1980 being related to Greek entry to the EC, although there is of course no EC requirement on
plans. Indeed, the authors later suggest (p. 54) that the first Greek attempt at the plan was in
1954, well before the Common Market existed. Again, the main British influence on Greece
is said in Table 2.1 to relate to audit, but in the section on audit (p. 55) there is mention of the
US but not of Britain.
The third paper is on the process of accounting regulation in Italy. It will be useful to some
because it is a detailed (and apparently authoritative) description of the several sources of
Italian rules related to accounting.
The next paper looks at the regulatory context of standard setting. It contains facts on the
UK and US, although the greatest detail concerns the old UK Accounting Standards Com-
mittee (ASC). I have not seen elsewhere such a detailed analysis of certain aspects of the ASC,
e.g., the members appointed to it.
The fifth paper has a clearer focus than the fourth: submissions to exposure drafts of the
Accounting Standards Board. It is found that they are dominated by submissions from
preparers working for large companies. Incidentally, the text of Chapter 5 refers erroneously
to Table 6. 1 etc., whereas the text of Chapter 4 refers to Table 5.1 etc., and the text of Chapter
6 to Table 4.1 etc.
The next paper is even more defined in scope: the development over 15 years of the UK's
standard on related party transactions. This study is well grounded in theory and rests on
much careful and detailed work. One reason for the long delay on this topic was that there
was always something more exciting for the standard setters to do. The authors do not dispel
this notion.
The seventh paper compares three harmonization regimes based on the amount of in-
formation about a firm that is successfully transmitted. The regimes are strong harmonization
(same mandated rules for a company reporting in two countries), weak hannonization (same
rules used for both countries but company chooses which), and mutual recognition (company
chooses one or more sets of rules for the two countries). I am not convinced by the author's
conclusion against strong harmonization. This could be because I do not believe that the
purpose of accounting information is to signal the "true value of the firni" (p. 131), and it
could be because the author leaves out the need to compare the company with others. I agree
that it is sensible to take account of "the way in which information is to be processed by
Book reviews 153
potential users" (p. 132). This may mean that it is useful to mandate one GAAP for users in
one country and to mandate another GAAP for users in a different country, but this was not
one of the author's three regimes.
Next Schredelseker gives an interesting and well-written analysis of the relationships
between public information and the quality of investment decisions by using a simu-
lation approach.
Blake and Amat then provide data on the views of Spanish auditors on creative accounting.
This is compared to a prior UK paper, and similarities are found. They precede this with a
helpfiil summary on creative accounting. However, I am not sure that we should still believe
the conventional comparison (pp. 156-59) of flexible/judgmental Anglo-American account-
ing with detailed continental Europe prescription. Surely, UK standards are now much more
detailed than Spanish rules on many financial reporting issues.
The tenth paper takes a look at deregulation for small- and medium-sized companies in the
UK. This includes a survey of the users and usefiilness of annual reports. It confirms earlier
results that showed use by bankers and tax authorities, but notes that customers are also users.
Particularly for the smallest companies, management is a user.
Lastly, there is a paper on the international difference in depreciation methods used in the
electricity industry. It is odd that the authors (from a Scottish university) make no reference to
the papers by Mclnnes on accounting policy choice in the gas industry that were published in
Accounting and Business Research in 1990. What is odder still is that the authors do not
consider tax regulations and motivations as a factor influencing international differences in
depreciation policies. The authors find that "depreciable hfe. . .does not appear to be linked to
any of the variables being considered" (p. 195). This is not surprising if one leaves out the
obvious explanation.
All in all, this book is interesting and enjoyable.
Christopher W. Nobes
Department ofEconomics, University of Reading,
P.O. Box 218, Whitenights, Reading RG6 6AA, UK
Tel: +44-118-931-8229
Fax: +44-118-931-6305
E-mail address: c.wright@reading.ac.uk
PII: 50020-7063(02)00128-0
Reporting on solvency and cash condition
By Janice A. Loftus and Malcolm C. Miller, Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Caulfield,
Victoria, 2000, Australia, xii+327 pp.
This monograph is the 11th in a series published by the Australian Accounting Research
Foundation that deals with conceptual matters that are considered to be relevant to the de-
velopment of Statements of Accounting Concepts and Accounting Standards.
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The objective of the monograph is stated as being "to identify the information relevant to
the users of financial reports for the evaluation of solvency and cash condition" (p. 1), and it
sets about this in a logical manner. Chapter 1 deals mostly with the justification for the study
and explains the Australian Conceptual Framework in order to provide a context for it.
Chapter 2 deals with key concepts focusing on solvency and liquidity. It is particularly
valuable in introducing and discussing the concepts of financial flexibility, financial
vulnerability, and cash condition— the last relating to an enterprise's ability to meet its
long-term cash needs, including those required to implement its operating and strategic
plans. The authors endeavor to distinguish between liquidity and solvency before investi-
gating the time dimension of solvency. The end result of these efforts is inconclusive and is
not entirely satisfactory; this chapter ends somewhat incompletely— a clear summary would
have been helpful.
Chapter 3 discusses the information needed to evaluate solvency and cash condition. This
chapter contains a useful diagram in an attempt to assist readers in gaining a perspective
regarding where the book is headed (p. 41). This chapter, more than the others, suffers from
extensive verbatim quotes— some lengthy— which are liable to distract the reader. It is pos-
sible that an understandable desire on the part of the authors to ensure a comprehensive over-
view may cause irritation on the part of some readers who might wish to get to the key issues
earlier. For example, on page 47, they deal with something as basic as the relationship between
accrual and cash flow information. As there is so much at the heart of this monograph that is of
value, it is a pity that "preliminary" matters were not dealt with more crisply.
Chapter 4, which deals with the reporting of cash flows, gives a much firmer sense of finally
coming to grips with the issues. The section on the choice between the direct and indirect
method of displaying operating cash flows is of particular interest and lends support to the IAS
7's preference for the direct method. This chapter also treats specific issues relating to the
reporting of components of cash flows, notably segmental cash flows, and cash flows of an
irregular nature. The question of distinguishing between cash flows on capital expenditure to
maintain operating activities, and for expansion, is also examined. With respect to segmental
cash flows, it is a little surprising that no reference was made to IAS 14 and the failure of that
statement to require the disclosure of cash flow information on a segmental basis, despite the
lASC's acknowledgment in IAS 7 of the relevance of such information, in relation to both
industry and geographical segments (IAS 14:62) (A discussion of IAS 14 in Chapter 6 simply
sets forth the disclosure requirements in the context of reporting on risk.) This, however, is a
minor criticism of a chapter that is clearly set out and well illustrated with suggested formats
for disclosure.
In Chapter 5, we encounter a concise overview of empirical research on cash-based and
other funds flow measures. The authors frequently refer to "working capital from ope-
rations" without defining the term; it is, however, evident that they have used the definition
of Beaver and Dukes (1972), which treats this simply as income plus depreciation. This
chapter will prove useful not only in providing a focused review of empirical research, but
also in the manner in which it deals clearly, but gently, with the limitations of the various
types of study; it would form a useful component of a course on research methods for
accounting students.
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The issue of reporting on financial position, i.e., the balance sheet, is thoroughly examined
in Chapter 6. A discussion of current Australian reporting requirements (both public and pri-
vate sector) and those of the lASC, US, and EU precedes a detailed evaluation of the current/
noncurrent distinction, pointing out the limitations of this approach, and also the difficulties
with using an "operating cycle" approach as an alternative. The weaknesses of IAS 1 are
identified, and the authors put forward a strong suggestion that detailed maturity profiles
should be disclosed. Here, as well as at one or two other places in the monograph, circum-
stances are identified where harmonization with international accounting standards by a
developed nation has had a retrogressive effect; in this instance, the explicit requirements of
Schedule 5 to the Australian Corporations Law were replaced by a generalized requirement to
disclose "the extent and nature of the underlying financial instruments, including significant
terms and conditions that may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows,"
now incorporated in the revised Australian statement, which follows the wording of IAS 32
almost verbatim (IAS 32:47(a)). The authors then proceed to deal with the mechanisms en-
countered for keeping items off the balance sheet, notably the use of derivatives and un-
consolidated entities and agreements equally proportionately unperformed (AEPUs). In
contrast to their approach to the current/noncurrent extension, where the authors take a very
firm view, they avoid taking a position on the issue of whether proportionate consolidation or
equity accounting is preferable for joint ventures, contenting themselves with the comment
that condensed financial information of such investments would be necessary to permit ade-
quate analysis (p. 142).
The problems of (AEPUs) are related specifically to leases and project financing arrange-
ments. The authors see this as a worldwide problem that needs to be addressed. There is a
minor omission in that their discussion does not specifically refer to the disclosures relating to
noncancellable operating leases in the revised IAS 17 (1997), which go part of the distance
toward addressing this problem in the leasing environment.
In dealing with risks and uncertainties. Chapter 7 has relevance to financial reporting gen-
erally, and not merely to the question of solvency and cash condition, on which this book has
focused. The authors point out that risk disclosures in relation to products, services, and con-
centrations of risk required in the US, notably by SOP 94-6, are in advance of the rest of the
world. Similarly, North America leads in disclosing information as to estimates that are sus-
ceptible to material changes, as a result of an expected change of circumstances in the near
future. The chapter concludes with a section on treasury risks, including cross-border risk.
The financial flexibility of enterprises in terms of their ability to adjust to unexpected needs
for cash is discussed in Chapter 8. The authors acknowledge that unexpected cash needs may
relate to new investment opportunities, but, submitted correctly, focus on the "defensive"
need, where deficiencies arise in liquid resources needed for operations. The authors identify a
number of factors influencing financial flexibility and identify the very limited disclosure
requirements that exist currently in this regard. This is clearly an area where there is much less
depth of empirical research. Accordingly, the authors' suggestions are normative in nature and
tentatively put forward.
Chapter 9 takes up disclosures where cash conditions are poor or doubtful. This chapter
includes a detailed, and revealing, discussion of attempts in the US and Canada in the mid-
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1990s to introduce financial flexibility disclosures when there was a reasonable possibility that
actions would be needed to remedy a near-term deficiency in liquidity. The arguments of
objectors are dealt with. Recommendations are necessarily couched in fairly general terms.
This monograph deals with solvency and cash condition in the environment of a man-
ufacturing or commercial enterprise. It would have been interesting to have encountered some
observations in relation to financial institutions and technology enterprises, but this would
have added to the length of what is already a fairly extensive publication. The monograph is
written with the thoroughness that one would expect from academics at the University ofNew
South Wales. This does, however, make it somewhat less accessible to accounting pro-
fessionals, who should be acting upon many of the recommendations that it contains. An
executive summary at the beginning of the monograph tends to overcome this; it would,
perhaps, have been more useful had the authors provided a summary in point form ofthe major
suggestions for disclosures that would improve the quality of reporting on solvency and
cash condition.
Finally, the monograph contains an extensive appendix, divided into nine categories, set-
ting forth the empirical research dealing with cash and other concepts of fiinds. Each section
is prefaced by a summary tabulating the major research studies. Not only is this an invaluable
resource, but its inclusion in the appendix, rather than within the text, assists in making the
text much more readable.
Geoff Everingham
Department ofAccounting
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch, South Africa
Tel: +27-21-650-2284
Fax: +27-21-689-7582
E-mail address: gevering@commerce.uct.ac.za
PIT: 80020-7063(02)0013 1-0
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A test of the Ohlson (1995) model:
Empirical evidence from Japan
Koji Ota*
Department of Commerce, Burgmann College, Kansai University Graduate School,
GPO Box 1345, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Abstract
This paper investigates the validity of the Ohlson [Contemp. Account. Res. 11 (1995) 661]
information dynamics (Linear Information Model: LIM) and attempts to improve the LIM. The
difficulty concerning the empirical tests of the LIM lies in identifying v„ which denotes information
other than abnormal eamings. Recent papers, such as those of Myers [Account. Rev. 74 (1999) 1],
Hand and Landsman [The pricing of dividends in equity valuation. Working paper, University of
North Carolina, 1999], and Barth et al. [Accruals, cash flows, and equity values. Working paper
(January) (July), Stanford University, 1999], all try to specify v, by using various accounting
information. Instead of tackling this difficult task, this paper focuses on serial correlation in the error
terms caused by omitting the necessary variable v, from the regression equation. The results indicate
that adjustment for serial correlation leads to an improvement of the LIM. © 2002 University of
Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Ohlson (1995) model; Information dynamics; Other information y,; Serial correlation; Durbin's
alternative test; GLS
1. Introduction
The work of Ohlson (1995) has attracted considerable attention among accounting re-
searchers since its publication. This seminal paper consists of two main parts: the residual
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income valuation model (RIV) and the linear information dynamics. The RIV expresses firm
value as the sum of the book value of equity and the present value of future abnormal
earnings.' However, the RIV is an application of the Dividend Discount Model and its
development cannot be attributed to Ohlson (1995)." Both Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999)
and Lo and Lys (2000) point out that the real contribution of Ohlson comes from his modehng
of the linear information dynamics.
The linear information dynamics attempts to identify the mechanism of abnormal
earnings and links current information to future abnormal earnings, which allows the
development of a valuation model of a firm. However, empirical testing of the Ohlson
(1995) linear information dynamics (the Linear Information Model: hereafter LIM) is not
easy, because the LIM contains the troublesome variable Vf This variable denotes
information other than abnormal earnings that has yet to be captured in current financial
statements but affects future abnormal earnings. It is often unobservable or very difficult
to observe because of its inherent properties. However, y, plays an integral role in the
LIM and seems to hold the key to the improvement of the LIM. Recent papers,
therefore, attempt to specify v, by using a number of accounting variables (e.g., Barth,
Beaver, Hand, & Landsman, 1999; Dechow et al, 1999; Hand & Landsman, 1998, 1999;
Myers, 1999).
This paper tries to improve the Ohlson (1995) LIM without tackling the difficult task of
specifying other information y,. The Ohlson (1995) LIM assumes that v, follows a first-order
autoregressive process, AR(1). Omitting this AR(1) variable, v„ from regression equations
will cause serial correlation in the regression error terms. Based on this presumption, the
error-term serial correlation is tested using Durbin's alternative statistics. Serial correlation is
detected in about 40% of the sample. The problem of serial correlation in the error terms is
rectified by using generalized least squares (GLS). The results generate some improvement in
the Ohlson (1995) LIM. This modified LIM is also tested using stock market data. The results
of the tests generally support the superiority of the modified LIM over other LIMs that omit
the other information term, y,.
In addition, the results of this research reveal some interesting similarities to those reported
in Barth et al. (1999), Dechow et al. (1999), and Hand and Landsman (1998, 1999). The
persistence coefficient of abnormal earnings has almost the same value for each of the prior
studies and this paper. Further, the coefficient on book value of equity is negative in this
study, which is consistent with previous studies.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Secfion 2 reviews the RTV and the
LIM. Section 3 conducts empirical tests on the LIM. Section 4 derives the valuation
models of the LIMs with testing based on stock market data, and Section 5 concludes
the paper.
Abnormal earnings are defined as accounting earnings minus a charge for the cost of capital.
" See Lo and Lys (2000) and Palepu, Bernard, and Healy (1996, chap. 7-17) for the historic details of
the model.
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2. Background
2.7. Residual income valuation model
The Dividend Discount Model defines the value of a firm as the present value of the
expected future dividends.
V, = Y.E.
i=\
dt+i
1+r) (1)
where r, = value of a firm at date t; E,[d, + i] = the expected dividends received at date t + i;
r = the discount rate that is assumed to be constant.
The clean surplus concept dictates that entries to retained earnings are limited to record
only periodic earnings and dividends. Then, the relation between book value of equity,
earnings, and dividends can be expressed as follows.
bt = b,-\ +x, -d,. (2)
where b, = book value of equity at date t; x, = earnings for period t; d, = dividends paid at date t.
Book value of equity at date t — 1 multiplied by the capital cost is considered ''normal
earnings" of the firm. Then, earnings for the period t minus "normal earnings" can be
defined as "abnormal eamings."»,3
x^ =Xt-rb(^\,
where xf = abnormal eamings for period t.
Simple algebraic manipulation allows Eqs. (2) and (3) to be rewritten as:
dt^x^ + (1 +r)Vi -b,.
Using this expression to replace d^ + i in Eq. (1) yields the RIV,
(3)
't = bt + J2^'
i=\
"t+i
1+r)'
(4)
The RIV implies that a firm's value equals its book value of equity and the present value of
anticipated abnormal eamings. One of the interesting properties of the RIV is that a firm's
value based on the RIV will not be affected by accounting choices."*
^ The terminology is conftising. When it is incorporated into the valuation model, it is usually "residual
income," such as "residual income valuation model". But, when it is referred to as eamings, it is either "residual
income" or "abnormal eamings". It seems that the term "abnormal eamings" is more commonly used. The terms
"residual income valuation model" and "abnormal eamings" are used in this paper.
^ See Lundholm (1995) and Palepu et al. (1996, chap. 7-5) for the details of this particular property of RIV.
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2.2. Linear information model
The LIM was originally proposed in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson (1995). The
LIM is an information dynamics model that describes the time-series behavior of abnormal
eamings. Dechow et al. (1999) emphasize that the real achievement of Feltham and Ohlson
(1995) and Ohlson (1995) is that the LIM creates a link between current information and a
firm's intrinsic value.
2.2.1. Ohlson (1995) LIM
The Ohlson (1995) LIM assumes that the time-series behavior of abnormal eamings
follows:
xj*^, = cJiiX^ + Vr + £ir+i, (5a)
Vt+\ =iyt + e2t+\, (5b)
where x,^ = abnormal eamings for period t (x,^ = x, — rZ), _ i); y, = information other than
abnormal eamings; a;n = persistence parameter of abnormal eamings x^ (0<a;ii<l);
7 = persistence parameter of other information v? (0 < 7< 1); £\t, 52r = error terms.
The Ohlson (1995) LIM assumes that the source of abnormal eamings is monopoly rents.
Although monopoly rents may persist for some time, market competition will force retums
toward the cost of capital in the long mn. Therefore, the persistence parameter cjn is
predicted to lie in the range 0<u\\<\.
Combining the RIV in Eq. (4) with the Ohlson (1995) LIM in Eqs. (5a) and (5b) yields the
following valuation function:^
Vt = b, + aix^ + piVt,
where
«i =
A =
1 +r - cj]i
1 +r
l+r-a;i,)(l+r-7)
2.2.2. Feltham and Ohlson (1995) LIM
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) assume the following four equations with some relabeling
for simplicity.^
^?+i =^11-^? -^i^nbt + y\t + £ir+i, (6a)
See Ohlson (1995), Appendix 1, for the demonstration of this result.
Although Feltham and Ohlson (1995) use operating assets and operating eamings instead of book value of
equity and eamings, both result in the same abnormal eamings. For further details, see Myers (1999, Note 6) and
Penman and Sougiannis (1998, pp. 350-351).
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bt+\ = uJiibi + V2t + £2t+\, (6b)
y\t+\ =7l^lr + ^3r+l, (6c)
yit+x = ll^lt + £m+\, (6d)
where Uw = persistence parameter of abnormal earnings x^; (0 < cjh < 1); a;i2 = conservatism
parameter (0<u;i2); a;22 = growth parameter of book value of equity (0 < c<;22 < 1 + ^); i^i?,
y2f = information other than abnormal eamings; 71, 72 = persistence parameter of vi, and 1^2?,
respectively (0 < 71, 72 < 1); S\t, ^it, ^it, £^4? = error terms.
The Feltham and Ohlson (1995) LIM assumes that abnormal eamings are generated from
two sources. The first source is monopoly rents. Since market competition is expected to
force retums toward the cost of capital in the long run, cJn is predicted to lie in the range
0<c<;n<l. The second source is accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism
generally depresses the valuation of assets below their market value, which generates
abnormal eamings that can be calculated by multiplying the difference between market
value and book value of equity by the cost of capital. Therefore, under conservative
accounting, u;i2 is predicted to be < c<;i2.^
Combining the RIV in Eq. (4) with the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) LIM in Eqs. (6a)-(6d)
yields the following valuation function:^
Vt ^ bt^ Qix^ + aibt + (3ivu + Pi^it,
where
^11 (1 -^ f)<^\2
Qi =- , Q2
l+r-a;ii' {\ + r - oj\\){\ + r - UJ22)'
Pi — 7^r~^ T7V~, r ' P2 =
(1 +r-u;ii)(l +r-7i)' "^ (1 + r - u;ii)(l + r - u;22)(l + ^ - 72)
Thus, the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) LIM and the Ohlson (1995) LIM allow us to obtain
the valuation functions of a firm without requiring either explicit forecasts of future dividends
or additional assumptions about the calculation of terminal value. However, whether or not
the LIM characterizes reality with reasonable accuracy is purely an empirical matter.
In the next section, I test the validity of the Ohlson (1995) LIM and the Feltham and
Ohlson (1995) LIM after transforming them to empirically testable forms.
^ Feltham and Ohlson ( 1 995) characterize (0 < cji 2) as conservative accounting, (0 = Wi 2) as unbiased accounting,
and (0>u;i2) as aggressive accounting.
^ See appendix in Fehham and Ohlson (1995) for the demonstration of this result.
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3. Empirical tests on LIM
3.1. Model development
3.1.1. LIMl and LIM2: based on the Ohlson (1995) model
It is challenging to test the Ohlson (1995) LIM in Eqs. (5a) and (5b) without any
modification, because other information Vt is unobservable or difficult to measure. Therefore,
LIMl assumes v, to be zero and omits it from the model. However, omitting a relevant
variable, just because it is unobservable, leads to model misspecification. Therefore, LIM2
assumes v, to be a constant. The parameters of the models LIMl and LIM2 are estimated
using OLS regression.
LIMl : x^^i = uux^t + ^t+\
LIM2 : x^^i = u\Q + cJiix^ + St+x
3.1.2. LIM3 and LIM4: based on the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model
Again, estimating the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) LIM in Eqs. (6a)-(6d) without any
modification is difficult, because it contains other information v\t, which is unobservable.
Therefore, LIM3 assumes V\t to be zero, and LIM4 assumes v\, to be a constant. The
parameters of LIM3 and LIM4 are estimated by OLS using the following forms:
LIM3 : x^_^j = uj\\x^j + u;22^r + £t+\
LIM4 : x]^^ = uj\Q + uj\ ix^ + 0^22^/ + £r+i
3.1.3. LIM5 and LIM6: higher-order autoregression ofx^
The Ohlson (1995) LIM assumes that abnormal earnings xf is the first-order autore-
gressive process AR(1). However, in reality, abnormal earnings x/ might follow a higher-
order autoregressive process AR(/>). It is possible that the next-period abnormal earnings
are affected not only by current-period abnormal earnings but also by past-period
abnormal earnings. Therefore, LIM5 examines the second-order autoregressive process
of abnormal earnings AR(2), and LIM6 examines the third-order autoregressive process of
abnormal earnings AR(3). The parameters of LIM5 and LIM6 are estimated by OLS.
LIM5 : x^^i = cJiix^ + 0JvJ^^_\ + ff,+i
LIM6 : xj^, = uj\\x] + a;i2X^_, + u;i3^?_2 + ^'+1
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3.1.4. LIM7: serial correlation in the error terms
The models, LIMl-6, are all based on the assumption of v, being zero or a constant
because of the difficulty in specifying v,. However, omitting a necessary variable just because
it is unobservable may lead to misspecification of the LIM causing v, to be absorbed in the
error term. As can be seen in Eqs. (5b) and (6c), both Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson
(1995) assume that v, follows a first-order autoregressive process with 0<7<1. If this
assumption is true, the residuals of LIM 1-6 would show positive serial correlation.
The Durbin-Watson (DW) test is employed to examine serial correlation in the error terms
of LIMl -6. However, the DW test should not be used when there is no constant term in the
model, and its statistic is known to exhibit a bias toward 2 when lagged dependent variables
are included as regressors (Johnston & DiNardo, 1997, pp. 178-184). To guard against these
problems, the Durbin's alternative test is primarily used.
Hypothesis testing for serial correlation in the error terms is:
Ho : u,+x = pu, + £,+ \ p =
Hi : u,+ i = pu, + £,+ ] p> 0.
The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation in the error terms and the alternative
hypothesis is that there is positive serial correlation in the error terms.
LIM7 is a modified version of LIMl and corrects serially correlated errors. Therefore, only
a portion of the LIMl sample, the part significant under the Durbin's alternative test,
comprises the sample for LIM7. The parameters of LIM7 are estimated using a generalized
least squares grid-search method (GLS-GRID).^
LIM7 : x^+] = ^\]X^ + Ui+i and Ut+\ = pu, -i- £,+ \.
3.2. Data
3.2.1. Sample selection
The sample selection requirements are as follows:
(i) the firms are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) or Osaka Stock Exchange
(OSE),
(ii) the accounting period ends in March,
(iii) banks, securities firms, and insurance firms are excluded,
(iv) a minimum of 27 consecutive years of accounting data is available for each firm
included in the sample, and
(v) book value of equity is not negative in any year.
^ The maximum likelihood method (ML) is commonly used to deal with the problem of serial correlation in
the error terms. However, ML is known to have a small sample bias when lagged endogenous variables are
included in the model. Therefore, GLS is used in this paper.
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Table 1
Sample firms
Panel A: Data years of sample firms^
Available data years No. of firms %
27 years 6 0.9
28 years 46 6.8
29 years 30 4.5
30 years 9 1.3
31 years 3 0.4
32 years 5 0.7
33 years 7 1.0
34 years 294 43.6
35 years 274 40.7
Total 674 100.0
Panel B: Stock markets listed''
Stock Market No. of firms %
TSE, first section 503 74.6
TSE, second section 116 17.2
OSE, first section 18 2.7
OSE, second secfion 37 5.5
Total 674 100.0
" Available data years for 674 sample fums. Data source is NIKKEI-ZAIMU DATA.
'' TSE and OSE stand for Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Stock Exchange. The first section has more
stringent criteria for listing than the second section. Therefore, the first section usually lists bigger firms than the
second section.
The data source is NIKKEI-ZAIMU DATA. As of March 1998, there were 1705 firms that
met requirements (i), (ii), and (iii), of which 750 firms also satisfy requirement (iv).
Requirement (v) reduces the sample to 674 firms. '^
The parameters for each of the LIMs for each firm are estimated fi"om the earliest year in
which data are available to years ending 1991 to 1998. For example, Fujitsu's accounting data
are available for 35 years since 1964. First, the parameters ofLIMl -7 are estimated using data
from 1964 to 1991. Next, the parameters ofLIMl -7 are estimated using data fi-om 1964 to 1992,
then from 1964 to 1993, and so on, until 1998. Thus, eight sets of parameters of LIMl -7 are
estimated for the periods 1964-1991, 1964-1992, 1964-1993, 1964-1994, 1964-1995,
1 964- 1 996, 1 964- 1 997, and 1 964- 1 998. Requirement (iv) guarantees that the parameters are
estimated using at least 18 years of necessary data. Requirement (v) is necessary because firms
with negative book value of equity generate negative normal earnings.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the number of years of historical accounting data available.
The weighted average is 33.6 years. Panel B of Table 1 presents the stock markets on which
^^ This 27-year requirement limits the generality of this paper because of potential survivorship bias. There is a
tradeoff between stable parameters and survivorship bias. This problem is discussed in Morel (1999, Note 7).
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sample firms are listed as of March 1998. About three-quarters of the sample firms are listed
on the TSE first section. Thus, the sample firms for which the LIM is appropriate are likely to
be large firms. The question of whether the selected sample represents a fair cross-section of
Japanese firms remains unsolved, though the study certainly provides insight into the impact
on large Japanese firms.
3.2.2. Estimating the cost of capital and the computation of abnormal earnings
In defining abnormal earnings, most prior research uses a constant discount rate of 12% or
an industry risk premium estimated by using methods similar to those reported in Fama and
French (1997). One of the few exceptions is Abarbanell and Bernard (2000) in which beta
(CAPM) is used to allow for the time-varying and firm-specific discount rate. Following
Abarbanell and Bernard, the discount rate is estimated for each firm-year.
rjt = rf + (3j,[Q.02i
where ry, = estimated cost of capital for firmy in May of year t; r/J = an interest rate of long-
term national bonds (10 years) in May of year f;'' /?/, = estimated CAPM beta for firm 7 in
May of year /.
The CAPM beta is estimated using a rolling regression procedure with a 60-month window
against the NIKKEI 225 Index. '^ The market risk premium is assumed to be 2%. The results
presented later are qualitatively similar when market risk premium is assumed to be 4% and 6%.
The computation of abnormal earnings is as follows. (After this subsection, subscript j,
which denotes a sample firm, will be omitted for ease of exposition.)
where Xy, = income before extraordinary items, net of tax, for firmy for period t; r„ = estimated
cost of capital for firm J in May of year t; bj, = book value of equity for firm j at date t.
Strictly speaking, excluding extraordinary items from net income violates the clean surplus
relation that underlies the theoretical development of RJV. However, including extraordinary
items in the calculation of abnormal earnings makes the estimation of the LIM unstable due to
their nonrecurring nature. Therefore, consistent with many prior studies in the United States,
income before extraordinary items, net of tax, is used instead of net income. ^^ Moreover, tax
applicable to extraordinary items is not reported in the income statement in Japan, so income
before extraordinary items, net of tax, is estimated using the formula below.
ECO (net of tax), = ECO, x {1 - (CorpTR, + ResidentTR,)} {t = 1964 - 1998),
" Since 10-year national bonds are not available before 1971, 7-year national bonds are used before 1971 and
government-guaranteed bonds are used before 1965.
'' Where monthly returns are not available for 60 months, due to the lack of stock price data, the beta is
assumed to be equal to one.
'^ See Barth et al. (1999), Dechow et al. (1999), Hand and Landsman (1998, 1999), and Myers (1999) for
further discussion.
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where ECO, = earnings from continuing operations for year t; CorpTR, = corporation tax rate
for year t; ResidentTR, = residents' tax rate for year /.'^
3.3. Results ofLIMl-7
3.3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in estimating LIMl-7.
The mean (median) abnormal earnings over the sample period is ¥37.1 (31.9) million
given an assumed market risk premium of 2%. When the 4% and the 6% market risk
premium are used, abnormal earnings become predominantly negative with the mean
(median) of -¥669.5 (-44.9) million and -¥1376.1 (-137.1) million, respectively.
Table 2 also reveals that the mean (median) estimated cost of capital over the sample period is
7.95% (8.80%).
3.3.2. Results ofLIMl-6
Panels A and B of Table 3 report the results for LIMl and LIM2, respectively. As
predicted, the persistence coefficients on abnormal earnings, uj\\, are positive and their t
statistics are statistically significant in both LIMl and LIM2. The estimates of c<;n for LIMl
and LIM2 are 0.73 and 0.67, respectively, both of which are comparable with prior research
in the US.'** The coefficient, ujxq, is a constant in LIM2 and it is not statistically significant.
The assumption of LIM2 that other information y, is a constant, does not seem to be
appropriate. The fact that both DW statistics and Durbin's alternative statistics calculated with
LIM2 are worse than those of LIMl supports this view. Other information v, does not appear
to be absorbed in a constant. The Adj. I^ for LIMl and LIM2 is .43 and .41, respectively.
These values, however, cannot be compared unconditionally, because LIMl is the regression
equation with no constant term. Still, there does not seem to be much difference between
LIMl and LIM2 in terms of Adj. R^.^^
Panels C and D of Table 3 report the results of LIM3 and LIM4, respectively. Both Panels
C and D reveal negative coefficients on book value of equity, 0^22, though they are not
statistically significant. As explained in Section 2.2, the coefficient on book value of equity
UJ22 is predicted to take a positive value under conservative accounting. The finding in this
'"^ Residents' tax is levied by local municipalities. The rate differs across regions. The standard tax rate is used
in this study. Corporation business tax is ignored, because it was included in general and administrative expenses
until 1999.
'"'' The persistence parameter ujw'm LIM2 is 0.62 in Dechow et al. (1999) and 0.66 in Barth et al. (1999). The
Adj. R~ is .34 and .40, respectively.
"' In estimating the regression equation with no constant term, R~ requires special attention. In the case of
LIMl, R" can be defined as either X^x/' /Z!-^/' or the correlation coefficient of .t/' and x/'. The latter definition of
R~ is used in this paper, because R~ is the correlation coefficient of .v/' and .y/' with or without a constant term.
Therefore, the comparison of the competing models is possible at least from this perspective. The meaning of the
Adj. R' in regression equations will vary depending on whether the model includes a constant term or not.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics on variables, 1965-1998 (in ¥ millions)^
Standard
Description Variable Mean deviation IQ Median 3Q
Book value of equity b 38,482 105,153 2603 8426 29,404
Net income X 2840 8497 180 666 2171
Abnormal earnings x^ 37.1 4964.0 -339.9 31.9 399.0
Cost of capital (%) r 7.95 1.95 6.42 8.80 9.13
Each variable has a total of 21,986 firm-year observations.
paper is not consistent with current conservative accounting practice. Similar results are
reported in prior US research and they are statistically significant. ' ^
The sample used in this study is limited to large firms that have been in operation for a
long time. Since large Japanese firms tend to possess land and securities that were acquired a
long time ago, these assets are recorded at historical costs and should depress the book value
of equity, which generates abnormal earnings. Therefore, UJ22 is predicted to be positive in this
study in contrast to the US studies that reports a negative coefficient. However, the finding
here does not support this theory.
The coefficient on abnormal earnings, cjn, is positive in both LIM3 and LIM4 and their t
statistics are statistically significant. The coefficient cjio is a constant in LIM4 and is not
statistically significant. The Adj. R" for LIM3 and LIM4 is .47, which indicates a slight
improvement compared with the Adj. R^ of LIMl and LIM2. However, considering that the
number of explanatory variables is increased in LIM3 and LIM4, the difference is statistically
small. After all, no improvement is observed by adding book value of equity, b„ to LIMl and
LIM2 as an explanatory variable.
Panels E and F of Table 3 indicate that the results for LIM5 and LIM6 are similar to those
for LIMl
-4, which show that only ujw is statistically significant. Still, one noticeable finding
is that both DW statistics and Durbin's alternative statistics show no evidence of statistically
significant serial correlation in the error terms in LIM5 and LIM6. The negative sign of a; 12 is
also noteworthy. An explanation for these findings is as follows.
The Ohlson (1995) model assumes
x]^^=ujxxx] + Vt + e\t+\ (0<a;ii<l), (5a)
v,+i -7v, + £2r+i (0<7<1)- (5b)
'^ In this study, the estimate of u;22 and its {t statistic) in LIM4 are — 0.03 ( — 1.54). Hand and Landsman
(1998) report - 0.02 { - 2.6), Myers (1999) reports - 0.005 (r statistic unknown), Dechow et al. (1999) report
-0.09 (-77.64), Hand and Landsman (1999) report -0.006 (- 1.4), and Barth et al. (1999) report -0.07
(-7.81).
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Table 3
Results of LIMl-6 estimation''
(Panel A) LIMl: x%
i
= u;i|x/' + f, .
,
U^'ii DW D-alt Adj. R-
Mean 0.73
(r-stat) (6.06)
1.62 1.28 .43
(Panel B) LIM2: xf+ ] = uj\o + i^\\xi^ + e,+ i
CJio UJ\\ DW D-alt Adj. R-
Mean 12.9 0.67
(r-stat) ( - 0.09) (4.95)
1.61 1.46 .41
(Panel C) LIM3: x%
i
= cJiiV + u;22^, + f/+ i
ijj\\ ljJ22 DW D-alt Adj. ^-
Mean 0.63 -0.01
(f-stat) (4.34) (-1.04)
1.63 1.44 .47
(Panel D) LIM4: xf+ i = u;,o + u;,|X,'' + a;226, + £r+ i
UJ]0 UJ\\ u;22 DW D-alt Adj. R-
Mean 445.6 0.58
(r-stat) (1.20) (3.79)
-0.03
(-1.54)
1.64 1.49 .47
(Panel E) LIM5: jc^
,
= u;,ix/ + u;,2x;_ ]+£,+ i
UJ]] iJ]2 DW D-alt Adj. R-
Mean 0.90 - 0.26
(f-stat) (4.63) (-1.28)
1.92 0.06 .47
(Panel F) LIM6: x^
i
= u;iix,^ + u;i2X,^_ i + u;i3X,^_ 2+^/+ i
^11 ^12 CJi3 DW D-alt Adj. R-
Mean 0.90 - 0.28
(r-stat) (4.24) ( - 0.93)
0.04
(0.18)
1.93 0.00 .47
^ A total of 5392 estimated parameters and t statistics are obtained from 674 sample firms for 8 years from
1991 to 1998. Figures in the table are the mean of the 5392 estimated parameters and / statistics. DW and D-alt.
denote the Durbin- Watson statistic and Durbin's alternative statistic.
However, v, is ignored in LIMl: xf+ i=iUux,^ + €,+ \ because it is unobservable. Then, v,
will be absorbed in the error term in LIMl. Since v, is assumed to be the first-order
autoregressive process, the error terms in LIMl would be serially correlated as follows:
u,+] = pu, -\- £,+] (0</9<l). - (7b)
Rewriting Eq. (7a) at date ^ — 1 as
x^ =uJux^_]-\-u,. (7c)
Multiplying Eq. (7c) by p, then subtracting the equation from Eq. (7a) yields
Jc?+i - px"! = cui 1 (xj* - px^_^) + w,+ i - pUf. (7d)
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Substituting Eq. (7b) into Eq. (7d) and rearranging the equation results in
x^+i = {uj\\+ p)x', - pu\ iy;_i +£,+,. (8)
Since both p and uj^ are assumed to take positive values, the coefficient on xf_ \ is expected
to be negative.
Thus, first-order serial correlation in the error terms is removed in LIM5 and LIM6 by
adding an additional lagged variable .rf_ ] to LIMl. The results of LIM5 and LIM6 show
much improvement in both DW statistics and Durbin's alternative statistics over the earlier
models, and the coefficients on xf _ i are negative. These findings appear to reinforce the
validity of the Ohlson (1995) model.
Finally, the difference from the results reported in prior research in the US for LIM5 and
LIM6 should be noted. While the results of LIMl -4 are similar to those of the US research,
the results of LIM5-6 are not. To highlight the difference, the results of LIM5-6 are
compared with those reported in the US in Table 4.
Table 4 reveals that the coefficient on xf_ i , a;i2, is negative in both LIM5 and LIM6. On
the other hand, in the US research, the a; 12 coefficients are positive and their t statistics show
that they are all statistically significant. However, as explained previously, uJxj rnay take a
negative value when other information v, is omitted from the regression equation.
3.3.3. Results ofLIM7
The Ohlson (1995) LIM attempts to model the mechanism of abnormal earnings. LIMl is
the simplest form of all and assumes the first-order autoregressive process of abnormal
earnings. LIM2-6 are all attempts to improve on LIMl, but they do not perform well in
general. It is presumed that the poor performance may be attributed to the omission of y,. This
variable plays an integral part in the Ohlson (1995) model, but it is often omitted in empirical
research because of the difficulty of the observation.
Table 4
Comparison of L1M5-6 and US results''
Regression model; .x;'- — Jj\() + UJ\\X, +Ll1 2X, _ i+u;i3x;'._ 2+^lW- 3+tr+ 1
'^\() u;|i ^\2 u>'i3 ^'14 Adj. R-
LIM5 0.90
(4.63)
-0.26
(-1.28)
.47
L1M6 0.90
(4.24)
-0.28
(-0.93)
0.04
(0.18)
.47
Hand and n/a 0.55 0.04 .32
Landsman (1998) (8.8) (2.1)
Dechow et al. (1999) -0.01 0.59 0.07 0.01 0.01 .35
(-12.36) (68.31) (7.50) (0.86) (1.59)
Hand and n/a 0.61 0.14 .45
Landsman (1999) (10.0) (3.0)
Sources: Dechow et al. (1999, p. 17), Hand and Landsman (1998, p. 37, 1999, p. 30).
'^ The coefficient on each variable appears in the top row, and the corresponding t statistic appears in
parentheses in the bottom row.
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Table 5
Number of LIMl observations that are significant in tests of serial correlation in the errors''
Estimation years No. of observations No. c
1965-1991 674 188
1965-1992 674 253
1965-1993 674 272
1965-1994 674 274
1965-1995 674 272
1965-1996 674 286
1965-1997 674 285
1965-1998 674 272
of AR(1) observations %
27.9
37.5
40.4
40.7
40.4
42.4
42.3
40.4
Total 5392 2102 39^
^ Durbin's alternative statistic is used to test for serial correlation in LIMl errors. The number of degrees of
fi'eedom = the number of observations — 2, and the significance level is 5% using a one-tailed test.
However, as v, does seem to hold the key to the improvement of the LIM, recent research
in the US attempts to specify Vf. Myers (1999) uses order backlog. Hand and Landsman
(1998, 1999) use dividends, Barth et al. (1999) use accruals and cash flows, and Dechow
et al. (1999) use the absolute value of abnormal earnings, the absolute value of special
accounting items, the absolute value of accounting accruals, dividends, an industry-specific
variable, and analysts' earnings forecasts as proxies for y,. hi this paper, LIMl is adjusted to
remove serial correlation from the residuals. Li effect, LIM7 tries to circumvent the difficulty
of specifying v, by correcting serial correlation in the error terms in LIMl that could arise
from the omission of Vf
Durbin's alternative statistic is used to test for serial correlation in the errors. The
significance level is 5% using a one-tailed test.^^ Table 5 shows that, of the entire sample
of 5392 firm-year observations in LIMl, 2102 observations are significant in the test for
serial correlation, which is about 40% of the entire sample.'^ Panel A of Table 6 shows
the results of estimating the parameters of LIM7 by GLS-GRID using the 2102
observations. To highhght the difference between LIM7 and LIMl, the results of LIMl
estimation using the same 2102 observations are shown in Panel B of Table 6. The Adj.
R^ increases from .48 in LIMl to .53 in LIM7, and Durbin's alternative statistic also
improves from 2.71 in LIMl to 0.09 in LIM7 indicating that serial correlation is removed
from the error terms.
The Durbin's alternative test is a test of the coefficient /5| in ii, + ]=f3\u, + /J^V- i+ ^/ + i in the case ofLIMl
.
Therefore, the number of degrees of fi^eedom is the number of observations minus two.
'" Myers (1999) notes that the mean (median) DW statistic for LIM2 and LIM4 is 1.895 (1.942) and 1.937
(1.958), respectively, and there are few firms with DW statistics far fi-om 2. These results are inconsistent with the
findings in this paper. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that Myers used the DW statistic to test
for serial correlation in the error terms, which is known to have a bias toward 2 when lagged endogenous variables
are included in the models.
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2M
37.5
Table 6
Results of LIM7 estimation"
(Panel A) LIM7: x%
,
= a.-, .x," + u,+
x
, z/, + 1 = pu, + t , + 1
uu P DW D-alt Adj. ^-
Mean 0.52
(r-stat) (2.04)
0.50
(1.88)
1.72 0.09 .53
(Panel B) LIMl: xf+ , =u;i,x,^ + c,^ i
^11 DW D-alt Adj. R-
Mean 0.75
(Nstat) (6.27)
1.31 2.71 .48
^ The comparison of the parameters between LIMl and LIM7 with regard to the 2102 firm-year observations
in Table 5 is reported. Figures in the table are the mean of the 2102 estimated parameters and t statistics. DW and
D-alt denote the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Durbin's altemative statistic.
5.4. Stationarity of abnormal earnings
Tests of the stationarity of abnormal earnings are of particular interest in the investiga-
tion of the validity of the Ohlson (1995) model. The Ohlson (1995) model assumes that
abnormal earnings converge eventually due to market competition. If abnormal earnings
follow a random-walk process, the validity of the Ohlson (1995) model is in doubt.
Therefore, the stationarity of abnormal earnings for the 674 firms is investigated using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (hereafter ADF) test. The problem of the ADF test is that the
actual data-generating process is unknown. Therefore, three types of unit root tests are
conducted in this paper:
(No Constant or Trend) Ax^ = 7xJ_, +^ /3^Ax^_p^, + £,,
(With Constant) AxJ = ao + 7^?_i +^ /S^Ax^.^^i + £,,
p=2
4
(With Constant and Trend) Ax^ = qq + «i ^ + 7^?-i + X] (^p^^t-p+\ + ^'•
Column (i) of Table 7 shows the results of the ADF test on the stationarity of abnormal
earnings x^. Maximum lags are set at 3 and optimal lags are chosen using the AIC. The
column reveals that 61.7% of the sample firms reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at
the 10% level when neither constant nor time trend is added. However, when both a
constant and a time trend are added to the model, only 28.9%) of the sample firms reject the
null of a unit root. This may be due to misspecification of the simpler model or it may be
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Table 7
Stationarity of abnormal earnings using the ADF test"
(i)^;'^ (ii) Ax/ ^
Percentage of obs
rejected at the
Percentage of observations
rejected at the
ervations
Model''
10%
level
5%
level
10%
level
5%
level
T
(No Constant or Trend)
(With Constant)
(With Constant and Trend)
61.7
34.3
28.9
44.5
22.7
19.7
96.7
87.1
71.2
93.6
79.1
54.2
Maximum lags are set at three and optimal lags are chosen using the AIC.
^ A total of 674 firms are used to test the stationarity of their abnormal earnings.
*' Three types of unit root tests are performed:
4
(No Constant or Trend) Ax^ = ^x^_^ + V^/3pAx^
_^i + e,,
p=2
4
(With Constant) Ax^ = ao + 7^'-i + J] /5pAx^_p+i + £t,
p=2
4
(With Constant and Trend) Ax^ = ao + a\t + 7x^_, +^ /5pAx^_p^, + e,.
p=2
(i) X," tests the stationarity of abnormal earnings.
(ii) Zix/ tests the stationarity of first-differenced abnormal earnings.
due to the decrease in the degrees of freedom caused by adding extra regressors to the
model.^^
First-differenced abnormal earnings Ax,^ are also tested for stationarity and the results
are shown in Column (ii) of Table 7. This reveals that 96.7% of the sample firms
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 10% level when neither constant nor
time trend is added. Even when these are added, 71.2% of the sample firms reject the
null hypothesis.
Qi, Wu, and Xiang (2000) conduct Phillips -Perron unit root test for abnormal earnings without a time trend
using 95 firms as a sample. They report that 78.9% of their sample firms reject the null of a unit root. However,
when a time trend is added to the model, they report that the rejection rate drops to 66%.
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These results are difficult to interpret. However, for some firms, the possibility of their
abnormal earnings following a random-walk process appears reasonable." ' '^'^
4. Empirical tests of the valuation models using stock market data
The time-series behavior of abnormal earnings was investigated in the previous section.
LIMl assumes the first-order autoregressive process of abnormal earnings, and adding extra
regressors to the model, such as book value of equity and additional lags of abnormal
earnings, does not lead to the improvement over what is obtained by LIMl. However, when
serial correlation in the error terms of LIMl is corrected in LIM7, some improvement in
explanatory power is observed.
In this section, the theoretical values for LIMl, LIM2, and LIM7 are derived and these
competing models are evaluated by comparing their theoretical values to the stock market
values in Japan. In assessing the competing models, certain criteria are required. This paper
uses two criteria for the assessment of the models based on the two-dimensional framework
suggested by Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999).^^ The first criterion is the models' ability
^^ Although it is often argued that heteroskedasticity is less of a concern in time-series data than in cross-
sectional data (Gujarati, 1995, p. 359), there are some studies in which deflated variables are used in time-series
regressions to mitigate heteroskedasticity (e.g., Bar-Yosef, Callen, & Livnat, 1996; Dechow et al., 1999; Morel,
1999). Therefore, LIMl -7 are tested for heteroskedasticity in the errors using the Lagrangian MuUiplier
heteroskedasticity test. The results show that, of the total 37,744 observations, 5554 reject the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity in the errors at the 5% level, which is one seventh of the total sample. Thus, heteroskedasticity
in the errors does not appear to pose a material problem in the estimation of LIMl -7.
"^^ In choosing the order/? in an autoregressive model AR{p), which is exactly the case of LIMl, L1M5, and
LIM6, it is much more common to use the Final Prediction Error (FPE) (AJcaike, 1969, 1970) or the Akaike
Information Criteria (AlC) (Akaike, 1973) than R~ and Adj. R~. Therefore, LIMl -7 are evaluated using the AIC.
The results indicate that there is not much difference in the mean AIC between the models LIMl -4, which implies
that adding a constant term and/or book value of equity to LIMl does not enhance LIMl. LIM7 appears to be
better than LIMl in terms of the AIC with a difference of 6.8 in the mean AIC. The most noticeable finding,
however, is the difference between LIMl, LIM5, and LIM6. LIMl, LIM5, and LIM6 assume that abnormal
earnings follow the AR(1), AR(2), and AR(3) processes, respectively, and their mean AIC is 438.1, 422.1, and
408.3, respectively. The mean AIC becomes smaller as the order of autoregressive process becomes higher. This
implies that a multilagged formulation is more appropriate than the single lagged formulation of the Ohlson (1995)
information dynamics. Similar findings are reported in Bar-Yosef et al. (1996), Morel (1999), and O'Hanlon
(1994, 1995). Bar-Yosef et al. and Morel test the lag structure of the Ohlson (1995) information dynamics using
the FPE and the AICc (Hurvich & Tsai, 1989, 1991), respectively. Their findings support a multilagged
information dynamic rather than the single lagged information dynamic of the Ohlson (1995) model. O'Hanlon
tries to identify the time-series properties of abnormal earnings using an Autoregressive Integrated Moving
Average (ARIMA) process and finds that all firms' abnormal-earnings series cannot be characterized into a
particular class of time-series process.
"^ The two dimensions suggested by Lee et al. (1999) are tracking ability and predictive ability. Tracking
ability investigates the time-series relation between stock price and estimated value, and predictive ability
examines the predictive power for future returns. Although this paper focuses on the cross-sectional relation
between stock price and estimated value, the basic idea of the two-dimensional framework is the same.
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to explain contemporaneous stock prices. If the stock market in Japan reflects the true value
of a firm correctly, the best model will be the one that explains contemporaneous stock prices
best. This is accomplished by regressing actual stock prices on theoretical stock prices based
on the competing models. The Adj. R~ values obtained from the models are compared. It is
assumed that the higher the Adj. R~, the more explanatory power the model has over
contemporaneous stock prices.
The second criterion is the models' ability to predict future stock returns. The motive
behind this is the basic idea of fundamental analysis, that is, the stock market in Japan may
not correctly price the intrinsic value of a firm immediately but they will reflect it
eventually."'^ First, quintile portfolios are constructed according to the ratio of a model's
theoretical stock price to actual stock price. Then, a strategy is set in place where the top
quintile portfolio is bought and the bottom quintile portfolio is sold. These portfolios are
maintained for a certain period of time and the performance is compared. The top quintile
consists of underpriced firms and the bottom quintile consists of overpriced firms relative to
their theoretical firm values. The higher the future stock returns, the better the predictive
ability of the model."^
4.1. Valuation functions ofLIMl, LIM2, and LIM7
4.1.1. Vi] model
The ^Li model is the valuation model of LIMl {xf+x =uJx\X^ + e,+ \). Expected ftiture
abnormal earnings are £',[xf+ \\ = ijj\\xf+i_ \. The persistence parameter uj\\ is the estimated
coefficient on x,^ in LIM 1 . Other information v, is ignored by the assumption of LIM 1
.
The value of a firm is expressed as
= *' +E—
rr (1
Simplifying this equation yields
^Ll = ^. +
1 ^r-ujn) ''
The condition for convergence is |a;| i| < 1 +r.
4.1.2. V/2 model
The Vi2 model is the valuation model of LIM2 (jc"+ j =a;io + a;i ]xi^ + £, + \). Expected future
abnonnal earnings are Et[xf+ \]^ujh) + uj\ \xj\- / _ i . The parameters u;io, u^i i are the estimated
^^ See Malkiel (1999, p. 119) and Palepu et al. (1996, chap. 8-5) for further detail on fundamental analysis.
^^ See Frankel and Lee (1998) for fiarther detail on this strategy.
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constant and coefficient on x/^ in LIM2. LIM2 assumes that other information v, is absorbed in
a constant term uj\o.
The value of a firm is expressed as
Simplifying this equation yields
Vl2 ^bt-\- -— — +
The condition for convergence is |a;ii| < 1 +r.
4.1.3. Vij model
The Fl7 model is the valuation model ofLIM7 {xf+\ =uj\ \X^+Ui+\, u,+i=pUf+e(+\). As can be
seen in the demonstration of Eq. (8), expected future abnormal earnings are Et[x%i]=(uii+p)
x,+/_i —pu;nX,+,_2 .The parameters uu and p are the estimated coefficients on x^^ and w, in
LIM7. LIM7 assumes that other information Vt is absorbed in the error term Uf As a result, w,
follows a first-order autoregressive process.
The value of a firm is expressed as
Simplifying this equation yields
(1 +r){uu +p) -uj\\P \ a
^L7 = ^ +
^
l+r)--(l+r)(u;,i +p)^ujxxp] '
_
f (1 +^)^ll^ la
\(1 +r)- - (1 +r)(a;n +p)+^iipj '"''
The conditions for convergence are |u;ii| < 1 +r and \p\ <\+r.
It should be noted that computation of Fl? is not applicable to the entire sample, because
LIM7 is a modified version of LIMl. It is applied only to the portion of the sample exhibiting
serial correlation in the LIMl error terms. Therefore, of the total 5392 firm-year observations,
the Fl7 formula only applies to 2102 firm-year observations in Table 5, while the remainder is
computed using the P^li formula.
These three valuation models are summarized in Fig. 1
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4.2. Explanatoiy power of contemporaneous stock prices
The relative ability of the three valuation models in Fig. 1 to explain contemporaneous
stock prices is tested in this subsection. Actual stock prices at the end of May are regressed
cross-sectionally on theoretical stock prices for 8 years, from 1991 to 1998. The sample
consists of the 674 firms selected in Section 3.2.
The theoretical stock price is computed as
Theoretical stock price =
Number of shares outstanding at the end of May
'
and the regression equation takes the form 26
Actual stock price,= oc + /^Theoretical stock price, + £,.
[t - the end of May, 1991 - 1998)
Fig. 2 reports the results of the explanatory-power test for the three valuation models.
The Fl2 model has the lowest explanatory power with the mean Adj. R" of .444. It appears
that the assumption of LIM2 that other information v, is a constant is not appropriate.
Comparing the Fli model and the Fl7 model in terms of Adj. R~ reveals that the Fl7
model excels the Fli model in 6 out of the 8 years. It appears that the Flv model has more
explanatory power over contemporaneous stock prices than the Fli model, although the
difference is subtle with the mean Adj. R^ of .494 and .483 for the Fl7 and Fli models,
respectively. However, as explained previously, less than 40% of the entire sample in
the Fl7 model (2102 observations in Table 5) is computed using the Fl7 formula. The
remainder is computed using the Fl i formula. Thus, the real explanatory power of the Fl7
model is somewhat diluted. When the 2102 Fl7 observations are matched with the Fli
observations, the results show that Adj. R" values for the Fl7 model is higher than that for
the Fli model in 7 out of the 8 years with the 8-year mean Adj. R" of .480 and .401,
respectively. Thus, the Fl7 model appears to possess more explanatory power over
contemporaneous stock prices than the F^ model.
4.3. Predictive ability offuture stock returns
The relative ability of the three valuation models in Fig. 1 to predict future stock returns is
investigated in this subsection. First, quintile portfolios are formed on the basis of the ratio of
the model's theoretical stock price to actual stock price at the end of May for 8 years from
Most sample firms have a par value of ¥50, but there are some sample firms whose par value is not ¥50.
With regard to these firms, actual stock prices and the number of shares outstanding are converted to match other
sample firms that have the par value of ¥50.
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1991 to 1998. The top quintile portfolio consists of underpriced firms and the bottom quintile
portfolio consists of overpriced firms relative to their theoretical firm values. The strategy is
to take a long position in the top quintile portfolio and a short position in the bottom quintile
portfolio, and maintain these positions for up to 50 months.^^ Higher future stock returns
indicate better predictive ability of the model. The sample consists of 674 firms selected in
Section 3.2 described earher."^^
Portfolio construction criterion,
Theoretical stock price of Vi\,Vi2,V'li in year t
Actual stock price at the end of May of year t
{t = year 1991 - 1998)
Kli/P denotes the abovementioned trading strategy that is based on the Fli model in Fig. 1
.
The Vi^2^P and the Vi^j/P strategies are formed in the same manner.
Fig. 3 illustrates the results of the Fli/P, the Fl2//', and the Vi^j/P strategies. It reveals that
the Vi^j/P strategy has the greatest ability to predict future stock returns followed by the Fli/P
strategy and the Vi^2/P strategy. The poor performance of the Fl2/^ strategy seems to indicate
that the assumption of LIM2, which is that other information Vf is a constant, is not
appropriate. The Vi^j/P strategy earns higher returns than the Fli/P strategy, which appears to
indicate the superiority of LIM7 over LIMl with respect to the predictive ability of future
stock returns.
Thus, in terms of both explanatory power of contemporaneous stock prices and predictive
ability of future stock returns, the Fl7 model performs better than the Fn model. These
findings support the superiority of LIM7 over LIMl Irom the perspective of the stock market
in Japan.
5. Conclusions
This study examines the validity of the Ohlson (1995) information dynamics model and
attempts to improve it. First, the theoretical developments of the RIV and the LIM are
discussed. The LIM is then transformed to give seven empirically testable models, namely,
LIMl -7. These models are tested using a sample of 674 Japanese firms.
LIMl assumes that abnormal earnings follow a first-order autoregressive process with
other information v, being ignored, and LIM2-6 attempt to improve on this model. The
results of the tests indicate that LIM2-6 basically fail to improve on LIMl. In spite of the
failure, the results of LIM2-6 coupled with those of the Durbin's alternative test help to
^' The effects of dividends, stock splits, capital reduction, changes in par value, and issuance ofnew shares on
stock prices are adjusted.
'^ Actual stock prices are obtained until the end of 1999. Therefore, the portfolios constructed at the end of
May 1996-1998 do not have the complete stock-price data of 50 months. When stock-price data are not available,
the mean returns of the month are calculated without those portfolios.
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clarify the empirical problem of testing the Ohlson (1995) LIM. Although other
information, v„ plays an integral role in the Ohlson (1995) LIM, it is often ignored or
assumed wrongly to be a constant because it is unobservable. As a result, other
information, v,, may be absorbed in the error term causing serial correlation in the
errors. This suggests the need for LIM7. Instead of focusing on the difficult problem of
identifying other information, y,, LIM7 tries to circumvent the problem by modeling serial
correlation in the error terms using GLS. LIM7 is a modified version of LIMl, and the
results for LIM7 indicate that LIM7 improves on LIMl in terms of both Adj. R^ and
Durbin's ahemative statistic.
Moreover, the valuation models of LIMl, LIM2, and LIM7 are derived and they are tested
using Japanese stock marlcet data from two perspectives. The first is the models' ability to
explain contemporaneous stock prices and the second is the models' ability to predict future
stock retums. The results from these tests indicate the superiority of the LIM7-based
valuation model over the LIMl -based valuation model.
The findings of this study generally support the validity of the Ohlson (1995) model. They
also indicate that the LIM can be improved by tackling the serially correlated error terms that
may have been caused by the omission of v,.
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Abstract
This paper explores the social disclosure policies of large Australian, Singaporean, and South
Korean multinational corporations. The researchers advanced arguments about why large multinational
corporations respond to "global expectations" rather than simply to the expectations of those people
residing in the corporation's "home" country. Two large international surveys conducted in 1998 and
1999 are used to determine global expectations. The results of the testing indicate a minimal
association between global expectations, as represented by the two surveys, and social disclosure
policies of large multinational corporations. Consistent with previous research, country of origin and
industry of operation appear to significantly influence disclosure practices. © 2002 University of
Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the corporate social disclosure (CSD) practices of large multina-
tional corporations.' The corporations we investigate have their "home base" in one of three
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: marc.newson@au.pwcglobal.com (M. Newson), craig.deegan@rmit.edu.au (C. Deegan).
' CSD itself can be defined as ". . .the process of communicating the social and environmental effects of
organizations' economic actions to particular interest groups within society and to society at large" (Gray, Owen,
& Adams, 1996, p. 3).
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countries, Australia, Singapore, or South Korea (ASK), with each ofthe tliree countries deemed
to be culturally different from one another." We explore whether large multinational corpo-
rations, with home bases in culturally different countries, produce CSD that is comparable by
theme and by the amount of disclosure. We do this on the basis of a view that large
multinational organizations are making their disclosure decisions in response to global
information demands rather than the demands of citizens in their "home" country. This paper
is exploratory in nature, and to our knowledge no published papers have, to date, considered
whether, at a global level of operations, corporations adopt similar social disclosure policies.
Motivation for this research originates from ongoing international efforts to explore and
understand CSD practices. Research into CSD in the Asia Pacific region (APR) has been
varied and incomplete (Andrew, Gul, Guthrie, & Teoh, 1989; Singh & Ahuja, 1983; Teoh &
Thong, 1984). Most of the existing studies have generally focused on a single country and
they often fail to link empirical results to the political, economic, or cultural characteristics of
the country (Gray et al., 1996). Recent studies in the APR suggest that culture and political
and civil systems might significantly influence CSD practices (Williams, 1999). There is also
a growing body of evidence that suggests that country of origin and industry of operation
significantly influence CSD (see, for example, Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998; Hackston &
Milne, 1996) but that further work is needed to clarify this.
As an overview, the study proposes two broad research questions:
(1) To what extent does voluntary CSD provided by large multinational organizations align
with expectations of a "global society"?
(2) If voluntary CSDs made by multinational corporations from different countries show
significant dissimilarity (inconsistent with our "global perspective"), does country of
origin or industry ofoperation appear to be a significant influence (as has been suggested
in other CSD research)?
In undertaking this study, we rely upon the cenfral tenets of legitimacy theory.
2. A brief overview of prior research
Much ofthe literature on CSD tends to focus on the experience ofEurope, the United States,
and Australia (see, for example, Adams et al., 1998; Gibson & Guthrie, 1995; Gray, Kouhy, &
Lavers, 1995a; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Kelly, 1981). Some research has also been undertaken
in Singapore (Andrew et al., 1989; Foo & Tan, 1988; Low, Koh, & Yeo, 1985; Teoh, Ping, Joo,
& Lee, 1 998; Tsang, 1 998). There is also research on other countries, including Nigeria (Disu &
Gray, 1998), South Korea (Choi, 1999), Uganda (Kisenyi & Gray, 1998), South Africa (De
Villiers, 1995), and Fiji (Lodhia, 2000). Some studies have only considered environmental
themes (see, for example, Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996, 1997; Gibson &
^ Our position that Australia, Singapore, and South Korea are "culturally different" is informed by the work of
Eddie (1996), Gray (1988), and Hofstede (1980, 1991).
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Guthrie, 1995; Tilt, 1998), while others have studied CSD using a broader set of themes,
largely based on the work of Ernst & Ernst (1973 et seq.). There are also examples where
environment CSD has been examined from a "global" perspective (see, for example, Thomas
& Kenny, 1997; United Nations, 1992).
A number of studies have sought to explain the motivations for CSD, whilst other studies
have been purely descriptive. More often than not, CSDs have been found to be made in a
manner consistent with legitimacy theory (see, for example, Adams et al., 1998; Deegan &
Rankin, 1996; Gray et al, 1995a; Hogner, 1982; O'Donovan, 1999; Patten, 1992; Tsang,
1998), with results suggesting that CSD practices of corporations within particular countries
will be influenced by such factors as changing community concerns, negative media
attention, the occurrence of a major social or environmental incident, concerns of lobby
groups, or proven environmental prosecutions.
The theoretical basis for this study relies upon organizational legitimacy, which is defined
as ". . .a status, which exists when an entity's value system is congruent with the value system
of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential,
exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity's legitimacy" (Lindblom,
1994, p. 2). As such, legitimacy is not necessarily defined or inferred by legality. The legal
institutionalization of corporations proscribes only narrow accountabilities and limited
responsibilities (Warren, 1999). While the law reinforces changes in social values, it does
not necessarily create them.
The concept of a social contract is central to organizational legitimacy. Whilst it is not easy
to be specific in terms of the confract's actual content (or the "clauses"), the concept is used
to represent the multitude of implicit and explicit expectations that society has about how an
organization should conduct its operations. It is assumed that society allows the organization
to continue operations to the extent that it generally meets their expectations. Legitimacy
theory emphasizes that the organization must appear to consider the rights of the public at
large, not merely those of its investors. It is also assumed that failure to comply with societal
expectations (that is, comply with the terms of the "social contract") may lead to sanctions
being imposed by society, for example, in the form of legal resfrictions imposed on
operations, limited resources (for example, financial capital and labor), and reduced demand
for products (Deegan, 2000, p. 254).
Legitimacy itself can be threatened even when an organization's performance is not
deviating from society's expectations of appropriate performance. This might be because the
organization has failed to make disclosures that show it is complying with society's
expectations, which in themselves might be changing across time. That is, legitimacy is
assumed to be influenced by disclosures of information and not simply by (undisclosed)
changes in corporate actions. If society's expectations about performance change, then
arguably an organization will need to show that what it is doing is also changing (or perhaps
it will need to communicate and justify why its operations have not changed). In relation to
the dynamics associated with changing expectations, Lindblom (1994, p. 3) states:
Legitimacy is dynamic in that the relevant publics continuously evaluate corporate output,
methods, and goals against an ever-evolving expectation. The legitimacy gap will fluctuate
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without any changes in action on the part of the corporation, hideed, as expectations of the
relevant pubhcs change the corporation must make changes or the legitimacy gap will grow
as the level of conflict increases and the levels of positive and passive support decreases.^
One issue that appears to be directly relevant to management, when determining whether
their actions might be perceived as legitimate, is the determination of the "relevant publics"
(Lindblom, 1994) or relevant society to which the organization is accountable. In the case of a
multinational or transnational company,"^ we could reasonably argue that the relevant society
would be global in nature rather than restricted to people within specific "home" countries.
Arguably, multinational organizations, the focus of this study, are part of a global social
system and in turn will direct attention to global concerns and not simply the concerns of
citizens in its home country (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Lewis &
Unerman, 1998; World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 1999).
That is, if an organization operates in a particular country and within that country there are
limited expectations about social responsibilities, and if the organization also relies upon
support from consumers, investors, and other parties from other countries, then realistically it
must demonstrate that it is exceeding local standards (which perhaps might be low by other
countries' standards).^
Using the cultural attributes developed by Hofstede (1980) and adapted by Gray (1988),
Zarzeski (1996) shows that small local enterprises, in countries that score highly in terms of
the cultural attribute secrecy, tend to limit their disclosures. By contrast, international
enterprises that have a home base in secretive nations tend to depart from the nation's
secretive orientation. In explaining this, Zarzeski (p. 20) states:
The global market is just a different "culture" than the one the firm faces at home. When a
firm does business in the global market, it is operating in a different "culture" and therefore
may need to have different "practices." Higher levels of financial disclosures may be
necessary for intemational survival because disclosure of quality operations should result in
lower resource costs. When enterprises from more secretive countries perceive economic gain
from increasing their financial disclosures, cultural borrowing may occur. The culture being
borrowed will be a "global-market culture" rather than a specific-country culture.
Hence, in summary to this point, we are arguing, consistent with legitimacy theory, that
corporations will respond to the expectations of their "relevant publics," else their "license to
operate" (or social contract) could be revoked. For larger multinational corporations, the
^ The "legitimacy gap" refers to the difference between the "relevant publics" expectations relating to how an
organization should act and the perceptions of how they do act.
'* For the purposes of this study, we use the terms mukinational and transnational interchangeably, recognizing
that they are both relevant when describing the activities of a "global corporation" (Enderle & Peters, 1998, p. 11;
Hopkins, 1997, p. 583; Korten, 1995, p. 125).
" There are a number of highly publicized cases where particular corporations failed to consider "global
expectations" and instead restricted their consideration to ensuring compliance with local expectations alone. For
example, the case of Nike paying low wages in Indonesia, BHP causing environmental damage in Papua New
Guinea, Shell's operations in Nigeria, and Disney's use of cheap labor in Haiti. In all cases, no local laws (or
perhaps even expectations) might have been breached, yet concerns at a global level caused the organizations
concerned to take remedial action.
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relevant public is not restricted to people residing in a particular country but rather is more
global in orientation.
3. Method
3.1. Identifying expectations of a global society
In this study, global expectations are determined by the use of two surveys, one relating to
expectations ofglobal interest groups within society and the other to a global society generally.
Between October 1997 and January 1998, Enderle and Peters (1998, p. 8) surveyed 133
interest groups or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)^ across 36 countries^ in seven
regions to determine ". . .the expectations of NGOs worldwide, as addressed, explicitly or
implicitly, to global companies in the late 1990s." Because NGOs represent the views of a
broad cross-section of the community, it is generally argued that organizations need to
consider the views of such groups.^
A survey questionnaire was written in English, Spanish, and Japanese and circulated via
local research institutes in the seven regions. Each research institute was asked to review the
NGO landscape and establish a list of potential NGOs (as defined by Yamamoto, 1995)
operating for at least 3 years and presenting a relatively geographically balanced sample of the
region. Respondents were asked to consider the importance of themes relating to global
competition, economic and human development, laws and regulations, equity and diversity,
work, environment, and illicit operations against a Likert scale of "yes, very important," "yes,
important," "yes, less important," "not important," and "no opinion" (1998, pp. 27-31).
Responses were received from NGOs in North America {n = 3\), Europe (« = 23), Japan
(n = 20). East Asia (except Japan) (« = 17), South America (n = l5), Indian subcontinent
(« = 14), and Africa and the Middle East (/2=13). In some countries, such as China, the
development of NGOs is largely insignificant.^ The NGOs that participated in the survey
^ The term NGO is defined as ". . .those nonprofit organizations and NGOs that are active in the field of
development issues in third world countries, such as rural development, alleviation of poverty, nutrition and
health, reproductive biology, and education and global issues such as the environment, human rights, refugees, and
the population crisis" (Yamamoto, 1995).
The countries included Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, New Zealand, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya,
Lebanon, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Senegal, South Africa, Morocco, Yemen, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, France, Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, Canada, United States, Costa Rica,
EI Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic.
^ In research that considers the influence of NGOs on corporate disclosure (see Tilt, 1994), Deegan and
Blomquist (2000) found that managers from large Australian minerals companies responded to the concerns of
one NGO (World Wide Fund for Nature, and their concerns related to the extent of disclosures being made by
minerals companies) on the basis that the managers of the minerals companies considered that the concerns of
WWF reflected concerns held by the broader community—concerns that could not be ignored if the organizations
wanted to comply with their "community license to operate," or social contract.
At a regional or country level, empirical results are not available from this survey. Only aggregated results
are available.
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were principally involved in activities related to education, alleviation of poverty, human
rights, policy advocacy, rural development, women, and the environment.
Enderle and Peters (1998) provided two sets of results regarding the expectations of
NGOs. The first set included the "most relevant expectations" and included those themes that
obtained a cumulative percentage of affirmative answers (i.e., "yes, very important," "yes,
important," and "yes, less important") from between 90% and 100% of the respondents. The
"most relevant expectations" ranged from ". . .respect the laws and regulations of the NGO's
country" with a score of 90.2% to ". . .promote equal treatment of men and women" with a
score of 98.5%. The second set of results included NGO expectations that were "less
emphasized" and obtained a cumulative percentage of affirmative answers below 90% of the
respondents.'^ The present study adopts the "most relevant expectations" defined by global
NGOs because arguably these themes are most relevant to large multinational organizations
maintaining their social contract with a global community. Table 1 details the expectations
used in the present study defined by global interest groups within society.
The second study that we rely upon was conducted between March and August 1999 by
Environics hitemational (1999) in collaboration with The Prince of Wales Business Leaders
Forum in London and The Conference Board in New York. Environics undertook a corporate
social responsibility survey to determine ". . .global public opinion on the role of companies
in society." Using representative samples of approximately 1000 citizens in 23 countries
across six different continents, 25,247 interviews were conducted worldwide using national
polls fielded by local research institutes. The countries surveyed were Argentina (n = 1001),
Australia («=1000), Canada (« = 1512), China («=1817), Dominican Republic (« = 501),
Germany («=1000), Great Britain (« = 919), India (« = 1000), Indonesia («=1007), Italy
(« = 1019), Japan {n = 1379), Kazakhstan (« = 1031), Malaysia {n = 1036), Mexico {n = 1277),
Nigeria («=1100), Poland (« = 994), Russia («=1054), Spain (« = 1000), South Africa
(« = 2000), Turkey (^=1200), the United States (« = 1000), Uruguay (« = 900), and Ven-
ezuela (n = 500).
The national polls conducted by Environics asked people ". . .to rate the extent to which
companies should be held responsible" for 1 1 different aspects of corporate behavior against
a three-point scale of "completely," "partially," or "not at all."
About three-quarters of the people across all countries surveyed think that large companies
should be held completely responsible for protecting the health and safety ofworkers, treating
all employees and job applicants fairly, and not participating in bribery or corruption. About
seven in ten people expect corporations to be completely responsible for ensuring that their
products and operations do not harm the environment and that their operations and suppliers
do not use child labor. A similar proportion expect large companies to operate profitably and
The "less emphasized" expectations were ". . .equally promote human development" (70.7%), ". . .help to
honor basic civil and political rights" (75.6%), ". . .foster creative diversity" (68.9%), ". . .balance their ethical
principles with local ethical demands" (78.6%), ". . .take on a leadership role to improve international business
behavior in general" (71.6%), and ". . .help to create a world community (beyond business)" (75.6%) (Enderle &
Peters, 1998, p. 39).
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Table 1
Expectations of large companies defined by global NGOs ("most relevant expectations," regarding corporate
behavior, beyond ". . .respect the laws and regulations of the NGO's country")
Respect the laws and regulations of the NGO's country
Assure no child labour used by contractors
Assure living wages paid by subcontractors
Pay at least living wages
Fair competition v^rithin existing legal and social constraints
Apply the same health and safety standards
Reduce net energy consumption
Recognise free associations of employees
No child or forced labour
Train and empower employees
Co-operate v^^th others to eliminate bribery
Improve energy efficiency
Promote "sustainable development
"
No bribery
Environmentally improve production
Recycle waste materials
Equal treatment of men and women
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Percentage response
(based on a global sample of 1 33 NGOs from 36 countries, where aggregate percentage relates
Source Enderle and Peters, 1998 to total affirmatve answers of "yes, very important', "yes, important" and, "yes, less Important")
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pay their fair share of taxes. About six in ten people think that companies should be held
completely accountable for providing secure, long-term jobs to their employees and for
applying the same high standards everywhere they operate in the world. About four in ten
hold companies completely responsible for listening and responding to public concerns,
helping solve social problems, and supporting charities and community projects (Environics
hitemational, 1999, p. 18).
The present study only includes those expectations of a global society regarding corporate
behavior that companies should be "held completely responsible for." Furthermore, this
study only includes those expectations beyond making a profit and paying taxes (and 68%
identified that companies should be held "completely responsible" for this), as arguably
those expectations are most relevant to large companies maintaining their social contract, and
hence organizational legitimacy, with a global community. Table 2 details the expectations
defined by a global society fi^om the Environics study.
These two surveys are considered relevant to exploring the legitimate role of large
corporations within a global society, ( 1 ) assuming that the concept of corporate legitimacy
is a function of public concern about certain issues and (2) accepting that the largest
multinational corporations operate in a global market and not just a local or regional market.
Evidence suggesting that the largest publicly listed corporations in ASK, the focus of this
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Table 2
Expectations of large companies defined by a global society (expectations regarding the corporate behavior,
beyond ". . .operate profitably and pay their fair share of taxes")
Make profits, pay taxes
No child labour
Protect the environment from operations & product
No bribery or corruption
Treat all employees fairly
Protect health/safety of workers
66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Percentage response
Source Environics, 1999
(based on a global sample of 25,247 citizens, across 23 countries, where aggregate
percentage relates to total affirmative answers of "held completely responsible for")
Study, are operating in a global market includes South Korea's move to completely open its
stock market to foreigners (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 1998b), that
26% of the sampled Australian companies are also listed in Europe or the United States, and
that multinational corporations have long been considered a key pillar to the Singapore
economy (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 1998a). Evidence of the
sampled companies' global orientation, as declared in annual reports, is provided in Section
3.2 of this paper.
3.2. Sampling multinational corporations
As already indicated, multinational companies were selected from three countries, the
countries being ASK. These countries were selected not only on the basis of data availability
but also on the basis of differences in their national culture. Briefly, using the five cultural
dimensions of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity, and
Long-term Orientation as developed by Hofstede (1980, 1991), Australia is ranked as a
small power distance society, weak on uncertainty avoidance, as an individualistic society,
and shows tendency towards having masculine traits and short-term orientation. Singapore
ranks highly on power distance, weakly on uncertainty avoidance, tends to be collectivistic, is
ranked lowly in terms of masculinity, and is medium-term orientated. South Korea ranks in
the midrange on power distance, relatively strongly on uncertainty avoidance, tends to be
collectivistic, possesses feminine traits, and is long-term orientated.
According to Gray (1988), the four cultural attributes relating to power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity can be linked to secrecy, and secrecy
in turn is negatively associated with extent of disclosure. Gray specifically argues that if a
country ranks highly in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and lowly in terms
of individualism and masculinity, then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy.
Eddie (1996, p. 90) tested all five cultural attributes across 10 Asia Pacific countries and
M. Newson. C. Deegan / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 183-213 191
added further evidence of a high ranking in power distance and low ranking in individuaHsm
attributing to high levels of secrecy.
Whilst it is difficult to determine the precise influence of each of Hofstede's five cultural
variables on the variable of secrecy, and whilst it is also difficult to precisely relate measures
of secrecy to extent of disclosure, it does appear that the countries that we have selected are
culturally different, and if we accept the work of Hofstede, Gray, and Eddie, then this should
translate to national acceptance of differences in disclosure levels (and this in tum should
translate to differences in extent of disclosure if the corporations involved adopt a national, as
opposed to global, culture). Our notion of a "global culture" should work against the
differences in disclosure policies suggested by national cultural traits.
The 50 largest publicly listed commercial and industrial organizations, by market
capitalization, were selected from each of the three countries." Market capitalization
figures for publicly listed companies were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, by referring to
publicly listed companies, the chances of obtaining English language annual reports are
improved (Adams et al., 1998). Secondly, market capitalization as a size ranking using the
50 largest companies is consistent with previous literature and provides data for inter-
national comparison (see, for example, Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Hackston & Milne, 1996).
It is argued that the 50 largest publicly listed commercial and industrial organizations in
each of the three countries are operating on a global basis and that the expectations of
global interest groups within society, and a global society in general, are relevant to their
social contract.
Reflective of their global orientation, 58% of the corporations investigated made statements
in their 1998 annual reports conceming global reach or presence, worldwide operations,
competing globally, embracing global competition, ox multinational recognition. For example,
in Australia, Pioneer International's annual report states that it (1998, p. 1) ". . .is a leading
global building materials company." In Singapore, Yeo Hiap Seng (1998, p. 11) describes
itself as taking ". . .a global perspective. . .capitalizing on its strong distribution network and
global presence in the Asian food and beverage industry. . .to capture a larger share of the
overseas market." In South Korea, Hyundai Engineering and Construction (1998, p. 6)
publicly pledge that they will ". . .continue to strive towards productivity and quality improve-
ments to better serve our global partners and the world community."
3.3. Coding and measuring voluntary CSD
Content analysis was used to establish the number of disclosures (incidence) and
amount of disclosure within the respective companies' annual reports, recognizing that the
latter indicates the importance of the issue to the reporting entity (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers,
1995b, p. 80; Krippendorff, 1980). For maximum comparability against previous studies,
the Ernst & Ernst (1978) categories are used as a basis for recording CSD (Gray et al..
" The sample size was initially reduced from 150 to 149 companies due to an inconsistency between the two
sources of market capitalization data used to select the South Korean companies. A complete list of the companies
investigated is available from the authors on request.
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1995b, p. 81), updated to include themes from Gray et al. (1995b), Hackston and Milne
(1996), and the expectations of a global society reported by Environics International
(1999) and global interest groups within society reported by Enderle and Peters (1998).
Statutory disclosure requirements for ASK were also included so that voluntary CSD
could be established.
Eight categories of CSD relating to environment, energy, diversity,^ fair business
practices, human resources, community, products, and other CSD were used and subse-
quently divided into 51 themes. Each theme is identified in Appendix A. Consistent with
previous studies (see, for example, Adams et al., 1998; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Ernst &
Ernst, 1978; Gray et al, 1995a; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Ingram, 1978; Patten, 1991; Singh
& Ahuja, 1983), corporate armual reports were selected to observe CSD practices amongst
organizations. In the present study, annual reports for the financial year 1998/1999
were reviewed.
A principal characteristic of content analysis is that data are coded and measured in a
reliable and systematic manner (Krippendorff, 1980). Decision rules were established to
control for consistency and replicability in coding and measuring CSD (see, for example,
Choi, 1999; Gray et al., 1995b; Hackston & Mihie, 1996). An initial sample of 15 reports
were read (five from each country) to test the relevance of the 5 1 themes prior to coding and
measuring CSD across the entire sample. Minor modifications were made to reflect country-
specific issues such as mandatory disclosure requirements and the recording of photographic
CSD. Photographic CSD is consistent with Campbell (2000), Gray et al. (1995b, p. 84),
Macintosh (1990, p. 159), Panchapakesan and McKirmon (1992, p. 76), and Singh and Ahuja
(1983), recognizing that ". . .photographs are sometimes a more powerful tool in CSR than
narrative disclosures for stakeholders who do not have either the time or the inclination to
read every word in the annual report and just flick through it, looking at the pictures and
possibly reading the chairman's statement" (Unerman, 2000, p. 675).
The present study adopts two types of reliability test for coding CSD. Firstly, tests are
performed to assess the proportion of coding errors between coders (intercoder reliability or
reproducibility) based on ex ante coding decisions. Secondly, tests are performed to assess the
performance of coders against a predetermined standard (ex post coding decisions) to
determine coder accuracy. Both calculations require knowledge of the total number of coding
decisions made by each coder and their outcome. Therefore, sentences were chosen as the
coding unit (Milne & Adler, 1998). Individual sentences in three randomly chosen reports
were sequentially numbered and photocopied.
One set of reports was read by one of the authors, and a further set by an expert coder from
the University of Otago. A coefficient of agreement was calculated using the ratio of coding
agreements to total number of coding decisions made by each coder. To allow for chance.
'" This category was included to reflect the potential for corporations to communicate diversity CSD, as
evident from an initial examination of the first 20 corporate annual reports received as part of this study. Such a
decision complements the categorizing of results from Enderle and Peters (1998) and Environics International
(1999). The decision to create a new category for (//ve'/'5'//>'-related CSD does not jeopardize potential comparisons
with previous studies, as the themes used to describe the diversity category are based on those that were originally
included in the Ernst & Ernst (\91H)fair business practice category.
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Krippendorff's (1980) adjustment was applied. The results for intercoder reliability indicate
that the author's coding techniques and decision rules produce a high level of intercoder
reliability ( + 0.9537) and valid inferences may be made about the incidence and amount of
CSD. Receipt of the expert coders' decisions also permitted some discussion'^ to obtain
a pooled set of ex post coding decisions and a further test of reliability to determine
coder accuracy.
Although sentences were used to code CSD for reliability testing, the present study
measures CSD to the nearest hundredth of a page using a transparent plastic A4 sheet. ''^ Such
a technique provides similar results to measurement by individual sentences (Hackston &
Mihie, 1996, p. 93).
3.4. Controlling for corporate characteristics
The literature suggests a strong industry effect on CSD (see, for example, Choi, 1999;
Cowen, Ferreri, & Parker, 1987; Deegan & Rankin, 1999; Gray et al., 1995a; Patten, 1991,
1992) and that companies can be categorized to reflect their industry's high or low profile
(Choi, 1999; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991, 1992; Roberts, 1992). High-profile
companies are those operating in high-profile industries such as raw material extraction,
chemical, wood, and paper and forestry and are more exposed to the political and social
environment than low-profile companies. Low-profile companies are those operating in low-
profile industries such as services, healthcare, computers, and electronics. High-profile
companies, therefore, have greater incentive to project a positive social image through
CSD (Adams et al., 1998; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991).
Each company's industry was identified from a single source, the OneSource Global
Business Browser. Fifty industry classifications were represented by the sample, which were
categorized under 15 industry "types." The predominant industry type was services (« = 30)
followed by computers and electronics (77=18) and then food and tobacco («=14) and
transportation {n = 14). Each industry type was labeled with a high or low profile as adopted
in previous studies (Choi, 1999; Hackston & Mihie, 1996; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992).'^
'^ Throughout the discussions, several issues became apparent regarding the coding of CSD categories and
themes. For example, in a number of cases, the expert coder regarded photographic evidence referring to
employees in a work environment as less relevant than photographic evidence highlighting employees
celebrating acts of achievement. Consistent with Macintosh (1990, p. 160), in this study, images of female staff
working, for example, and images of employees celebrating acts of achievement were considered equally
relevant and measured as CSD.
'"* Previous studies (see, for example, Gray et al., 1995b, pp. 90 and 99) have ignored issues regarding actual
physical page size, as the extra effort involved does not appear to make a significant difference to the
interpretation. The present study reports "pages" of CSD measured using a transparent plastic A4 sheet divided
into a grid of 100 rectangles. Each side is divided into 10 after allowing for a standard margin of approximately
25 mm. The transparent sheet is placed over sections of highlighted text, pictures, or captions and the number of
hundredths assessed. No allowance was made for typeface or margins between blocks of text.
'^ Based on prior studies, the food and tobacco industry could be considered high or low profile. The
present study considers it high profile given its consumer orientation (Adams et al., 1998; Choi, 1999; Cowen
et al, 1987).
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Table 3
Industry profiles relevant to the current study
Sample
Industry profiles (H == high, L == low)
Industry "types" Patten Roberts Hackston and Choi Current
for the current study size (n) (1991) (1992) Milne (1996) (1999) study
Services (including hotels) 30 L L L
Computers and electronics 18 L L L
Food and tobacco 14 L L/H H H"
Transportation (including 14 H H H .
airlines)
Metals (including mining) 12 H H H
Construction 9 L L
Fabricated goods (including 9 L L L
appliances)
Utilities (including oil, gas, 9 H H H H H
and electricity)
Communication 8 H H
Chemical 7 H H H H
Healthcare 7 L L L
Retail 5 L L L
Automotive 3 H H
Wood, paper, and forestry 2 H H H H
Fabric and apparel 1 L L L
Labeled as high profile given its consumer orientation (Adams et al., 1998; Choi, 1999; Cowen et al, 1987).
Table 3 gives an overview of the literature's previous industry profiles and the profiles
adopted in the present study.
Given the literature also suggests a potential country effect on CSD (see, for example,
Adams et al, 1998; Gray et al., 1995a; Perera & Mathews, 1990; Williams, 1999), each
country was assigned a numeric reference.
4. CSD results and discussion
For consistency with previous studies, results are first discussed against CSD categories
(see, for example, Gray et al., 1995a; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Tsang, 1998; Williams,
1999). Ninety-five percent of the 148 companies investigated provided some form of
voluntary CSD, with a mean amount across the sample of 3.47 pages. Table 4 provides
the results of descriptive analysis for total voluntary CSD. The most measured pages
disclosed were for categories relating to human resources, community involvement, diversity,
and environment.
The environment category has been the subject of many recent CSD studies (see, for
example, Choi, 1999; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Teoh et al., 1998). In the present study,
environment CSD accounts for 11% of total voluntary CSD, with 38% of companies making
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at least one disclosure. A similar percentage of companies also make at least one disclosure
forproduct CSD (36%), but this accounts for only 2% of all measured pages. If the amount of
CSD for an issue is an indication of the perceived importance of that issue, then it appears that
matters regarding an organization's impact on the environment are still considered more
important than product impacts on the environment. On average, companies reporting
product CSD only provide 0.07 pages compared to an average 0.37 pages of environ-
ment CSD.
Only a few studies have reported CSD regarding ya/> business practices since the Emst &
Ernst studies in the 1970s (see Cowen et al., 1987; Foo & Tan, 1988; Patten, 1991, 1992,
1995). In the present study, the Emst & Emstfair business practices is defined and measured
using two categories relating to diversity CSD and fair business practices CSD (refer to
Appendix A). Collectively, these two categories account for 13% of total voluntary CSD, in
contrast to environment CSD, which accounted for 11% of total voluntary CSD. Companies
sampled provide an average 0.38 pages of diversity CSD and 0.06 pages offair business
practices CSD (mean total = 0.44 pages), a figure well in excess of environment CSD
(mean = 0.37 pages).
Human resource is the CSD category most reported and also the most variable (5 = 2.61
pages), with 91% of the companies sampled providing an average disclosure of 2.07 pages.
Recognizing that an examination of message types embodied in the disclosure can add further
insight regarding CSD motivations (Buhr, 1998, p. 170; Guthrie & Parker, 1990, p. 162) and
is an issue fi-equently overlooked (Campbell, 2000, p. 87), Table 4 also reports "evidence"
and "news" types. Photographic images and qualitative statements make up the vast
majority of CSD "evidence" (51% and 32% of measured pages disclosed, respectively)
and 92% of all disclosure is considered good news, defined as a statement beyond the
statutory minimum that includes specific details having a creditable reflection on the
organization or statements/photos/analysis/discussion that reflect credit on the organization
(Gray et al., 1995b).
This study also analyzed results against 51 CSD themes. Table 5 provides mean disclosure
amounts of 0.01 pages or more against voluntary CSD themes. CSD with a mean below 0.01
pages is excluded.
At a theme level, employee performance and profiles is reported more than other forms of
CSD (mean= 1.27 pages). This type of CSD includes general statistics on staff (average age,
numbers employed, length of service, etc.), details of qualifications, per employee statistics,
staff locations, and descriptions of occupations (Hackston & Milne, 1996). Community
sponsorship and services ranked second in terms of quantity of disclosure (mean = 0.27
pages) and employee morale and incentives was ranked third equal with employment of
women (mean = 0.24 pages).
Table 5 also shows that amongst the 30 voluntary themes reported by the largest
corporations in ASK, nine themes align with a total of eight expectations, either fi-om the
"most relevant expectations" (Enderle & Peters, 1998) of global interest groups or from those
aspects of corporate behavior that companies should be "held completely responsible for"
(Environics International, 1999) from a global society. Appendix B provides descriptions of
the nine themes and how they align with the eight expectations (hereafter referred to as global
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Table 5
Company disclosure of corporate social responsibility themes (16 voluntary themes with a mean disclosure of less
than 0.01 pages have been excluded)
# Reducing pollulton arising from use of product (G2) I 01
« Industnal relations (E9) | 01
Leadersfiip (D6)
|
01
#Generaldiverslty-relateddisclosure (C7)
|
C 01
Employment of minorities (CI) | C 01
ation of energy in tfie conduct of business (B1) | 0,01
ental audit (A2) |0 01
General fiuman
#Consen/ation of natural r
as disclosure (E13)
land recycling (A5)
General product-related disclosure (G4)
Product safety (G1)
Community healtfi-related activities (F2) ^ 03
Employee benefits (E5) | 03
General community involvement disclosure (F4)
Employee sfiare purchase scfiemes (E7)
General environment disclosure (AIO)
General fair business practices disclosure (D7)
General social disclosures not included in categones A to G (HI)
] 02
] 03
]0 03
04
Prevention or repair of damage to ttie environment resulting from
processing of natural resources (A4)
] 04
H 04
°
Education and the arts (F3) ^~\
Employee entitlements and remuneration {E3)
Environmental policy and systems (A1) [
# Advancement of vromen (C4)
pe rations {A3)
# Employee training and empowerment (E2)
# Employee health and safety (El)
Employee morale and incentives (E8)
Employment of women {C3)
mmunrty sponsorship and services (F1)
Employee performance and profiles (E6)
# Pollution control in the conduct of bu
0,02
7Z2
10
10
10
012
014
16
20
Tr^O.24
I 24
]]027
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Mean pages disclosed
(based on a sample of 148 companies from ASK; mean total CSD = 3 47 pages;
letters and numbers in brackets refer to theme references in Appendix A;
# indicates themes aligned with global expectations)
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expectations). Against those themes for which there was some disclosure, it appears that
global expectations aligned with themes concerning child and forced labor, illicit operations
(no bribery or corruption), minimum wages ^ (pay at least living wages), socially responsible
business practices abroad'^ (including apply the same health and safety standards),
sustainable development, and design for the envirormient (including environmentally improve
production) are not addressed.
Using the descriptions in Appendix B, Table 6 reports results of the descriptive analysis
against global expectations.
The mean disclosure amount against aspects of corporate behavior that companies should
be "held completely responsible for" (Environics International, 1999), as expected by a
global society, is 0.31 pages or 9% of the mean total voluntary CSD (3.47 pages). The mean
disclosure amount against the "most relevant expectations" (Enderle & Peters, 1998) of
global interest groups is 0.35 pages or 10% of the mean total voluntary CSD provided by the
largest corporations in ASK. Seventy-two percent of companies that provided some
disclosure volunteered an average of 0.66 pages of CSD aligned with global expectations,
which represented 19% of total voluntary CSD.
The global expectations most reported were protect health/safety ofworkers (mean = 0.20
pages), train and empower employees (mean = 0.1 6 pages), protect the environment from
operations and product (mean = 0.14 pages), and disclosures supporting equal treatment of
men and women in career advancement (mean = 0.1 2 pages). However, whereas 47% and
42% of the sample, respectively, consider train and empower employees and equal treatment
of men and women worthy of at least one mention, only 24% and 26%, respectively,
mention j^ra/^c? the environment from operations and products dind protect health/safety of
workers. It appears that the largest companies in ASK are volunteering CSD but little aligns
with global expectations.
If we accept that surveys, such as the ones used in this study, reflect society's expectations
of corporate behavior, then the results suggest a legitimacy gap between the sampled company
values and the value system of a global society. Perhaps CSD is being determined by reference
to the expectations of other "relevant publics" (Lindblom, 1994) such as shareholders and
employees or that management are unaware oi global concerns. A further explanation might
be that some companies sampled are more globally orientated, have a stronger tendency to
borrow a global reporting culture, and subsequently adopt different disclosure practices
(Zarzeski, 1996, p. 35). Reflective of this last possible explanation. Table 7 below reports an
analysis of variance in CSD aligned with global expectations between the 58% of corporations
that declared a global orientation in their annual report and those that did not.
The between sample variation has a -\ statistic of 11.541 {df=\), suggesting that
companies declaring their global orientation in the annual report provide significantly more
This theme specifically focussed on disclosure regarding payment of living wages. Disclosure regarding
employee entitlements and remuneration (theme E3 in Appendix A) was measured separately.
Socially responsible business practices abroad was defined as providing reference to using local suppliers,
providing reference to promoting foreign nationals to managerial positions or training them for advancement,
providing reference to disclosing involvement in the civic affairs of a foreign country, and providing reference to
applying the same health and safety standards all over the world (Enderle & Peters, 1998).
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Table 7
Analysis of variance for CSD aligned with global expectations using global orientation
Ranks Global orientation in annual report n Mean rank
CSD aligned with global expectations No 62 60.56
Yes 86 84.55
Total 148
Test statistics^"^ CSD aligned with global expectations
X^ 11-541
df 1
Asymptotic sig. .001
^ Kruskal-Wallis test.
^ Grouping variable: global orientation declared in the annual report.
CSD aligned with global expectations, at the .01 level (P=.001). However, while this result
might help to explain a variation against disclosed global expectations, it does not help to
explain the lack of disclosure against other "most relevant expectations" (Enderle & Peters,
1998) or other aspects of corporate behavior that companies should be "held completely
responsible for" (Environics International, 1999).
Whilst we have set out to explore the potential relevance of global expectations, alternative
explanations for CSD trends have been advanced by other researchers. To further explore
these results and given that CSD is potentially affected by country of origin and industry of
operation (Adams et al., 1998; Gray et al., 1995a, p. 49), total voluntary CSD amounts and
CSD aligned with global expectations for each country and industry profile are reported in
Table 8.
Table 8 shows a significant variation in total voluntary CSD across countries. The
between-country variation has a x^ statistic of 22.245 (df=2, asymptotic sig. = 0.000),
indicating that total voluntary CSD was sampled from populations with different mean ranks
and providing support for a significant country effect, at the .01 level. Australia provides the
highest mean amount of voluntary CSD (5.31 pages), almost twice as much as Singapore and
South Korea. ^^ This is a considerable increase over voluntary CSD amounts reported for
Australia by Guthrie (1982, 1983, as cited in Guthrie & Mathews, 1985) in 1980 (0.68 pages)
and 1983 (0.70 pages). The difference could be partly explained from the use of different
criteria, in particular photographic evidence, which amounted to 2.56 pages.
There is also a significant variation in total voluntary CSD across industries. The between-
industry-profile variation has a x" statistic of 5.383 {df=\, asymptotic sig. = 0.020),
indicating that total voluntary CSD was sampled from populations with different mean ranks
and providing support for a significant industry effect, at the .05 level. High-profile
industries, on average, provide significantly more voluntary CSD (4.54 pages) than low-
profile industries (2.72 pages).
'^ Mean amounts for voluntary and statutory CSD combined are Australia (7.41 pages), Singapore (3.13
pages), and South Korea (2.85 pages).
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Table 8
Total voluntary CSD and CSD aligned with global expectations, by country of origin and industry profile
Country comparisons Industry comparisons
Australia Singapore South Korea High Low
(« = 50) (n = 49) (« = 49) Kruskal-Wallis (« = 53) in = 95) Kruskal-Wallis
Mean Mean Mean X" Mean Mean X"
(S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (asymptotic sig.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (asymptotic sig.)
5.31 3.00 2.07 22.245 4.54 2.72 5.383 (0.020)**
(4.59) (3.10) (2.76) (0.000)*** (4.59) (2.96)
1.28 0.38 0.30 37.722 0.98 0.44 5.770 (0.016)**
(1.44) (0.62) (0.68) (0.000)*** (1.40) (0.71)
Total voluntary
CSD
CSD against
global expectations
** Significant at the .05 level.
*** Significant at the .01 level.
Table 8 also indicates a significant variation in CSD aligned with global expectations. The
largest Australian companies provide, on average, 1.28 disclosed pages (24% of total
voluntary CSD), considerably more than the largest Singapore and South Korean companies
(mean disclosures of 0.38 and 0.30 pages, respectively). High-profile companies also provide
significantly more CSD aligned with global expectations, at the .05 level. '^ There is clearly
an attempt by corporations in ASK to volunteer CSD, but the quantity appears to be highly
dependent on country of origin and industry profile. Recognizing the significant country and
industry effect on CSD aligned with global expectations, Table 9 reports mean pages
disclosed by country of origin and industry profile against individual themes aligned with
global expectations.
Against individual themes aligned with global expectations, Australia provides the highest
disclosure for protect health/safety of workers regardless of industry profile (high profile
mean = 0.74 pages, low profile mean = 0.35 pages). This is also the case for equal treatment of
men and women (high profile mean = 0.21 pages, low profile mean = 0.26 pages) and reduce
net energy consumption/improve energy efficiency (high profile mean = 0.02 pages, low
profile mean = 0.01 pages). Singapore, however, provides the highest disclosure regardless of
industry profile for train and empower employees (high profile mean = 0.29 pages, low profile
mean = 0.21 pages). South Korean companies disclose digaiinsX protect the environment from
operations and product more so than any other individual expectation reported (high profile
mean = 0.29 pages).
Regardless of industry profile, there are significant country differences, at the .01 level, for
all CSD aligned with global expectations and individual expectations concerning protect
health/safety of workers, protect the environment from operations and product, and equal
treatment of men and women. Total voluntary CSD is also significantly different across
countries, at the .01 level for high-profile companies and at the .05 level for low-profile
'^ Although not reported, a significant industry variation (at the .05 level) was also noted for total voluntary
CSD and CSD aligned with global expectations when using the 15 industry types.
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companies. However, matters regarding employee training, "...treating all employees and
job applicants fairly, regardless of gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation" (Environics
International, 1999, p. 19), and the free associations of staff do not appear as volatile across
countries. CSD in general, and certain CSD themes, appear to be highly dependent on the
social, political, and cultural envirormient of the reporting company's "home" country.
From this discussion, certain CSD themes appear to be influenced by country of origin and
industry profile, with some country/industry combinations more likely to address particular
themes than others. However, there are also global expectations concerning child and forced
labor, illicit operations, minimum wages, socially responsible business practices abroad,
sustainable development, and design for the environment, that are not reported regardless of
country of origin or industry profile.
In considering the two research questions we posed towards the begirming of this paper,
we now provide the following summarizing comments. In relation to the question "to what
extent does voluntary CSD provided by large multinational organizations align with the
expectations of a global society'V our results indicate little alignment. However, this result
does improve when using a subsample of those companies declaring their global orientation
in the annual report. Of course, such a conclusion is based on an assumption that the surveys
used capture "global expectations."
In relation to the second question "if the voluntary CSDs made by multinational
corporations from different countries shows significant dissimilarity (inconsistent with our
"global perspective"), does country of origin or industry of operation appear to be a
significant influence (as has been suggested in other CSD research)?" our results indicate that
country of origin is significant, at the .01 level, in explaining differences in total voluntary
CSD provided by high-profile companies. Country of origin is also significant, at the .05
level, in explaining variation in total voluntary CSD for low-profile companies sampled.
5. Conclusion and implications
This study has explored the social disclosure practices of the largest publicly listed
industrial and commercial corporations headquartered in ASK. It contributes to the literature
in a number of ways.
First, it provides an analysis of CSD by category and theme across culturally diverse
countries and highlights the relevance of diversity and fair business practices CSD in fiiture
studies. Second, it provides CSD analysis by theme, recognizing that organizational
legitimacy relies on a social contract maintained by disclosing information that aligns with
society's expectations (in this case, disclosure by large multinational companies aligned with
global expectations). Third, it examines the extent that voluntary CSD practices of the largest
publicly listed corporations in ASK aligns with global expectations. Fourth, it adds further
evidence to the significant influence of country of origin and industry of operation on CSD
practices in general. Fifth, consistent with legitimacy theory, it has found that 92% ofCSD is
self-laudatory (Deegan & Gordon, 1996). Further work is needed to empirically link the
results to company, industry, and country characteristics.
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At an aggregated level, the results indicate that 19% of total voluntary CSD reported by the
largest publicly listed industrial and commercial organizations in ASK aligns with global
expectations. Recognizing the growing body of evidence that suggests that CSD is
significantly impacted by country of origin and industry of operation, the study provides
disclosure amounts for country/industry combinations across ASK and highlights how certain
global expectations are reported more than others.
For example, Singapore reported the highest levels of CSD regarding train and empower
employees, regardless of industry profile (refer to Table 9). Perhaps this is due to specific
issues at the time. In the first half of 1998, some 18,000 redundancies were reported in
Singapore, and for the first time since the country's independence, unemployment rose above
3%."^ On 29 June 1998, the Singapore Government announced a series of measures aimed at
reducing costs and encouraging businesses not to make redundancies but to undertake
retraining (DFAT, 1998a). Singapore companies sampled might be reporting against the
training and empowerment of employees to legitimize economic and political arrangements
that contribute towards their own private interests (Guthrie & Parker, 1990, p. 166). This
result is in stark contrast to the low level of disclosure regarding pro^ec? the environmentfrom
operations and product (refer to Table 9), which is surprising given the country's lack of
natural resources and the Government's regular environment campaigns (Low et al., 1985).
There are certain global expectations that all companies sampled fail to address. Why these
multinational organizations elect to provide only minimal information relating to the concerns
of a global society is not something about which we can be sure. While the study suggests
that "global orientation" declared in annual reports has a significant effect on CSD aligned
with eight of the most relevant global expectations, it does not assist with understanding the
lack of disclosure against the remaining 13 most relevant global expectations. Shell
International, a company not included in the present study, regularly discloses on matters
regarding illicit operations, child labor, socially responsible business practices abroad, and
other global expectations not reported in the present study,"' suggesting that these matters are
considered important by some large multinational organizations.
In trying to explain this minimal disclosure, we can consider the following. Perhaps the
managers of the organizations sampled are not aware of global concerns (although given the
^° The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998 (17 November, Singapore Economy: Business Outlook).
^' On the matter of illicit operations. Shell International state in their 1998 report "Profit and Principles—does
there have to be a choice?" (p. 20) "We do not bribe nor do we accept bribes. We do not sanction illegal payments of
any kind. We investigate all suspicious circumstances. Any employee found to have bribed or to have accepted bribes
is dismissed. We believe that cutting corruption is essential and leads to greater equality, a happier workplace, more
efficient economies, rapidly increasing investment flows, and the spread ofprosperity." On the matter of child labor,
their 1999 report (p. 17) states "In every country where we operate, our employees are above the local legal age of
employment. The youngest company employee, who is 1 5 years old, is employed part time and works in Europe.
Shell companies in 84 countries have a specific policy to prevent the use of child labor in any of their operations.
Contractors and/or suppliers are screened against the use of child labor in 52 countries." And on the subject of social
responsibility abroad, the 1999 report (p. 10) states "Shell companies cooperate with local governments and
regulatory bodies in all countries where they operate and contribute, wherever possible, to the development of
appropriate regulatory frameworks for emissions from refinery and chemicals manufacturing facilities. These are
designed to take account of local circumstances including potential impact on the surrounding environment."
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sophisticated ways that most organizations collect information about community perceptions
and other market related issues, this possibility is perhaps open to question). Alternatively,
perhaps managers focus on the concerns of a narrow "relevant public," such as shareholders,
employees, or local communities. As another alternative, consistent with some of the
legitimizing strategies suggested by Lindblom (1994), the organizations might be disclosing
information about the strengths of the organization (for example, employee performance and
profiles reported in Table 5) in an attempt to deflect attention from other concerns that might be
held by the global community, such as those identified in the two surveys used in this study. A
further explanation might be that, consistent with Zarzeski (1996) and relating back to the
cultural work ofGray (1988), secretive countries such as South Korea do not presently perceive
an economic gain from increasing their disclosures and therefore chose not to adopt reporting
practices consistent with a global culture.
While the large multinational organizations sampled might be using CSD to respond to
expectations of national relevant publics, represented by 81% of CSD not meeting global
expectations, response to the terms of a "social contract" with global citizens and interest
groups appears flaccid. Assuming that CSD is being made in response to the concerns of
relevant publics, organizational legitimacy might be more secure from a national, rather than
global, perspective. Based on the amount of disclosure, only the high-profile Australian
companies sampled appear to show any significant response to global expectations
(mean= 1.85 pages in Table 9).
For large multinationals headquartered in ASK and concerned with maintaining a social
contract against the most relevant global expectations, the findings suggest some immediate
consideration should be given to disclosure regarding child and forced labor, illicit operations,
minimum wages, socially responsible business practices abroad, sustainable development, and
design for the environment. To meet the two most relevant expectations of a global society,
greater discussion is needed on issues regarding protect health/safety ofworkers and treat all
employeesfairly (refer to Table 2). To meet the two most relevant expectations ofglobal interest
groups, greater discussion is needed on equal treatment ofmen and women and recycling waste
materials (refer to Table 1 ). Some companies sampled from ASK have yet to provide discussion
on these matters.
Our results have a number of implications. First, our proposition that large multinational
corporations will embrace similar disclosure sfrategies that recognize global concerns might
only be acceptable for a certain percentage of the companies sampled. Consistent with Adams
et al. (1998, p. 16), reasons for CSD differences across countries is complex and the country/
industry effect requires fiirther investigation, perhaps at a theme level. Second, if it is accepted
that we have reasonably reliable measures of concerns held by people throughout the world,
and ifwe are to accept that organizations are accountable for their actions in the same way that
Gray et al. (1996) suggest,^*^ then the results of our study indicate that multinational
" Gray et al. (1996, p. 38) suggest that organizations have a duty to provide information (or an "account")
about those actions for which they are held responsible. "Accountability" is considered to involve two
responsibilities. First, there is a responsibility to undertake certain actions (or to refrain from certain actions).
Second, there is a responsibility to provide information about those actions.
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organizations are not providing information sufficient to allow people to monitor corporate
performance against these concerns. With the lack ofany relevant global legislative forces, this
deficiency is likely to remain.
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Appendix A. Content analysis categories and themes
The content analysis categories are principally based on the work of Ernst & Ernst (1978).
Modifications include additional content from Choi (1999), Enderle and Peters (1998),
Environics International (1999), Gray et al. (1995b), Hackston and Milne (1996), and
statutory disclosure requirements for Ausfralia, Singapore, and South Korea. Eight categories
(A-H) and 51 themes are used to classify voluntary and mandatory disclosure (46 voluntary
themes and 5 mandatory themes). A fiill copy of the coding instrument is available from the
authors on request.
A. Environment
Al. Environmental policy and systems
A2. Environmental audit
A3. Pollution control in the conduct of business operations
A4. Prevention or repair of damage to the environment resulting from processing of
natural resources
A5. Conservation of natural resources and recycling
A6. Promoting sustainable development
A7. Design for the environment and environmentally improve production
A8. Australian mandatory disclosure in the Directors' report against compliance with
significant and particular environmental legislation
A9. Australian mandatory disclosure regarding accounting policies for Restoration
Obligations in the Extractive Industries
A 10. General environment disclosure not included in themes A1-A9
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B. Energy
B 1 . Conservation of energy in the conduct of business
B2. Energy efficiency of products
B3. Alternative energy sources
B4. General energy-related disclosure not included in themes B1-B3
C. Diversity (formerly included in Ernst & Ernst's, 1978 Fair Business Practices
category^
CI. Employment of minorities
C2. Advancement of minorities
C3 . Employment of women
C4. Advancement of women
C5. Employment of other special-interest groups
C6. Support for minority businesses
C7. General diversity-related disclosure not included in themes C1-C6
D. Fair business practices
D 1 . Socially responsible business practices abroad
D2. Illicit operations
D3. Child and forced labor
D4. Global competition
D5. Civil rights
D6. Leadership
D7. General fair business practices disclosure not included in themes D1-D6
E. Human resources
El. Employee health and safety
E2. Employee training and empowerment
E3. Employee entitlements and remuneration
E4. Minimum wages
E5. Employee benefits
E6. Employee performance and profiles
E7. Employee share purchase schemes
E8. Employee morale and incentives
E9. Industrial relations
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ElO. Australian mandatory requirements relating to disclosure against superannuation
commitments and employee entitlements
Ell. Australian mandatory requirements relating to disclosure against employee share
schemes
El 2. Korean mandatory requirements relating to disclosure against severance benefits
E13. General human resources disclosure not included in themes El -El
2
F. Community involvement
Fl. Community sponsorship and services
F2. Community health-related activities
F3. Education and the arts
F4. General community involvement disclosure not included in themes F1-F3
G. Products
Gl. Product safety
G2. Reducing pollution arising from use of product
G3. Product development
G4. General product-related social disclosure not included in themes G1-G3
H. Other
HI. General social disclosures not included in categories A-G
H2. References to additional information
I
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Abstract
The issue of timeliness of financial reporting, an important qualitative characteristic of accounting
information, has received much attention from regulatory and professional bodies in France in recent
years. The increasing presence of international investors, particularly from the US, on the Paris Stock
Exchange adds to the importance of this issue. The timeliness of corporate and audit reports in the
French context is analyzed by examining the trend in reporting delay of companies, the effect that
qualified reports have on the timeliness of corporate reporting, and the relationship between reporting
behavior and types of audit reports over a 10-year period. The data are taken from more than 5000
aimual reports of French pubUcly held companies for the years 1986-1995. These bear witness to an
improvement in timeliness of corporate and audit reports. This improvement is greater for reports from
consolidated accounts of groups than those from annual accounts of companies. There is also evidence
that qualified audit opinions were released later than unqualified opinions and that, in general, the
more serious the quahfication, the greater the delay. © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Timeliness; French corporate reporting; Delay of annual and consolidated reports; Delay of audit
report; Audit qualifications
1. Introduction
Corporate reporting is generally directed at providing information, which will assist the
user in decision making. Timeliness of reports is recognized by the accounting profession, the
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users of accounting information, and the regulatory and professional agencies as an important
characteristic of financial accounting information.
This paper examines two major issues connected with the timeliness of financial reporting
in the French context: (1) the improvement in timeliness of corporate reports (annual and
consolidated accounts), and (2) the impact of different types of audit reports and the nature of
audit qualifications on the timeliness of companies' financial reports.
Empirical research in this area is usefiil for a number of reasons. First, it is of
importance in comparative international accounting and reporting. The present study
examines some recent empirical works on the timeliness of corporate reporting and audit
delay in France. Previous research studies have been conducted in Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the US, countries where the environment of accounting and auditing practices
is different fi-om that of France. Most of these prior research works used data for the
period before 1990.' Additionally, unlike in English-speaking countries, particularly
the US, the French accounting and auditing systems are essentially macrobased and are
very much government-inspired, -oriented, and -regulated. The complexity of the French
accounting system, which is governed by the Plan Comptable General (French General
Accounting Manual), does little to help reduce delays in companies' financial reporting.
For example, French groups have to publish two separate sets of financial statements and
two reports on parent and consolidated accounts. And, all listed companies must have their
financial statements audited by at least two statutory auditors who have also to submit two
separate types of audit report (a "general report" on financial statements and a "special
report" on legal and statutory issues). These French auditing practices do not lend
themselves to the reduction of companies' reporting delays. One of the objectives of this
study is to demonstrate that major environmental differences, in terms of accounting and
auditing practices, between France and English-speaking countries affect the issue of
timeliness of reporting.
Given the increasing level of foreign investment in France over recent years, this study
should also provide information of use to foreign investors, notably those from the US
(corporations and mutual funds) who seek a quality of financial information comparable to
the level in their own country. For a variety of reasons (e.g., France's role in European
markets and the European Monetary System), the French Stock Market has become more
international in recent years. France is now fourth in the world in terms of inflow of foreign
capital funds (after the US, Great Britain, and Sweden) and is third after the UK and the US
for its investment abroad." The increasing presence of foreign investors in the ownership of
' For example, Ashton, Willingham, and Elliott (1987), Chambers and Penman (1984), Elliott (1982a,
1982b) and Givoly and Palmon (1982), US; Davis and Whittled (1980) and Whittled (1980), Australia;
Carslaw and Kaplan (1991), New Zealand; Newton and Ashton (1989), Canada. Even studies such as
Simnett, Aitken, Choo, and Firth (1995) used sample data regarding the Australian companies for the period
1981-1989.
Annual report of French Central Bank (Banque de France), 1999, and "Invest in France" by Network and
Datar (2000).
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French listed companies has influenced corporate reporting, corporate governance, and the
choice of accounting methods used by pubhcly held French com-panies.'^ Several large
French companies have already adopted US accounting standards, either because their shares
are quoted directly on the New York Stock Exchange or because many of their shares are in
the hands of foreign investors."^ In response to their demands, the French Commission of the
Stock Exchange {Commission des Operations de Bourses, COB) has constantly urged French
listed companies to publish high-quality and more timely information.^
The principal aim of this paper is to measure the improvement in timeliness of audit
reports and annual and consolidated accounts of French listed companies, as a response to the
recommendations made by the French National Company of Statutory Auditors (Compagnie
Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC), 1989, 1996) and the COB.^ There are
implications for policy with respect to regulatory action in France to reduce reporting delays
from the current legal period of 180 days. International investors are likely to consider an
improvement as a positive signal and there is a clear interest in increasing the quality of
reporting in order to meet the high international standards required by foreign investors.
The research objective is also consistent with the strong emphasis given in the Statement of
Financial Accounting (SFAC 2, FASB 1976, in Delaney, Epstein, Adler, & Foran, 1997)
identifying timeliness as an important qualitative characteristic of accounting information.^
Such information can be of value if it helps to predict events or to confirm or correct
expectations. As the SFAC 2 stated, "although timeliness alone will not make information
relevant, information must be timely to be relevant. It must be available before it loses its
ability to influence the decision makers" (Delaney et al., 1997, p. 24, US GAAP).
Section 1.1 of this paper reviews the principal research studies undertaken at the
international level on the timeliness of corporate reporting and/or audit delay. Following
this, the research questions and the objectives of the study are outlined. The sample selection,
research design, and methodology used in the study are then described. Finally, the
conclusions are presented.
^ The author has undertaken a research project which is in progress and is concerned with the impHcations of
foreign investments in French companies on corporate reporting (e.g., the choice of US and lASC accounting
principles by French companies) and corporate governance. The preliminary results show that between 20 percent
to 50 percent of companies' shares listed in the CAC40 (French index) belong to foreign investors who have a
major influence on the companies' financial and corporate strategies. The impact of the presence ofUS investors
in French publicly held companies is also emphasized in the French senate report, sessions August 19th, 1999, and
November 25th, 1999.
'^ This issue is discussed in "Corporate Governance, Corporate Reporting and Regulatory Forces—French
Case, " paper submitted by the author to an academic journal for publication.
Aimual reports of French Commission of Stock Exchange (COB) for the years 1998-2000 and the special
report of Jean Francois Lepetit (president of the French Council of Financial Markets and member of the COB),
dated January 4, 2000.
^ The French organizations of the CNCC and the COB are, respectively, the equivalent of the AICPA and the
SEC in the US.
'^
This issue was discussed in the "Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting: Elements
of Financial Statement and Their Measurement," Delaney et al. (1997, p. 24, US GAAP).
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1.1. Background and prior research
Several studies on the timeliness of corporate reporting and/or audit delay have been
undertaken in English-speaking countries. Most of these studies were conducted in the US and
are mainly related to issues such as the timeliness of annual earnings announcements (Bamber,
Bamber, & Schoderbek, 1993; Chambers & Penman, 1984; Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Han &
Wild, 1997; Kinney & McDaniel, 1993; Sinclair & Young, 1991), or the timeliness of
corporate and audit reports (Ashton et al., 1987; Elliott, 1982a, 1982b; Kinney & McDaniel,
1993; Zeghal, 1984). Several studies have also been carried out in Australia (Davis &
Whittred, 1980; Simnett et al, 1995; Whittred, 1980), Bahrain (Abdulla, 1996), Canada
(Newton & Ashton, 1989), and New Zealand (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Courtis, 1976).
Whittred (1980) investigated the effect of qualified audit reports on the timeliness of
Australian armual reports, comparing companies that received audit qualifications (120 du-
ring a 10-year period, 1965-1974) with companies that received no such qualification. In
such cases, the reporting behavior of the companies is compared with the reporting delays in
the year preceding the qualification. The results of his study indicate that "first year" qua-
lifications delay the release of companies' preliminary profit and annual reports and that, in
general, the more serious the qualification, the greater the delay. He (p. 576) thinks that this is
related to the increase in the year-end audit time and an almost certain increase in auditor-
client negotiation time as a result of the impending qualification. He also refers to the notion
of "anticipation effect" and suggests that one informative signal driving this anticipatory
effect is the timing of the reporting release.
Givoly and Palmon (1982) examined the relationship between the information content of
the accounting report and its timeliness using a sample of 210 US firms during the period
1960-1974. They also presented data for the timeliness of annual earnings announcements
and its possible determinants. They observed an improvement in timeliness of the annual
earnings announcement over the period, down to a median delay of 37 days in 1974. Their
study also indicated that bad news tends to be delayed and the findings also show a
differential degree of market reaction to "early" and "late" announcements. Judged by the
intensity of market response, "late" earnings reports appear to convey less new information
than "early" reports. The evidence presented in their study is also important for regulatory
purposes. As Givoly and Palmon indicate, "if almost all companies are capable of and are
actually issuing their statements within a much shorter period, the 90-day requirement might
be too loose" (p. 485). hi their concluding remarks, the authors also recommend reexamining
the adequacy of the 90-day deadline with a view to shortening it, at least for large
corporations. The same general idea—to shorten the legal reporting delay in France (currently
1 80 days^)—is examined in one of the research questions of this study.
^ French Company Law requires the audited annual report to be submitted no later than 1 5 days prior to the
firm's annual general meeting (AGM); the AGM has to be held within 6 months of the fiscal year-end. The annual
report, including management report, the financial statements, notes to the accounts, and audit reports on annual
accounts (and/or consolidated accounts for the groups) should be submitted to the general meeting for the
shareholders' approval. [Lamy, 1997, "Lamy Societes Commerciales," Notes 3574 (p. 1682) and 3581 (p. 1587)].
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Elliott (1982a, 1982b) examined the impact of audit qualifications on the delay in annual
earnings release, the date of which in the qualification year was compared to the date of the
corresponding release the previous year. To control for the possibility that a general pattern of
lengthening audit time accounted for any delay observed, the release pattern of the
"experimental firms" was also compared to that of the "matched control firms." According
to Elliott (p. 145), earnings releases occur later for a firm receiving a "subject-to" opinion
than when the opinion is unqualified. Rational investors observing the lateness of reports
might infer the nature of the delayed signal, since the delay itself becomes a signal. Normally,
successive earnings releases occur around the same date each year, but Elliott shows that the
more serious qualifications ("going concern" and "asset realization") are associated with a
delay in the earnings announcement of 2 weeks on average.
Ashton et al. (1987) and Bamber et al. (1993) for the US and Simnett et al. (1995) for
Australia reported empirical evidence for certain determinants of "audit delay," defined as
the length of time from a company's fiscal year-end to the date of the auditor's report. All
three studies used variables that describe companies, their auditors, and the various types of
interaction between these parties. They showed that audit delay is significantly longer in the
case of companies that receive qualified audit opinions. Simnett et al. also showed that it is
not only the issuing of a qualification, but also the type of qualification, that affects audit
delay. Besides this, in contrast to the previous studies in this area, Simnett et al. indicate that
variables representing audit complexity, debt/equity position, extraordinary items, audit
technology, and the "Big Eight-non-Big Eight" status of the auditor had little or no impact
on audit delay. The different results for these variables might be related to environmental
factors such as the size of the market, accounting, and audit practices in different countries,
and legal requirements concerning the listing and disclosure of accounting information.
Kinney and McDaniel (1993) took the analysis a step further by relating audit delay to
correction of previously reported interim earnings, which may be the result of client-related
factors such as poor internal controls or intentional violation of the securities acts by client
management. According to the authors, the presence of such factors is likely to lead to
increased year-end audit work and auditor- client negotiations about the best disclosure
action. The authors say that firms with declining eamings who report corrections of interim
earnings that were initially overstated also tend to have significantly increased audit delay.
In the case ofthe relationship between timeliness ofeamings reports and stock prices, Zeghal
(1 984) indicates that accounting reports with shorter delays have a higher informational content
than those with longer delays. Chambers and Penman (1984) also provide descriptive evidence
on the relationship between timeliness ofeamings reports and stock price behavior at the time of
the reports' release. They show that when reports are published earlier than expected, they tend
to have larger price effects than when they are published on time or later than expected.
The overall conclusion of these studies is that timeliness is a relevant characteristic when
assessing the usefulness of accounting information. Although their results do show a
considerable shortening of the reporting delay over time, some of the researchers cited feel
that the adequacy of reporting deadlines should be reexamined. An investigation of the effects
of qualified audit reports is needed. Some of these research works revealed that there is a
significant delay associated with serious audit opinions (disclaimer, adverse, going concern)
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and, in general, the more serious the qualification, the greater the delay. It was also shown that
the reporting behavior of companies in the year of qualification was significantly longer than
"normal" reporting behavior.
The present paper seeks to add to the empirical international accounting literature on
timeliness by examining trends in timeliness of corporate reports (annual and consolidated
accounts). It also investigates the change in audit reporting delays, the relationship between
the length of the reporting delay and the type of qualification, as well as the relationship
between reporting behavior for audit reports and the type of corporate reports (annual-
nongroup, aimual-group, and consolidated reports) for French publicly traded companies.
The specific research questions posed are detailed in Section 1.2.
1.2. Research questions and objectives
The following research questions (RQ) are examined in this paper.
1.2.1. RQl: Has reporting delay for the French companies decreased in recent years?
French companies should submit their armual report to the ordinary annual general meeting
(AGM) of shareholders within 6 months fi"om the end of the fiscal year.^ Under French law,
the shareholders' AGM takes place once per year in order to examine the management report,
audited financial statements, and issues such as dividend policy. It is likely that the change in
a company's general meeting date over time is mainly a function of management's intention
to release early (or late) armual and/or consolidated accounts to the shareholders. The French
accounting and auditing professional body (CNCC) and the financial market regulatory
agency (COB) have regularly called for the early release of the audited financial statements to
the AGM in order to respond to the demand of shareholders for more timely information.
Thus, any improvement in reporting delay to the general meeting will confirm the need to
reduce the current legal delay requirement of 1 80 days, bringing reporting delays in line with
those of certain English-speaking countries (US, 90 days; Australia, 120 days).^^
Such issues have regularly been discussed by the French regulatory and professional
bodies at their annual meetings. The CNCC, in its fifth national meeting," acknowledged that
^ Under French law (L. no. 66-537, July 24, 1966, Art. 157, al. T"^ to 3), the AGM of company's shareholders
takes place once a year in order to examine the audited financial statements. The majority of the shareholders can
approve, reject, or modify the content of the propositions made by the company's board of directors (see "Lamy
Societes Commerciales", 1997, Notes 3574-3589 on the AGM, pp. 1589-1595.
"^ The Australian Stock Exchange (ASE) specifies a maximum period whereby firms have to file their annual
reports within 120 days after the year-end. However, the Australian company law requires that the AGM has to be
held within 5 months of the fiscal year-end.
" CNCC (1989), "L' Information Financiere en Question-12 propositions, Livre Blanc des S'^"^^ Assises
Nationales du Commissariat aux Comptes." The recommendations made in this report are the resuhs of the debate
between various professional groups in order to improve the quality of financial reporting along with the
development of the French financial market. The proposifions were mainly made in order to respond to the needs
of the various interested parties and listed companies in the areas of accounting principles and standards and
financial reporting.
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"the timeliness of accounting information relies heavily on the communications policy of
companies, which should not be based on the legal deadline of publication for accounting
information but on the needs of the various interested parties " (CNCC, 1989, p. 29, author's
translation). With regard to the timeliness of financial reporting of French corporations, the
CNCC report discussed the following criteria for improving the quality of information;
reducing the legal reporting delay, shortening the period of preparation of financial statements
by companies, and improving the quality of information systems within the company as well
as of publicly available information.
The issue of timeliness has also been raised regularly in the annual reports of the
COB}^ Its major concem in this area is to encourage French listed companies to release
more timely information in order to satisfy the demand of the shareholders, particularly
foreign investors. Acknowledging that there had been "a major improvement in timeliness
of financial reporting in France," the COB noted that it was "still longer than that of
English-speaking countries."'^ hi 1999, it formed a working party to examine the
different ways of improving the quality of financial reporting of French listed companies
to make it conform to intemational standards and respond to the growing presence of
intemational investors. The working party's report raised the issue of periodic financial
information as a factor in reducing uncertainty (Section 4 of the report, 2000). '"^ Two of
its 10 recommendations related specifically to the timeliness of financial information: (1)
to increase the frequency of periodic financial disclosure with respect to the company's
results, and (2) to reduce delay in publication (Working Group and COB, 2000b, p. 14).
The issue of the quality of financial information in relation to the increasing presence of
foreign investors has also been considered by the French parliament and has been discussed
in the senate.'^
At the time of writing, however, no action has been taken to reduce the legal delay.
7.2.2. RQ2: What differences are there between groups and nongroups in terms ofreporting
delays?
Unlike US groups, French groups are required to submit two sets of reports to their AGM:
parent and consolidated.'^ It is, therefore, interesting to compare reporting delays of
'^ See, for example, the annual report of the COB for 1998 (p. 254) and 1999 (p. 287) regarding the timeliness
of financial reporting of French companies.
^^ Monthly bulletin of the COB (2000a, p. 31) with regard to the report on financial information of 100
commercial and industrial groups "Cauvin Angleys, et al. 1999, L' information fmanciere-100 Groupes industriels
et commerciaux" CPC, France (1999).
'"* This working party was formed at the request of the president of the COB (Michel Prada) who, in his letter
dated May 20, 1999, asked the president of the French Council of Financial Markets and the member of the COB,
Jean Frangois Lepetit, to supervise the working group in charge of examining the publication of financial
information of French listed companies and the issue of "profit warnings." The working group submitted its
report to the COB in January 2000.
'^ See, for example, Senat (1996), no. 191, and Senat (1999), dated August 19 and November 25.
'^ See "Lamy Societes commerciales", 1997, no. 3581, pp. 1586-1587. Both parent and consolidated reports
of groups are simultaneously examined at a single AGM.
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nongroup companies, which present only one set of accounts, and groups, which must present
parent as well as consolidated accounts. This will indicate whether the COB's policy
to encourage companies to reduce their reporting delays has had any impact. A comparison
between the reporting behavior of nongroup companies and groups can be of interest to
international investors. Though foreign investors invest mainly in large French groups, some
of their investments are in French medium-sized firms (nongroup companies) for which only
the annual accounts are prepared.
In RQ3, it should be stated that three types of accounts for French companies are
currently published by French companies. These must be independently audited by
statutory auditors:
1
.
annual accounts by nongroups
2. annual accounts by groups
3. consolidated accounts by groups.
The following RQ3 (a, b, and c) are designed to find out whether audit qualifications have
had any effect on the reporting delays in recent years.
J. 2. 3. RQ3(a): Was there a general improvement in audit reporting delays (qualified and
unqualified) in France over the period?
To measure this, the audit reports of nongroups, groups, and parent companies of groups
were used. The audit report is an integral part of the company's annual report to the AGM,
and all decisions taken by company's shareholders are based on audited financial statements.
It is obvious that any reduction in audit delay should have a positive impact on shortening the
reporting delay as recommended by the COB and the CNCC.
1.2.4. RQ3(b): Is there a relationship between audit qualifications and timeliness of
reporting?
The presence of a qualified audit opinion may be expected to be associated with a longer
audit delay, since French auditors are likely to be reluctant to issue a qualification and may
spend some time attempting to resolve the items subject to the qualification. Support for
this expectation is provided by Simnett et al. (1995) and Whittred (1980) using Australian
data; Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) using New Zealand data; Ashton et al. (1987), Bamber
et al. (1993), and Elliott (1982a, 1982b) using US data; and Ashton, Graul, &, Newton (1989,
Spring) using Canadian data.
1.2.5. RQ3(c): If there is a relationship between audit qualification and timeliness, does it
differ by type of financial report (annual-nongroups, annual parent company, and
consolidated)?
The relationship, even though it concerns the impact of qualification on three different sets
of accounts, may provide information for foreign investors, who are more likely to invest in
groups than in smaller nongroup companies. In the case of qualified audit reports, it is
expected that the improvement in audit reporting delay on group accounts should be greater
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than that on annual accounts by nongroups, as the former are hkely to be better prepared and
wilhng to disclose more timely information.
The comparisons discussed in RQ 3a, 3b, and 3c can be of interest to the regulatory bodies
and to the users of audited financial statements. Their demand for more timely accounting
information depends, to a great extent, on the attitude of companies" management towards
providing auditors with early release of preliminary financial statements and also on the delay
required for submission of audit reports on the company's accounts.
1.2.6. RQ4: Is there a relationship between the length of the reporting delay and the type of
qualification?
Audit qualifications are not all the same, and some are potentially more significant than
others. Simnett et al. (1995) and Whittred (1980) for Australia and Elliott (1982a, 1982b) for
the US show that, in general, the more serious the qualification, the greater the reporting
delay. In this respect, Simnett et al. (p. 18) stated, "it is not only the issuing of a qualification,
but the type of qualification, that affects audit delay".
1.2.7. RQ5: Does the relationship between reporting behavior (early, on time, and late) and
type ofaudit reports differ by type offinancial report (annual-nongroup, annual-group, and
consolidated reports)?
For this, the sample of companies for the period of study (1986-1995) was first divided
into two parts: audit reports without qualifications, and audit reports with qualifications. For
each company and for each year, the comparison was made between the actual delay,
discussed in RQ3 (a, b, and c), and "normal" reporting behavior.
To do this, it is necessary to define what constitutes a company's "normal" reporting
behavior, for which the actual reporting delays of companies in the study's sample are used.
The aim is to examine if the reporting behavior of companies in the year of a qualification is
significantly different from "normal reporting behavior." It is to be expected that "early"
reports are associated with "good" news (clean audit reports) and "late" reports with "bad"
news (qualifications). This research question is formulated in a manner similar to Chambers
and Penman (1984), Givoly and Palmon (1982), and Whittred (1980).
Reference has already been made to Whittred's (1980) evidence that qualified audit
opinions in Australia are released later than unqualified opinions. This is because the decision
to qualify may involve negotiation with the client, consultation with more senior audit
partners, and extension of the scope of the audit work.
According to Whittred (1980, p. 572), "to show that the reporting attributes of companies
which receive qualified audit reports are different from those of companies which are not
qualified does not allow one to conclude that it is the qualification per se that is responsible
for the difference. This might be due to the point that those companies which receive
qualifications come from a (significantly) different subset of the population of listed
companies." The explanation proposed by Chambers and Penman (1984), Givoly and
Palmon (1982) and Whittred is that the reporting behavior of companies in the year they
receive bad news (e.g., audit qualification) is significandy different (longer) from "normal."
A similar approach has been adopted in this study in order to show the relationship between
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various types of audit reports [qualified (bad news), unqualified (good news)] on annual and
consolidated accounts and the companies' reporting behavior. "Normal" reporting behavior
was defined by Whittred in two ways: "in the first, a company's 'normal' reporting behavior
was defined to be the same as that occurring in the year immediately preceding the
qualification. In the second, it was defined to be the mean total lag for the preceding three
years" (Whittred, 1980, p. 572).
Givoly and Palmon (1982) tested the relationship between reporting timeliness (early, on
time, and late) and annual earnings announcements (bad, neutral, and good news) using
contingency tables. Chambers and Penman (1984) used a slightly different approach to show
the relationship between stock price behavior and "early" and "late" reports.
The above-mentioned research questions are designed to examine the trend in reporting
delay, the audit delay, and the impact of audit qualification on the reporting process of French
listed companies. This will provide useful information about the reporting process of
companies, an issue which has been under the close scrutiny of the French regulatory'^
and professional bodies in recent years. The questions raised in this study are also in line
with the demands of shareholders, particularly foreign investors, who desire a clearer
understanding of the reporting behavior of French companies. Finally, they should also
contribute to bringing the quality of French reporting up to international standards.
2. Research design
2.1. Sample selection and sources of information
The annual and consolidated reports of companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange were
examined for the period of January 1986 to December 1995.'^ (In certain cases, the average
delays for the year 1985 were also provided in the tables in order to provide a better analysis
of improvement in reporting delay during the period of study.) These reports were not always
available, in which case an attempt was made to obtain the information by contacting the
company directly. Although it was still not possible to obtain reports for about 25% of
companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange, the remaining 75% was analyzed for this study.
Annual reports from French companies contain the following information:
• the management, business, corporate governance, and social (labor force) reports;
• financial statements and notes to the accounts, including the company's accounting
policies (presented separately for consolidated and annual accounts of groups);
• two reports by external auditors: the "general report" and the "special report."
The COB, French Commission of Stock Exchange has regularly emphasized the improvement of reporting
delay of listed companies in their annual reports, (annual reports of COB, 1998 and 1999).
Year 1986 is selected as the starting point in this study since the submission of consolidated accounts by
groups became mandatory in January 1986.
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The content and the date of the "general report," which includes the independent auditors'
opinion, was used for this study. (An example of the "general report" of BIC group using the
French audit practices is presented in the Appendix). The "special report," which refers to
French commercial law and legal matters, is not of use to the present study.
The following information was extracted from the reports:
• date ofAGM for nongroup companies and groups (This date is considered to be the first
date of public release of a company's information.);
• date of fiscal year-end;
• date of audit reports (on the annual accounts by nongroups, annual accounts by groups,
and consolidated accounts by groups);
• types of audit reports—unqualified, qualified, and disclaimers; and
• types of qualifications (uncertainties, nonconformity with accounting principles, lack of
different accounting provisions, etc.).
2.2. Sample size
A total of 5801 companies' files (company/years) containing annual and consolidated
reports of listed companies for the period January 1986 to December 1995 were included in
the sample. From these files, 5064 audit reports on annual accounts (2384 for nongroups and
2680 reports for groups) and 3417 audit reports on consolidated accounts (see Table 1) were
Table 1
Number of annual and consolidated reports examined during the period of study
Files examined
(annual and Annual Consolidated Audit reports on Audit reports on Audit reports
consolidated accounts accounts annual accounts annual accounts on consolidated
Year accounts) (nongroups) (groups) (nongroups) (groups) accounts (groups)
1986 610 415 195 402 64 208
1987 623 390 233 301 203 322
1988 606 361 245 277 226 329
1989 598 372 226 266 219 332
1990 530 322 208 179 303 351
1991 545 313 232 180 328 365
1992 564 329 235 189 345 375
1993 521 306 215 166 331 355
1994 589 352 237 202 333 387
1995 615 348 267 222 328 393
Total 5801 3508 2293 2384 2680 3317
The above table shows two separate subsamples. Columns 3 and 4 indicate the number of annual and consolidated
accounts examined to extract the dates of general meetings. Columns 5-7 are related to the number of audit
reports of nongroups and groups. Because of the absence of some dates in both cases (general meeting and audit
report), only the available dates are included in the sample. Therefore, the total numbers of annual and
consolidated accounts do not match the corresponding figures for audit reports. However, the total of 5801 reports
in both cases were included in the sample.
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considered. These reports were examined for the date of the audit report (signature date by
auditors) and to determine whether the reports contained any qualification.
The absence of dates for the AGM in certain cases, and of the audit reports in other cases,
means that the figures for the number of aimual accounts (date ofAGM) and for dates of audit
reports do not match. For nongroups, these are, respectively, 3508 and 2384 and for
consolidated accounts 2293 and 3417. However, the total number (5801) of audit reports
and dates of AGM analyzed in the sample were the same.
The total number of qualifications expressed in audit reports on annual and consolidated
accounts is 478 (301 reports on annual accounts by nongroups and 177 reports on annual
accounts by groups) and 309, respectively.
Since groups have to present two sets of accounts, two separate audit reports (for the parent
company and for consolidated accounts) have been included in the sample for all the groups.
However, as these two reports do not necessarily have the same date, where appropriate, the
calculations for reporting audit delay have been made separately for audit reports on parent as
well as consolidated accounts of groups.
3. Methodology
Several aspects of timeliness are investigated in the paper:
• the trend in companies' reporting delay over time;
• a comparison of reporting delay of auditors' reports across annual-nongroups, annual-
groups, and consolidated group accounts;
• the relationship between reporting delay and the types of audit reports (unqualified and
qualified reports); and
• the association between the reporting delay and the nature of auditors' qualifications.
The methodology used to examine each of these relationships is detailed below.
S.l. Trend in reporting delay of listed companies (RQl)
The reporting delay (RD) is defined as the number of days between the fiscal year-end date
and the date of the AGM. Under French law, the annual report must be available to the
shareholders at least 15 days before the AGM. The report must be approved at the company's
general meeting before being announced to the public and sent to the COB. The company is
also supposed to publish unaudited preliminary earnings in the Official Bulletin for Legal
Announcements (BALO) within 4 months of the final year-end. However, according to the
COB's annual reports, 43% of listed companies in 1999 did not respect this requirement (47%
for 1998).'^^ For this reason, we consider the company's date of AGM to be the first date of
Annual reports of the COB for 1998 (p. 254) and 1999 (p. 287) with respect to the periodic publication.
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public release of audited financial statements. In the case of groups, only one AGM~*^ is held
to examine the audited financial statements of both the parent company (annual accounts) and
the group (consolidated accounts).
For each of the companies in the study, the number of days fi"om the date of fiscal year-end
to the date of the AGM is calculated for each year, in the following manner:
rd,v = dg,,, - df,,,
where rd/ ,, company's reporting delay in terms of number of days for company (or group) i in
each year t; dg, „ date of AGM for each firm (or group) i in each year t\ df,.,, date of fiscal
year-end for firm i in each year /.
In order to examine the trend in reporting delay to AGM during the period of study, the
average number of days (ad) is measured using the following method for each year using the
reporting delay (rd), as defined above, for all sample firms:
ad^ = (l/7V)^rd,,,
where adyv, the average reporting delay (number of days) needed to submit the companies'
reports to AGM for each year during the period of study; rd, , reporting delay (number of
days) for firm i in each year r; A^, the number of companies' annual and consolidated reports
for which the reporting delay is calculated.
3.2. Reporting delay of annual and consolidated accounts (RQ2)
Two separate subsamples for the reports of annual-nongroup and consolidated group were
derived (Table 1). The reporting delay, as defined above, was measured separately for each
subsample. As stated earlier, in the case of groups, two separate reports are prepared (one for
aimual accounts on parent company and another on consolidated accounts of group), but
these are submitted simultaneously to the AGM. For this reason, it was not necessary to use
both in the sample.
The same method of measurement for reporting delay, shown above, was used with regard
to these two subsamples.
3.3. Reporting delay of auditors ' reports on annual and consolidated accounts (RQ 3a, 3b,
and 3c)
To examine RQ3a, a comparison was made of audit reporting delay for the three
subsamples (regardless of whether the audit reports are qualified or not). The audit delay
"" If a majority of shareholders are not reached at the first general meeting, decisions are postponed to the
following annual meeting, which must normally be held within 6 months. The decisions, other than examination
of audited financial statements, are discussed at extraordinary general meetings, which can be held at any time
during the year in accordance with the company's requirements.
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(auditor's signature lag) was defined as the number of days between the year-end and the
date of auditors' reports. The calculation was made separately for each subsample on the
basis of the methodology defined above in Section 1.2.1 relating to RQl, with the date of
AGM for firm (or group) i replaced by the date of the auditors' signature for each category of
the audit report.
The second comparison, RQ3b, is between the reporting audit delay of qualified reports
with that of unqualified reports. Again, audit delay (average number of days between fiscal
year-end and the audit report date) was calculated for each year for the subsamples of
unqualified and qualified audit reports.
To examine RQ3c, the audit delay for qualified audit reports was compared across three
different sets of accounts (annual-nongroups, annual-groups, and consolidated),
3.4. Relationship between type of audit qualification and timeliness (RQ4)
To assess the impact of different types of audit qualification on reporting delay, the average
delay for qualified reports was calculated for each type of qualification. Each qualified report
in the sample was classified according to the type of event or uncertainty that generated the
qualification. The 543 qualifications observed during the period of study were classified
following the French auditing practices and the CNCCs categories, as either: (i) qualified
"except for" opinions, (ii) "adverse opinions," or (iii) "disclaimer of opinions." A similar
classification is used in some American textbooks with special reference to US auditing
standards."' Those cases that could not be assigned to a particular qualification, due to the
absence of specific wording, were included in the "other" category. An attempt was also
made to rank the "except for" qualifications according to their nature and the seriousness of
their impact on the company's financial statements.
In the French context, a qualified opinion report can result from a limitation on the scope
of the audit or from failure by the auditee to respect accounting principles and appropriate
control systems. A "qualified opinion" report can be used only when the auditor concludes
that, overall, the financial statements are fairly stated. A "disclaimer opinion" must be used if
the auditor believes the condition being reported is highly material. French auditing standards
only propose three categories of audit reports: unqualified, qualified, and disclaimers of
opinion. A qualified report consists of several cases, certain of which correspond to the
Anglo-Saxon "except for" and others to "adverse" opinions. A qualified report can take the
form of a qualification of both the scope and the opinion or of the opinion alone. Scope and
uncertainty qualifications are more serious than "nonconformity with accounting principles"
as this type of qualification is used when the auditor's scope has been restricted by the client
or when circumstances exist that prevent the auditor from conducting a complete audit. ""
^' See, for example, Arens and Loebbecke (2000) or Knechel (2001, pp. 565 and 566), Dodd, Dopuch,
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1984, pp. 11 and 12), and Whittred (1980, p. 565).
"" For full information about the conditions requiring a departure from an unqualified report in the French
context, refer to "Le Rapport General," published by the CNCC (1985), Notes d'Information no. 1.
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On the other hand, the audit reports used in our sample of Hsted companies are mainly
prepared by international audit firms and the reports contain clearly the "unqualified,"
"except for," and "adverse opinion" disclaimers.
hi that sense, we believe that a "disclaimer of opinion" (in the French context) is more
serious than an "adverse opinion." Therefore, the classification of audit reports presented in
this paper is based on the definitions provided in French auditing standards, but we use the
equivalent terms in Anglo-Saxon auditing.
Due to the relatively small number (65) of "adverse opinion" qualifications, this type of
qualification was not classified according to cause.
5.5. Reporting behavior (early, on time, late) ofannual and consolidated audit reports (RQ5)
To address RQ5, three alternative definitions of "normal" timeliness were used, combin-
ing elements from Chambers and Penman (1984) and Givoly and Palmon (1982) and, to a
certain extent, Whittred (1980).
For the first definition, a company's "normal" reporting delay was assumed to be the same
as that occurring in the previous year. In the second, it was defined as the mean delay for the
period of study (10 years). For the third definition, a comparison is made between the actual
delay for each year and delays for the remaining years. Whittred (1980) proposed two
definitions for "normal" reporting behavior: "in the first, a company's 'normal' reporting
behavior was defined to be the same as that occurring in the year immediately preceding the
qualification. In the second, it was defined to be the mean total lag for the preceding years"
(p. 572). Chambers and Penman (1984, p. 42) used a similar approach to define "early," "on
time," and "late" interim reports, except that they used the mean within-firm standard
deviation of lag times (approximately 4 days over a 7-year period of study).^^
Using the above-mentioned methods, the "normal" reporting audit delays were calculated
for every sample member and compared with the actual reporting delay for a given year. The
measurement of each definition of "normal" reporting delay is shown below.
3. 6. First method
A comparison of the reporting delay of audit report for each company in each year and the
reporting delay of the previous year:
E{Tdt) = rd,_i
where £'(rd,) is "normal" delay for year t, and rd, _
i
is "actual" reporting delay year ? — 1.
^^ Chambers and Penman (1984) defined "early" reports as those which were more than 4 days earlier than
the date of the report for the same fiscal period in the previous year, "late" reports as those more than 4 days later
than that date, and "on time" reports all others. The 4-day period is approximately equal to the mean standard
deviation of lag time and the mean absolute deviation of lag time from that in the previous year.
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3. 7. Second method
The "normal reporting delay" for each company is assumed to be the average delay within
the period of study (1986-1995):
E{vdr)=^J2'^,
where rd, is the annual reporting delay for each company, and K represents the number of
years (10 years) for which the audit reports are available.
3.8. Third method
In this method, the calculation is as follows:
£(rd,)=^^rd,
t=\
This method, which was also used by Givoly and Palmon (1982, p. 506), defines a
company's "normal" reporting behavior as the mean total lag for all remaining years. For
example, for the year 1995, this would be the average for the preceding years 1986-1994.
In order to calculate any deviation from "normal delay," the actual reporting delay for
each company was compared with the "normal reporting delay" using the above three
methods. The calculation is done for qualified and unqualified audit reports on annual
accounts by nongroup and group as well as consolidated accounts group for each sample
member separately. Reports are then classified as "late," "early," or "on time" as follows:
A ^ rd, - ^(rd,)
If D,>0, the report is "late".
If D,<0, the report is "early".
If D, = 0, the report is "on time".
The relationship between the "normal" and "actual" reporting delay was subjected to the
tests of chi-square and Fisher with confidence intervals for a sample proportion.
3.9. Relationship between reporting behavior and type of audit report on annual and
consolidated accounts
The chi-square test is used to see if there is a relationship between the reporting behavior
(early, on time, and late) and the types of audit reports (qualified and unqualified) on annual
(nongroup and group) and consolidated accounts.
B. Soltani / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 215-246 231
We reject the hypothesis Hp for: a = 0.05 if x~ = 5.991; at 0.01 if x" = 9.210; and at 0.001
ifx'=13.81.
In addition, the following test of Fisher with confidence interval for a sample proportion
is employed:
X
n
where P is the probability of any event, X is the number of reports (with or without
qualification) with regard to timeliness (early or late publication), and n is the total number of
reports which are published early or delayed.
4. Results
4.1. Corporate reporting delay ofFrench listed companies (RQl)
Table 2 shows the average number of days between the date of companies' fiscal
year-end and the date of the general meeting—the earliest date of release of companies'
reports and financial statements. This shows that the average delay fell from 114.7 days
in 1986 to 101.1 days in 1995. Taking into account the standard deviation calculated for
the average delays, it can be stated that the 180-day legal requirement for corporate
reporting was met by the all the companies in this study.""* This does not mean, how-
ever, that all companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange met the 180-day legal
requirement because the study sample only covers 75% of them. Similarly, the annual
reports for 1998 and 1999 of the COB^'' show that approximately the same percentage of
publicly held companies (541 and 568 companies, respectively) met their legal delay.
Consequently, shortening the legal delay was proposed by the COB and the CNCC as
one means to improve the timeliness of financial reporting particularly for listed com-
panies in France.
The proposals of the COB and the CNCC were designed to respond to the demands of
investors, mainly foreign institutions, for more timely information comparable to inter-
national standards. Even though the majority of companies met the 180-day legal
requirement, the suggestion is that the 180-day requirement for financial reporting may
be too loose, and possibly points to a need to reexamine the regulations concerning
timeliness of reporting delay.
^'* The legal delay of 6 months must be respected by all listed companies. However, the president of
Commercial Court (Tribunal de Commerce) can postpone the meeting beyond this legal delay in exceptional cases
at the request of a company's board of directors or supervisory board (L. no. 67-537, July 24, 1966, Art. 157,
al.r^).
"^ See, for example, the annual reports of the COB for 1998 and 1999.
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Table 2
Average number of days between fiscal year-end and the date of ordinary general meeting of companies (for all
sample reports examined)
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Total reports
Mean
Number of reports examined
(annual nongroups and Average delay
consolidated accounts groups) (number of days) S.D.
610 114.7 35.4
623 116.4 32.3
606 114.6 31.8
598 110.9 28.6
530 110.5 29.5
545 107.4 31.2
564 103.5 28.5
521 103.1 27.8
589 101.6 26.7
615 101.1 29.2
108.5
4.2. Reporting delay ofgroups and nongroups accounts (RQ2)
Comparison of the reporting delays on different sets of accounts (annual accounts by
nongroups, annual accounts of parent company, and consolidated accounts by groups, taking
into account that the date of general meeting is the same for the last two sets of accounts"^)
provides more detail about the overall improvement in the area of timeliness of French listed
companies. Table 3 shows the change in average reporting delays between fiscal year-end and
the AGM for French companies in the sample during the period 1986-1995.
There was a reduction of reporting delay for both annual-nongroups and consolidated
accounts. The changes in average delays during the period of study were calculated (121.5
and 120.8 days average delay in 1985, respectively, for annual reports for nongroups and
consolidated reports for groups). The results show a 10-day decrease in the period for annual
reports of nongroups and 16 days for the consolidated reports of groups presented to the
general meeting. (The Student's t value of 2.47 shows that there is significant difference
between the changes in average number of reporting delay for annual and consolidated
accounts). There was, thus, a greater improvement in reporting delay for groups than for
nongroup companies. Since groups have to submit their annual and consolidated reports
simultaneously to their general meetings, then parent companies of groups did better than
nongroup companies in improving their performance.
The figures illustrate the success of the efforts made by the COB and the CNCC to
encourage the companies listed, regardless of their size, to release their reports as early
as possible.
Annual and consolidated accounts of groups are presented and examined simultaneously at the AGM.
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Table 3
Change in average number of days between fiscal year-end and the date of ordinary general meeting (annual and
consolidated accounts)
Changes in Consolidated Change in
Annual accounts average delay days accounts average delay days
Year (nongroups) (annual accounts) (groups)'' (consolidated accounts)
wss"" 585 121.5 198 120.8
1986 415 -1.7 195 -2.4
1987 390 + 2.1 233 -3.2
1988 361 + 0.8 245 -4.0
1989 372 -1.8 226 -7.1
1990 322 + 0.1 208 -8.3
1991 313 -5.3 232 -10.0
1992 329 -9.7 235 -12.3
1993 306 -9.0 215 -12.5
1994 352 -10.8 237 -15.6
1995 348 -10.2 267 -16.0
Total 1-eports (1986-1995) 3508 2293
Mean -3.74 -9.17
S.D. 4.88 4.93
Linear trend -0.94 -1.47
Mest == 2.47 two-tailed sig.=.24
^ The number of annual and consolidated accounts for groups is the same since both sets of financial statement
are examined simultaneously at the ordinary general meeting.
^ For the year 1985, the average number of days is presented. The change in average delays for the following
years is calculated in relation to the average delay for year 1985.
Three possible explanations can be offered for the greater improvement in reporting delay
by groups when compared to nongroups.
First, releasing more timely information might carry a higher cost and thus groups' better
access to financial resources may facilitate the process.
Second, the more active presence of international investors, notably US institutional
investors, in groups (between 22% and 50% of shares of groups listed in the CAC40 is owned
by foreign investors) is possibly a determinant factor persuading groups to release their parent
company and consolidated accounts early to the general shareholders' meeting. Generally
speaking, the board of directors is responsible for calling the shareholders' general meeting
for discussion of financial operations and company results, and, if the board includes foreign
investors, they are likely to ask for a shortening of the reporting period at the meeting.
Third, improving timeliness of financial reporting by groups to a level comparable to
international standards is likely to have become part of their financial policy, either because
they might hope to be listed in the near fiiture in foreign financial markets such as New York
27
or London, or because they might want to raise funds to finance their mvestment strategy.
^^ The issue of timeliness of reporting comparable to international standards has been raised in some of the
annual reports of French groups in years 1999 and 2000. They refereed to this point as an important element in
raising funds and listing in foreign financial markets.
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4.2.1. Reporting delay ofauditors ' reports on annual and consolidated accounts (RQ 3a, 3b,
and 3c)
Results comparing timeliness of audit reports on three sets of accounts (annual accounts by
nongroups, annual accounts by groups, and consolidated accounts by groups) are presented in
Tables 4-6. These complement those provided in the preceding sections, since the share-
holders' decisions on financial statements are subject to the opinions the auditors give about
the companies' accounts.
Table 4 reports the changes in average delay between fiscal year-end and the audit
report date for three sets of accounts (RpSa)."^^ The results show a significant reduction in
audit delay in all three sets of accounts after 1986. They show that by the end of the
period, the companies and the groups in the sample were able to present the audit reports
on their financial statements within 3 months from fiscal year-end. However, the reduction
was greater for reports on group accounts: an improvement of 16.5 days for consolidated
accounts and 15.6 days for parent companies of groups' accounts, compared with 14.3
days for the annual accounts provided by nongroups. This has implications for regulatory
action since the audit report is an integral part of the company's annual report and only
audited financial statements submitted to the shareholders can be considered as a basis of
policies on finance, investment, and dividends at the general meeting. Consequently, the
shortening of legal reporting delays to the general meeting and the demand from
regulatory bodies and investors for more timely information depend also on the audit
reporting delay.
Table 5 compares reporting delays for unqualified audit reports with those for qualified
audit reports for all the companies in the sample (RQ3b). Although in both cases there was a
considerable reduction in audit delays during the period of study, it was more substantial in
the case of unqualified audit reports (34.3 days with Student's / value of — 2.15). The results
are consistent with previous research (Simnett et al., 1995; Whittred, 1980 on Australian data;
Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991 on New Zealand data; Ashton et al., 1987; Bamber et al., 1993;
Elliott, 1982a, 1982b on US data), which found that audit qualification was associated with
longer audit delay. Simnett et al. (1995) also found that continuing qualifications are
associated with longer audit delay.
To examine RQ3c, a comparison was made between the three sets of accounts
(annual accounts by nongroups, annual and consolidated accounts by groups) in order
to see whether the relationship between the audit qualification and timeliness of re-
porting presented in Section 4.1 varies. Table 6 shows audit delays for the sample of
qualified reports presented in this study (a total of 787 qualified reports). It shows a
substantial decrease in audit delay (40.5 days) in the case of qualified audit reports on
consolidated accounts. On the other hand, the changes in average audit delays for both
qualified reports on annual -groups and annual-nongroups accounts are not significant
In contrast to the reports on annual and consolidated accounts of groups which are submitted simultaneously
to the general meeting, the two audit reports on these accounts do not necessarily have the same date.
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Table 4
Change in average number of days between fiscal year-end and the date of audit reports on annual report for
nongroups, groups, and consolidated accounts
Number Change in Number Change in Number of Change in
of annual average delay of annual average delay consolidated average delay
audit reports (annual reports audit reports (annual reports reports (consolidated
Year (nongroups) for nongroups) (groups)'' for groups) (groups) reports)
1985^ 379 104.8 61 104 147 104
1986 402 -1.6 64 -1.8 208 -0.9
1987 301 -0.3 203 -1.4 322 -2.5
1988 277 -1.3 226 -2.8 329 -5.3
1989 266 -2.2 219 -4.6 332 -6.4
1990 179 -4.0 303 -6.2 351 -7.8
1991 180 -6.3 328 -8.4 365 -8.9
1992 189 -8.6 345 -10.3 375 -11.4
1993 166 -10.0 331 -10.8 355 -12.2
1994 202 -12.4 333 -13.5 387 -14.6
1995 222 -14.3 328 -15.6 393 -16.5
Total 2384 2680 3417
(1986-1995)
Mean -6.10 -7.54 -8.65
S.D. 5.00 4.97 5.07
Trend -1.41 -1.53 -1.73
t test between annual accounts of nongroups and groups = 0.65 (two-tailed sig.=.52); t test between annual
nongroups and consolidated accounts of nongroups = 1 . 1 3 (two-tailed sig.=.27); / test between annual and
consohdated accounts of groups = 0.49 (two-tailed sig.=.62).
^ The annual audit reports of groups concern only the reports whose dates are not the same as for the
consolidated audit reports.
^ For the year 1985, the average number of days is presented for both types of reports. For the following years,
only the changes in average are indicated in the table.
(3.4 and 3.9 days fewer, respectively; Significant Student's t scores are reported in
Table 6).
This suggests that, generally, an audit qualification has more impact on delaying audit
reports on annual accounts than it does on consolidated accounts. It may, thus, be argued that
groups believe that only audited consolidated financial statements are relevant to in-
vestors. The average delay for the audit reports on consolidated accounts (results for both
clean and qualified audit reports as indicated in Tables 4 and 6) is shorter than for reports on
annual accounts, whilst the overall trend in the case of three types of audit reports is one of
general improvement.
For consolidated accounts of groups, it is interesting to note that for the period of the
study, the change in average delay for all audit reports on consolidated accounts is 16.5 days
(last column in Table 4), whereas for qualified audit reports on the same accounts is 40.5
days (Table 6). Longer delay on qualified audit reports represents the impact of audit
qualifications on group accounts, as is the case for the overall sample of qualified reports
(Table 5).
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Table 5
Change in average number of days between fiscal year-end and the audit report date (unqualified versus qualified)
Change in Change in
Number of average delay Number of average delay
Year unqualified reports (unqualified reports) qualified reports (qualified reports)
1985'' 521 101.2 62 131.5
1986 543 -3.4 67 -lA
1987 539 -6.6 80 -2.8
1988 532 -8.1 78 -4.9
1989 528 -10.3 70 -6.4
1990 460 -14.5 70 -7.7
1991 466 -17.3 79 -9.3
1992 473 -21.7 91 -11.0
1993 441 -26.6 80 -13.9
1994 505 -27.8 84 -18.1
1995 527 -34.3 88 -22.3
Total reports (1986-1995) 5014 787
Mean -18.16 -9.88
S.D. 10.26 6.56
Trend -3.43 -2.21
t test = -2.15 two-tailed sig.==.045
^ For the year 1985, the average number of days is presented for both types of reports. For the following years,
only the changes in the average are indicated in the table.
As already indicated, the results, which confirm that audit qualification has some impact
on delaying audit reports, should be of interest to researchers in comparative international
accounting and reporting. According to Whittred (1980, p. 576), the reasons for this type of
delay are "an apparent increase in the year-end audit time and an almost certain increase in
auditor- client negotiation time as a result of the impending qualification." It is to be
expected that this would be even more the case in France as a result of the appointment of
two, or sometimes three, statutory auditors from different audit firms for the examination of
the company's accounts at the year-end.
It should be stated that the results of both these measures (delays on corporate and on audit
reports), though longer for French companies than for Canadian and US, are basically similar
to those reported by Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) in New Zealand (95.5 days in 1988),
although earlier studies in that country showed shorter delays (Courtis, 1976; Gilling, 1977).
Similarly, Simnett et al. (1995), using Australian data, report that the mean audit delay
increased steadily (94 days in 1989) over their period of study (1981-1989). Studies by
Ashton et al. (1987) on US and Newton and Ashton (1989) on Canadian data showed much
shorter audit delays.
4.3. Audit qualifications and timeliness (RQ4)
The results described in Section 4.2 reveal that audit qualifications delay the release of
companies' annual and consolidated accounts, although the change in average delay with
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Table 6
Change in average number of days between fiscal year-end
versus consolidated)
and the date of qualified audit reports (annual
Number Number Number
of annual Change in of annual Change in of qualified Change in
qualified average delay qualified average delay consolidated average delay
reports (annual reports reports (annual reports reports consolidated
Year (nongroups) for nongroups) (groups) for groups) (groups) reports
1985'' 28 135.2 13 130.5 20 126.3
1986 30 -2.6 15 -3.2 22 -2.1
1987 29 -0.4 20 - 31 -5.8
1988 31 + 1.0 15 + 2.7 32 -9.6
1989 25 + 1.3 16 + 3.9 29 -13.5
1990 23 + 3.2 16 + 5.7 31 -17.8
1991 29 + 2.9 18 + 4.0 32 -22.1
1992 34 + 2.1 22 + 3.1 35 -26.2
1993 31 + 1.6 15 + 1.9 34 -30.7
1994 33 -0.6 19 -1.3 32 -35.6
1995 36 -3.4 21 -3.9 31 -40.5
Total reports 301 177 309
(1986-1995)
Mean 0.51 1.29 -20.39
S.D. 2.22 3.24 12.89
Trend - 0.088 - 0.077 -4.26
t test between annual reports of nongroups and groups = — 0.63 (two-tailed sig.=.53); t test between annual
(nongroups) and consolidated accounts = 5.05 (two-tailed sig. =0); t test between reports on annual and
consolidated accounts = 5. 16 (two-tailed sig. = 0).
^ For the year 1985, the average number of days is presented for three types of reports. For the following years,
only the changes in the average are indicated in the table.
regard to qualified audit reports on consolidated financial statements fell significantly (by
40.5 days) during the period of study.
Audit qualifications are not homogenous and some are more serious than others. In the
French context, seriousness of qualified audit report depends mainly on issues such as
scope limitation, the materiality of the issues raised in the report, and the auditors'
assessment of the nature and the effect of factors that prevent the expression of an
unqualified opinion (see the explanation provided in Section 4.3 on the methodology used
for RQ4).
There were 543 qualifications in audit reports on annual and consolidated accounts during
the period of study. These have been classified on the basis of their nature.
Table 7 shows that there is a correlation between the delay for the major categories of
qualified audit opinions (disclaimers of opinion, adverse opinion, and multiple uncertainties)
and the seriousness of the qualification. Even though other cases—nonconformity with
accounting principles and lack of sufficient accounting provisions—are considered the least
severe type of departure from an unqualified report, the average delay is nevertheless
Types of qualification Number of reports Avera
"Disclaimer of opinion" 28 179.8
"Adverse opinion" 65 129.5
"Except for opinion"
Scope limitation 41 124.7
Multiple uncertainties 144 134.5
Nonconformity with accounting principles 137 127.8
Lack of provisions for employees' retirement 63 126.4
Other provisions 46 115.6
"Other" 19 126.6
Total number of qualifications 543
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Table 7
Average delay of the announcement of audit qualifications
day (days) S.D.
14.3
27.2
19.2
24.5
25.8
18.5
15.8
20.3
relatively high (127.8 and 126.4 days, respectively), providing further evidence of the
relationship between audit qualification and timeliness.
The results presented in Table 7 are consistent with other researchers' findings, not
surprisingly, given that the decision to quality a company's financial statements is likely to be
time-consuming. Elliott (1982a, p. 135) reports greater improvement in delays for "going
concern" than for "asset realization" and "litigation" qualifications. Whittred (1980, p. 573)
calculates mean total delays of 117 days for "subject to," 141 days for "disclaimers of
opinion," and 107 days for "unqualified" reports. Simnett et al. (1995, p. 18) also associated
the length of delay to the seriousness of audit qualifications.
For the French context, there is an additional factor that explains the link between
length of delay and nature of qualification. The legal requirement that a company's
accounts must be audited by at least two different statutory auditors,*^^ fi"om different audit
firms, might well delay the preparation of a single audit report, taking into account that
both auditors have to sign the same report and must agree on a common audit opinion.
Besides which, as previously indicated, most of the larger companies listed on the Paris
Stock Exchange employ three or more auditors (see, e.g., the audit report of the BIC
group in the Appendix).
4.4. Relationship between reporting behavior (early, on time, late) and type of audit report
(RQ5)
Analysis is made by comparing actual reporting delays with "normal" reporting delays.
As presented above in Methodology, three different methods were used to define a
"normal" delay.
Tables 8-10 present the number of qualified and clean reports on the three sets of
accounts provided by the sample (annual accounts by nongroups, annual accounts by groups.
^"^ French Law, L. no. 66-537, July 24, 1966, Art. 223, al. 3.
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Table 8
Timeliness of qualified and clean reports on annual accounts prepared by nongroups—audit delay versus "normal
reporting"
Method (l),£(rd,) == rd, _
1
Test of \' = 5.16
Timeliness Number of (ijualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
Method (2), E{rd,)
132 (44%)
30(10%)
139 (46%)
301 (100%)
Test of \" = 11.10
983 (47%)
272 (13%)
828 (40%)
2083 (100%)
1115 (47%)
302 (13%)
967 (40%)
2384 (100%)
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
Method (3), £(rd,)
117 (39%)
12 (4%)
172 (57%)
301 (100%)
Test of \" = 2.26
1005 (48%)
84 (4%)
994 (48%)
2083 (100%)
1122 (47%)
96 (4%)
1166(49%)
2384 (100%)
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
144 (48%)
10 (3%)
147 (49%)
301 (100%)
1083 (52%)
80 (4%)
920 (44%)
2083 (100%)
1227 (51%)
90 (4%)
1067 (45%)
2384 (100%)
and consolidated accounts by groups), and compare the reporting delay with "normal"
reporting delay.
Several results are obtained. First, a higher proportion of "qualified" audit reports on
annual accounts (both for nongroups and parent companies of groups) is published "late"
than "early," whereas the opposite is true in the case of "clean" reports (Tables 8 and 9).
Second, the results indicated in Table 1 (audit reports on consolidated accounts) show that
on the whole, "clean" reports are published "early" during the period of study, whichever
method is used. With regard to the "qualified" audit reports on consolidated financial
statements, when using the first and third methods,''^ a majority of qualified reports are
published "early".
Overall, there was a general improvement in the reporting behavior of companies for both
annual and consolidated audit reports, with the greater improvement for the latter. This is
consistent with the results reported previously in Tables 4 and 6.
^^ If the second method is used (the average reporting delay over the period of study), the number of reports
published "late" is greater. The possible explanation for this is the overall improvement in reporting trends for
audit reports on consolidated accounts, which is also apparent fi^om Table 6 (RQ3c).
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Table 9
Timeliness of qualified and clean reports on annual accounts prepared by groups—audit delay versus "normal
reporting"
Method (1), £(rd,) = rd,_, Test of \" = 5.48
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
a:
Method (2), £(rd,) =j(^Erd,
77 (44%)
18 (10%)
82 (46%)
177 (100%)
Test of X" = 10.76
1181 (47%)
326 (13%)
996 (40%)
2503 (100%)
1258 (47%)
344(13%)
1078 (40%)
2680 (100%)
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
t-\
Method (3), £(rd,) = 7^E rd,
t=\
69 (39%)
7 (4%)
101 (57%)
177 (100%)
Test of x"^ = 2.11
1209 (48%)
100 (4%)
1194(48%)
2503 (100%)
1278 (48%)
107 (4%)
1295 (48%)
2680 (100%)
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
84 (47%)
6 (4%)
87 (49%)
177 (100%)
1302 (52%)
96 (4%)
1105 (44%)
2503 (100%)
1386 (52%)
102 (4%)
1192 (44%)
2680 (100%)
To examine the relationship between reporting behavior of audit reports and the type of
reports, the chi-square and Fisher (with confidence intervals for a sample proportion) tests
were applied to the data in Tables 8-10.
The chi-square test was used to compare the observed number of samples in each category
with the expected number. It was applied to the data for reports on annual (both for nongroups
and groups) and consolidated accounts, under the three predefined methods. The results are
indicated in Tables 8-10.
Since the computed values of chi-square using the second method (11.10 for annual
accounts by nongroups, 10.76 for parent companies of groups, and 15.20 for consolidated
reports) are higher than the critical values, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level.
A similar result is obtained using the third method, in the case of consolidated reports at the
5% level (chi-square of 6.53 compared to critical value of 5.99). It can be concluded that there
is a relationship between the type of audit reports (qualified and unqualified) and audit
reporting behavior (early, on time, late) when using the second (for annual and consolidated
reports) and third (for consolidated reports) methods. In other words, "qualified" audit
reports on both annual and consolidated accounts are generally published "later" than
"normal," unlike "clean" reports which are usually reported "earlier" than "normal".
To summarize, statistical tests show that there is a relationship between the type of audit
report (qualified and unqualified) and the reporting behavior. This confirms results obtained
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Table 10
Timeliness of qualified and clean
"normal reporting"
reports on consolidated accounts prepared by groups— audit delay versus
Method (l),£(rd,) = rd,^i Test of \~ = 4.37
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
K
Method (2), £(rd,) =i;Erd,
t=\
113 (37%)
103 (33%)
93 (30%)
309 (100%)
Test of \" = 15.20
1369 (44%)
861 (28%)
878 (28%)
3108 (100%)
1482 (43%)
964 (28%)
971 (29%)
3417 (100%)
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
Method (3), £(rd,) = T^Erd,
104 (34%)
22 (7%)
183 (59%)
309 (100%)
Test of x~ = 6.53
1486 (48%)
237 (8%)
1385 (44%)
3108(100%)
1590 (47%)
259 (7%)
1568 (46%)
3417 (100%)
Timeliness Number of qualified reports Number of clean reports Total
Early
On time
Late
Total
129 (42%)
75 (24%)
105 (34%)
309 (100%)
1623 (52%)
631 (20%)
854 (28%)
3108 (100%)
1752 (51%)
706 (21%)
959 (28%)
3417 (100%)
in previous research work, notably that of Whittred (1980) in Australia and Elliott (1982a,
1982b) in the US market.
5. Conclusion
This study set out to examine the issue of timeliness of corporate and audit reports in the
French context, using data from French listed companies for each year in the period 1986-
1995. Various aspects of this issue, which is of great importance to researchers in comparative
international accounting and to shareholders, particularly foreign investors in the French
financial market, have been analyzed.
Following on from research conducted in English-speaking countries, research questions
were developed regarding the timeliness of French corporate reports to AGM and audit delay.
In doing so, special attention has been paid to the role of regulatory and professional bodies,
the presence of foreign investors, and accounting and auditing practices in the French context,
where there are major differences from English-speaking countries. There is evidence of an
improvement in timeliness of corporate and audit reporting delays. It has also been shown
that the existence of a qualification audit tends to lengthen the delay. Although account must
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be taken of certain specific characteristics, the results presented are consistent with the
findings for EngHsh-speaking countries.
Generally speaking, there was an improvement in the reporting delays for annual and
consolidated accounts to the AGM of French companies and groups during the period of
study. However, the improvement in reporting delay for groups' accounts (both annual
accounts of parent companies and consolidated financial statements) is more significant than
for nongroups. Consolidated accounts prepared by French groups can thus be considered
more relevant because they are more timely.
Similar results were found for the impact of audit qualification on timeliness of audit
reports. They show that the statutory auditors of companies and groups in the sample were
able to submit their audit reports within 3 months from fiscal year-end. Besides this,
although there was a steady reduction in audit reporting delays for all three sets of accounts,
the improvement is marginally greater for reports on the consolidated accounts of groups
and their parent companies than for nongroup companies. That larger firms tend to release
their financial reports earlier than smaller companies may be related to their access to
financial resources and the greater influence of foreign investors and market regulatory
bodies on the groups. The results obtained may have implications for regulatory action with
regard to the reduction in the reporting delay of companies, as the audit report is an integral
part of the annual report to the shareholders.
With respect to the relationship between audit qualification and reporting delay, it was
shown that audit qualifications were associated with longer audit delay, since the change in
average delay of unqualified audit reports is significantly higher than that of qualified
reports. When the impact of audit qualifications on three types of reports was measured,
again the audit reports on consolidated financial statements show a decrease in delay (this
time substantial) compared to audit reports on annual accounts (both for nongroup
companies and parent companies of groups). This implies that the audit qualification has
generally more impact on delaying the audit reports on annual accounts than on consolidated
financial statements.
In the case of the impact of different types of audit reports (unqualified, qualified, and
disclaimer opinions), the results show that a longer delay generally corresponds to a more
serious qualification, which in the French case is the "disclaimer of opinion." Although the
results are consistent with those obtained in English-speaking countries, they show a
relatively high average delay even for "except for" (the least severe type of departure from
an unqualified report). This may be related to the comparatively longer delay in almost all
areas of timeliness of corporate and audit reports in France.
The analysis of the relationship between reporting behavior (early, on time, late) and type
of audit reports (unqualified and qualified) supports the above conclusions. A greater number
of qualified audit reports on all three sets of accounts are published "later" than the "normal
reporting delay," whereas the "clean audit reports" are associated more with "early" release.
Also, the improvement in the reporting delay of unqualified and qualified reports on
consolidated accounts is greater than that for annual accounts.
Although the reporting delays both for corporate and audit reports are longer in the French
case (even taking into account that most previous research studies conducted in English-
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speaking countries were based on company reports released before 1990), the results are
consistent with those from an Anglo-Saxon context, particularly those for Ausfralia and the
US (Elliott, 1982a, 1982b; Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Simnett et al, 1995; Whittred, 1980).
The French context is different in many respects from that of English-speaking countries as
far as accounting and auditing practices are concerned (e.g., comparison of reporting delay
among three sets of accounts, timeliness of two corporate and two audit reports submitted to
ordinary general meeting, presence of more than two statutory auditors to prepare a single
audit report, etc.).
The results reported here are encouraging with regards to the improvement of reporting
behavior of French corporate and audit reports. However, some limitations should be
noted. First, the period of 180 days legal requirement for reporting may be superfluous,
at least for listed companies, given that most listed firms are able to report well within
this time. Moreover, 180 days is relatively long, especially when compared to require-
ments in certain English-speaking countries (e.g., Australia and the US). Second, any
reduction in legal reporting delay might incur exfra cost, related to the preparation of
more up-to-date accounting and financial data, and, therefore, this would have to be
assessed against the benefits of more timely disclosure of audited annual and consoli-
dated financial statements.
Nevertheless, while it would appear that the efforts made by the stock market regulatory
agency and professional auditing body {COB and CNCC) have been effective in convincing
firms listed in French financial markets and their auditors to release more timely audit and
corporate reports, reexamination of the adequacy of the 1 80-day deadline, with a view to
shortening it, at least for the large French corporations, may still be necessary. It should
encourage publication of even more timely financial information comparable to the
standards expected at the international level. The growing number of international investors
in French companies, together with multiple listings in foreign stock markets by some
larger companies, is having some impact on the general improvement in reporting delay of
French companies. Both these issues require the disclosure of more timely accounting and
financial information.
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Appendix
Rapport des commissaires
aux comptes sur les
compfes consolides
Exercice dos le 31 decembre 1999
Statutory auditors' report
on the consolidated
financial statements
Year ended December 31, 1999
Mesfbmcs et Messieurs les Actionnaires,
K.n cxeL'utioii dc la mission qui nous a cti confine par
^otre Asseinblcc Gen^rale, nous avons proc^d^ au
conlrole des comptes consolides de la socicte BIC ^a-
blis en l£uros rclafifs a I'exercicc clos ic ?1 decembre
IVW, tels c|u'ils sont prcscnt^s aux pages 63 A 99.
Les comptes consolides out etc arrctes par Ic Conseil
d'Adniinistration. II nous appartient, sur la base dc notrc
audit, d'exprimer unc opinion sur ces comptes.
Nous avons effectiid notre audit seion les nonnes pmfcs-
sioniielles applicables en France ; ces nomies rcquicrent
la misc en ccuue de diligences pcmicttant d'obtcnir I'as-
surance raisonnablc que les comptes consolid^ ne com-
portent pas d'anomalies significatives. Un audit consiste ^
examiner, par soiidages, les elements probants justifiant
les donnccs contenues dans ces comptes. II consiste 6ga-
lement ^ apprecicr les principcs comptables siiivis ct les
estimations significativcs retenues pour larrettf des
comptes ct h apprecier Icur prfeentation d'ensemble.
Nous cstimons que nos controles foumissent unc base rai-
sonnabic a I'opinion e.xprimce ci-aprte.
Nous certifions que les comptes consolidds dtablis
conformement aux regies ct principes comptables appli-
cables en France sont regidicrs ct sincires et donnent
unc image fidele du patrimoine, de la situation finan-
citre. ainsi que du r^ultat dc I 'ensemble constitue par
les entreprises comprises dans la consolidation.
Par aillcurs, nous avons dgalcment procddd i la verifi-
cation des informations donn^es dans Ic rapport sur la
gcshon du Croupe confomiement aux nomics profev
sionnellcs applicables en France. Nous n'avons pas
d'observation ii formuler sur Icur sincerity ct leur
concordance avec les comptes consolides.
Paris et Neuilly le 28 avril 2000
Les Commissaires aux Comptes
Alain Ldin^ Deloittc Touche Tohmatsu
Patrice de Maistrc
Thierry Benoit
Ladies and (>cntleinen.
In accordance witli our appointment as audilon> by your
Annual General Meeting, wc have audited the accom-
panying consolidated financial statements of BIC pre-
pared in Kuros for the )car ended December 31, 1999,
as shown on pages 63 to 99.
'lite coii-tolidated financial statements ha\e been appro
ved by the Board of Directors. Our role is to express an
opinion on these financial statements, based on our audit.
Wc conducted our audit in accordance with profession-
al standards applicable in France. 'Pilose standards
require that wc plan and perfonn the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the consolidated
financial statements are free of maSciiaS russtatemcnt.
An audit includes examining, on a test basis, e\'idencc
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial
statcmenb. An audit also includes assessing the account-
ing principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial
statement presentation. Wc believe that our audit pro-
vides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements
give a tnie and fair \ iew of the financial position and
the assets and liabilities of tlie Group as at December
31, 1999 and the results of its operations for the year
then ended in accordance with accounting principles
generally accepted in France.
We have al.so performed the procedures required by law
on the Group financial information given in the report
of the Board of Direcfors. We liavc no eonnncnt to
make as to the fair presentation of this information nor
its consistency with the con.solidatcd financial state-
ments.
Paris and Neuilly, April 28, 2000
'llie Slatutorv Auditors
Alain Laine Deloittc Touche Tohmatsu
Patrice dc Maislre
lliierrv Bcnuit
(TliU i« 3 fret: traiisUlion of Ihc ongriial French lexl for iiifor-
mation purposes only)
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Abstract
Drawing on prior empirical research based on disclosure behavior in developed western markets,
this study examines the association of ownership structure with the voluntary disclosures of listed
companies in the Asian settings of Hong Kong and Singapore. An analysis of annual reporting
practices shows that the extent of outside ownership is positively associated with voluntary
disclosures. In particular, the results also indicate that the level of information disclosure is likely to be
less in "insider" or family-controlled companies, a significant feature of the Hong Kong and
Singapore stock markets. © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Corporate voluntary disclosure has been the focus of an increasing amount of attention in
recent years. Such disclosures can be defined as "disclosures in excess of requirements,
representing free choices on the part of company managements to provide accounting and
other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual reports"
(Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995, p. 555). Studies in this area have mainly focused on the
impact of company characteristics on the extent of voluntary disclosure. Understanding why
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firms disclose information voluntarily is useful to both the preparers and users of accounting
information as well as to accounting policymakers (Meek et al., 1995). However, the focus of
much of the research to date has been on the US, the UK, and Continental European countries
(e.g., Buzby, 1975; Cerf, 1961; Choi, 1973; Cooke, 1989; Firth, 1979; Frost & Pownall,
1994; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Meek & Gray, 1989; Meek et al, 1995; Turpin &
DeZoort, 1998). In contrast, very few studies (e.g., Cooke, 1991; Hossain, Tan, & Adams,
1994; Lau, 1992) have been concerned with the nature and extent of corporate voluntary
disclosure in Asian countries. Accordingly, this study aims to examine the voluntary
disclosure behavior of listed companies from two important Asian markets, namely. Hong
Kong (China) and Singapore.
Hong Kong and Singapore are the focus of this study, first, because of their unique
and similar backgrounds as emerging market economies with rapidly growing capital
markets. Total market capitalization of the Hong Kong capital market has increased more
than seven times from US$83,386 million to US$608,159 million during 1990-1999
(Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), 1999). Similarly, it has increased more than
nine times from US$21,124 million to US$192,983 milhon for the Singapore capital
market during the same period (SEHK, 1999). In 1999, Hong Kong ranked as the second
largest and Singapore the fourth largest economics in Asia in terms of market
capitalization (SEHK, 1999). The Hong Kong and Singapore capital markets have both
increased in importance and are keenly competing to be among the leading stock market
locations in Asia outside Japan. So not only is more research needed on these markets,
but also an assessment of similarities and differences in disclosure behavior is likely to
be insightful.
Second, voluntary disclosure deserves special attention in the Asian context because firms
in these countries have less incentives for transparent disclosure than their Anglo-American
counterparts (Ball, Wu, & Robin, 1999). The disclosure orientation of firms in Asian
countries is significantly influenced by the cultural environment in which they operate (Gray,
1988; Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). The cultural environments in which Hong Kong and
Singapore firms operate do not encourage voluntary disclosure of corporate information. Both
societies have been dominated by Chinese people. Chinese society is characterized by having
relatively high levels of collectivism and power distance, and strong uncertainty avoidance
(Chow, Chau, & Gray, 1995). The societal values of high collectivism and large power
distance indicate that people would tend to adhere to rules and regulations and disclose
voluntarily less information in their annual reports compared to their counterparts in US and
UK markets. On the other hand, long-term creditors in strong uncertainty-avoidance countries
such as Hong Kong and Singapore may require more information from their borrowers in
order to preserve security. Such unique environments in Hong Kong and Singapore provide
us with an opportunity to examine empirically the firm characteristics affecting corporate
information disclosure in emerging economies.
Third, the disclosure orientation of firms in these countries is also greatly influenced by
the form of their ownership and management structure (Lam, Mok, Cheung, & Yam, 1994;
Mok, Lam, & Cheung, 1992). In Hong Kong and Singapore, listed companies are usually
controlled by a family group who staff many of the senior positions and also own a large
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proportion of the shares. In Hong Kong, a survey conducted in 1997 by the Hong Kong
Society of Accountants (HKSA) confirmed the widespread view that the extent of control of
listed companies in Hong Kong by one shareholder or a family group of shareholders is
significant (HKSA, 1997). In contrast, a large proportion of listed companies in more
developed countries such as the US and UK are owned by a diverse shareholder population,
in which institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds predominate. The
prevalence of family companies on a stock exchange may result in less demand for
corporate disclosures than found in more developed countries because the major providers
of finance already have that information. The impact of ownership structure is of particular
significance for the current Hong Kong investment scene. As Hong Kong endeavors to
become one of the major international capital markets, this has brought about rising
expectations among market users and calls for more corporate disclosure for proper
evaluation of the firm's economic performance. However, the influence of family-controlled
companies may well be a countervailing force to the growing pressures for intemation-
alization of the market.
Accordingly, this study examines whether ownership structure is associated with the
voluntary disclosures of listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. It also investigates
whether family ownership and control of firms has an impact on the level of voluntary
disclosures because a substantial number of firms are family-owned and -controlled (Lam
etal., 1994; Mok et al., 1992).
The paper is organized as follows: first, hypotheses are developed; second, the research
methods used are explained; third, the results are detailed and discussed; and finally, some
conclusions are drawn.
2. Development of hypotheses
2.1. Ownership structure and voluntary disclosures
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977) suggests that where there is a
separation of ownership and control of a firm, the potential for agency costs arises
because of conflicts of interest between contracting parties. Fama and Jensen (1983)
propose that where share ownership is widely held, the potential for conflicts between
principal and agent is greater than in more closely held companies. As a result,
information disclosure is likely to be greater in widely held firms so that principals can
effectively monitor that their economic interests are optimized and agents can signal that
they act in the best interests of the owners. In the Asian context, research is very limited
on this issue. However, Hossain et al. (1994) found that ownership structure is statistically
related to the level of information voluntarily disclosed by listed Malaysian companies.
The hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis I: There is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of
voluntary disclosure by Hong Kong and Singapore companies.
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2.2. Impact offamily ownership on voluntary disclosures
In both of Hong Kong and Singapore, it seems tliat family-owned and -controlled
companies are more in evidence than in western developed stock markets and that "insiders"
control a significant proportion of listed companies. In Hong Kong, a survey conducted in
1997 by the HKSA confirmed the widespread view that the extent of control of listed
companies in Hong Kong by one shareholder or a family group of shareholders is significant
(HKSA, 1997). In Singapore, a similar situation seems to prevail though there is limited
empirical evidence available owing to the difficulty of obtaining relevant data.
Family-controlled firms have little motivation to disclose information in excess of
mandatory requirements because the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak in
comparison with companies that have wider ownership. In the context of the Chinese culture,
with relatively high levels of collectivism and power distance, and strong uncertainty
avoidance, it would also be expected that transparency and information disclosure levels
would be lower compared to the US and UK markets (Gray, 1988). Accordingly, an
alternative hypothesis can be stated thus:
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative association between family or concentrated ownership
and the extent of disclosure by Hong Kong companies.
3. Research methods
3.1. Sample
To ensure that samples selected from Hong Kong and Singapore were homogeneous, only
industrial companies were selected. These companies fall into industrial sectors such as food
and beverages; shipping and transportation; publishing and printing; electronics and tech-
nology; building materials and construction. A list of all the industrial companies whose
shares were listed on the SEHK as of December 31, 1997, was prepared from the Guide to the
Companies of Hong Kong—1998 (Thornton, 1998a). To examine the annual reports of all
respondent companies was not feasible, and hence, about one out of every three Hong Kong
industrial companies was selected randomly by using the random number generator provided
by "Excel." Annual Reports for 1997 were analyzed. These annual reports represented the
most recent source of data available at the time of the study. The sample size of 60 represents
about 32% of the total population. A similar procedure was carried out for Singapore
companies based on the Guide to the Companies of Singapore and Malaysia—1998
(Thornton, 1998b) for the financial year 1997. Because of the smaller population, about
one out of every two Singapore industrial companies was selected randomly by using the
random number generator provided by "Excel." Hence, 62 companies out of the total
population of 133 were selected, representing about 47% of the total population. Thus, while
the samples were random and represented a significant proportion of the companies listed on
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each stock exchange, they did not comprise the entire population of industrial companies in
Hong Kong and Singapore.
Regarding the industry composition of the samples, the Hong Kong and Singapore sample
companies were similar in constitution with the vast majority of companies in the electronics
and technology industry (70% for Hong Kong sample companies and 73% for Singapore
sample companies, respectively) and fewer companies in other industrial sectors (publishing
and printing; food and beverages; and shipping and transportation). Nevertheless, a control
for industry was incorporated in the statistical tests.
5.2. Disclosure index
The voluntary disclosure checklist was based on the one developed in a recent study by
Meek et al. (1995), which examined the voluntary disclosures of US, UK and Continental
European companies. The major reason for adopting this checklist is that the original
checklist was compiled "based on an analysis of international trends and observations of
standard reporting practice, taking into account the relevant research studies as well as other
comprehensive international surveys of accounting and reporting" (Meek et al., 1995,
p. 561). It also provides a usefiil benchmark for comparison with earlier research. The items on
the checklist were checked against the mandatory disclosure requirements of Hong Kong and
Singapore in order to arrive at the voluntary disclosure checklist applicable to the sample
companies (see Appendix A). The items on the checklist were categorized into three
information types: (a) Strategic Information including (1) General Corporate Information,
(2) Corporate Strategy, (3) Acquisitions and Disposals, (4) Research and Development, (5)
Future Prospects; (b) Nonfmancial Information including (1) Information about Directors, (2)
Employee Information, (3) Social Policy and Value Added Information; and (c) Financial
Information including (1) Segmental information, (2) Financial Review, (3) Foreign Currency
Inforaiation, and (4) Stock Price Information.
Most of the prior studies related to corporate information disclosure have tended to treat
voluntary disclosure as a whole. Strategic and financial types of information have decision
relevance to investors while nonfinancial information is directed more toward a corporation's
social accountability and targeted at a wider spectrum of stakeholders than the owners/
investors. As a result, the variables affecting voluntary disclosure choices may also vary
by information type. Thus, following Meek et al. (1995), the voluntary disclosure items of
this study are categorized into three major types of information: strategic, nonfinancial,
and financial.
The voluntary disclosure index for each company becomes TVD/MVD—the number of
total voluntary disclosures (TVD) as a proportion of the maximum voluntary disclosure
possible (MVD). The voluntary disclosure index was compiled based on the addition, and
unweighted scoring approach, of the disclosure items. Such an approach was based on the
assumption that each item of information disclosure is of equal importance in the corporate
information users' decision-making process. Assigning weights would bring about a certain
degree of subjectivity and reflect the importance of certain types of information to the
specific groups of information users (Firth, 1979). This may not be able to properly reflect
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the decision made by the majority of information users as the annual report is usually
considered as a very general-user report. Such an addition and unweighted scoring approach
has been employed and supported in several prior studies (Ahmed & NichoUs, 1994; Cooke,
1991; Meek et al., 1995). In addition, weights may not represent real economic conse-
quences to the subjects whose opinions are pooled (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987) and may
not reflect stable perceptions on similar disclosure items across subjects over time
(Dhaliwal, 1980). Finally, the results of prior studies (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987) have
suggested that weighted and unweighted disclosure indexes are interchangeable because
their effects are equivalent.
One of the major issues of adopting this dichotomous procedure is the applicability of
the item concerned, i.e., the determination of whether an information disclosure item is
not disclosed (0) or not applicable (N/A) when that particular item is not included in the
annual report. In order to tackle this problem, an information disclosure item was coded
as N/A (not applicable) only after having investigated the entire annual report and
ensuring that no similar information could be found in any part of the report. This
approach has been used in prior studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Wallace, 1988; Wallace,
Naser, & Mora, 1994).
The employment of index numbers as a measure of the degree of voluntary disclosure
depends on the information items that are used as a basis of the calculation of the index
number. The voluntary information disclosure checklists admittedly do not include all of the
information disclosed by corporate management. However, these information disclosure
items do comprise the majority of the significant corporate information disclosures that
corporate managements are expected to disclose in their annual reports in order to meet the
information needs of different stakeholders. Thus, the use of index numbers can be
considered to be able to capture a large degree of corporate voluntary disclosure by the
sample companies. Such an approach is also consistent with prior studies (Aitken, Hooper, &
Pickering, 1997; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989, 1991; Firth, 1979; Hackston &
Mikie, 1996; Hossain, Perera, & Rahman, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et al, 1995;
Wallace & Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 1994).
3.5. Ownership structure variable—outside owners
While there is little or no information in the annual reports of the Hong Kong companies
about the number of shareholders, there is information about the proportion of shares owned
by directors and dominant shareholders, as this is a required disclosure by the SEHK. In
addition, the SEHK requires 25% or more of the issued share capital of listed companies to be
held by "unconnected persons" (those with no family relationships with members of a firm's
board of directors) and the general public (Phenix, 1994). On the other hand, the Stock
Exchange of Singapore (SES) requires only 10% to be held by "unconnected persons" and
the general public. The ownership variable in this study was calculated initially by adding
together the proportions of equity belonging to directors and to dominant shareholders to
arrive at the proportion of a firm's equity owned by insiders. This figure was then used to
derive the proportion of a firm's equity owned by outsiders (OOWN).
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3.4. Regression model
A linear multiple regression analysis was used to test the association between the
dependent variable of voluntary disclosure and the independent variable of ownership
structure. In addition to the ownership structure, a number of control variables are also
included in the model to test the hypotheses. These control variables have been commonly
used in prior disclosure research studies (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989, 1991;
Craswell & Taylor, 1992; Hossain et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996). The analysis of voluntary
disclosure was based on the following multiple regression model:
VOEXT = (3o + 3, SIZE + 32LEV + 33AUD + 34OOWN + 35PROF + 36MULT
where: VOEXT=extent of voluntary disclosure scores; 3o=regression intercept; SIZE^firm
size; LEV=leverage; AUD=size of auditors; OOWN^ownership structure; PROF=profit-
ability; MULT=multinationality; 3i^parameters to be estimated; /=1, . .
., 6.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample of Hong Kong and Singapore
companies in terms of the disclosure scores for 1997. For the Hong Kong companies, the
voluntary mean disclosure in 1997 varied from 9.77% in the case of financial information to
18.49% for strategic information, with nonfmancial information in between at 10.45%. The
overall mean disclosure in 1997 was 12.23%. Whereas for the Singapore companies, the
voluntary mean disclosure in 1997 varied from 10.68% for financial information to 16.76%
for nonfmancial information, with strategic information in between at 16.00%. The overall
mean disclosure in 1997 was at 13.83%. Table 1 shows that, with the exception of
nonfmancial information, the levels of voluntary disclosure for Hong Kong and Singapore
companies were relatively similar. The voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information,
however, appears to be a phenomenon particular to Singapore companies. This was
confirmed by ANOVA statistical tests for differences in disclosure between Hong Kong
and Singapore, where it was found that only in respect of nonfinancial information was the
difference significant.
Table 1 also provides information about the sample companies for Hong Kong and
Singapore in terms of the independent and control variables for 1997. Examination of Table 1
reveals that the Singapore companies were larger, on average, in terms of profitability and
sales than their Hong Kong counterparts. As regards leverage, auditor, ownership, and
multinationality, they did not differ substantially. However, an important finding concems the
ownership structure of the sample companies. As reflected in Table 1, the proportion of equity
owned by the external stakeholders compared with the insiders (directors and dominant
shareholders) of Hong Kong and Singapore companies in 1997 was 56.16% and 57.31%,
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Sample characteristics
Ownership
(external)
Mean S.D.
Sales
(HK$ million)
Mean S.D.
Leverage
Mean S.D.
Profitability
Mean S.D.
Auditor
Mean S.D.
Multinationality
Mean S.D.
HK 56.16 22.78 1683 1515 21.00 21.86 7.62 8.05 0.87 0.34 41.63 23.31
companies
Singapore 57.31 30.89 1703 2407 18.11 21.45 11.85 16.63 0.97 0.18 45.74 21.91
companies
Strategic
information
1997 (%)
Nonfinancial
information
1997 (%)
Financial
information
1997 (%)
Total
disclosures
1997 (%)
Disclosure scores—Hong Kong
Mean 18.49 10.45
S.D. 9.90 5.11
Minimum 3.80 3.10
Maximum 40.00 25.00
Source: HK Company Annual Reports for 1997
9.77
8.37
1.50
42.00
12.23
7.74
3.80
40.00
Disclosure scores-
Mean
S.D.
Minimum
Maximum
-Singapore
16.00
9.00
4.00
32.00
16.76
9.69
2.86
37.00
Source: Singapore Company Annual Reports for 1997
10.68
6.93
2.30
23.80
13.83
8.09
2.90
27.20
respectively. A further analysis of the biographical details of the directors of the Hong Kong
companies indicated the family relationships among the directors and senior management
staff (such family relationships are not required to be disclosed by Singapore listed
companies). Based on the family relationships, a further analysis of the shareholdings among
the family members revealed that more than half (35 firms accounting for 58% of the sample
companies) of the listed companies in Hong Kong were subject to family control (i.e., one
family group of shareholders owning 50% or more of the issued share capital).
4.2. Multivariate tests
As shown in Table 2, the multiple regression model for 1997 for Hong Kong companies
reported the F value of 5.401 (significant at the .001 level) for the level of overall
disclosure. The adjusted coefficient of determination (R^) for the level of overall disclosure
was 42.7%.
Similarly, the F value of Singapore companies in 1997 as shown in Table 3 was 17.057
(significant at the .001 level) for the level of overall disclosure. The R~ for the level of overall
disclosure in 1997 was 72.5% for Singapore companies.
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Table 2
Regression results—Hong Kong (1997)
Strategic Nonfinancial Financial Total
information information information disclosures
Adjusted R~ 0.225 0.322 0.350 0.427
F statistic 3.860** 3.807*** 4.184*** 5.401***
Significance 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
Intercept - (-0.857) - (0.225) - (-2.540) -(-2.331)
Variables:
00WN^ 0.464 (3.756)*** 0.599 (5.272)*** 0.613 (5.515)*** 0.556 (6.556)***
aud'' 0.121 (0.980) 0.122 (1.070) 0.130(1.166) 0.111 (1.058)
LEV-" 0.001 (0.008) 0.026 (0.210) -0.05 (-0.406) -0.103 (-0.895)
PROF*^ 0.182 (1.505) 0.098 (0.885) -0.027 (-0.248) 0.087 (0.850)
SALE" 0.171 (1.366) 0.007 (0.060) 0.220 (2.078)* 0.203 (1.915)*
MULT*' -0.026 (-0.026) 0.157 (1.345) 0.144 (1.258) 0.092 (0.853)
Industry
= 1 if electronics -0.276 (-1.881) -0.276 (-1.881) 0.149 (1.041) 0.091 (0.676)
and technology
= 1 if publishing -0.059 (-0.437) -0.059 (-0.437) 0.134(1.016) 0.148(1.188)
and printing
=1 if food -0.041 (-0.302) -0.041 (-0.302) 0.081 (0.608) 0.095 (0.763)
and beverage
= 1 if shipping -0.120 (-0.895) -0.120 (-0.895) 0.228 (1.736) 0.225 (1.818)
and transportation
The table shows standardized coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective independent variable in
the model.
^ Ratio of a firm's equity owTied by outsiders to all equity of the firms.
''
1 for Big 5 and for Non-Big 5.
'^ Long-term liabilities over shareholders' equity.
Income after tax, exceptional items, and extraordinary items over net sales.
" Natural logarithm of net sales.
^ Foreign sales by subsidiaries over total operations.
* Significant at .05.
** Significant at .01.
*** Significant at .001.
Thus, these mukiple regression models were highly significant and had an explanatory
power similar to those reported in earlier studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989, 1991). However,
there were some apparent differences in the explanatory power of the information types
between Hong Kong and Singapore companies as shown by the Fr. The amount of
explained variation in disclosure for Hong Kong companies in 1997 ranged from 22.50%
for strategic information to 35% for financial information, with nonfinancial information
in between at 32.2%. On the other hand, the amount of explained variation in disclosure
for Singapore companies in 1997 was higher ranging from 42.6% for strategic
information to 64.9% for financial information, with nonfinancial information in between
at 46%.
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Table 3
Regression results—Singapore (1997)
Strategic Nonfinancial Financial Total
information information information disclosures
Adjusted R' 0.426 0.460 0.649 0.725
F statistic 5.528*** 6.186*** 12.282*** 17.057***
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Intercept - (-1.762) - (-1.383) - (-0.540) -(-1.181)
Variables:
00WN" 0.454 (4.072)*** 0.487 (4.509)*** 0.794(9.117)*** 0.761 (9.858)***
AUD^ 0.121 (1.189) 0.131 (1.318) 0.074 (0.925) 0.025 (0.348)
LEV- 0.157 (1.382) 0.187(1.701) -0.035 (-0.395) -0.043 (-0.549)
PROF'^ 0.002 (0.023) 0.000 (0.002) -0.032 (-0.386) 0.029 (0.392)
SALE'' 0.301 (2.483)* 0.249 (2.348)* 0.055 (0.584) 0.107 (2.027)*
MULT*' -0.021 (0.189) 0.088 (0.821) 0.081 (0.934) 0.111 (1.449)
Industry
= 1 if electronics -0.061 (-0.395) -0.028 (-0.185) -0.189 (-1.576) -0.171 (-1.611)
and technology
= 1 if publishing 0.033 (0.271) 0.188 (1.577) -0.043 (-0.443) -0.006 (-0.069)
and printing
=1 if food 0.072 (0.517) 0.045 (0.331) -0.143 (-1.319) -0.090 (-0.933)
and beverage
=1 if shipping 0.021 (0.174) -0.019 (-0.161) -0.118 (-1.271) -0.058 (-0.711)
and transportation
The table shows standardized coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective independent variable in
the model.
^ Ratio of a firm's equity owned by outsiders to all equity of the firms.
•^
1 for Big 5 and for Non-Big 5.
'^ Long-term liabilities over shareholders' equity.
^ Income after tax, exceptional items, and extraordinary items over net sales.
^ Natural logarithm of net sales.
' Foreign sales by subsidiaries over total operations.
* Significant at .05.
** Significant at .01.
*** Significant at .001.
The use of this statistical tool is based on the assumptions of no significant multi-
collinearity between the explanatory variables, and conditions of linearity and normality.
Potential problems related to multicollinearity may be investigated by means of a correlation
matrix. The Pearson correlations generated by SPSS suggested that multicollinearity between
the explanatory variables was most unlikely to cause a serious problem in the interpretation
of the results of the multivariate analysis. In addition, another more formal method for
detecting multicollinearity involves the calculation of the variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF
measures the degree to which each explanatory variable is explained by the other
explanatory variables and "very large VIF values indicate high collinearity and a common
cutoff threshold is VIF values above 10" (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995, p. 127).
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VIF figures for all the independent variables were generated by SPSS and well below 10,
indicating that multicoUinearity did not exist in the multiple regression model. To test
whether the fundamental assumption of linearity in the multiple regression model is
appropriate, an analysis of the scatterplots should be examined. Analyses of the scatterplots
indicated that the assumption of linearity was approximately met. In addition, the normal
probability plot was also analyzed. The line representing the actual data distribution close-
ly follows the diagonal, indicating that the data set adheres approximately to the normal-
ity assumption.
The regression results on the association between ownership structure and the extent of
voluntary disclosure are discussed as follows:
4.2.1. Hong Kong
As shown in Table 2, the coefficients for ownership structure of the Hong Kong companies
were highly significant (P<.001), not only for total information but also for all of the
information subgroups. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 that there is a
positive association between wider ownership and the extent oj voluntary disclosure.
An analysis of the shareholdings among the family members of the Hong Kong sample
companies for 1997 reveals that more than half (35 firms accounting for 58% of the
sample companies) of the listed companies in Hong Kong are subject to family control. In
order to analyze the impact of family control on voluntary disclosures, another regression
model was run with the same variables as in Table 2, but with an added indicator variable
for family control. The coefficient on 00WN remains significantly positive, and the
coefficient on the proportion owned by family members was negative and statistically
significant (P<.05), not only for total information but also for all of the information
subgroups: strategic, financial, and nonfinancial. This indicates that while concentrated
ownership in general reduces disclosure, that effect is particularly pronounced when the
firm is family-controlled. Gray's (1988) secrecy hypothesis also argues that where a firm's
shares are held by family-controlled firms, there is a preference for confidentiality and
restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely
involved with its management and financing. Thus, the findings of this study support
Hypothesis 2 that there is a negative association between family ownership and volun-
tary disclosures.
In addition, we tested for the presence of nonlinear relationships. It has been suggested by
Lang and Lundholm (1993) that the nonparametric test (ranked regression) is a powerful
method for dealing with data sets with nonlinear relationships between dependent and
independent variables. The ranked regressions were thus conducted based on the procedure
suggested by Lang and Lundholm (p. 264). The results were similar to the regression analysis
based on unranked data. Ranked ownership was a significant predictor of the ranked
disclosure index.
It is also interesting to know the extent to which the relation is nonlinear because high
levels of ownership may be required to exercise the level of control necessary to affect
disclosure policy. Similarly, at small levels of ownership, block holders may not have the
ability to expropriate from the firm and may be less concerned about disclosure. Thus, the
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ownership variable was divided into quartiles (1-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, and 76-100%)
and further regressions were conducted on these four groups to test for the presence of a
nonlinear relationship. Overall, the regression results of the ownership variable based on
these four groups do not differ statistically from the results contained in Table 2, i.e., the
coefficient on OOWN remains significantly positive not only for total information but also
for all of the information subgroups for all quartiles. Further, F tests for differences in
coefficient estimates suggest that each increase is not statistically significant, indicating that
there is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure
regardless of the level of ownership.
4.2.2. Singapore
As shown in Table 3, the coefficients for ownership structure of the Singapore companies
were highly significant (P<.001), not only for total information but also for all of the
information subgroups. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2 that there is a
positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure.
To test for the presence of nonlinear relationships, ranked regressions and ownership
quartile regressions were conducted with similar results to those in Table 3, i.e., there was no
evidence of a nonlinear relationship.
While the Singapore situation seems likely to be similar to Hong Kong in terms of family
ownership and control, it was not possible to test this aspect further, owing to the lack of
information available. In contrast to Hong Kong, the SES does not require the disclosure of
family relationships among directors and senior management.
5. Conclusions
The results of this study of voluntary disclosure behavior by Hong Kong and Singapore
listed companies provide support for the agency theory-based hypothesis that there is a
positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The
empirical findings also highlight the importance of the contextual characteristics of Hong
Kong and Singapore. The strong prevalence of "insider" and family-controlled companies is
likely to be associated with lower levels of disclosure. This hypothesis is supported strongly
in the case of Hong Kong. However, in the case of Singapore, it was not possible to test for
this directly, owing to a lack of data, though indirect support is provided by the findings on
ownership in general.
Insider and family-controlled companies have little motivation to disclose information
in excess of mandatory requirements because the demand for public information
disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with that of companies with wider share
ownership. This structural feature of the Hong Kong and Singapore stock markets
provides a countervailing force to the growing pressures for internationalization and
global transparency. This is an important issue that needs to be factored into investor
decisions and accounting standards setting policy at both the national and internation-
al levels.
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Appendix A. Voluntary disclosure checklist—Hong Kong and Singapore
Voluntary in
Voluntary in Voluntary in both Hong Kong
Hong Kong Singapore and Singapore
(1) General corporate information
1
.
Brief history of company
2. Organizational structure
(2) Corporate strategy
1 Statement of strategy
and objectives
—
general
2. Statement of strategy
and objectives—financial
3. Statement of strategy
and objectives—marketing
4. Statement of strategy
and objectives—social
5. Impact of strategy on
current results
6. Impact of strategy on
future results
(3) Acquisitions and disposals
1 . Reasons for the X X X
acquisitions
2. Amount of goodwill X
on acquisition
3. Reasons for the disposals X X X
4. Amount of consideration X
realized fi-om the disposal
(4) Research and development (R&D)
1 . Description of R&D projects X X X
2. Corporate policy on R&D X X X
3. Location of R&D activities X X X
4. Number employed in R&D X X X
(5) Future prospects
1 . Statement of future X X X
prospects
—
qualitative
2. Qualitative forecast of sales X X X
3. Quantitative forecast of sales X X X
T.
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4. Qualitative forecast of profits
5. Quantitative forecast of profits
6. Description of capital
project committed
7. Committed expenditure
for capital projects
8. Qualitative forecast
of cash flows
9. Quantitative forecast
of cash flows
10. Assumptions underlying
the forecasts
1 1
.
Order book or
backlog information
(6) Information about directors
1. Age of the directors
2. Educational qualifications
3. Commercial experience of
the nonexecutive directors
4. Commercial experience of
the executive directors
5. Other directorships held by
nonexecutive directors
6. Other directorships held by
executive directors
7. Position or office held by
executive directors
(7) Employee information
1. Geographical distribution
of employees
2. Line-of-business distribution
of employees
3. Categories of employees by sex
4. Categories of employees by function
5. Identification of senior
management and their functions
6. Number of employees for 2
or more years
7. Reasons for changes in employee
numbers or categories over time
8. Share option schemes
—
policy
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9. Profit sharing schemes
—
pohcy X X X
10. Amount spent in training X X X
1 1 . Nature of training X X X
12. Policy on training X X X
13. Categories of employees trained X X X
14. Number of employees trained X X X
15. Welfare information X X X
16. Safety policy X X X
17. Data on accidents X X X
18. Cost of safety measures X X X
19. Policy on communication X X X
20. Redundancy information X X X
21. Equal opportunity X X X
policy statement
22. Recruitment problems X X X
and related policy
(8) Social policy and value-added information
1 . Safety of products X X X
2. Environmental protection X X X
programs
—
qualitative
3. Environmental protection X X X
programs
—
quantitative
4. Charitable donations X
5. Community programs X X X
6. Value-added statement X X X
7. Value-added data X X X
8. Value-added ratios X X X
9. Qualitative value-added information X X X
I
(9) Segmental information
1. Geographical capital
expenditure
—
quantitative
2. Geographical net
assets
—
quantitative
3. Geographical
production
—
quantitative
4. Line-of-business capital
expenditure
—
quantitative
5. Line-of-business net
assets
—
quantitative
6. Line-of-business
production
—
quantitative
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
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7. Competitor analysis
—
qualitative
8. Competitor analysis
—
quantitative
9. Market share analysis
—
qualitative
10. Market share analysis
—
quantitative
(10) Financial review
1. Profitability ratios
2. Qualitative comments on profitability
3. Cash flow statement—direct
4. Cash flow ratios
5. Liquidity ratios
6. Gearing ratios
7. Fixed asset revaluation within
the last 5 years
8. Disclosure of brand valuation
9. Disclosure of other intangible
valuations (except goodwill)
10. Dividend payout policy
1 1
.
Transfer pricing policy
12. Impact of any accounting
policy changes on results
13. Financial history or x x
summary—3 or more years
14. Financial history or x x
summary— 6 or more years
15. Restatement of financial x x
information to lASC
16. Off balance sheet x x
financing information
17. Advertising x x
information
—
qualitative
18. Advertising x x
expenditure
—
quantitative
19. Effects of inflation on x x
future operations
—
qualitative
20. Effects of inflation on x x
results
—
qualitative
2 1
.
Effects of inflation on x x
results
—
quantitative
22. Effects of inflation on x x
assets
—
qualitative
23. Effects of inflation on x x
assets
—
quantitative
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24. Effects of interest x x x
rates on results
25. Effects of interest rates x x x
on future operations
(11) Foreign currency information
1 . Effects of foreign currency X X X
fluctuations on future
operations
—
qualitative
2. Effects of foreign currency X X X
fluctuations on current
results
—
qualitative
3. Major exchange rates used X X X
in the accounts
4. Long-term debt by currency X X X
5. Short-term debt by currency X X X
6. Foreign currency exposure X X X
management description
(12) Stock price information
1 . Share price at year end X X X
2. Share price trend X X X
3. Market capitalization at year end X X X
4. Market capitalization trend X X X
5. Size of shareholdings X
6. Type of shareholder X
7. Foreign stock market X X X
1 listing information
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Book reviews
International Accounting: A Global Perspective
By M. Zafar Iqbal, South-Westem College Publishing, Cincinnati, Ohio, second edition,
2002, xxii+546 pp.
Of immediate note is that the authorship of the second edition has dramatically changed.
Instead of a triauthored text, only the primary author of the first edition authors this version.
In the preface (p. iii), he states, "the second edition is completely rewritten to streamline
presentation of the material. Many numerical examples have been added within the chapter
texts. End-of-chapter problems and cases have been greatly expanded."
Initially, I expected the streamlined version to be shorter and perhaps to provide less
coverage than the first edition. Surprisingly, most of the text and student materials at the
end of each chapter are identical to the previous version. However, modest enhancements
and restructuring of the material have been undertaken. Previously, the text was comprised
of 14 chapters, while the current version contains only 12. Examples and references have
been updated throughout, and some changes have been made in the examples to reflect
more recent events. The major "streamlining" appears to be removal of the topical
discussion for 11 selected countries throughout the text, as well as combining the
discussion of standard setting in selected nations with the discussion of harmonization.
This edition includes a discussion of accounting in five nations with diverse accounting
systems, namely, Brazil, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the US in only two chapters
(Chapters 6 and 11).
In the current version, the author has reordered the chapters with mixed success.
Following the introductory chapter, students are plunged into the two most difficult and
technical topics in international accounting: foreign currency, including limited discussion
of foreign exchange risk management, moved from Chapter 9 (now Chapter 2), and
accounting for changing prices (Chapter 3). Thereafter, the text presents cultural influences
on accounting (Chapter 4), which is a fundamental issue in international accounting and is
perhaps better grouped with overview and introductory materials. Chapters 5 and 6 address
accounting measurement and disclosures, and disclosure diversity and harmonization,
respectively. Chapter 7 provides good closure on external financial reporting issues through
its focus on international financial statement analysis. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 retain the
strong emphasis on managerial accounting found in the previous version. Chapter 11
focuses on internal and external auditing issues, and Chapter 12 deals with the emerging
world economy.
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Each chapter now begins with a set of learning objectives and an introductory overview
paragraph, correcting deficiencies noted by McKinnon (1998, p. 669). The development of a
chapter on cultural influences on accounting, a topic that had been summarily discussed in
one page in the first edition (Chapter 4), is an improvement that will aid students in gaining a
fundamental understanding of intemational accounting. The revised Chapter 5 provides both
a general overview of disclosure topics, such as social disclosure and voluntary disclosure, as
well as a discussion of specific issues, including consolidation, leases, goodwill, which is an
improvement over the previous edition's separation of those topics. Chapter 6 provides an
overview of standard setting in the five abovementioned nations, coupled with a disappoint-
ing discussion of the lASB (formerly lASC). While fleetingly mentioning IOSCO and its
formal acceptance of lASC standards, the text fails to provide an adequate discussion of the
issues surrounding adoption of intemational standards in some nations (e.g., the US), its
prevalence in other nations as an acceptable basis of presentation, and the current status of the
lASB. Brief discussions of EVA and return on equity have been added to Strategic Plarming
and Control (Chapter 8). Chapter 12 presents a good general discussion of issues in emerging
economies. It represents a consolidation of general topics covered in two chapters in the first
edition but omits specific discussion of any nations. As a result, the accounting focus in this
text is much more general and focused on industrialized nations than its predecessor.
To tie the text to the Intemet, Web sites are provided within the text and a Web index has
been added following the subject index. Because Web sites often change, an index can
quickly become outdated. This concern has been mitigated by limiting the entries in the index
to prominent entities (e.g., IOSCO, the US SEC, the European Union) and selected
established intemational press and data sites (e.g., the interactive Wall Street Journal, the
Financial Times, Afiica News Online, and Hoover's Online). As with the reference lists at the
end of each chapter, this index will also require careful updating in future versions to ensure
that Web sites are correct at the time of publication.
Student materials at the end of each chapter consist of questions, exercises and problems,
and cases. In some chapters, a few questions have been added or replaced, while in others,
they are identical to, or a subset of, those from the previous edition. Names, amounts, and
even the order of exercises and problems have often been changed, but almost all of the
problems have been carried forward from the previous edition. The cases have not
changed significantly either. With the exception of the newly included Chapter 4, I did
not find significant additions to the student materials provided in this edition.
Overall, the text is highly readable and, with the exception of the placement of the
technical topics, well designed. Chapter placement, in itself, creates no major barrier to
adoption, because instmctors can rearrange chapters according to personal preference
without loss of necessary prerequisite information. With the caveat that instmctors will
need to augment the harmonization discussion with extemal materials, I believe that this
text can be easily adapted to a wide variety of courses and instmctor teaching styles.
Even students with a modest knowledge of accounting will gain a good general
introduction to issues in intemational accounting. In particular, I would recommend this
text for undergraduate intemational accounting courses taught to students from all
business disciplines.
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Financial Accounting, An International Introduction
By David Alexander and Christopher Nobes, Pearson Education, Harlow, Essex, England,
2001, xvii+456 pp.
Alexander and Nobes' introductory textbook in financial accounting is not based on any
specific national regulatory fi^amework. histead. International Accounting Standards (lASs)
are used as the point of reference for the text. In the cases where the authors refer to a
regulatory fi^amework, the regulation of the European Union (EU) is used.
The book is intended to be useful as the main textbook in introductory financial accounting
courses throughout the EU, as well as in internationally oriented courses in the rest of the
world. These courses may be either at the undergraduate or the graduate (MBA) levels.
The book is divided into three main parts. The first part covers the context of accounting,
including such areas as the reasons for having accounting, an overview of the primary
financial statements, accounting frameworks and concepts, the regulation of accounting, and
international diversity and harmonization. There is a section on the basics of double-entry
bookkeeping, as well as a discussion of financial statement analysis, that is, common ratios
based on financial statement data.
The second part contains many of the financial reporting issues that are commonly
discussed. This includes areas such as fixed assets (both tangible and intangible), inventories,
financial assets and liabilities, income taxes, cash flow statements, consolidation, and foreign
currencies. A relatively broad range of financial reporting issues are covered in the book. In
addition. Part 2 has two chapters of a more theoretical nature, where recognition, measure-
ment, and the effects of changing prices are discussed.
Part 3 is rather compact, containing only two chapters that discuss how to use accounting
data for analysis. The first chapter covers how accounting may be used in stock market
valuation, and the second covers specific difficulties that may arise in international
comparisons between companies. Furthermore, the authors have included outlines of both
the EU's Fourth Directive and LASs in appendices.
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As indicated by the overview provided above, the book is rather wide in its scope. Many
different issues are included. Most of these are useful to students in an introductory level
course, but there are some that are of less interest. Chapters 4 and 5 cover accounting
regulation, international diversity, and harmonization. The sections on regulation and
harmonization are kept suitably short. However, there is too much emphasis on international
diversity, given that this is not a book on international accounting. Rather, it is an
international introductory accounting book. Thus, the inclusion of Chapter 18, which covers
problems encountered when comparing and analyzing companies from different countries,
could also be questioned.
A further issue concerns the level of theory to be included in an introductory textbook. For
example. Chapter 16, on accounting for price changes, is mostly of theoretical interest. This
comment is predicated on the assumption that inflation accounting is not used, or not likely to
be used in the near fiiture, and thus has little practical relevance.
It is obvious that the authors are very much up to date on current issues in accounting. For
example. Chapter 9 starts with a distinction between tangible and intangible fixed assets and a
summary of the current discussion about the increased importance of intangible assets.
Similarly, Chapter 1 1 , on financial assets and liabilities, is also up to date in its coverage of
the latest developments in that area. This feature of the book is most useful.
The appendices, which include a glossary, summaries of EU's Fourth Directive and lASs,
and answers to exercises, are helpful for students.
The overall structure of the book is well planned. As noted above, it is divided into three
parts, beginning with the context of accounting, continuing with accounting issues, and
ending with analysis of accounting. However, one could question the reasoning behind the
structure in some cases. For instance. Chapter 7 (included in Part 1) is about financial
statement analysis through ratios, and it is closely related to Part 3.
The book is very well written in the sense that it is written in a way that makes it easy for
students to understand. For being an introductory book in financial accounting, the theoretical
level is relatively high. The authors have chosen not to focus very much on the structure of
the double-entry bookkeeping system. There is a brief discussion on this, but it is far from the
focus of the book. As the discussion in the book is advanced per se, it may be difficuU for
entry-level students to grasp the content, in spite of the clarity of the language used. Thus, the
assistance of the professor is clearly needed. It is not a self-study book.
Not only is the book relatively advanced conceptually, it also covers more issues than are
normally found in an introductory level textbook. By necessity, some of these issues are
covered rather briefly. If students are expected to intemalize all of this, they will need a long
course, and help from the professor
Some of the central issues in accounting are explained in a way that is very easy to grasp.
A good example is found on page 280, under the heading 'Why it matters', where the role of
judgments in accounting is linked to the usefulness of the cash flow statement.
This leads into the pedagogical features of the book. Every chapter starts with learning
objectives. Quite often in the text, there are notes on 'Why it matters', that is, why a certain
accounting issue is important and relevant. This feature is most useful, as entry-level students
might have difficulty understanding the relevance of what they learn. There are also
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suggested activities and self-assessment questions. All these pedagogical features are useful
as aids in the learning process of students.
An interesting issue with a book of this nature is whether higher education in accounting is
ready for textbooks that are not set in any particular national context. lASs are used as the
point of reference, and it is true that LASs are useful for listed companies in most of Europe.
However, there are a lot of companies that neither are listed nor are following LASs. Students
should be prepared to deal with those companies, too. A further potential complication for
students who are not native English speakers could be the English language itself, as the
authors point out in Chapter 1 (page 9).
All of this might not be a problem if the book is accompanied with national teaching
material in the courses where it is used. Most importantly, the authors have succeeded in
removing the national context, and they have created a truly international textbook. Thus, the
book is ideal for courses with a mix of students from different countries.
hi summary, this is a unique book, which is not like any of its competitors. It is an
introductory financial accounting textbook with a relatively high theoretical level and
coverage of a wide range of issues. Each topic covered is very clearly explained. The book
is highly up to date. However, for those looking for in-depth coverage of specific issues, or
more technically oriented teaching material, this book will need to be supplemented.
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Abstract
This study quantifies the current level of diversity observed in airline accounting and examines
possible determinants that explain accounting-policy choices by the global airline industry. Airlines'
accounting-measurement policy for unrealized foreign-exchange differences and their disclosure of
frequent-flyer information remains diverse. Inferential statistics shows that larger airlines tend to take
unrealized foreign-exchange differences directly to equity and tend to disclose frequent-flyer
accounting policy, while airlines with lower leverage tend to disclose frequent-flyer accounting.
© 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: International accounting; Accounting-policy choice; Determinants; Airline industry; Measurement and
disclosure practices
1. Introduction
The worldwide disparity in accounting practices is a large impediment to the growing trend
in internationalization of corporate activities and the growing globalization of business and
capital markets (International Accounting Standards Committee [lASC], 2000). Within the
international business community, there is a call for accounting information to converge
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61-8-9360-6205; fax: +61-8-9310-5004.
E-mail address: c.tan(^murdoch.edu.au (C.W. Tan).
' Tel.: +61-8-9360-2419; fax: +61-8-9360-6332.
0020-7063/02/$ - see front matter © 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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(Purvis, Gemon, & Diamond, 1991). The airline industry, an important industry with unique
characteristics, is no exception (Feldman, 1992). Greater interest in mergers and alliances
within the airline industry and greater scrutiny by the financial community means that the
disparity in airline accounting practices can be troublesome as airlines are being forced onto
international capital markets in search of funds (KPMG, 1992).
Sampson (1984, p. 19) wrote, "The airlines, as they changed the shape of the world,
were also locked into the ambitions of nations. They provide a kind of visual projection of
changes on earth—the shifting political balances of power and wealth, the swings of
economic beliefs, the technological developments coming up against political deadlocks
and reactions." These two sentences best capture the essence of the global airline industry,
which today is one of the world's largest industries with over 300" international and
regional airline companies based in over 137 countries. It is also a high-profile industry that
commands substantial media attention whenever anything goes wrong, for example, the
health issue, aptly named the "economy class syndrome," for passengers on long-haul
flights.
In 1997, 1.4 billion passengers were carried by the world's airlines resulting in operating
profits of US$16.5 billion on US$291 billion of revenues (Aviation Information and
Research, 1998b). This industry's average growth rate is estimated at 5.5% per annum, over
the next 5 years (Aviation Information and Research, 1998a). Airlines are typically in
monopoly or oligopoly arrangements. This gives them additional power and size to have a
large impact on a country's economy (Nunes, Farago, & Travis, 1997). Furthermore, airline
operations span the world but they are not truly multinational. This industry also has a
dependence on expensive technology that will cost airlines an estimated US$1000 billion in
the next 20 years (Boeing, 1996).
Recently, methods of airline financial reporting and disclosure became a matter of
greater importance as an airline's real financial stature began to play a lead role in
strategic decisions, especially in light of the growth experienced by the industry together
with the growing trend of forming airline alliances. A survey of the airline industry in
1992 found that the substance of airline financial statements varied significantly fi"om
country to country and even between airlines operating within the same country, due to
the differing accounting policies used. This led to the promulgation of six airline
accounting guidelines (AAGs) as industry-specific guidance to the accounting methods
available for dealing with particular issues between the periods of 1993-1996 by the
International Air Transport Association's (lATA) Accounting Policy Task Force (lATA &
KPMG, 1994b).
The first phase of this study looks at the current level of diversity observed in the airline
industry with regard to the key accounting issues identified in the survey. Phase II analyzes
areas of ongoing diversity by exploring detennining factors that may influence airlines'
choice for certain accounting practices addressed in the IATA and KPMG's accounting
^ Two hundred and sixty are members of the International Air Transport Association (lATA), a body that
oversees and represents the airhne industry (hitemational Air Transport Association (lATA), 1997).
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guidelines. Costly contracting theory forms the underlying theoretical framework for this
study. The relevant research questions pertaining to this study are:
1
.
What is the current level of diversity in airline reporting on key accounting practices?
2. What factors help explain the choice of key accounting practices for airline companies?
This research study is important for several reasons. First, this study provides insights into
H^ otithe diversity of accounting practices and examines factors that may explain the differences
'k that are observed. Second, financiers are placing greater emphasis on airline financial
statements in their evaluation of frinding proposals, which are impaired by the disparity in
accounting practices (lATA & KPMG, 1994b). National aviation authorities also need
comparable financial information to be able to draw clear comparisons between airlines
financial accounts to assess their financial fitness before approving landing rights and airport
slot applications (lATA & KPMG, 1994b). Third, the diversity of airline accounting practices
was such a major problem that the lATA in association with KPMG created an Accounting
Policy Task Force to establish greater consistency in airline financial reporting. The
collaboration brought about six AAGs. Such comprehensive attempts at self-regulation point
to the priority given by the airline industry to this issue. This study examines the extent to
which accounting practices have become more consistent after these self-imposed guidelines
were introduced. Fourth, this study is an intra-industry study with a sole focus on airlines.
Any variability due to an industry factor is removed, thus, resulting in a more powerful
analysis (Chong, Tower, & Taplin, 2000). Finally, this study empirically examines explan-
atory factors for accounting-policy choice at a global level, an area virtually ignored in the
past literature. An understanding of how cultural factors, institutional structure, and the
external environment affect cross-national accounting diversity is useful in international
accounting harmonization efforts (Doupnik & Salter, 1995).
2. Phase I: disparity in airline accounting
KPMG and lATA's (1992) survey of airlines' annual reports found great diversity in the
accounting policies adopted, making the comparison of airlines' financial accounts difficult
for users. The lATA Accounting Policy Task Force was established to identify the areas of
accounting that are potentially contentious or were causing divergence within the industry. As
a resuh of the task force's efforts, six AAGs—addressing the issues of accounting for
unrealized foreign-exchange differences resulting from the translation of long-term foreign
currency borrowings, frequent-flyer liabilities, fleet depreciation, revenue recognition,
maintenance costs, and lease accounting—were issued between 1994 and 1997.
2.1. Unrealizedforeign-exchange differences
The conversion of foreign-currency balances is a major issue for most airlines. As the
operations of the global airline industry involve numerous foreign-currency inflows with
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expenditure often substantially denominated in US dollars, the treatment of exchange differ-
ences as a result of such conversions are of critical importance (KPMG, 1992). Volatility in
foreign-exchange markets will cause substantial fluctuation in reported results. The most
notable diversity is in relation to the method of recognition of unrealized exchange differences
arising from the translation offoreign currency long-term monetary liabilities (lATA & KPMG,
1994a). The tvvo basic approaches used by airlines are immediate recognition of unrealized
differences in the profit and loss account and the direct-to-equity approach.
This diversity is addressed in AAG I: Translation of Long-Term Foreign Currency
Borrowings promulgated in 1994. AAG 1 states that unrealized foreign-exchange differences
should be recognized immediately through the profit and loss account consistent with
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 21: The Effects of Changes in Foreign-Exchange
Rates (IAS 21 refers to such conversions as foreign-currency transactions not translations).
The AAG guideline recommends that airlines provide a comprehensive explanation of the
accounting policy being applied, as well as making clear the effect of that policy on the profit
and loss account and the balance sheet.
2.2. Frequent-flyer liabilities
Frequent-flyer programmes have been introduced by many international airlines since the
1980s, principally to induce higher levels of repeat business from premium-fare traffic and to
foster customer loyalty (Gallacher, 1997). The basic concept of this frequent-flyer programme
is to reward passengers based on the frequency of fravel on sponsoring airlines. Airlines are
becoming more concerned about the impact of frequent-flyer programmes on their financial
statements (Bowman, 1995). Frequent-flyer programmes are "one part ticking time bomb to
one part invaluable marketing tool;" they are a mounting cost which many airlines are
attempting to minimize but are they definitely here to stay (Bowman, 1995, p. 23).
Accounting for frequent-flyer liabilities in the form of the commitment to give frequent-
flyer benefits to customers are hard to quantify with precision. AAG 2: Frequent-Flyer
Programme Accounting identified three methods that have been used by airlines; the
contingent-liability method, incremental-cost method, and deferred-revenue approach. The
contingent-liability method freats frequent-flyer liabilities as an obligation that is only
payable contingent upon a future event (in this case, the redemption of frequent-flyer awards)
and, therefore, is deemed inappropriate because it effectively excludes the amount of
frequent-flyer liability from the balance sheet. The incremental-cost method is recommended;
wherein a provision is made in the balance sheet for the incremental or marginal costs
associated with the expected redemption of frequent-flyer points (Bowman, 1995). Con-
versely, the deferred-revenue approach entails the deferral of revenue generated from the sale
of tickets conferring frequent-flyer points (lATA & KPMG, 1995).
2.3. Aircraft depreciation
Depreciation is another important accounting issue in this highly capital-intensive industry.
The KPMG and lATA's (1992) survey found extensive diversity in the methods used for
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depreciation. Asian airlines adopted relatively conservative depreciation policies that charged
double the annual depreciation rate of the European or North American airlines even though
their fleets were generally younger. There are also movements towards differentiated
depreciation between new technology aircraft and those in earlier series. The two most
commonly used methods of calculating depreciation are the straight-line method, based on
estimated useful life, and units of output depreciation based on actual aircraft usage. The latter
is believed to be adopted to smooth the impact of depreciation charges on the profit and loss
account (KPMG, 1992). AAG 3: Components of Fleet Acquisition Cost and Associated
Depreciation (lATA & KPMG, 1 996a) recommends the use of the straight-line method.
2.4. Revenue recognition
Revenue in the airline industry comprises tumover fi^om the transportation of passengers
and cargo, as well as fi-om the provision of other services. The basic principle that revenue
should only be recognized when transportation is provided is well established, reflecting the
application of the accruals basis. However, the treatment of commissions, discounts, and the
recognition of unredeemed tickets varied widely between airlines (lATA & KPMG, 1996b).
Differing accounting treatment of revenue-related issues and insufficient disclosure made
comparison of the airline's financial performance difficult. AAG 4: Recognition of Revenue
issued in 1996 stated that the accrual principle should be adopted for the recognition of
revenue consistent with IAS 18: Revenue.
2.5. Maintenance costs
Expenditure on fleet maintenance in relation to both owned and leased assets is an
important component of operating costs for all airlines. Airlines have different maintenance
regimes depending on the age and type of aircraft in addition to the requirements of aviation
regulatory authorities and manufacturers' specifications (lATA & KPMG, 1996c). The two
main methods adopted were expensing the cost as a period expense and capitalizing the cost
and then amortizing it to the profit and loss account over the period until the next scheduled
maintenance. The Accounting Policy Task Force advocates that the accounting policy
employed should ensure that costs are expensed to the profit and loss account in a manner
that fulfils the matching concept. The use of a provision account for maintenance is not
consistent with the recently issued IAS 37: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent
Assets.
2.6. Lease accounting
Lease finance is a significant source of funding in this capital-intensive industry,
particularly in relation to fleet assets. The use of leasing as a source of finance has increased
dramatically because of its flexibility in tax planning and capital structuring. From an
accounting perspective, the most fundamental issue arising from lease financing is whether a
lease is treated as an operating lease or a finance lease. Whether it is on or off balance sheet
II
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Table 1
Current level of uniformity in airline accounting
Uniformity' in measurement Level of disclosure
Unrealized Dnerse (54" —immediate recognition) Uniform (92% disclosed)
foreign-exchange
differences
Frequent-flyer Uniform {93°o—incremental cost) Diverse (38% disclosed)
liabilities
Aircraft depreciation Unifomi (96''/o—straight-line) Uniform (100% disclosed)
Revenue recognition Uniform (100%—accrual basis) Uniform (100% disclosed)
Maintenance cost Uniform (^9%—period expense) Uniform (100% disclosed)
Lease accounting Di\erse (60° had both operating
and finance leases)
Uniform (90% disclosed dollar
values for leases)
has consequent implications for financial analysis, for example, the computation of the debt-
to-equit>' ratio (KPMG, 1992). Essentially, AAG 6: Accounting for Leases ofAircraft Fleet
Assets recommends that finance leases be brought onto the balance sheet and treated as
purchased assets, while operating leases only give rise to lease rentals that are charged to the
profit and loss statement evenly over the lease term (LATA & KPMG, 1997). This approach is
consistent with lASC's IAS 17: Leases. The major concern is related to the inclination of
airline companies to structure their lease agreements strategically to avoid requirements for
recognizing additional liabilities on the balance sheet.
The abo\'e issues were identified as prime areas of diversity in global airlines' financial
reporting, warranting the issuance of six AAGs fi^om 1992 to 1996. Phase I of the study
examines the current level of diversity in airline reporting on these key accounting practices
from both a measurement and disclosure perspective. The level of uniformity observed in the
airline sample is depicted in Table 1.
From a measurement perspective, airlines" accounting policy for aircraft depreciation and
re\enue recognition are highly uniform. All but three airlines (96%) are depreciating aircraft
using the straight-line method while 100°o of the airlines recognize revenue on an accrual-
accounting basis. In terms of disclosure, the major problem area is the disclosure of fre-
quent-flyer accounting policy, with only 30 airlines (38%) having the relevant disclosure.
Twenty-eight airlines (93%) used the incremental-cost method, while the other two used the
deferred-revenue approach. The treatment of maintenance cost is reasonably unifonn with
89% recognizing it as a period expense (11% used the capitalize-and-amortize method).
Airlines" accounting policy for unrealized foreign-exchange differences is more diverse. Of
those airlines that disclosed their accounting policy for unrealized foreign-exchange differ-
ences, 43 (67%) immediately recognize the gain or loss in the profit and loss statement,
while the rest take them direct to equity. Finally, with respect to lease accounting,' 9% had
finance leases only, 31% used only operating leases, but 60% of the airlines have a mixture
of both operating and finance leases.
" The lack of information about the details of the lease contracts entered into by the airlines deters the flirther
examination of true differences in accounting policies adopted.
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Table 2
Measurement comparison of the results of Phase I with results of the 1 992 survey
Accounting practice Accounting policy choice 1992 survey 1999 Phase I
(%) (%)
Unrealized foreign-exchange
differences
Frequent-flyer liabilities
Aircraft depreciation
Revenue recognition
Maintenance costs
Lease accounting is not reported further due to insufficient and inconsistent disclosure.
In relation to disclosure, all airlines provided information on their accounting policy for
aircraft depreciation, revenue recognition, and maintenance cost. Seven airlines (8%) did not
disclose their accounting policy for unrealized foreign-exchange differences, while various
types of information are disclosed concerning lease commitments. Most airlines (90%)
disclose the monetary values for both operating and finance lease commitments, but five
airlines gave only the number of planes under each type of lease. "^ Disclosure on frequent-
flyer accounting is the most problematic with only 38% of airlines with frequent-flyer
programmes providing this information.
There seems to be a high level of uniformity in measurement practices now (frequent-flyer
accounting, aircraft depreciation, revenue recognition, and maintenance cost" ) as compared to
when the survey was conducted in 1992 (see Table 2). The implications of the trend towards
higher disclosure are discussed in Section 8.
As shown in Table 1, only three areas remain diverse and warrants flirther examination;
the accounting for unrealized foreign-exchange differences, the accounting for leases, and
the disclosure of frequent-flyer liability accounting policy. However, the lack of disclosure
on the details of lease arrangements meant that an examination into the appropriateness of
Immediate recognition 47.8 67.2
Direct-to-equity 26.1 32.8
Other 26.1 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Incremental cost 55.0 93.3
Other 45.0 6.7
Total 100.0 100.0
Straight-line method 91.6 96.3
Other 8.4 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0
Accrual accounting basis 100.0 100.0
Other 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Period expense 100.0 88.8
Capital and amortize 0.0 11.3
Total 100.0 100.0
'* Further examination of the 10 airlines that disclosed both number and currency amounts showed that the
ratios calculated using either type of information are virtually identical. The proportion of operating leases based
on the number of airplanes or the currency amounts are very highly correlated (/?=.996, P-wa\ue=.000) and, thus,
comparable.
"^
Statistical analyses conducted on the partial diversity noted in the measurement of maintenance cost revealed
that all the independent variables were statistically insignificant in relation to the accounting-policy choice for
maintenance cost.
284 C W. Tan et al / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 277-299
the classification of leases was not possible. For example, the proposer lease classification
(operating versus financing) could not normally be determined nor could the effect of
different choices be calculated from the financial statements. Therefore, only the other two
issues (i.e., accounting for unrealized exchange differences and the disclosure of frequent-
flyer accounting policy) are further examined in the next phase of this study.
3. Determinants of accounting policies
3.1. Costly contracting theory
The second phase of this study uses the costly contracting theoretical framework of Watts
and Zimmerman (1986) to examine possible determinants of airlines' accounting practices for
the two areas of diversity (unrealized exchange differences and the disclosure of frequent-
flyer accounting policy). Costly contracting theory is founded on the notion that accounting-
policy choices have economic consequences, if changes in the rules used to calculate
accounting numbers change the distribution of a firm's cash flows (Holthausen & Leftwich,
1983). This theory states that the firm exists as a legal nexus of contractual relationships and
managers would choose policies that serve their best interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Consequently, their choices are not always in the best interests of the shareholders, giving rise
to agency costs between managers (the agents) and stakeholders (the principals).
Agency costs refers to the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the
principal due to the divergence of their individual interests (Godfrey, Hodgson, & Holmes,
1994). These costs include contracting and monitoring costs incurred to reduce or eliminate
the effects of adverse selection on behalf of the agents (Jones, 1995). The presence of
contracting and monitoring costs (i.e., the costs of designing, negotiating, and evaluating
compliance), for example, management compensation and lending confracts as a result of
contractual agreements in the real world, is readily conceded (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983).
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) propose three hypotheses of costly contracting theory
to explain the actions of agents (managers); the political-cost hypothesis, the bonus-plan
hypothesis, and the debt-equity hypothesis. The political-cost hypothesis stipulates that the
larger the firm, the more politically visible it is (Cahan, 1992). This means that the larger the
firm, the more likely the managers of these firms would use income-reducing accounting
policies to avoid unfavourable political exposure. The bonus-plan hypothesis postulates that
managers would choose income-maximizing accounting policies if their remuneration is
dependent upon accounting income (Healy, 1985). Finally, the debt-equity hypothesis
proposes that the closer a firm gets to a breach of a debt covenant, the greater the incentive
to adopt income-maximizing accounting policies in order to avoid violating existing
conditions agreed upon in the covenants (Press & Weintrop, 1990).
Costly contracting theory provides a powerful theoretical framework for analyzing the
behavior of managers based on the assumption of the "rational economic man" as readily
evidenced in the real world (Locke & Tower, 1995). Fig. 1 shows the conceptual schema of
this study with the costly contracting theory as the underlying theoretical perspective.
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Determinants of Airline Accounting Practices
Independent Variables
Coiintr\ Cluster
Company Size
Profitability
Leverage
H, & H.
H: & H„
H;, & H7
H4&HS
Dependent Variables
Measurement:
1. Unrealized Foreign-
exchange Differences
Disclosure:
2. Frequent-flyer
Accounting
3.2. Hypotheses development
Fig. 1. Conceptual schema.
Two sets of hypotheses are developed, one for the measurement of unreaHzed foreign-
exchange differences and another for the disclosure of frequent-flyer accounting policy using
costly contracting theory to examine economic drivers and country cluster as a proxy for
country effects. Consistent with past costly contracting theory, size, and profitability are used
as measures of political visibility and leverage as the link to the debt-equity hypothesis.
Country cluster is examined as an exploratory variable as a surrogate measure of a country's
accounting regulatory system and the sophistication of capital markets.
3.2.1. Measurement
This subsection deals with the development of hypotheses in relation to airline's
accounting-measurement policy choices.
Empirical international accounting research has indicated that the country within which the
company reports affects the financial-reporting system (e.g., Craig & Diga, 1998; Guthrie &
Parker, 1990). Country cluster is similar in concept to country of origin except that it refers to
a group of countries that are similar in terms of possible external factors (Nobes, 1992, 1998).
For example, countries with a tradition of codified Roman law accounting systems tend to be
detailed and comprehensive (Mueller, Gemon, & Meek, 1994). Therefore, airlines originating
fi'om countries that belong to the same cluster^ are expected to adopt similar accounting-
policy choices. Following this, the resulting hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Airlines in the same country cluster will tend to adopt the same ac-
counting-policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
Using various organizational attributes as measures of political visibility and breach of
debt covenant (see, for example, Craig & Diga, 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995), many costly
^ Airlines are typically in monopoly or oligopoly arrangements (the 80 airlines in the sample originated from
52 countries for an average of 1.5 airlines from each country). Therefore, companies classified by country of
origin will not provide sufficient cell sizes for statistical purposes.
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contracting studies concluded that management's choice of accounting practices is influenced
by economic factors. In this study, company size and profitability are used as measures of
political visibility and leverage is used as the approximation of a breach of debt covenants.
Company size is seen as a proxy for corporate attributes such as political visibility, lower
information-production costs, and competitive advantage (Ball & Foster, 1982; Leftwich,
Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981). A firm's reported accounting numbers potentially affects the
extent to which it is criticized or supported, with subsequent economic consequences, for
example, additional taxes. As a firm grows in size, it may be subject to increased regulatory
or political scrutiny. Therefore, the level of political visibility of airlines is expected to
influence accounting-policy choices. The second hypothesis'' is:
Hypothesis 2: There is an association between company size and airlines' accounting-
policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
Profitability is a performance-related variable of interest to financial-report users (Wallace,
Naser, & Mora, 1994). Costly contracting theory argues that firms making unusually high
profits (i.e., more politically visible) may be subject to increased regulatory scrutiny such that
firms choose to adopt accounting policies that will reduce reported earnings (Hagerman &
Zmijeski, 1979; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983). Chong et al. (2000) found profitability to be a
significant predictor of accounting-measurement practices. To determine the impact of an
airline company's profitability on its accounting policies, the following hypothesis is
developed:
Hypothesis 3: There is an association between profitability and airlines' accounting-
policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
Leverage represents the proportion of a company's assets that are financed by debt. High
leverage ratios indicate that the company uses assets that are mainly financed by creditors.
These creditors in turn use debt covenants and restrictions on the borrowing company to
reduce management's ability to transfer wealth between debt and equity holders (Daley &
Vigeland, 1983). Firms with higher leverage are closer to technical default on their covenants
and this motivates the adoption of accounting policies that maximize net income (Lilien &
Pastena, 1982). This is an important issue given the tendency of airlines to have high debt
levels. Past research found leverage to be correlated with accounting policies that maximizes
income (Christie & Lefhvich, 1990; Lemke & Page, 1992; Lilien & Pastena, 1982).
Therefore, it is hypothesized that the degree of leverage of an airline influences account-
ing-measurement practices. The resulting hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4: There is an association between leverage and airlines' accounting-policy
choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
Hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 are nondirectional because the effects of the different accounting poHcies on
accounting income cannot be quantified. Unreahzed gains and losses are reported in aggregate, therefore, there is
insufficient data to determine directionahty (the final effect could be an increase or decrease in income).
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3.2.2. Disclosure
The following details the development of the hypotheses to test airlines' disclosure practice
in terms of frequent-flyer accounting.
In relation to Nobes' (1998) concept of country cluster, the corollary is that countries with
similar cultures and environments should have similar accounting systems and thus, similar
accounting practices. It is argued that countries in a particular cluster adopt similar accounting
practices and are subject to similar external factors because they have similar background
features like laws and company structures (Nobes, 1992). For example, the United States and
Canada would have more investor-oriented disclosures while countries in the European
cluster are more likely to be more legalistic and secretive in what they disclose. It is therefore
postulated that airlines from the same country cluster will tend to provide similar accounting
disclosure.
Hypothesis 5: Airlines in the same country cluster will tend to provide the same level of
frequent-flyer accounting-policy disclosure.
Foster (1986) noted that firm size is the variable most consistently reported as significant in
studies examining differences across firms in their disclosure policy. Meek, Roberts, and
Gray (1995) postulate that larger firms have lower information-production costs or lower
costs of competitive disadvantage associated with disclosure. Other costly contracting studies
argue that large firms choose to increase disclosures to reduce the agency costs associated
with increased company size (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Leftwich et al, 1981). The size
hypothesis for disclosure is:
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive association between company size and the likelihood
of frequent-flyer accounting-policy disclosure.
Past costly contracting literature asserted that profitable firms have incentives to distin-
guish themselves from less profitable firms in order to raise capital on the best available terms
(Meek et al., 1995). One way to achieve this is through voluntary information disclosure,
which may also be related to the variability of a firm's profitability (Foster, 1986; Lang &
Lundholm, 1993). Others believe that profitability is a factor that impels the dissemination of
more extensive disclosure to users (Cowan, Ferreri, & Parker, 1987). However, the empirical
evidence on the direction of the relationship between profitability and disclosure is not clear,
given the mixed results reported by different authors (Wallace et al., 1994), and so a
nondirecfional hypothesis for this variable is used here.
Hypothesis 7: There is an association between profitability and the likelihood of
frequent-flyer accounting-policy disclosure.
Wallace and Naser (1995) argued that highly leveraged firms provide additional information
to satisfy the needs of long-term creditors who often require assurance on firms' paying
capabilities. Costly contracting tenets argue that potential wealth transfers from debtholders to
shareholders increase with leverage and so should lead to increased disclosure (Craig & Diga,
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1998). Conversely, Zarzeski (1996) postulates that companies with higher leverage share more
private information with their creditors and subsequently have lower levels of disclosure.
Several studies also found lower leveraged firms disclosed more information (Meek et al,
1995). Again, the mixed results obtained in past research led to a nondirectional hypothesis for
the effect of leverage on jfrequent-flyer disclosure. Therefore, the final hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 8: There is an association between leverage and the likelihood of fi"equent-
flyer accounting-policy disclosure.
4. Research methodology
The data source for this study is collected from 80 airline annual's financial reports around
the world for the 1997/1998 fiscal financial year.
4.1. Measurement of independent variables
The techniques used to measure country cluster, size, profitability and leverage are
summarized in Table 3. All dollar figures were converted to US dollars for comparison.
The use of a composite measure of size is in line with Cooke's (1992) argument that each
measure of size contains a possibly unique aspect of company size and there is no
overwhelming theoretical reason for one measure to be superior. Therefore, the use of a
measure of size made up of several different size variables collapsed into a composite size
index using factor analysis is adopted in this study (Cooke, 1992). In addition, the six
variables were log-transformed to satisfy the assumption of normality of distribution for the
factor analysis conducted.
4.2. Measurement of dependent variables
The issues are classified according to the accounting choices identified in the respective
AAG. Logistic regression, an alternative form of regression for binary nonmetric dependent
variables, is used as it allows for the use of dichotomous dependent variables (as is the case
with both dependent variables examined) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
AAG 1: Translation ofLong-Term Foreign Currency Borrowings identified two different
methods used by airlines to account for unrealized exchange differences. Airlines either take
such exchange differences, whether they are gains or losses, to the profit and loss account or
"Alliance partners" is another possible independent variable as the changing dynamics of the airline industry
environment is a strong motivation for alliance arrangements, which help airlines gain technical know-how and
expand the scope of an airline's activities (Hall & Eppink, 1998). The growth of alliances could be a catalyst for
compatible accounting policies within the same alliance (Nunes et al., 1997; Sheets, 1989). The effect of alliance
partners is problematic because only 25 airlines (out of a total of 80) could be grouped into five mutually exclusive
alliances. However, exploratory statistical analyses performed (for the 25 airlines) on the three dependent variables
proved that the participation in an alliance was to be insignificant in predicting the accounting policies adopted.
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Table 3
Measurement technique for independent variables
Variable Measurement technique
Country cluster Grouped according to the Class A/Class B country cluster based on Nobes' (1998)
classification schema
Company size Composite measure for size using six proxies (total revenue, total assets, issued capital,
total employees, revenue passenger kilometres, and available seat kilometres)
Profitability Two-year average of the ratio of profit before interest and tax to total assets
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total equity
record the exchange differences direct-to-equity in the balance sheet. The following
classification of policies for unrealized exchange differences is used:
1. Immediate recognition in the profit and loss account
2. Direct-to-equity
Two main methods for frequent-flyer accounting are identified in AAG 2: Frequent-Flyer
Programme Accounting. One method maintains a provision for potential frequent-flyer
liability equivalent to the incremental costs that the airline expects to incur when frequent-
flyer points are redeemed. The other involves deferring a portion of revenue on the ground
that part of the ticket value conferring frequent-flyer points is unearned until those points
are used. However, the raw data showed that all but one of the disclosing airlines uses the
first method. The main issue with frequent-flyer liabilities is, therefore, whether the airlines
disclose their policy. Given the rapid rise of such liabilities, it is argued that the disclosure
of their policy is important information for users of the financial statements (Gallacher,
1997). Therefore, the issue examined will be whether the airline disclosed their frequent-
flyer accounting policy in their armual reports. The resulting dichotomous classifications
used are:
1. Disclosed
2. Not disclosed
5. Results
The data set consists of 80 airlines representative of the overall population of global
airlines, originating from 52 countries. These annual reports were obtained from a combina-
tion of mail requests to the airlines and annual reports available on a database compiled by the
LATA: "Airline Aimual Reports on CDROM." Table 4 depicts the ranges, means, and
standard deviation of each continuous independent variable, while Table 5 shows the
characteristics of the two categorical dependent variables via frequency statistics.
The categorical independent variable used in this study is country cluster. A total of 25 out
of the 52 countries could be classified into Nobes' (1998) classification schema. There were
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Independent variable N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
Total revenue (USS millions) 80 13 18.570 2962 4203
Total assets (USS millions) 80 10 20,915 3351 4752
Issued capital (USS millions) 80 0.008 2877 361 558
Employees (number) 80 192 113,900 15,377 20,743
Revenue passenger kilometres 80 34 195,553 26,218 39,696
(million kilometres)
Available seat kilometres 80 69 272,319 37,308 55,708
(million kilometres)
Profitability ratio 80 -0.167 0.593 0.049 0.087
Leverage ratio 80 0.000 44.469 1.719' 5.088
The first six variables were used to obtain a composite overall measure for the independent variable of size, which
is defined to have a mean of and standard deviation of 1
.
" TTie mean leverage becomes 227.5% when Thai Airways (airline with an extreme leverage ratio of4400%) is
included in the calculation.
50 annual reports originating from those 25 countries and all were grouped into two clusters.
Class A (strong equity) or Class B (weak equity), as classified by Nobes (1998). Accordingly,
there were 30 airlines in the Class A cluster and 20 in the Class B cluster.
5.1. Unrealizedforeign-exchange differences
Logistic-regression runs were performed at two levels to test the relationship between the
four independent variables of country cluster, company size, profitability, and leverage on
airlines' accounting-policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences. First, a simple
Table 5
Frequency table for unrealized foreign-exchange differences and frequent-flyer disclosure
Accounting pracdce Accounting policy choice Frequency Percentage
53.8
26.2
8.8
11.2
1 00.0
37.5
38.8
23.7
100.0
' Further examination confirmed that, whichever approach was adopted, it was consistently applied to both
unrealized gains and losses. A logistic-regression analysis was also carried to see if airlines with net unrealized
gains tended to adopt a different method to those airlines that reported net unrealized losses. The results proved
that there was no significant relationship (P=.41).
Unrealized foreign-exchange Immediate recognition in 43
differences" the profit and loss account
Direct-to-equity 21
Not disclosed 7
Not applicable 9
Total 80
Frequent-flyer accounting Disclosed 30
disclosure Not disclosed 31
Not applicable 19
Total 80
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Table 6
Logistic regression results for unrealized foreign-exchange differences
Independent vanable Simple logistic regression Multiple logistic regression
P-value A^ With country Without country
cluster (»
=
= 38) cluster (» = 64)
Country cluster .5750 38 0.7006 -
Company size .0494** 64 0.3224 0.0811***
Profitability .7883 64 0.9215 0.9939
Leverage .3326 64 0.4638 0.3021
** Significant at the .05 level.
*** Moderately significant at the .10 level.
logistic regression is conducted where each independent variable^ is considered one at a time.
Following this, a multiple-logistic-regression analysis is performed using all the independent
variables. Two separate multiple-logistic-regression models were constructed, with the
inclusion of country cluster and without country cluster in the backward elimination model.
The difference between these two models is simply that the multiple-logistic-regression
model, which considered the country cluster variable, is based on a subset of the sample (50
out of the 80 airlines). Table 6 depicts the results obtained from the logistic-regression models
performed.
The results in Table 6 shows that only company size is a significant factor at P-
value=.0494 in predicting the choice of method for unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
In the multiple-logistic-regression models, company size was the last variable to be removed
during a backward elimination analysis and the only significant determinant. Further
examination of the logistic-regression output revealed that the larger airlines tend to take
unrealized exchange differences direct-to-equity. There are no outliers that influenced these
conclusions.
5.2. Frequent-flyer accounting disclosure
Logistic regressions were performed to test the association between the four independent
variables on airlines' accounting-policy choice to disclose or not disclose frequent-flyer
liabilities. However, 19 airlines were excluded from the analysis because they did not offer
frequent-flyer programmes. '° Each individual independent variable is considered separately
as a potential predictor for the disclosure of frequent-flyer liabilities and then considered
simultaneously. Results from the logistic-regression runs are shown in Table 7.
Thirty airlines cannot be grouped into the two Class A and Class B country clusters. Therefore, the result of
the logistic-regression model for the country-cluster variable is based on a sample size of 50 airlines.
The airlines that were excluded because of lack of frequent-flyer programs came from both country clusters,
mostly from developing countries and the smaller countries in general (but with wide geographical spread). They
consist of small and medium airlines with leverage of up to 272%.
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Table 7
Logistic regression results for frequent-flyer accounting disclosure
Independent variable Simple logistic regression
P-value A'^
Multiple logistic
With country
cluster (11 = 41)
regression
Without country
cluster (7; = 61)
Country' cluster
Company size
Profitability
Leverage
.0010* 41
.0030* 61
.7628 61
.0976*** 61
0.0073*
0.0397**
0.3940
0.1427
0.0025 *
0.7957
0.0385**
* Highly significant at the .01 level.
* * Significant at the .05 level.
** * Moderately significant at the .10 level.
Both country cluster and company size were highly significant predictors of accounting-
policy choice to disclose frequent-flyer liabilities with P-values of .001 and .003, respectively.
Leverage was only moderately significant without country cluster and insignificant with the
smaller sample size with country cluster. The regression results suggest that larger airlines,
airlines from the Class A country cluster and airlines with lower levels of leverage, tend to
disclose their frequent-flyer accounting policy. Backward elimination analyses showed
country cluster and company size as significant variables (with country cluster) and company
size and leverage to be significant predictors (without country cluster).
Overall, results of the logistic regression revealed company size as a significant predictor
of airline accounting-policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences and frequent-
flyer liability disclosure. In addition, Nobes' (1998) country cluster classification was found
to be a possible factor in predicting accounting-policy choice for frequent-flyer liability
disclosure, while leverage was moderately significant in predicting frequent-flyer liability
disclosure. Again, regressions performed with and without outliers produced the same results.
6. Analysis of results
In 1992, six issues were identified as prime areas of diversity in global airlines' financial
reporting and resulted in the issuance of AAGs. Five years later, diversity in several of those
problem areas has been dramatically reduced. The industry-specific efforts undertaken to
improve comparability have resulted in increased uniformity in half of the problem areas.
Gupta and Lad (1983) define industry self-regulation as a process, whereby an organization at
the industry level sets and enforces the rules and standards relating to the conduct of all firms
in the industry. The airline industry, previously a government-controlled industry in most
countries, had been exposed to increased competition. In light of this reform, industry self-
regulation is proposed as an altemafive to the traditional regulatory framework and includes
the establishment of minimum standards of safety and quality and the creation of industry
codes or standards (Garvin, 1983). Regulation of accounting at the industry level through the
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establishment of industry accounting standards has the potential to improve the comparability
of financial reports (Arbor & Wotruba, 1997).
As the business environment becomes increasingly international, the "use of accounting
information across national boundaries creates a pressure" for comparable information
(Taylor & Turley, 1986, p. 142). At present, the International Accounting Standards
Committee is committed to narrowing the differences in financial reporting to facilitate
decision making in a global financial market (International Accounting Standards Committee,
2000). The "success" of the industry-specific guidelines in improving uniformity in at least
half of the problem areas in just a few years is an important signal. Perhaps, a workable
strategy to achieve better international accounting harmonization is to first aim for
harmonization within industries.
6.1. Country' cluster
Past international accounting authors clustered countries together based on the premise that
they have similar accounting practices. The corollary is that countries with similar cultures
and environments should have similar accounting practices. Results from the logistic
regression were mixed. Airlines in the Class A (strong equity markets) cluster were more
likely to disclose accounting policy for frequent-flyer liabilities. However, country cluster
was not influential in predicting accounting-policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange
differences.
The finding is consistent with prior literature by providing empirical evidence that Class
A/Class B country clusters are fundamentally different in terms of accounting-disclosure
practices. Nobes' (1998) Class A cluster refers to countries with high dependence on equity
markets and outside creditors' financial systems (includes countries where securities markets
are the dominant influence on accounting regulation, tax laws have little effect on financial-
accounting practices and specified requirements of the format and content of financial
reports). Countries in the Class B cluster, on the other hand, have tax laws that determine
most detailed measurement and valuation rules, heavy emphasis on conservatism, and
preferences are given to the information needs of creditors and tax authorities (Radebaugh &
Gray, 1997). The accounting system of countries with a tradition of codified Roman law
tends to be detailed and comprehensive, while common law systems are more adaptive and
iimovative (Mueller et al., 1994). These differences in the institutional structures may
explain why organizations in countries from the Class A cluster exhibit higher levels of
disclosure.
However, Nobes (1998) argues that outsider companies in Class B countries will move to
Class A country accounting and the accounting approach in consolidated statements would
also tend towards Class A country accounting. According to Nobes (1998), even organ-
izations in countries grouped in the Class B cluster will tend, over time, to adopt accounting
practices similar to those adopted by organizations in Class A countries as a result of capital
market pressures, culture assimilation, and globalization trends. This assimilation over time
explains the insignificance of country cluster in predicting accounting measurement for
unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
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6.2. Company size
The size of a company is seen as a proxy for political visibility and competitive advantage.
The larger a company, the higher its political costs and the greater the threat of adverse
regulatory action. Size also is believed to be positively correlated to levels of disclosure
because larger companies are more complex than smaller ones and, thus need to report more
information (Craig & Diga, 1998). Past literature has consistently found company size to be a
determinant of both measurement and disclosure practices. These results are, to a certain
extent, consistent with prior accounting literature. Size was found to be a driving factor in
predicting accounting practices around the world. Chong et al. (2000) discovered that
company size was significant in predicting the use of the amortization method of accounting
for goodwill, while Lemke and Page (1992) concluded that firm size significantly predicts
accounting-policy choice. In this study, company size is a significant predictor of airlines'
accounting-policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences.
In past disclosure studies, Craig and Diga (1998), Meek et al. (1995), and Zarzeski (1996)
all found size to have a positive and highly statistically significant effect on disclosure level.
Similarly, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) in their study of the extent of voluntary disclosure
indicated that voluntary disclosure increases with the size of the firm. Consistent with extant
literature, company size was found to be a significant predictor of the disclosure of
accounting policy for frequent-flyer liabilities. This may be because larger companies
disclose higher levels of information, as they are more likely to compete internationally
for resources (Zarzeski, 1996).
6.3. Profitability
Profitable airlines have incentives to adopt income-reducing accounting policies to avoid
political scrutiny (Cahan, 1992). The results obtained differ from the research of Chong et al.
(2000), which found that the profitability of manufacturing companies was a statistically
significant predictor of accounting-measurement practices. A reason for these conflicting
results is the fundamental difference between the two industry groups. In the airline industry,
total revenue, revenue passenger kilometres, and available seat kilometres seem to be more
important" than profitability as measures of performance. Lemke and Page (1992) and
Tower, Hancock, and Taplin (1999) in cross industry studies found profitability to be
insignificant in predicting accounting practices. The results of this study are consistent with
these latter cross-industry studies.
The empirical evidence on the influence of profitability on disclosure is mixed. However,
Cowan et al. (1987), Meek et al. (1995), and Wallace et al. (1994) consistently found that
profitability is not significantly associated with the level of disclosure. Thus, the results of
this study are consistent with these past findings.
" Most articles on the airline industry stress the size of the revenue achieved but say little about the level of
profits.
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6.4. Leverage
Airlines with higher leverage are less likely to disclose frequent-flyer accounting
information. It was, however, not a significant determinant of airlines' accounting-policy
choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences. Past research into the effects of leverage
provides mixed results. The results obtained showed no support for the use of leverage in
predicting measurement-accounting practices. The regression results in fact showed a
negative relationship between leverage as opposed to the positive relationship postulated.
The finding that airlines with higher leverage disclose less lends weight to the results obtained
by Meek et al. (1995) and Zarzeski (1996). In the latter study, it was initially hypothesized that
companies with higher debt ratios have higher levels of disclosure but the results showed
significant support in the opposite direction. Other studies found leverage insignificant in
influencing the levels of disclosure (see, for example, Wallace & Naser, 1995; Wallace et al.,
1994), while there are also studies that found a positive correlation between leverage and
disclosure levels (some examples are from Ahmed & NichoUs, 1994; Craig & Diga, 1998).
Zarzeski (1996) postulated that companies with higher debt ratios share more private
information with their creditors (creditors have rights to obtain information) and, thus, do not
need to disclose as much in the reports (such companies have more creditors relative to
stockholders). The results showed support for this logic and fiirther examination of the eighty
reports confirms this. Many airlines still have some type of government linkage and therefore
have relatively less individual shareholders and high levels of debt. Therefore, airlines with
more creditors relative to shareholders have lower levels of disclosure, as their creditors
obtain the necessary information through sources other than annual reports.
7. Implications
Airline financial reporting is becoming more uniform. The self-regulation efforts the airline
industry has undertaken have improved comparability and uniformity in half of the initial
problem areas. This indicates that self-regulation could be an important strategy towards
international accounting harmonization.
Overall, results from this study indicate that country cluster does play a role in determining
the choice of accounting practices among global airlines. Logistic and linear regression found
country cluster to be significant in relation to the disclosure of accounting policy for frequent-
flyer liabilities. Airlines in the Class A country cluster are more likely to disclose their
accounting policy for frequent-flyer liabilities. Company size was a significant predictor of
the accounting-policy choice for unrealized foreign-exchange differences and the disclosure
of accounting policy for frequent-flyer liabilities. Larger airlines tend to defer unrealized
foreign-exchange differences and disclose their frequent-flyer accounting policy. Leverage
was found only to be moderately significant in predicting the accounting-policy choice for
frequent-fiyer accounting disclosure. Airlines with lower debt levels tend to disclose their
accounting policy for frequent-flyer programmes. The profitability of an airline was not found
to influence its accounting-policy choices.
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Findings from this study have provided a number of valuable insights to airline accounting
practices worldwide. First, the industry-specific guidelines examined in Phase I have, in a
short time, improved the uniformity in at least half of the major areas of accounting diversity
in the airline industry. The lack of any variance observed in three (revenue recognition,
depreciation, and maintenance cost accounting) of the six areas that were found to be major
sources of disparity back in 1992 signals greater consistency and, hence, comparability
between airline financial reporting five years after the survey. This could mean that the efforts
of the lATA have been successful in improving the comparability of airline financial
reporting, and/or that airlines are submitting to pressures from global financial markets for
greater comparability.
A further implication of these results is that industry-specific regulation may be an
appropriate way of achieving international harmonization. The results obtained in this study,
which contrast findings on other industry studies, indicate that ftandamental differences exist
between industries (see Craig & Diga, 1998). Perhaps, international organizations, such as the
lASC, should first attempt to harmonize accounting within an industry instead of formulating
standards or subverting various national accounting practices away from the optimal ones for
domestic purposes. After all, the impetus for harmonization is the desire to improve
comparability between companies to facilitate the optimal worldwide allocation of resources
(Meek & Saudagaran, 1990). Industry-based harmonization would enable users to compare
companies in the same industry worldwide when making economic decisions, and thus allow
optimal worldwide allocation of resources within a particular industry.
The findings add empirical support to the Class A/Class B classifications of countries
developed by Nobes (1998). Both Doupnik and Salter (1995) and Nair and Frank (1980)
echoed support for the distinction between the two major classes of measurement-accounting
systems that are fundamentally different because of differences in the external environment,
cultural values, and institutional structure.
At the same time, from a theoretical perspective, the results support the application of
Watts and Zimmerman's (1990) costly contracting theory in the context of intemational
accounting research. Evidence is found in the explanatory significance of company size and
leverage in determining accounting-policy choice. Therefore, costly contracting theoretical
framework provides a means of explaining and predicting the attributes of corporate financial
reporting in an intemational context.
Results from the Phase II analyses performed in this study seem to indicate that no one
clear driver but several possible determinants of accounting-policy choice decisions exist. It
can be concluded that the accounting-policy choices are affected by a hybrid of interacting
forces. Therefore, this study provides a signal to the intemational accounting standard-setters
that there may be ongoing problems in efforts to improve the comparability of worldwide
companies' financial accounts.
Further empirical research could benefit from a longitudinal research examining several
consecutive years' annual reports. Additional research incorporating other accounting issues
such as accounting for financial instruments could be undertaken for this particular industry.
Airlines are exposed to exchange-rate fluctuations because of their multi-currency operations,
leading to incentives for the extensive use of financial instruments to hedge foreign-exchange
C. W. Tan et al / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 277-299 297
risk. Moreover, other independent variables such as the level of domestic competition and
government ownership could be included.
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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and the
informativeness of earnings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance of one
primary owner who also participates in firm management. Existing literature offers two alternative
perspectives on the behavior of such owner-manager firms, convergence of interests, and
management entrenchment hypotheses. We tested the altemative views to see how they are reflected
in earnings informativeness. The results show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the
owner increase, supporting the convergence of interest explanation for the owner-manager structure.
Second, we examine the role of institutional investors and blockholders. On the one hand, institutions/
blockholders have incentives to actively monitor management. However, on the other hand,
institutions/blockholders may not render effective monitoring because they lack expertise, suffer from
freerider problems, or strategically ally with management. These opposing views predict conflicting
signs on the relation between the eamings informativeness and holdings of institutions/blockholders.
We find that eamings informativeness increases with the holdings of institutions and blockholders.
This supports the active monitoring role of institufions/blockholders. Finally, we test the relationship
between eamings informativeness for chaebol (Korean business group)-affiliated companies vs. that
for nonchaebol-affiliated companies, and find no significant relationship between the owner- largest
shareholder's holdings and eamings informativeness. This provides evidence that for chaebol
companies, the negative effect of management entrenchment/expropriation of minority shareholders
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offsets the positive effects. This phenomenon is stronger for chaebol-affihated companies than for
nonchaebol affihates.
© 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and
the informativeness of eamings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance
ofone primary owner. The dominant owner, typically a founder or his immediate family, holds
a significant number of shares—enough to be the largest shareholder but usually much less
than the majority holdings of a company—and controls the whole company. Using the
holdings of family and related companies, this control often extends over many companies in
different industries, forming a corporate group called chaebol. These owners usually particip-
ate in the management of the firm, directly or indirectly, influencing most of the management
decisions. This management style lacks transparency and credibility, and is cited by investors
as the main source of economic inefficiency that led to the recent economic crisis in Korea.
We address three issues based on the owner-manager's role and incentives. First, we
examine the relationship between holdings of the owner- largest shareholder and eamings
informativeness. There are two conflicting views about the informativeness ofeamings when an
owner-manager dominates the management. One view is that, as Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) claim, management entrenchment occurs, causing a moral hazard and information-
asymmetry problem between the owner and outside investors. Investment decisions are likely
made to maximize the (inside) owner's wealth rather than that ofoutside shareholders. Outsiders
could find it difficult to monitor decisions; thus, the firm's management appears less transparent
and credible. In such cases, investors and creditors could protect themselves by imposing more
contractual constraints on the firm. The owner, in tum, may use eamings management to respond
to these accounting constraints. This will reduce the quality of eamings and informativeness.
Another view, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, is that convergence of interest could
occur as the owner's holdings increase, reducing agency costs. Reduction in agency costs
would be greater, the higher the holdings of the owner- largest shareholder. In this case, the
owner- largest shareholder behaves in a way to maximize firm value and impose fewer
contractual constraints on the firm. The owner will be less motivated to manage eamings,
resulting in higher eamings quality and informativeness.'
' Recently, the issue of economic efficiency related to ownership structure in Asia has been a subject of many
studies. Fan and Wong (2000) examine how expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders
affects eamings informativeness. Claessens, Djankov, Lang, and Fan (1999) examine the efficiency of investment
by diversified firms in nine East Asian countries, and report that misallocation of capital by diversified firms are
more pronounced in certain less developed countries. Claessens, Djankov, Lang, and Fan (2000) also examine
how expropriation of minority shareholders in East Asia affects market valuation.
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Second, we examine the role of institutional investors and blockholders in the presence
of the owner- largest shareholder. The role of institutional investors is not always clear.
Theory suggests that institutions may have incentives to actively monitor firm manage-
ment (Pound, 1988; Shleifer & Vishney, 1986). Yet many argue that institutions do not
monitor effectively because they either lack expertise or suffer from freerider problems
among themselves (Admati, Pfeiderer, & Zechner, 1994), or strategically ally with the
management (Pound, 1988). A similar argument can be made for the blockholders. We
examine how the monitoring role of institutional investors and blockholders affects
earnings informativeness.
Third, we investigate whether there is a difference in earnings informativeness between
chaebol and nonchaebol companies. A chaebol, as a large business group, could display a
different type of agency problem. The owner of a chaebol may use an affiliate's resources for
the benefit of the group as a whole or the welfare of the owner-manager, not for the interests
of shareholders of a particular affiliate. This creates another type of agency cost: expropri-
ation of minority shareholders by the owner-manager to increase his own personal interest
and value of other group firms."
This is often accomplished through complicated transactions among chaebol affiliates that
decrease the value of a prosperous member firm to support a troubled member firm. Such
transactions are usually not fully disclosed. They introduce noise and reduce the reliability of
accounting numbers, resulting in reduced earnings informativeness.
The results show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the owner increase,
supporting the convergence of interest hypothesis for the owner- largest shareholder. It
appears that the market places more weight on the positive side ofowner-manager's holdings
(reduction in agency costs) than the negative side (management entrenchment). We also find
that earnings become more infonnative with increases in the holdings of institutions and
blockholders, supporting their role as an active monitor.
However, when we partition the sample for chaebol vs. nonchaebol companies, we find
that the relationship between earnings informativeness and holdings of the owner- largest
shareholder becomes insignificant. This result is inconsistent with the convergence of interest
hypothesis and suggests that management entrenchment and expropriation of minority
shareholders offset the positive effect of convergence of interest for chaebol firms. This
phenomenon is most apparent for those firms in our sample that have the strongest
characteristics of chaebol, i.e., the top five chaebol firms and chaebols with a large number
of affiliates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics
of ownership structure in Korea. Section 3 explains the relationship between the ownership
structure and earnings informativeness. Section 4 presents the data. The results are reported in
Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.
' Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) use the term "tunneling" to describe the transfer of
resources out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders.
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2. Ownership structure in Korea
2.7. The owner-largest shareholder structure in Korea
Korean ownership structure is characterized by the predominant role of the owner- largest
shareholder The owner-largest shareholder, by holding a significant proportion of shares of
the company, effectively controls the whole company. These owners usually participate in
firm management directly or indirectly through close key managers, and influence most of the
management decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Typically, the owner-manager holds the largest proportion but much less than the majority
holdings of the company. In some cases, they are able to exercise complete control of the
company with holdings as low as 10%. This is possible through the holdings of the family
and/or related companies. This kind of control mechanism is more evident for chaebol
companies than nonchaebol companies.
A chaebol is a financial clique consisting of many corporate enterprises engaged in diverse
businesses, and typically owned and controlled by one or two interrelated family groups.^ As
of 1997, the number of affiliates of the top 30 chaebols represented only 24.2% of all firms
listed in the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), but they accounted for 45.8% of Korea's total
market capitalization. This illustrates the importance of chaebols in the Korean economy.
Korean chaebols are quite similar to Japanese keiretsu in that affiliates both maintain
substantial ties with other affiliates in the group, and there is considerable interlocking equity
ownership. Unlike Japanese keiretsu that is controlled by a professional corporate manage-
ment however, chaebols are controlled by families through stock ownership. That is, a
founder/owner or his designated successor exercises the ultimate management control over
the entire group. Furthermore, chaebols maintain a central staff within the headquarters of a
group, enabling the individual owner to exercise control over all group affiliates.
Fig. 1 shows how an owner controls the companies in a chaebol. It describes how
Chairman Lee Kun-Hee (Lee) of the Samsung Group, one of the largest chaebols in Korea,
controls Samsung Electronics, a key company in the group. At the end of 1998, Lee held
2.4% of Samsung Electronics and was the largest individual shareholder. The other major
shareholders were related companies of Samsung Electronics including Samsung Life (7.0%),
Samsung (3.5%), Cheil Jedang (3.2%), Shinsegae Department Store (1.9%), Cheil Wool
Textile (1.6%), and Joong-ang Daily News (1.0%).
Lee is the largest shareholder of these related companies, which are also shareholders of
Samsung Electronics, such as Samsung Life (Lee holds 9.2%), Cheil Jedang (14.1%), and
Shinsegae Department Store (22.7%). Lee is not the largest shareholder for the remaining
corporate shareholders of Samsung Electronics—Joong-ang Daily News and its subsidiary
Joong-ang Development. However, Lee controls these companies indirectly because the
Samsung Group that he controls owns 49.3% of Joong-ang Daily News and 48.3% of Joong-
ang Development.
The term "chaebol" simply means a closely held, integrated, yet diversified corporate entity that produces a
wide array of product lines for global consumption.
>
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Thus, Lee, who holds only 2.4% of the total holdings of Samsung Electronics, effectively
controls 19.6% (the total holdings by Lee plus those by all related companies) of the total
shares of Samsung Electronics through direct and indirect holdings. This shows how an
owner can control a key company in a chaebol, and eventually all the companies in the group
through significant but less than majority holdings of a company."^
2.2. Institutional investors and blockholders
Korean banks, insurance companies, securities brokerage firms, investment trust compan-
ies,"^ and small-scale savings and loans are classified as financial institutions. Korean financial
institutions are allowed under a certain limit to hold shares of other companies. Banks are
allowed to invest in stocks and bonds up to the limit of 1 00% of the net capital of the bank.
However, investment in stocks may not exceed 10% of the total shares for the invested
company. Also, acquisition of other bank stocks is prohibited. An insurance company's
investment in securities is limited to 40% of its equity and to 5% of the outstanding shares of
the invested company. The limit is higher for investment trust companies. They can invest up
to 20% of the total shares of the invested company. A similar restriction exists for savings and
loan companies. No limit exists for security brokerage companies as long as they maintain an
operating net equity ratio of at least 50%.
A bank can also exercise significant influence over companies as the creditor. Tradition-
ally, the major source of corporate financing in Korea has been bank loans, although they
have been replaced somewhat with equity financing recently.^ Since most companies
maintain close financial ties with banks through debt and equity financing, banks are in a
position to exercise significant influence over the company operations. However, unlike the
main bank system in Japan, Korean banks have not been very active in monitoring their client
firms. '' As a major shareholder of many banks, the government has used banks as a vehicle to
control many companies, thereby restricting the efficiency of the banking system.
^ Obviously, it is also necessary to examine the owner's indirect holdings—through related companies—to
investigate fully the influence of the owner- largest shareholder. However, these data are generally not available,
and often not accurate even if available. This study, therefore, uses only the holdings of the owner and related
families, which limits the study.
Investment trusts are the companies that collect fiands from investors—which is usually on a small scale
—
form a fund, make investments on behalf of the investors, and distribute returns to them according to their
holdings.
^ Debt financing has decreased in Korea recently. This is due to the government policy to reduce the debt ratio
of most Korean companies and the financial restructuring attempts by many financially distressed firms after the
Korean economic crisis in 1997. Another factor is the rapid expansion of equity market. For instance, equity
financing through the recently established KOSDAQ (equivalent to NASDAQ in the US) increased 10 times to
US$15 billion m 1999 from US$1.5 billion in 1998.
^ Studies on the control role of Japanese main banks report that Japanese main banks appoint external directors
to troubled firms, and appointments of directors from banks increase with negative earnings (Kaplan, 1994;
Kaplan & Minton, 1994). Further, Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) show that there is a certain
relationship between main bank ownership and corporate performance. Little has been studied about the bank's
control of troubled firms in Korea. However, bank control is in general not as tight as that of Japanese main banks.
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Blockholders are defined as those stockholders who hold more than 5% of the holdings.
These investors are required to report to the authorities once they obtain more than 5% of the
holdings and whenever their holdings change by more than 1%. The blockholders' role in
Korea is rather limited compared with that in the US since minority shareholders' rights are
not well protected in Korea.
3. The relationship between ownership structure and earnings informativeness
3.]. The owner-largest shareholder and earnings informativeness
As discussed, the relationship between ownership and earnings informativeness can
possibly be explained using two opposing views suggested in the finance literature
—
convergence of interest and management entrenchment hypotheses. The former is based on
the classic agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The researchers suggest that
agency costs decrease as owner's ownership interest increases. Investors may perceive that
the owner- largest shareholder behaves in a way to maximize firm value when the owner's
holding is large, and in this case, convergence of interest between the owner and outside
investors occurs.
Therefore, investors will impose fewer contractual constraints on the firm, and the owner is
less motivated to manage earnings. Also, owners will maintain a disclosure policy that is
consistent with firm value maximization. Investors will perceive the earnings quality of these
firms to be high. Under the scenario of convergence of interest, we expect that the higher the
owner's holdings, the greater the earnings informativeness—a positive relationship. This is
consistent with evidence by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) who report that earnings
informativeness is positively related to insider holdings.^
The opposing view is that management entrenchment could occur when insider holdings
are high (Morck et al., 1988), causing a moral hazard and information-asymmetry problem
between the insiders (owner-manager) and outside investors. Management decisions will
likely be made to benefit the personal wealth of the owner, and expropriation of minority
shareholders by the controlling owner could also occur.^
Under a weak governance system, monitoring will be more difficult to perform as the
owner's holdings increase. Outside investors will be motivated to impose more accounting
constraints on the firm, but owners who have complete discretionary power could respond by
manipularing eamings through discretionary accruals, thus lowering the reliability of earnings
and eamings quality. This will result in the reduction of stock price informativeness of those
eamings. Under this scenario, there will be a negative relationship between the owner's
holdings and eamings informativeness.
The study by Warfield et al. (1995) is in a diffuse ownership setting. The results could be different in a
concentrated ownership setting like Korea.
Shleifer and Vishney (1997) argue that when ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner
obtains effective control, the nature of agency problems shifts away fi^om conflicts between the manager and
shareholders to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders.
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We examine the relationship between holdings by the owner- largest shareholder and
earnings informativeness using the following regression:'^
Ri = flo + axE,/P„-\ + ajOWH, x £,/P„-i + ^z (1)
where /?, = stock return of firm / for the 12-month period to the fiscal year-end, calculated as
( Pi, — Pi, _ I + Di,)IPi, _ 1 . Pi, is the stock price of firm / at t and D,, is dividend of firm / at t;
Ei = earnings per share (before extraordinary item) of firm /; OWN, = a dummy variable for
holdings of the owner- largest shareholder of firm /— 1 if owner's holding is greater than the
sample median number, otherwise; e, = random error.
We measure earnings infonnativeness by examining the magnitude of the earnings
coefficients. The coefficient a
i
measures a traditional return- earnings relation. The coefficient
<72 measures a differential eamings informativeness according to the level of ownership by the
owner- largest shareholder. The positive coefficient on ^2 indicates that eamings informative-
ness increases as an owner-largest shareholder's proportionate ownership increases.
3.2. Institutional holdings/blockholdings and earnings
We examine two opposing views on the role of institutional holders—active monitoring
and strategic alliance hypotheses. Proponents of the active monitoring hypothesis contend
that institutional investors are long-term investors with significant incentives to actively
oversee managers. However, little evidence exists in favor of the active monitoring
hypothesis.
On the other hand, the strategic alliance hypothesis suggests that institutional investors and
owners find it mutually advantageous to cooperate. This cooperation reduces monitoring,
which might benefit the firm value, and investors' perception of eamings quality could
decline, resulting in a negative relation between eamings informativeness and institutional
holdings.
'
'
"^*
Alternative return and eamings measures could be considered. However, Korean studies (Han. 1998; Kim,
2000) show that return-earnings relation is robust for alternative measures of return (12-month window ending at
fiscal year-end or after eamings announcement) and eamings (the change or level of eamings). We rely on these
studies and use a retum measure that ends at fiscal year-end and the level of eamings model, following Warfield et
al. (1995).
'
' There is another hypothesis on the role of institutions—-the transient investor hypothesis. It suggests that
institutions are transient investors without significant incentives to monitor firm management. Institutions are
likely to sell the firm stock in the absence of current profits instead of trying to monitor management to adopt
value-increasing policies. Graves (1988) argues that fimd managers cannot afford to take the long view in their
investment decisions since they are reviewed and rewarded on the basis of quarterly or, at most, annual
performance measures. Evidence on institutional transience is mixed. Graves reports that firm's investment in
R&D systematically decreases with institutional ownership. On the other hand, Bushee (1998) finds no evidence
to indicate that institutional owners stifle R&D expenditures. Further, Kim, Krinsky, and Lee (1997) report that
there is greater stock retum volatility and trading volume surrounding eamings announcements with high
institutional ownership, supporting institutional transience. Under the transient hypothesis, eamings informative-
ness is negatively related to institutional holdings. See Rajgopal, Venkatachalan, and Jiambalvo (1999) for more
details.
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A similar argument can be applied to blockholders. Shleifer and Vishney (1986) argue that
equity blockholders can work as an effective device for monitoring management. Therefore,
the presence of a large-block equityholder will have a positive effect on firm value and
earnings quality. On the other hand, the strategic alliance argument can also apply to
blockholders, resulting in a negative relation between earnings informativeness and holdings
of blockholders.
The influence of institutions/blockholders is important in Korea because the owner- largest
shareholder has the ultimate control, and extemal market forces to discipline the owner
—
through the capital market, the market for corporate control, and the labor market—are not
well developed.'" However, the influence of institutions/blockholders could be limited in
Korea because the owner- largest shareholder is dominant, and minority interests are not well
protected.
We examine the effect of institutions/blockholders on earnings informativeness using the
following regression model:
R. = ao + axEi/P„-\ + a20WN/ x EjPa^x + asINST,- x £//P,y_i + fl4BLOCK/
xE,/P,,^x+ei (2)
where ESfST = a dummy variable for institutional holdings by banks, insurance, and security
companies— 1 if the institutional holding is greater than the sample median, otherwise;
BLOCK = a dummy variable for holdings by blockholders— 1 if the blockholding is greater
than 5% and otherwise. '^^ All other variables are previously defined.
Positive and significant coefficients on ai, and ^4 support active monitoring by institutions/
blockholders.
3.3. Earnings informativeness of chaebols vs. nonchaebols
Chaebols, large business groups in Korea, are highly diversified in business, but heavily
concentrated in ownership. Thus, having both control rights and ownership vested in one
individual, chaebol could minimize the agency problem that arises from the separation of
ownership and control in the Jensen and Meckling (1976) firamework. On the other hand,
however, it could create another type of agency problem. Since the owners-managers of
chaebols have substantial discretionary power over all important strategic decision making,
they can easily expropriate outside minority shareholders by investing the firm's resources to
maximize their own personal wealth and the overall value of the entire group.
La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) conclude that ". . .the central agency problem in
large corporations around the world is that ofrestricting expropriation ofminority shareholders
'" For instance, hostile takeovers have been allowed in Korea since the early 1990s, but only a few successful
hostile takeovers have occurred in Korea.
' For blockholdings, we used a 5% cut-off point, not a median. This tests the effect of existence vs.
nonexistence of blockholdings because blockholdings are defined as holdings of more than 5% in Korea. We
believe that a cut-off point using a median is not very meaningful.
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by controlling shareholders..." This agency problem between controlling and restricting
expropriation of minority shareholders can be particularly serious when there are few
mechanisms to protect minority investors and to control the discretionary power of large
shareholders. Johnson et al. (2000) further argue that the controlling shareholders have strong
incentives to siphon resources out of the firm to increase their wealth."^ Thus, they can easily
expropriate minority investors in the chaebol by investing the firm's resources to maximize
their own or the group's wealth, even when such investments do not maximize the value of the
individual firm.
This type of management entrenchment could occur in many ways. One way is through
nonarms' length transactions among chaebol affiliates. For instance, unlisted shares of an
affiliate owned by the owner-largest shareholder could be purchased at a price much higher
than its fair value, enriching the owner at the expense of the firm.
Also, complicated intercompany transactions with an affiliate, which are not included in
the consolidated financial statement, are difficult to identify, thus making it difficult to
understand the overall financial picture of the entire chaebol group. Further, chaebol
companies often exercise influence for their benefits in negotiations when there are
accounting conflicts with the auditor.'^ These will make accounting numbers of chaebol
affiliates less transparent and reliable, reduce eamings quality, and dampen the positive
effects of the owner-manager's holdings on eamings informativeness.
3.4. Control variables
The return-eamings relationship discussed in the previous sections is influenced by other
factors that should be controlled. We consider two types of control variables—agency and
eamings quality variables. Variables fi^om the agency theory include firm size, risk, and debt.
Numerous studies report that these variables affect the firm's accounting choice decisions (see
Watts & Zimmerman, 1990 for a review of this issue). Firm size is motivated by the political
cost theory. Watts and Zimmerman argue that managers of large corporations are politically
sensitive and are more likely to exploit accounting discretion to reduce political costs. The
risk variable is considered because high-risk firms possess greater incentives to exploit
accounting discretion (Zmijewski & Hagerman, 1981). Evidence indicates that leverage is
positively related to an accounting choice decision. The higher the leverage, the more likely
managers choose income-increasing methods. Also, the leverage variable captures the fimi's
default risk that is not captured by the equity beta (Billings, 1999).
''* To describe the transfer of resources out of firms for the benefit of their controlhng shareholders, Johnson et
al. use the term "tunneling." They show that tunneling can take many forms. For example, it can take the form of
outright theft or fraud. It can also take more subtle legal foims, such as diluted share issues that discriminate
against minority shareholders and mergers between affiliated firms to siphon resources out of the bidder or the
target.
'^ One of the major CPA firms in Korea, Sandong, was dissolved in early 2001 in connection with fiaud in the
audit of now bankrupt Daewoo, one of the big three chaebols in Korea. They allegedly cooperated with their client
company in overstating assets and omitting foreign liabilities.
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Table 1
Summary of sample selection criteria
Panel A: Number of firm-years by sample selection criteria
Selection criteria
Year
Number of firm-years
Firms listed on the KSE 4258
Less firms with ownership data not available for the period of 1996 and 1998 (375)
Firms with ownership data available 3883
Less firms with missing financial data (648)
firms with missing return data (415)
Total firms included in the sample 2820
Panel B: Number of sample firms by year
Number of firms
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Total
373
463
492
504
514
465
2820
For earnings quality considerations, we include variables for growth and earnings
persistence. These variables have been found to affect the informativeness of earnings
(Collins & Kothari, 1989; Easton & Zmijewski, 1989; Kormendi & Lipe, 1987). Eq. (3)
shows the full model for all variables including control variables:'^
R- = ao + axE,/Pa-\ + a20WN,- x £,/P/,_i + asINST,- x £',/P,7_i + fl4BL0CK/
X Ei/Pi,-i + as SIZE,, + a6RISK„ + ayDEBT,, + agGRWTH,,/ + a9PERS/, + e,
(3)
where SIZE, = firm size measured as logarithm of sales revenue; RISK, = risk of the firm
measured as a market beta. The market beta was calculated using daily returns for the past 2
years; DEBT, = leverage of the firm measured as total debt divided as total assets;
GRWTH, = growth prospects of the firm, measured as Tobin's' Q ratio. The Q ratio is
computed as market value of equity/book value of equity; PERS, = persistence of earnings
measured as the autocorrelation coefficient of earnings during the test periods, 1993-1998.
Other variables are previously defined.
Warfield et al. (1995) use multiplicative variables with earnings for the control variables. That is, for size
variable, they use SIZE x ElP. This has a different meaning from the specification in Eq. (3). The multiplicative
variable signifies that the slope of earnings -response coefficient is higher or lower due to a size effect. On the
other hand, the SIZE variable when used alone without EIP simply controls for the size effect. We use a model
specification as in Eq. (3) because these variables are used as control variables.
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4. Data
Sample firms are obtained from firms listed on the KSE fi-om 1993 to 1998. The following
data should be available during our sample period: the equity ownership data, the financial
statements data, the daily returns, and the month-end prices. We collected these data for each
fiscal year fi^om the Korea Investors Service (KIS) database. The KIS as a professional rating
agency developed the financial statements database based on Business Reports filed with the
Korea Financial Supervisory Commission (KFSC) and makes it available for researchers.'^ It
also provides market data for firms listed on the KSE.
By excluding financial companies, we initially obtained 4258 firm-years (760 firms). From
these, we excluded firms whose ownership data were unavailable and whose financial and
stock return data were missing, resulting in 2820 firm-year observations. The number of firms
in each year ranges fi"om 373 to 504 firms. '^ The sample selection procedures are reported in
Table 1.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Selected descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 2 and 3 . Table 2 shows the ownership
variables. Panel A shows stockholdings by owner-largest shareholder, institutions, and
blockholders by year. The average stockholding of the largest shareholder is 28.33%. It
increased to 31.77% in 1997 and 33.14% in 1998. These are the years when Korea
experienced an economic crisis due to the foreign exchange problem.
The mean institutional holdings of banks, insurance, and security companies are 15.83%.
They consistently decrease over the years. The average holdings of the blockholders are
14.64%, and show a decreasing trend similar to that of institutional holdings. It is interesting
to note that during the Korean economic crisis in 1997 and 1998, holdings of the owner-
largest shareholder increased while those of institutions and blockholders substantially
decreased. The stock market plunged during this period, and it is likely that institutions/
blockholders decreased their portfolio in stocks, and the largest stockholders increased their
holdings. Some companies may have purchased the stocks back fi"om other shareholders to
bolster their stock prices.
Panel B of Table 2 shows holdings by type of the owner-largest shareholder, classified by
individuals, corporations, and foreign investors. The largest shareholder is an individual for
" Firms that are registered with the KFSC must file Business Reports (equivalent to the US 10-K) with the
KFSC within 90 days from the fiscal year-end. Business Reports are publicly available at the KFSC or at the
electronic reporting system of KSE.
' ^ Our initial sample had 2820 observations. For regressions, the sample size drops slightly in accordance with
the particular model used due to missing additional variables or classificatory variables, such as individual vs.
corporation largest shareholder, and chaebols vs. nonchaebols.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of ownership by largest shareholder, institutional investors, and large blockholders
Panel A: Distribution of ownership by the owner--largest shareholder, institutional investors, and large
blockholders by year
Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Equity held by the 26.36" 25.89 26.11 26.25 31.77 33.14 28.33
largest shareholder 25.07" 25.05 24.73 25.44 30.26 31.48 27.30
373" 463 492 504 514 465 2820
Equity held by the 22.23 18.63 17.08 16.02 13.72 8.70 15.83
institutional investor 22.39 17.48 15.06 14.05 11.42 7.09 13.59
374 464 493 506 514 465 2820
Equity held by large'^ 17.31 15.69 14.81 14.28 12.96 12.71 14.64
blockholders 15.48 13.28 12.24 11.55 10.28 8.91 11.81
205 273 288 294 251 188 1499
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of ownership by type of largest shareholder
Owner- largest Summary statistics
shareholder Mean Median S.E. Min Max n
Individuals 28.52 28.01 0.29 0.00 89.95 2075
Corporation 28.64 25.58 0.64 0.00 99.00 609
Foreign investors 27.92 33.40 2.01 8.01 57.77 49
Others'' 21.19 16.28 2.20 1.80 77.57 87
Total 28.33 27.30 0.45 0.00 99.00 2820
Panel C: Frequency of Dwnership by type of largest shareholder
Type of largest Distribution of ownership (a'')
shareholder
a<10.0 10.0<a 20.0 < a 30.0 <Q 40.0 <Q Q>50.0 Total
<20.0 <30.0 <40.0 <50.0
Individuals 154 439 579 488 304 111 2075
7.42 21.16 27.90 23.52 14.65 5.35 100.00
Corporation 63 111 201 102 77 55 609
10.34 18.23 33.00 16.75 12.64 9.03 100.00
Foreign investors 6 12 5 18 7 1 49
12.24 24.49 10.20 36.73 14.29 2.04 100.00
Others' 37 16 16 8 10 87
42.53 18.39 18.39 9.20 0.00 11.49 100.00
Total 260 578 801 616 388 177 2820
9.22 24.49 28.40 21.84 13.76 6.28 100.00
Test statistics X- statistics = 179.69 (P=m\)
" Mean, median, and number of fums, respectively.
Forty-seven percent of fums has no large blockholders.
'^
It includes banks, governmental, and nonprofit organizations.
Q represents the percentage of ownership.
^ It includes banks, governmental, and nonprofit organizations.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of study variables
Panel A: Univariate analyses of study variables by ownership
Variables Mean Median S.E. / statistic
(/?-value)
EP
OWN = -0.0310 0.0274 0.0140 -1.50
0WN=1 - 0.0027 0.0272 0.0126 (.1338)
Total sample -0.0167 0.0273 0.0094
SIZE
OWN = 24.37 24.39 0.03 3.36***
0WN=1 24.22 24.25 0.03 (.0008)
Total sample 24.30 24.32 0.02
DEBT
OWN = 0.74 0.71 0.01 5.98***
0WN=1 0.66 0.66 0.01 (.0008)
Total sample 0.70 0.68 0.01
RISK
OWN = 0.98 1.00 0.01 -4.56***
0WN=1 1.02 1.03 0.01 (.0001)
Total sample 1.00 1.02 0.01
GRWTH
OWN = 1.16 0.84 0.08 -0.29
0WN=1 1.19 0.81 0.11 (.7731)
Total sample 1.18 0.82 0.07
PERS
OWN = 0.31 0.13 0.02 0.44
OWN=l 0.30 0.07 0.02 (.6636)
Total sample 0.31 0.10 0.02
EP
EP)
Panel B: Correlation matrix of study variables
Study variables RET EP EP X OWN EP X INST EP x BLOCK SIZE RISK GRWTH
EP .1819"
(.0001)
EPxOWN .1362
(.0001)
.6761
(.0001)
EP X INST .2033
(.0004)
.4194
(.0001)
.1315
(.0001)
EP X BLOCK .1882
(.0001)
.5509
(.0001)
.2745
(.0001)
.4322
(.0001)
SIZE - .0541 .0354 .1447 .0879 .0820
(.0043) (.0610) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
RISK -.0126 -.0651 - .0334 - .0302 - .0405 - .5073
(.5489) (.0018) (.1098) (.1486) (.0524) (.0001)
GRWTH .0757 - .0001 - .0039 .0015 .0042 -.1325 .0364
(.0001) (.9953) (.8388) (.9392) (.8258) (.0001) (.0817)
PERS - .0258 - .0958 - .0609 - .0474 - .0536 .0545 - .0327 - .0257
(.1736) (.0001) (.0013) (.0122) (.0045) (.0038) (.1163) (.1743)
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Table 4
Cross-sectional regression of stock returns on earnings
315
Explanatory Positive Negative Total sample Positive Negative Total sample
variables earnings earnings Model Ic earnings earnings Model 2c
Model la Model lb Model 2a Model 2b
Panel A: OWN, INST, and BLOCK are measured as dichotomoiis variables
EP 2.5408* * * -0.1172 0.4552*** 0.4022 -0.0874 0.0227
(.0001) (.1590) (.0001) (.1192) (.3376) (.7891)
EPxOWN 0.7131*** -0.2151* 0.1019* 1.7914*** -0.2536* 0.3551***
(.0030) (.0990) (.0835) (.0001) (.0594) (.0008)
EP X INST 4.0231***
(.0001)
-0.3835*
(.0551)
0.9536***
(.0001)
EP X BLOCK 1.3236***
(.0001)
0.2111
(.2692)
0.4982* * *
(.0001)
Number of 2294 489 2783 1962 489 2783
observations
Adjusted R- (%) 20. 2.91 3.34 29.64 4.10 8.65
Panel B: OWN, INST, and BLOCK are measured as continuous variables
EP 1.3912*** 0.0131 0.4309* * * 0.6081* - 0.0547 0.0132
(.0001) (.8772) (.0001) (.0630) (.5437) (.7064)
EPxOWN 0.0397*** - 0.0057 * 0.0126* 0.0556* * * -0.0073** 0.0071**
(.0001) (.0259) (.0937) (.0001) (.0052) (.0302)
EP X INST 2.0587***
(.0001)
-0.3141**
(.0224)
0.9370* * *
(.0001)
EP X BLOCK 0.5271**
(.0116)
0.1773
(.1037)
0.4213***
(.0003)
Number of 2294 489 2783 1962 489 2783
observations
Adjusted Br (%) 19.18 2.06 3.26 22.15 2.88 5.76
Model: RET=flo+o i EP+o.EP xOWN+ojEP x INST+a4EP x BLOCK+^ ,
.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level (see ;?-values in parentheses).
** Statistically significant at the .05 level (seep-values in parentheses).
*** Statistically significant at the .01 level (see /^-values in parentheses).
2075 of 2820 observations (73.6%), followed by corporations for 609 observations (21.6%).
Foreign investors are the largest shareholders in 49 observations (1.7%). The average
stockholdings by each type of shareholder are approximately the same, however.
Panel C reports stockholdings by type of the largest shareholder. When the owner-largest
shareholders are individuals, most of them own between 20% and 30% of the shares 27.90%
of the time. When it is a corporation, 33% falls in the 20-30% range. Foreign owners are
most concentrated in the 30-40% range. Chi-square test shows that the differences in the
ownership distribution across each percent range are statistically significant (/'=.001).
Notes to Table 3:
Refer to Exhibit 1 for definitions and notations of the variables.
^ Coefficient (;7-value).
*** Statistically significant at the .01 level (p-values in parentheses).
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Table 3 shows summary statistics for selected financial variables, separated by the holdings
of the largest shareholder (high and low holdings) and the total. The mean earnings per price
(EP) is — 0.0167, and is not much different between high and low holdings. The t statistics of
the variables SIZE, DEBT, and RISK are statistically significant, suggesting that firms with
high shareholdings by the owner- largest shareholder are smaller, less leveraged, and riskier
than those with low shareholdings.
Panel B of Table 3 presents Pearson correlations of the study variables. The second column
shows that RET is highly correlated with EP, EP x OWN, EP x INST, EP x BLOCK, and
SIZE. This suggests that the ownership variables explain much of the variation of stock
prices. The panel generally indicates low correlation among the study variables. However,
correlations among EP and its interaction variables are high. This is expected because the
interaction variables are multiplicative variables with EP.^^
5.2. Regression results
5.2.1. Regression results for the ownership variables
Table 4 shows the regression of return on the earnings and ownership variables. Panel A
reports the results when ownership variables are measured as dichotomous variables whereas
Panel B uses continuous variables. We report the results for the total samples and two
partitions of samples separated into positive and negative earnings according to Collins,
Pincus, and Xie (1999) and Hayn (1995). Hayn reports that the earnings-response coefficient
is low and not stable when earnings are negative. Collins et al. report that eamings-response
coefficients on the negative eamings are negative.
For positive eamings in Panel A, Model la shows that both eamings (EP) and owner-
largest shareholder (EP x OWN) variables are positive and significant with adjusted R" of
20.48%, suggesting that the greater the holdings of owner-largest shareholder, the more
informative the eamings are. The EP x OWN variable remains significant when other
ownership variables are added (Model 2a). ~*^ We interpret the results as supporting the
convergence of interest hypothesis as Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict, but not the
management entrenchment or the expropriation hypothesis.
The coefficient on the institutional holdings variable (EP x INST) in Model 2a is positive
and significant, indicating that the higher the holdings of the institutions, the more
informative the eamings are. This supports the active monitoring role of institutions as
opposed to the strategic alliance hypothesis or the transient investor hypothesis.
Similar results are found of the blockholder variable (EP x BLOCK). We suggested earlier
that blockholders, like insdtutional holders, can be an effective monitoring vehicle for
management or, on the other hand, the strategic alliance argument can be applied. The
'^ This could cause some multicollinearity problems. However, it will negatively affect our results.
"" We used a median number (27.30%) in separating the holdings of the owner- largest shareholder.
Alternatively, we partitioned the sample into three groups—high, middle, and low holdings of owner- largest
shareholder—then repeated the tests with high and low group with the middle group eliminated. Further, we used
another cut-off point of 20%, which we chose randomly. All these results were qualitatively similar.
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positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between earnings and blockholders
suggests that effective monitoring by blockholders improves earnings informativeness."'""
The results for negative earnings are not consistent. The coefficient on the earnings
variable is negative and the adjusted R~ is quite low (2.91% for Model lb and 4.10% for
Model 2b). The negative coefficient on the earnings variable is not inconsistent with the
existing literature (Collins et al., 1999). The results for the total sample are basically the same
as those for the positive earnings except that the significance of earnings variable and
adjusted R~ decreases.
Panel B reports the results when ownership variables are measured as continuous variables.
These results are not much different from those reported in Panel A, except that R" slightly
declines. We choose to use dichotomous variables for ownership variables because our focus
is to contrast high and low ownership groups, not to examine the sensitivity of earnings
informativenss to ownership variables.
5.2.2. Regression results with control variables included
Table 5 shows the results of the models when control variables for the agency problem
and earnings quality are added. For positive eamings (Model 3 a), all the ownership variables
remain positive and significant, similar to those reported in Table 4. For control variables,
the size variable, measured as the logarithm of sales revenue, is negative and significant,
indicating that eamings are less informative as the firm size increases, supporting the political
hypothesis explanation. The leverage variable (DEBT) is negative, but not significant. The
RISK variable has a negative and significant sign, as expected. The growth (GRWTH) variable
"' In the presence of a primary owner, the influence of institutions/blockholders may not be determined by
their holdings alone. It will interact with the influence of the owner-largest shareholder. If the owner's holdings
are large enough not to allow others to influence the firm's decisions, monitoring activities by institutions/
blockholders will be limited compared with what is possible otherwise. The reverse is true if the owner's holding
is low. The influence of institutions/blockholders will be accentuated in this case because of the lack of owner's
control. The following regression examines the interaction effects between the owner's holdings and those of
institutions/blockholders
:
R. = ao + a\Ei/Pi,-\ + a20WN/ x E,/P„-\ + 03 INST, x Ei/P„-\ + 04BLOCK, x EJP,,^] + 05OWN,
X INST, X £,/P„_i + OftOWN, x BLOCK, x £,/P„_i + e,-.
The coefficients on both these interaction variables (05 and og) are positive and significant, suggesting that the
active monitoring role of institutional holders and blockholders is more pronounced when the holdings of both the
largest shareholders and institutional holders/blockholders are high. This indicates that institutional holders/
blockholders exert more effort as an effective monitoring mechanism when the holdings of the largest shareholders
are high. However, these double multiplicative interaction variables are often difficult to interpret, and therefore
should be interpreted with caution.
"~ Holdings of owner- largest shareholder and holdings of institutions and blockholders may not be mutually
exclusive. However, we do not believe that such effect is significant.
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Table 5
Cross-sectional regression of stock returns on earnings with inclusion of determinants of earnings response
coefficients
Explanatory variables Positive earnings Model 3a Negative earnings Model 3b Total sample Model 3c
EP 0.4134 (.1077) -0.1891* (.0577) -0.0437* (.0601)
HP X OWN 1.7585*** (.0001) -0.2295* (.0877) 2.1304*** (.0001)
EP X INST 4.1010*** (.0001) -0.3641* (.0731) 1.0393*** (.0001)
EP X BLOCK 1.2539*** (.0001) 0.0911 (.6408) 1.1713*** (.0001)
SIZE -0.0987*** (.0001) -0.0166 (.7094) -0.0563* (.0616)
DEBT -0.0899 (.6257) -0.8213** (0.0186) -0.1438 (.5339)
RISK -0.3850** (.0169) 0.0683 (.8312) -0.1936 (.3794)
GRWTH 0.0358*** (.0001) 0.0188 (.2952) 0.1013*** (.0001)
PERS -0.0134 (.6470) -0.0850 (.1715) -0.0169 (.6532)
Number of observations 2245 467 2712
Adjusted R" (%) 31.09 5.75 15.75
Model: RET=6o+Z), EP+fe.EP x OWN+63EP x INST+Z)4EP
x
BLOCK+bsS\ZE+b(,DEBT+bjRlSK+
6sGRWTH+69PERS+^2-
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Exhibit 1
.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level (see /^-values in parentheses).
* * Statistically significant at the .05 level (see /^-values in parentheses).
* * * Statistically significant at the .01 level (see/?-values in parentheses).
is positive and significant, consistent with existing findings. Tiie persistence variable (PERS)
is not significant?"^
The results for the negative earnings (Model 3b) do not show a consistent pattern. The
earnings variables are negative and significant. Ownership variables are generally not
significant. Most control variables are not significant, and the adjusted R' is substantially
lower than that for the positive earning model.
The results for the total sample (Model 3c) are not much different from those for the
positive earnings except that the risk variable becomes insignificant. In sum, the results in
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that earnings are more informative with the increase in holdings of the
owner- largest shareholder and institutions/blockholdings. This supports the convergence of
interest hypothesis for the owner- largest shareholder and the active monitoring role for the
institutions/blockholders.
5.2.3. Regression results by type of owner- largest shareholder
The owner- largest shareholder of a firm may be an individual or a corporation. Shleifer
and Vishney (1986) report that corporate shareholders behave differently from individual
shareholders. We repeat the regression analyses performed in Table 5 separately for the
individual and corporate shareholders. The results are reported in Table 6.
For individuals (Model 3d), all the ownership variables are positive and significant, and
control variables are generally significant with expected signs except for DEBT and PERS.
- Because of data limitation, we measured the persistence based on six time series data. This could have
caused the insignificance of the PER variable.
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Table 6
Cross-sectional regression of stock returns on earnings by type of owner- largest shareholder
Explanatory variables" Type of largest shareholder
Individuals Model 3d Corporations Model 3e
EP 0.8668*** (.0089) 2.5347*** (.0001)
EPxOWN 1.1186*** (.0006) 2.3690*** (.0003)
EPxINST 4.9056*** (.0001) 0.7958 (.1749)
EPx BLOCK 0.6272* (.0521) 0.3349 (.5986)
SIZE -0.1068*** (.0003) 0.0052 (.9143)
DEBT 0.0742 (.7319) - 0.6339 (.1044)
RISK -0.4728** (0.0172) - 0.1016 (.7682)
GRWTH 0.0297*** (.0006) 0.2585*** (.0001)
PERS -0.0028 (.9356) - 0.0389 (.4906)
Number of observations 2034 587
Adjusted R- (%) 30.70 37.40
Model: RET=6o+^iEP+/72EPxOWN+i3EPxINST+64EPxBLOCK+/)5SIZE+Z76DEBT+ft7RISK+
fe8GRWTH+6gPERS+^2.
'' Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Exhibit 1
.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level (see /^-values in parentheses).
* * Statistically significant at the .05 level (see p-values in parentheses).
* * * Statistically significant at the .01 level (see /^-values in parentheses).
These results are similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5 (when earnings are positive).
When the largest shareholder is a corporation, the ownership variables do not show a
consistent pattern. The owner- largest shareholder variable remains positive and significant,
consistent with the results for individuals. However, the institutions and blockholders
variables do not show significance, which is inconsistent with our previous finding that
institutions are active monitors. This result suggests that institutions play a more active
monitoring role when the largest shareholder is an individual than when it is a corporation.
5.2.4. Regression results for chaebol vs. nonchaebol groups
A Korean chaebol is characterized as a large conglomerate that involves many different
lines of businesses in different industries. Its inefficiencies as a company have been criticized
as a major reason for the Korean economic crisis in 1997. Since then, some chaebols have
been dissolved while others underwent restructuring. Since companies that are parts of the
chaebol group could display different corporate behavior fi^om that of nonchaebol companies,
we separate the sample firms into two groups, chaebol affiliates and nonchaebol affiliates.
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) defines a chaebol as "a group of companies of
which more than 30% of its shares are owned by the group's controlling shareholder and its
affiliated companies." Each year, the KFTC ranks business groups according to the size of
their total assets and identifies the 30 largest business groups (hereafter "Top 30 chaebols").
The Top 30 chaebols have been Korea's most prominent chaebols during the past three
decades.
The results are reported in Table 7. For nonchaebol affiliates (Model 3f), ownership
variables are in general positive and significant, consistent with previous results suggesting a
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Table 7
Cross-sectional regression of stock returns on earnings by membership of Korean chaebols
Explanatory variables'' Affiliation with chaebol
Nonchaebol affiliates Model 3f Chaebol affiliates Model 3g
EP 1.8215*** (.0001) 0.5702 (.3199)
EP X OWN 0.4941 * (.0546) 1.1857 (.2347)
EPxINST 3.4329*** (.0001) 3.5508*** (.0001)
EPx BLOCK 2.0230*** (.0001) 0.3603 (.5214)
SIZE -0.1490*** (.0001) 0.0443 (.3596)
DEBT 0.1321 (.5162) - 0.9744 ** (0.0314)
RISK -0.5535*** (.0035) 0.2330 (.4623)
GRWTH 0.0306*** (.0003) 0.2277*** (.0002)
PERS -0.0118 (.7742) - 0.0262 (.5199)
Number of observations 1663 582
Adjusted R- (%) 34.40 27.17
Model : RET=bo+b
,
EP+i.EP xOWN+b^E? x INST+&4EP x BLOCK+bsSlZE+beDEBT+bjmSK+
Z)8GRWTH+Z79PERS+^2-
^ Definitions and notafions of the variables are given in Exhibit 1
.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level (see p-values in parentheses).
* * Statisfically significant at the .05 level (see p-values in parentheses).
* * * Statistically significant at the .01 level (see /j-values in parentheses).
convergence of interest between owner- largest shareholder and outside investors. For
chaebol companies (Model 3g), however, the owner- largest shareholder variable is not
significant, inconsistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis. We interpret the
insignificance of the owner-largest shareholder variable as an indication that management
entrenchment and/or expropriation of minority shareholders has occurred in the chaebol
companies, and their negative effects offset the positive effects from the convergence of
interest effects. Bae, Kang, and Kim (in press) also find similar results related to the
expropriation hypothesis. They report that when a chaebol-affiliated firm makes an acquisi-
tion, its stock prices on average go down. However, they find that the controlling shareholder
benefits because the acquisition enhances the value of other firms in the group that the
controlling shareholder controls.
The result for chaebol companies is also consistent with our conjecture (as discussed
earlier) that complicated intercompany transactions among affiliates of chaebol companies
make it difficult to understand the overall picture of the entire chaebol group, and that chaebol
companies often use influence for their benefit in negotiations when there are accounting
conflicts with the auditor. These will make accounting numbers of chaebol affiliates less
transparent and reliable, and thus reduce earnings quality and its informativeness.^"*
Fan and Wong (2000) report that earnings informativeness decreases as holdings of the controlling
shareholders increase for the seven Asian countries they studied. They explain this by expropriation of minority
shareholders by controlling shareholders. For Korean samples, however, they report insignificant results. Our
results suggest that the expropriation hypothesis holds for only chaebol companies. For the total sample, the
convergence of interest hypothesis is a more appropriate explanation. Our result for Korean chaebol companies is
not inconsistent with Fan and Wong's.
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Although the Top 30 chaebols are organized in similar ways, they are not homogeneous
with respect to the diversity and complexity of operations. We split the chaebols into two
subsamples based on two criteria. The first criterion is the size of chaebols ranked by the
KFTC (Top 5 vs. those ranked between 6 and 30). The Top 5 chaebols (Samsung, Hyundai,
LG, Daewoo, and SK) display more distinctive characteristics of the chaebol than those
ranked between 6 and 30 with respect to the complexity of operations. We expect that the
transparency of management and the quality of earnings will be lower for the Top 5 chaebols.
The second criterion for splitting the sample is the number of affiliates. We hypothesize
that a chaebol with a large number of affiliates has more complicated and sophisticated
transactions among its affiliates, introducing more noise in earnings compared with a small
number of affiliates. We code 1 if a chaebol has a number of affiliates greater than 28, the
median of the 30 chaebols, and otherwise. Table 8 shows that Top 5 chaebols have more
than twice as many affiliates as the bottom Top 5 chaebols do.
Table 9 presents the regression results for subsamples of chaebol affiliates. The first two
columns (Models 3h and 3i) compare the results between the Top 5 and non-Top 5 chaebols.
The Top 5 chaebols do not show a consistent pattern for ownership variables. The owner-
largest shareholder variable is not significant, and the institutions variable has an opposite
sign. On the other hand, for the non-Top 5 chaebols, the owner-largest shareholder is weakly
significant. For institutions, it is positive and significant, and the blockholders variable is not
significant. These results indicate that the insignificance of the owner-largest shareholder
variable for chaebol companies reported in Table 7 is largely driven by the Top 5 chaebols,
which have more distinctive characteristics of chaebols.
A similar inference is drawn fi^om the results reported in the last two columns of Table 9
(Models 3j and 3k) that compare chaebols based on the number of affiliates. The chaebols
with a larger number of affiliates (that are more characteristic of the chaebol) do not show
significance on the owner- largest shareholder variable consistent with the model for the Top
5 chaebols. Other ownership variables are also similar to those reported in the first two
columns. The results reported in Tables 7 and 9 suggest that expropriation of minority
shareholders and/or management entrenchment tends to occur in chaebol companies as the
owner-largest shareholder's holdings increase, and earnings informativeness decreases. This
Table 8
Number of affiliates for Korean chaebols
Summary statistics Classification
Top 5 Chaebols Chaebols ranked between 6 and 30 Top 30 Chaebols
33.30
28
15.28
7
59
Mean 50.90 23.70
Median 58 25
S.E. 10.43 6.33
Min 31 7
Max 59 36
/ statistics -41.89 (.0001) -41.89 (.0001)
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Table 9
Cross-sectional regression of stock returns on earnings for Korean chaebols
Explanatory variables Chaebol classification
Top 5 based on total assets Number of affiliates
Top 5 Chaebols Non-Top 5 Chaebols Above the median Below the median
Model 3h Model 3i Model 3j Model 3k
EP
EPxOWN
EP X INST
EP X BLOCK
SIZE
DEBT
RISK
GRWTH
PERS
Number of observations
Adjusted R- (%)
4.4990* (.0765)
1.6876 (.5038)
- 0.6704 (.7897)
4.9135*** (.0001)
-0.0193 (.8060)
-0.3987 (.6625)
-0.2096 (.7214)
0.1332 (.2227)
0.1907 (.4292)
206
32.12
1.3508** (.0437)
0.9892* (.0726)
2.8308*** (.0005)
-0.5775 (.3782)
0.0140 (.8379)
-0.7901 (.1538)
0.3021 (.4204)
0.2580*** (.0004)
-0.0140 (.7161)
376
24.09
3.3326 (.1115)
1.6172 (.4317)
0.8282 (.6876)
2.6725*** (.0050)
-0.0119 (.8645)
-0.6398 (.3445)
-0.0965 (.8510)
0.2123** (.0121)
0.1670 (.4639)
291
32.54
1.1803* (.0897)
1.4269** (.0446)
2.2416** (.0129)
-0.4187 (.5651)
0.0231 (.7637)
-0.8409 (.1887)
0.4604 (.2675)
0.2216** (.0133)
-0.0092 (.8201)
291
23.84
Model: RET=Z)o+/>i EP+Zj.EP x OWN+ZjjEP x INST+64EP x BLOCK+65SIZE+66DEBT+67RISK+
&8GRWTH+ft9PERS+e,2.
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Exhibit 1
.
* Statistically significant at the . 1 level (see /^-values in parentheses).
* * Statistically significant at the .05 level (see p-values in parentheses).
* * * Statistically significant at the .01 level (see p-values in parentheses).
phenomenon is stronger for the group of sample firms with more distinctive characteristics of
the chaebol.
6. Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between earnings informativeness and corporate
ownership structure in Korea. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominant
role of an owner- largest shareholder. The owner- largest shareholder in Korea, typically a
founder or his immediate family, usually participates in firm management directly or
indirectly, and influences most of the management decisions.
We first examined the relationship between the holdings of owner- largest shareholder and
earnings informativeness. In the Jensen and Meckling (1976) framework, there is a reduction
in agency costs as the owner-manager's holdings increase. If the market perceives that the
owner-largest shareholder's holdings are value-increasing, convergence of interest between
the owner-manager and outside shareholders occurs and a positive relationship is expected
between earnings informativeness and the holdings of owner- largest shareholder. On the
other hand, management entrenchment could occur as owner-manager's holdings increase.
In this case, we expect earnings quality and earnings infonnativeness to decrease. The results
in general support the convergence of interest hypothesis and the positive relationship
between earnings informativeness and the owner- largest shareholder.
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We then examined the role of institutions and blockholders, proposing two opposing
hypotheses—an active monitoring role and a strategic alliance hypothesis. The results, as
manifested in eamings informativeness, suggest that institutions and blockholders generally
play an active monitoring role. Also, we showed that the positive relationship between
eamings and the holdings of owner- largest shareholder is more obvious when the owner-
largest shareholder is an individual rather than a corporate shareholder.
Finally, we investigated eamings informativeness for chaebol companies as opposed to
nonchaebol companies, and find that the owner- largest shareholder variable for chaebol
companies is insignificant while it is positive and significant for nonchaebol companies. The
results appear to indicate that expropriation of minority shareholders and management
entrenchment dominate convergence of interest for chaebol companies, reducing eamings
quality and informativeness. The phenomenon is more apparent for the group of sample firms
with more distinctive characteristics of chaebol companies, i.e., the Top 5 chaebol companies
and chaebols with a large number of affiliates.
Exhibit 1
Definitions of variables used in the study
Dependent variable
RET annual returns of stocks; measured by subtracting the stock price at the
beginning of year from the fiscal year-end stock price, which is deflated by
the beginning-year stock price.
Independent variables
EP
OWN
INST
BLOCK
SIZE
RISK
GRWTH
PERS
eamings per share deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the year.
coded as 1 if the percentage of stocks held by the owner-largest shareholder
is above the median of the sample firms and otherwise.
coded as 1 if the percentage of stocks held by institutional investors is above
the median of the sample firms and otherwise; institutions include banks,
security firms, and insurance companies.
coded as 1 if the percentage of stocks held by large blockholders is greater than
5 percent and otherwise; large blockholders are defined as the investors who
own at least 5% of stocks.
logarithm of sales revenue.
risk of a firm measured as market beta.
growth prospect of a fum measured as Tobin's Q; the Q ratio is computed as
the market value of equity divided by book value of equity.
persistence of eamings measured by the autocorrelation coefficient
of eamings during the period 1993-1998.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Korea Research Foundation Grant (no. 2001-042-
C00109). The second author is grateful for the research grant provided by IBRD.
324 K. Jung, S.Y. Kwon / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 301-325
References
Admati, A. R., Pfeiderer, P., & Zechner, J. (1994). Large shareholder activism, risk sharing, and financial market
equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy, 1097-1130.
Bae, K.-H., Kang, J.-K., & Kim, J.-M. (2001). Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean
business groups. Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
Billings, B. (1999, April). Revisiting the relation between the default risk of debt and the earnings response
coefficients. Accounting Review, 509-522.
Bushee, B. (1998). Institutional investors, long-term investment, and earnings management. Accounting Review,
305-333.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, S. L., & Fan, J. (1999). Diversification and efficiency ofinvestment ofEast Asian
corporations. Working paper.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, S. L., & Fan, J. (2000). On expropriation of minority shareholders: evidence
from East Asia. Working paper.
Collins, D., & Kothari, S. P. (1989, July). An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of
earnings response coefficients. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 139-157.
Collins, D., Pincus, M., & Xie, H. (1999, January). Equity valuation and negative earnings: the role of book value
of equity. Accounting Review, 29-62.
Easton, P. D., & Zmijewski, M. E. (1989, July). Cross-sectional variation in stock market response to accounting
earnings announcements. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 117-141.
Fan, J., & Wong, T. J. (2000). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in
East Asia. Working paper. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Graves, S. B. (1988). Institutional ownership and corporate R&D in the computer industry. Academy ofManage-
ment Journal, 417-428.
Han, B. H. (1998, March). Has the usefulness of accounting earnings information improved in the Korean stock
market? Korean Accounting Review, 1-24.
Hayn,C. (1995, September). l\\QmiormdX\onconitn\.onos.SQS. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 20, 125-153.
Jensen, M. C, & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership
structure. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 305-360.
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings, 90, 22-21
.
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top executive rewards and firm performance: a comparison of Japan and the US. Journal of
Political Economy, 102, 510-546.
Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A. (1994). Outside activity in Japanese companies: determinants and managerial
implications. Journal of Financial Economics, 36, 225-258.
Kim, J. J. (2000). A study of the impact of signs of earnings level and change, and earnings management of
earnings response coefficient. Korean Accounting Review, 1-25.
Kim, J., Krinsky, I., & Lee, J. (1997). Institutional holdings and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings
announcement. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 1-14.
Kormendi, R., & Lipe, R. (1987). Earnings innovation, earnings persistence and stock returns. Journal of Busi-
ness, 323-346.
La Porta, R., de Silanes, F. L., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. Journal of
Finance, 5^,471-518.
Morck, R., Nakamura, M., & Shivdasani, A. (2000). Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan. Journal
of Business, 73, 539-567.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical
analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 293-315.
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contest and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,
237-265.
Rajgopal, S., Venkatachalam, M., & Jiambalvo, J. (1999). Is institutional ownership associated with earnings
K. Jung. S. Y. Kwon / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 301-325 325
management and the extent to which prices reflectfuture earnings? Working paper. University of Washington
and Stanford University.
Shleifer, A., & Vishney, R. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94,
461-488.
Shleifer, A., & Vishney, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52, 13)1 -1%?).
Warfield, T., Wild, J. J., & Wild. K. (1995). Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of
earnings. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 61 -91.
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: a ten year perspective. Accounting Review,
65, 131-156.
Zmijewski, M., & Hagerman, R. (1981). An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting
standards setting/choice. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 3, 129-149.

The
„ International
Pergamon journal of
The International Journal of Accounting Accounting
37 (2002) 327-346 ^=^^^=
Harmonization of the auditor's report
Jagdish S. Gangolly^, Mohamed E. Hussein^'*,
Gim S, Seow^, Kinsun Tam^
^State University ofNew York at Albany, Albany, NY, USA
Department ofAccounting, School ofBusiness Administration, University of Connecticut,
2100 Hillside Road, Unit 1041A, Storrs, CT 06269-1049, USA
Accepted 25 June 2002
Abstract
International effoits to harmonize the audit report, spearheaded by the International Auditing
Practices Committee of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), culminated in the issuance
of International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 13 in 1983. The stated purpose of ISA 13 was to:
"provide guidance to auditors on the form and content of the auditor's report issued in connection with
the independent audit of the financial statements of any entity." The purpose of this paper is to assess
whether ISA 13 has resulted in greater international harmonization of audit reports. We assess the level
of harmonization both by examining the extent to which countries have adopted ISA 1 3 and by the
extent to which the content of the auditor's report has changed. A survey of IFAC's member
organizations in 86 countries netted 50 responses. Eighty-six percent of respondents (and 93% of
respondents fi^om developing and emerging economies) said they have achieved harmonization with
ISA 13. We compared the auditor's reports (in financial reports) of 450 companies in 33 IFAC member
countries on two different dates (a pre-ISA 13 date and a post-ISA 13 date). The results suggest a
higher degree of conformity with the standard for the post-ISA 13 reports. Finally, cluster analysis was
conducted to explore the dynamics of clustering fi-om pre-ISA 13 to post-ISA 13 regimes. A slight
drop in the divisiveness coefficient (DC) was observed for the total audit report elements as well as for
the form elements, suggesting a less cohesive cluster structure for the post-ISA 13 regime. The
empirical evidence, taken as a whole, shows reduced diversity of practices and standards involving the
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audit report since the issuance of ISA 13. This conclusion should provide encouragement for
international standard-setters.
© 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The globalization of capital markets and the growth of international capital flows have
heightened the significance of cross-national comprehension of corporate financial reports as
well as the associated audit reports. The accounting literature is replete with assessments of
the harmonization efforts and the international differences in the financial accounting area
(Archer, McLeay, & Dufour, 1989; Doupnik & Taylor, 1985; Evans & Taylor, 1982;
Guenther & Hussein, 1995; McKinnon & Jannell, 1984; Nair & Frank, 1981; Nobes,
1987). However, there have been only three previous attempts to study the international
differences and harmonization in the auditing area (Archer et al, 1989; Hussein, Bavishi, &
GangoUy, 1986; Jones & Karbhari, 1996). This paper extends the work in the latter three
studies by assessing the impact of International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 13' on the
harmonization of audit reports. Since ISA 13 has been in effect for almost two decades, it
seems a valuable exercise to examine its impact on the harmonization of audit reports. An
assessment of the success of harmonization efforts and the extraction of any insights that can
improve the process should be of value to regulators, standard-setters, corporate executives,
and the accounting profession.
Intemational efforts to harmonize the audit report spearheaded by the Intemational
Auditing Practices Committee of the Intemational Federation of Accountants (IFAC),
culminated in the issuance of the ISA 13 in 1983. The stated purpose of ISA 13 was to
"provide guidance to auditors on the form and content of the auditor's report issued in
connection with the independent audit of the financial statements of any entity" (paragraph
2). The committee believed that "a measure of uniformity in the form and content of the
auditor's report is desirable because it helps to promote the reader's understanding." While
nearly two decades have passed since the issuance of ISA 13, to our knowledge, there has
been no study of its impact on harmonization. Our objective in this paper is to fill that
void.
The harmonization of the auditor's report is important because the report is a primary tool
auditor's use to communicate with financial statement users. The Cohen Commission
(AICPA, 1978) has emphasized the importance of the auditor's report (p. 71): "The auditor's
' At the time ofissuance oflSA 13, IFAC used the term Intemational Auditing Guidelines but later changed to
Intemational Standards on Auditing (ISA). In this paper, we use the term ISA to be consistent with the current
terminology.
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report is almost the only formal means used both to educate and inform users of financial
statements concerning the audit function." The Cohen Commission noted the importance the
profession put on a standardized report (p. 73): "Since 1933, the profession has supported the
use of a standardized report, the variation fi"om which an auditor could be called upon to
justify." Finally, the importance of the auditor's report is confirmed by the fact that 4 of the
10 generally accepted auditing standards are devoted to audit reporting.
The recognifion of the importance of the auditor's report is not limited to the United States.
For example, a commission set up by the Irish Institute of Chartered Accountants (1992)
recommended a greatly expanded auditor's report that should outline the steps taken in the
audit.
While the auditor's report is important in its own right, it also can contribute to the
improvement of accounting and auditing standards. The changes to the report to address the
expectation gap have brought to the forefront many of the issues of conducting the audit and
have led to many changes in GAAS. As another example, the Fourth Directive of the
European Community requires that the auditor's report include whether the financial state-
ments present a "true and fair view." By requiring auditors to attest that the financial
statements present a "true and fair view," the Fourth Directive has motivated EU accountants
and auditors to pursue changes in accounting and in the auditing process necessary to ensure
that the statements reflect a "true and fair view." Zeff (1993) reported that the Fourth
Directive's requirement not only sparked debate in Continental Europe but also among British
accountants: "U.K. accountants and auditors share the dilemma of Continental EC account-
ants in trying to understand how to apply the 'true and fair view' when judging financial
statements" (p. 404).
Finally, by requiring the auditor to express an opinion about whether the financial
statements "give a true and fair view (or presents fairly)," ISA 13 requires the auditor to
conduct the necessary auditing procedures to support his or her expressed opinion or risk
legal liability. When disclosure and auditing standards and procedures do not help the auditor
reach an opinion with confidence, there will be pressure to change those standards and
procedures.
In this article, we assess the impact of ISA 13 on audit reports by seeking answers to
questions such as: Has ISA 13 accomplished harmonization in that the audit reports
worldwide are now more uniform than they were prior to its issuance? Has such harmon-
ization been accomplished only in terms of the conformity of IFAC's member-countries'
standards to ISA 13 (de jure harmonization) or has such harmonization also permeated audit-
reporting practice to yield ISA 13 compliant audit reports (de facto harmonization)? The de
jure/de facto distinction is important because the enforcement of auditing standards cannot be
expected to be uniform across different countries. Moreover, some international auditing
firms may have encouraged their multinational clients to adopt intemational standards even
when their home countries may not have embraced those standards. We also examine the
shifts in the groupings of countries, from the pre- to the post-ISA 13 regimes, derived from a
stadstical analysis of audit-report-characteristics data on 450 corporations from 33 countries.
This analysis is important since earlier studies (e.g., Hussein et al., 1986) have shown the
existence of coalitions (such as US-influenced countries, the British Commonwealth,
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Continental Europe, and so on), and one consequence of international harmonization efforts is
the realignment of countries in such coalitions.
In the next section, we discuss the importance of harmonizing auditing standards,
especially the auditor's report and describe ISA 13. In Section 3, we present the empirical
study. In Section 4, we provide concluding observations.
2. Importance of harmonization
In this section, we provide arguments as to why harmonization of audit reports is
important, and briefly discuss the primary attempt at such harmonization in ISA 13. It is
well known that the audit report is the primary means of informing users of financial
statements about the results of the audit function (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1978), that it enhances the credibility of the information in corporate financial
reports (Jones & Karbhari, 1996), and that to be effective, the audit report should be clear,
unequivocal, and comprehensive (Stamp & Moonitz, 1978). We offer at least three arguments
why harmonization of the audit report assumes an even greater importance in an international
setting: (1) information asymmetry, (2) information search, and (3) standard-setting costs.
2.1. Information asymmetry
Since the legal, regulatory, and business environments (including accounting and auditing)
vary considerably fi-om country to country, financial statement users will typically be more
familiar with reports issued by domestic entities than those issued by foreign entides. This
gives rise to information asymmetries between these two classes of financial statement users.
Differences in the accounting and auditing standards as well as in the audit report exacerbate
such information asymmetries (see, for example. Archer et al., 1989). Harmonization of the
accounting and auditing standards in general and that of the audit report in particular help
alleviate such information asymmetries. Harmonization, consequently, can lead to more
efficient and effective allocation of resources in intemational capital markets.
2.2. Information search
Information asymmetry imposes search costs on all users of foreign corporate financial
statements. Investors have to incur costs to investigate investment opportunities, and
preparers have to incur costs to meet the credibility thresholds of capital suppliers from
many countries. Often, such costs have to be borne by those least able to bear them, for
example, firms from less developed countries. Harmonization reduces such costs.
2.3. Standard-setting costs
Developing standards is expensive, and in an intemational setting, the cost of commun-
icating and educating the rest of the world on the reasonableness of such national standards
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can be prohibitive. Sucli costs can impose an undue burden on both the suppHers and
consumers of capital in the international markets. Harmonization of standards benefits both
these classes in that it reduces the search costs for suppliers (often from the developed
countries) and also reduces the standard-setting costs for consumers (often from the less
developed countries). The general acceptance of international standards by many developing
countries lends support to this argument,
2.4. Literature review
While the focus in accounting literature has been on the harmonization of accounting, three
studies have dealt with the harmonization of the audit report. The first study, by Hussein et al.
(1986), investigated the similarities and differences in the audit reports issued in 27 countries
in the context of their conformity with the then exposure draft of ISA 13. They found
differences between the audit reports of various countries. Based on those differences,
countries in the study were clustered into five broad groups: US-influenced group (including
Canada); the British Commonwealth (including the Netherlands, but excluding Canada);
Austria and Germany; Italy and Spain; and the rest of Europe.
Archer et al. (1989, p. 79) compared the audit reports used in the annual reports of
European multinationals and documented "considerable variations in audit report practice
between countries, including EC member states, as well as certain reduction of variations."
Finally, Jones and Karbhari (1996) compared the English language versions of 1989 reports
in France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
They also found considerable diversity across countries and some diversity within countries.
While ISA 13 was not yet implemented at the time of the Hussein et al. (1986) study, for the
other two studies, it was perhaps too premature to account for its impact so soon after its
promulgation.
2.5. ISA 13: the auditor's report on financial statements
An exposure draft on the auditor's report was issued in February 1982 and ISA 13 was
finally promulgated in October 1983. Motivated by the belief that "a measure of uniformity
in the form and content of the auditor's report is desirable because it helps to promote the
reader's understanding" (paragraph 3), the stated purpose of ISA 13 was "to provide
guidance to auditors on the form and content of the auditor's report issued in connection
with the independent audit of the financial statements of any entity" (paragraph 2). Since its
issuance, ISA 13 has been revised twice (in 1989 and in 1993) to address issues related to the
form of the audit report and to provide clarifications of the standard (IFAC, 1995).
The ISA 13 requires the auditor's report to include the following elements (paragraphs 3-
13):
• Title: An appropriate title to help readers identify easily the report within an annual report.
• Addressee: The report should be appropriately addressed as required by the circumstances
of the engagement and local regulation.
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• The report should identify the financial statements that have been audited, including the
name of the entity and the date and periods covered by the financial statements.
• The report should indicate the auditing standards or practices followed in conducting the
audit. Unless otherwise stated, the auditing standards or practices are presumed to be
those of the country indicated by the auditor's address.
• The report should clearly set forth the auditor's opinion on the presentation in the financial
statements of the entity's financial position and the results of its operations.
• Signature: The report should be signed in the name of the audit firm, the personal name of
the auditor, or both as appropriate.
• Auditor's address: The report should name a specific location, which is usually the city in
which the auditor maintains his office.
• Report date: The report should be dated to inform the reader that the auditor has considered
subsequent events about which he became aware up to that date.
An important feature of ISA 13 is that it requires the auditor to express an opinion on
whether the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the
entity. This requirement helps ensure that the information satisfies the need of the
international users of financial statements. It describes four types of audit opinions that can
be expressed by the auditor: unqualified, qualified, adverse, and disclaimer of opinion. It also
discusses circumstances that may result in other than an unqualified opinion, which include
limitation of scope, disagreement with management, and uncertainty. The appendices to the
standard include suggested expressions for the different types of opinions. Although one can
debate whether ISA 1 3 is the best standard to meet the needs of the international users of
financial statements, it is the standard that IFAC member countries are expected to follow.
3. Empirical study
3.1. De jure harmonization
Promulgation of ISA by the IFAC usually sets in motion a process toward harmonization
in all member countries by the affirmation of such standards by individual countries through
amendment of laws or national standards. We call this de jure harmonization. On the other
hand, we define de facto harmonization as the result of global economic and competitive
forces that lead to following such international standards in practice.
The IFAC member organizations examine their current standards to determine what is
required to bring them in harmony with the ISAs. Since the regulatory and professional
environments vary from country to country, one would expect variations in the harmonization
across IFAC membership. While it is perhaps more appropriate to measure hannonization at
the level of practice as Tay and Parker (1990) have suggested, we consider an examination of
de jure harmonization to be important since it sheds light on the seriousness with which IFAC
members view the ISAs. While de facto harmonization is dictated by the competitive and
economic considerations of international capital markets, de jure harmonization provides
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insights into the poHtical viability of the harmonization process. The importance of assessing
the de jure harmonization is underscored by IFAC's survey of its members' adoption of ISAs
(IFAC Quarterly, April 1999)." However, IFAC's survey does not report separately the level
of harmonization of each ISA. As a resuh, one cannot tell from IFAC's survey which
countries have adopted ISA 13. Hence, there is still information to be gained in reporting the
de jure harmonization of ISA 13. Furthermore, reporting both de jure and de facto
harmonization in the same paper gives the reader a more complete picture of the harmon-
ization of the auditor's report.
The data for the de jure harmonization study were obtained by writing to IFAC member
organizations in 86 countries and asking them whether:
• They have a standard on the auditor's report, and
• If they have a standard on the auditor's report, whether it is harmonized with ISA 13.
They were also asked to provide a sample of the model auditor's report as well as a copy
of the current standard and/or regulation. The first survey was mailed in mid- 1995. Forty-
four countries initially responded to the survey. A second mailing was sent, in mid- 1 996, to
the organizations that did not respond originally or when responses were not clear. The
second mailing increased the number of responses from 44 to 50 countries (58% response).
We classified the responses as either harmonized or not harmonized, based on Tay and
Parker's (1990) definition of harmonization as "complete agreement or significant agree-
ment." Some of the respondents did not answer the question on harmonization directly but
sent us copies of their standards and/or a sample auditor's report. Some of the standards did
not mention the international standard explicitly, but comparisons showed a high level of
agreement with ISA 13. For example, the US is classified as harmonized because the
AICPA includes the ISA in the same publication as its Professional Standards and provides
a comparison between US standards and the intemational standards. A comparison between
ISA 13 and US standards reveals no significant differences. On the other hand, Germany is
classified as not harmonized because the statutory report is not harmonized with ISA 13.
However, German auditors are allowed to report in accordance with the intemational
standard. Therefore, if a German auditor takes advantage of such an opportunity, this is a
case of de facto harmonization rather than a de jure haraionization. In one case (Belgium),
we were not able to determine whether the country has harmonized or not, and classified it
as "not known." The results are in Table 1. Eighty-six percent (43 of 50) of the responding
countries have harmonized.
Intemational standards are seen as more important to the developing countries where
the poor quality of financial reporting may impede their ability to attract foreign
investors. In assessing the problems facing intemational investors in Africa's stock
markets. The Economist (1997, January 11-17, p. 67) observed: "Poor company
' IFAC's survey results show that 28% of the 65 respondents adopt ISAs in total, another 43% use ISAs in
developing their standards and have no significant differences, while the rest (29%) either have significant
differences or have not identified the differences.
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Table 1
De jure harmonization of the auditor's report
Audit report standards in conformity with ISA 13'
Yes No Not Known
Does the country have
audit report standards?
Yes Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Austria, Belgium
Barbados, Canada,'' Chile, Germany,''
China, Cyprus, Denmark, Italy,
Finland, France, Greece, Saudi Arabia,
Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Sweden
Jamaica, Japan,"* Jordan,
Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi,
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines,^
Singapore, South Africa,'' Spain,
Sri Lanka. Sudan, Swaziland,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom,
United States,"* Venezuela, Zimbabwe
No Botswana, Nigeria Egypt (None)
Harmonization implicit in the text of the standard or in the sample auditor's report.
The law allows the auditors to issue reports in compliance with ISA 13.
reporting and weak accounting rules make matters difficult [for foreign investors]." For
the developing and emerging countries, adopting international standards is a less costly
alternative to developing their own standards. Twenty-five of the 27 developing countries
that responded have harmonized. Among them are Nigeria and Botswana, which have no
auditing standards of their own but have adopted ISA 13. We consider this evidence that
developing countries find international standards a valuable resource for improving their
accounting and auditing practices. Up to 86% of all respondents (and 93% among the
developing respondents) have achieved harmonization with ISA 13. Thus, the conclusion
that the current audit reports as required under the national standards are substantially
harmonized is perhaps justified.^
3.2. De facto harmonization
While de jure harmonization of the audit report is important, the ultimate objective of
harmonization is to bring about some measure of uniformity in accounting and auditing
practice. In as much as the enforcement of standards is not uniform across countries, an
analysis of the content of actual audit reports can provide important information about the
^ Of the 36 nonresponding countries, 8 are from Africa, 10 from Asia and the Middle East, 14 from Latin
America, and 4 from Europe. The high nonresponse from developing countries might have some impact on the
survey results.
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variability of enforcement and the level of conformity with the international standard. It is
with this in mind that this part of the study was initiated.
The sample is comprised of audit reports in the annual reports of 450 companies from 33
countries found in the collections of The Center for Transnational Accounting and Financial
Research (CTFAR) at the University of Connecticut and the Baker Library of Harvard
Business School. Table 2 reports the number of companies from each country and provides
industry and size data on the sample firms. The sample companies are large in terms of sales
and assets, many of them are in manufacturing, with a smaller number in the financial and
Table 2
Sample description (1992/1993)
Country Mfg Fm Svcs Total Mean sales
(in US$ mil)
Mean total assets
(in US$ mil)
Australia 7 2 2 9 2800 10,841
Austria 6 2 1 9 1959 11,422
Belgium 7 2 2 11 2489 5262
Brazil 7 2 1 10
Canada 33 8 4 45 5706 8901
Denmark 4 3 1 8 1093 8143
Finland 2 1 3 1386 5494
France 14 3 2 19 4819 23,389
Germany 18 3 2 23 7571 19,221
Greece 4 7 11 623 7047
Hong Kong 3 6 2 11 563 5916
India 9 1 10 662 3416
Ireland 6 2 1 9 1622 5688
Italy 2 3 5 2897 5736
Japan 21 10 3 34 13,139 66,889
Korea 3 3 6 1705 11,888
Malaysia 8 1 2 11 369 1334
Netheriands 18 5 3 26 2295 12,760
New Zealand 7 2 1 10 971 2641
Norway 7 1 2 10 3037 5015
Singapore 4 2 4 10 446 3665
South Africa 13 1 1 15 1315 1997
Sweden 12 5 3 20 2546 12,019
Switzeriand 3 4 2 9 2095 41,073
Taiwan 8 1 1 10 4252 6784
Thailand 5 4 1 10 864 3884
Turkey 1 3 4
United Kingdom 29 6 2 37 3335 12,179
United States 13 1 3 17 4911 10,962
For non-US firms, their sales and total assets numbers were converted into US$ using the exchange rates
prevailing at the financial statement dates. Foreign exchange data were obtained ft-om the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis. Due to currency changes and/or highly inflationary environments, we are unable to convert data for
firms domiciled in Brazil and Turkey.
Sales and assets for fiscal year 1992/1993.
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service industries. The main criteria for the inclusion of a country in this study are that the
country must be an IFAC member, and that the annual report collection contain at least two
annual reports of two companies from that country. Also, at least one annual report each had
to be in the collection for the pre-ISA 13 period (1983-1984) and the post-ISA 13 period
(1993-1994). The reason for choosing the two dates was to compare the conformity to ISA
13 of reports issued a decade after its promulgation to those issued prior to ISA 13. We
assume that a decade is sufficient time for the standard to be assimilated by the audit
profession in the IFAC member countries."^
As might be expected, many of the annual reports were in languages other than English.
International students enrolled in a full-time MBA (accounting concentration) Program
translated the foreign language audit reports into English. The content audit reports was
analyzed for conformity with ISA 13 by accounting doctoral students using a standardized
form based on ISA 13 elements (see Appendix A). Each element in Appendix A is binary in
that an audit report either has the element or does not (coded as 1 and 0, respectively). The
total score is computed as the sum of all 1 's. This score is then used as a measure of the extent
of harmonization between an auditor's report and ISA 13. Both Hussein et al. (1986) and
Archer et al. (1989) used similar measures.
3.3. Overall data characteristics
The comparison across countries is made simpler by the fact that a high percentage of
corporations received an unqualified audit opinion. Of the 450 audit reports, 418 in pre-ISA
13 reports and 425 in post-ISA 13 reports included unqualified opinions. The majority of
qualified opinions were due to the use of inappropriate accounting principles. Table 3
summarizes the data set in terms of the scores on the various elements of the audit report
mandated in ISA 13. A comparison of the pre- and post-ISA 13 data reveals that the
disclosure that "the financial statements are management's responsibility" increased from
to 157 reports, the disclosure that "the audit provides a reasonable basis for opinion"
increased from 28 to 152 reports, and the number of audit reports that have separate
introductory/scope/opinion paragraphs increased from 191 to 280 reports. Also, the use of
the phrases "present fairly" or "true and fair view" has increased significantly in several
countries: in Austria from zero to eight of nine reports, in Germany from one to 19 of 23
reports, in Italy from zero to two of five reports, and in Denmark from five to eight of eight
reports. Only two countries (Sweden and Finland) did not use such phraseology in their
audit reports. Apparently, the European Community's Fourth Directive mandating the use
of such phraseology might have had an important role in this behavior in Austria,
Denmark, Germany, and Italy. Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995 after the period
of the study.
'* Another reason is that when we attempt to use more recent years for the post-ISA reports, we lose a
significant number of firms in our sample because they have either been merged/taken over or went out of
business.
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Table 3
Analysis of individual elements in auditor's report
Item Description Pre Post Change
Opinion
Audita?- s report:
2. Title
3. Addressee
4 Report indexed
5. Auditor's signature
^
6. Auditor's address stated
7. Date of auditor's report stated
8. Introductory, scope and opinion paragraphs separate
Intivductoiy paragraph:
9. Financial statements audited identified
10. Entity audited identified
1
1
. Period covered stated
12. Financial statements—responsibility of management
Scope parag)-aph:
13. Reference to auditing standards followed
14. Audit provides reasonable basis for opinion
Opinion paragraph:
15. Present fairly or true and fair view
16. Conformity with accounting standards
17. Conformity with the law
450 450
406 436 + 30
313 322 + 9
258 258
442 446 + 4
306 320 + 14
439 447 + 8
191 280 + 89
261 255 -6
270 297 + 27
323 326 + 3
157 + 157
285 381 + 96
28 152 + 124
357 397 + 40
220 273 + 53
249 275 + 26
3.4. Dispersion of total score and ISA 13
The primary aim of harmonization efforts, in the context of the audit report, is to bring
about uniformity. Effectiveness of such harmonization efforts can be measured by the
reduction in the dispersion of audit-report elements. We use the Kolmogorov-Smimov
(KS) test and the Wald-Wolfowitz (WW) test (Siegel, 1956) to test the null hypothesis that
there is no difference in the dispersion of audit reports between the two regimes (pre-ISA 1
3
and post-ISA 13)."^ The KS test compares the two cumulative distributions for differences in
the dispersions between pre- and post-ISA 13 audit reports, whereas the WW test uses the
Before performing statistical tests, we conducted tests for normality of data by computing skewness
(symmetry around the mean) and kurtosis (steepness of the distribution around the mean) for the data set. The
skewness measures for the total scores of both pre-ISA 13 and post-ISA 13 regimes are negative, revealing a high
rate of conformity with the standard. The negative kurtosis measure for the post-ISA 13 total scores suggests a
platykurtic distribution (i.e., a flatter distribution with fat tails). Since both test results indicate a departure from
normality, we used nonparametric tests for testing the various hypotheses.
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Fig. 1. Frequency distribution of firms pre- vs. post-ISA 13 scores. A score of 17 is a 100% agreement with ISA
13 (see Appendix A for the scoring form).
rank orders of the observations in the two samples to determine whether there is a difference
in the dispersions. The null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two regimes is
rejected by both the KS and WW tests (Z=3.33, P<.01; Z= 16.74, P<.01, one-tailed,
respectively). Therefore, we conclude that post-ISA 13 audit reports do differ from the pre-
ISA 13 audit reports in terms of dispersion.
Fig. 1 provides a plot of the frequency distributions of the total scores for the pre- and post-
ISA 13 regimes. It can clearly be seen from that figure that the distribution of scores has
shifted to the right since the implementation of ISA 13, suggesting an increased conformity
with the standard. There is ample evidence in our data set to suggest that the dispersion in the
audit reports has changed since the implementation of ISA 13.
3.5. Pre-/Post-ISA 13 differences in conformity with ISA 13
If ISA 13 was successful in its harmonizing efforts, one would expect a larger number
of audit reports to be in conformity with the standard for the post-ISA 13 regime. We
tested the null hypothesis of no difference between the total scores of the two regimes
using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This is more powerfiil than the sign test since it
uses rank infomiation as well (Daniel, 1990, pp. 38-39). A comparison of the pre- and
post-ISA 13 pairs of audit reports of the 450 corporations from 33 countries shows a
statistically significant difference (Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic = 12.83, P<.01, two-
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tailed) leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis. Also presented in Table 4 are
country-specific comparisons. For 21 of the 33 countries, the differences between the pre-
ISA 13 data and the post-ISA 13 data are marginally significant (P<.\0). However, in
cases of Greece and India, their pre-ISA 13 scores are higher than the post-ISA 13
scores. The countries for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected all have a small
number of firms in our data set (Finland with three, Italy with five, Turkey with four,
and Spain with only two).
Table 4
De facto harmonization results
Pre > Post Post>Pre Pre = Post Total Z* P value * *
Full sample 71 284 95 450 12.83 .0000
NonUS 71 268 94 433 12.28 .0000
Australia 10 1 11 2.80 .00511
Austria 8 1 9 2.52 .0117
Belgium 2 9 11 1.51 .1307
Brazil 9 1 10 2.67 .0077
Canada 44 1 45 5.78 .0000
Denmark 3 4 1 8 0.68 .4990
Finland 1 2 3 1.00 .3173
France 7 6 6 19 0.94 .3454
Germany 1 18 4 23 3.70 .0002
Greece 8 1 2 11 2.13 .0330
Hong Kong 4 7 11 1.83 .0679
India 6 4 10 2.20 .0277
Ireland 3 7 10 1.84 .0665
Israel 2 8 10 2.34 .191
Italy 1 3 1 5 1.29 .2012
Japan 12 13 9 34 1.63 .1036
Korea 2 2 3 7 0.00 .9999
Malaysia 4 7 11 1.83 .0679
Netherlands 2 23 1 26 4.02 .0001
New Zealand 3 3 4 10 0.11 .9165
Norway 9 1 10 2.67 .0077
Pakistan 7 1 8 2.37 .0180
Philippines 10 1 11 2.80 .0051
Singapore 10 10 2.80 .0051
South Africa 15 15 3.41 .0007
Spain 2 2 1.34 .1797
Sweden 6 8 7 21 1.00 .3152
Switzerland 1 6 2 9 2.03 .0425
Taiwan 3 5 2 10 1.19 .2340
Thailand 3 2 5 10 0.41 .6858
Turkey 1 3 4 1.00 .3173
UK 6 16 17 39 2.78 .0055
US 16 1 17 3.52 .0004
* Based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
** Two-tailed.
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Table 5
Auditor's report harmonization and auditor type
Auditor type Pre-ISA 13 mean rank Post-ISA 13 mean rank
Big-6/8
Non-Big-6/8
Mann-Whitney U
243.89 (153)"
216.03 (297)"
19,907.5 (.0302)**
240.14(284)"
200.45 (166)"
19,413.0 (.0017)**
" Number of observations.
* * Two-tailed P value.
3.6. Big-6 audit reports conformity with ISA 13
The importance of the harmonization of the audit report to the large intemational
accounting firms is well documented in the accounting literature. The requirements of large
multinational corporations that usually engage large accounting firms for audit services, and
the need to control audit costs (and standardization does reduce audit costs) provide unique
incentives to the large accounting firms to influence as well as benefit fi-om harmonization. It
follows that the audit reports issued by the large (Big-6/8) accounting firms tend to be better
harmonized relative to those of smaller accounting firms. We first segregated the data set by
the type of auditor and tested the differences, using the Mann-Whitney t/test, for the pre- as
well as the post-ISA 13 reports between the Big-6/8 and non-Big-6/8 auditors. The results, in
Table 5 show no difference between the two groups of auditors (Mann-Whitney U
statistic =19,908, P<.03) for the pre-ISA 13 and (Mann-Whitney t/= 19,413, P<.01)
post-ISA 13 data.
While the above results are significant, our data set includes inconsistencies. We examine
the audit reports at two different dates and the audit reports for any company at those two
dates may be issued by different accounting firms. To account for such inconsistencies, we
analyze the data set considering four cases: both pre- and post-ISA 13 reports by Big-6/8
auditors, both pre- and post-ISA 13 reports by non-Big-6/8 auditors, audit reports with
switches from a non-Big-6/8 auditor in the pre-ISA 13 period to a Big-6/8 auditor in the post-
ISA 1 3 period, and finally, the audit reports with switches fi"om a Big-6/8 auditor in the pre-
ISA 13 period to a non-Big-6/8 auditor in the post-ISA 13 period. We tested the null
hypothesis (of no difference between pre- and post-ISA 13 data) for these four cases using the
Mann-Whitney Latest. The results indicate significant differences between pre- and post-ISA
1 3 data for all the cases except for the corporations that switched from a Big-6/8 auditor in the
pre-ISA 13 regime to a non-Big-6/8 in the post-ISA 13 regime. The data set provides some
evidence that the large accounting firms, with substantial stakes in the harmonization efforts,
issue auditor's reports that adhere closely to IAS 13.
3.7. Clustering of countries by audit report characteristics
The process of harmonization in accounting and auditing takes place in a political
environment where cultural and economic influences exert pressures on countries to form
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blocs of similar practice, a fact widely accepted in the accounting literature (see Nobes &
Parker, 1998). One can therefore expect to observe a reduction in the diversity of practice as
well as the movement of countries from bloc to bloc depending on their economic, trade, and
cultural attributes. Our results in the earlier sections in this paper indicate a measure of
success of the harmonization efforts in bringing about a reduction in the diversity of practice.
In this section, we analyze our data set to explore the dynamics of clustering of countries from
pre-ISA 13 to post-ISA 13 regimes.
Hussein et al. (1986) examined corporate audit reports issued during pre-ISA 13 years
in terms of their conformity with the ISA 13 exposure draft. They found three primary
clusters of countries: the British Commonwealth, Continental Europe, and US-influenced
countries. That study ftirther concluded that there were substantial differences within the
European group, to support viewing Italy and Spain on the one hand and Germany and
Austria on the other as distinct groups within Europe. Since that study was conducted
before the promulgation of ISA 13, it did not assess the harmonization of the audit report
after the issuance of ISA 13. In this study, since we had information on audit reports at
two different dates (pre- and post-ISA 13), we subjected our data set to statistical
analysis to derive the cluster structure. For the rest of this paper, we discuss the results
of this analysis.
In this study, we performed divisive clustering^ using DIANA^ and confirmed the results
using agglomerative clustering.^ The results of divisive clustering in DIANA, like those of
other hierarchical clustering methods, are usually displayed in the form of dendrograms. A
dendrogram shows graphically the order in which the cluster division takes place, as well as
the diameter of the clusters. The results are summarized in a "divisiveness coefficient" (DC).
The DC measures the sfrength of support for the cluster hypothesis, and is measured on a
^ There are basically two kinds of hierarchical clustering methods: (1) agglomerative methods, which start
with data points as individual clusters and then successively derive larger clusters by grouping such basic data
points based on the measures of similarities/dissimilarities, and (2) divisive methods, which at the outset treat the
entire set of data points in the data set as a single cluster and then successively divide it into smaller clusters by
separating data points which are least similar (or most dissimilar). Studies in the social sciences typically confirm
the resuhs of one method, say divisive clustering, using another method, say agglomerative clustering. Divisive
methods that employ complex clustering algorithms are computationally very intensive. Therefore, until recently,
they have not been very popular in spite of their attractive features. However, the increased sophistication of
computer hardware and software has made divisive clustering viable and, in fact, attractive (Kaufman &
Rousseeuw, 1991).
Based on the divisive clustering algorithm of McNaughton-Smith et al. (1964) described in Kaufman and
Rousseeuw (1991) and implemented in the exploratory data analysis language S-Plus (Venables & Ripley, 1996).
Divisive clustering is attractive because of the natural interpretation of coalition formation in the political arena
provided in Kaufman and Rousseeuw: the algorithm proceeds the way a political party might split due to inner
conflicts; the most discontented member leaves the cluster and starts a splinter group, others follow suit until an
equilibrium is attained. This is implemented by identifying the most discontented member as the one whose
average dissimilarity with the rest of the members in the group is the highest.
^ We used the agglomerative nesting algorithm of Kaufinan and Rousseeuw (1991) as implemented in the
program AGNES in S-Plus.
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scale that lies between and 1 . The closer a DC is to 1 , the greater is the strength of support
for the cluster hypothesis. Kaufman and Rousseeuw consider a DC of 0.6 for analysis using
DIANA to be good support for the cluster hypothesis in the social sciences. In the natural
sciences, where the clustering is determined by natural laws, such coefficients are usually
larger.
For each element of the audit report and for each country, we computed the percentage
of conformity with ISA 13. An element was considered in the analysis only if at least
one country was different (i.e., not all countries were fiilly conforming or fully
nonconforming to ISA 13 for that element). Based on this cluster analysis, the DCs
are 0.66 versus 0.63 for the pre- and post-ISA 13 regimes, respectively. This suggests
relatively fewer cohesive clusters in the post-ISA 13 regime compared with the pre-ISA
13 regime.*^ This observation provides a measure of support for the hypothesis that the
Hierarchical clustering is a non-deterministic procedure and not based on any statistical assumptions, and
therefore there are no statistical tests of significance for the divisiveness coefficients. However, as we have stated
before, the higher the DC, the higher the support for cluster hypothesis.
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Table 6
Divisive clustering results for the total score of audit report elements
Group or mo\'ement Countries
Core British Commonwealth (BC) group
Core US-influenced group (US)
Core European group
Moved BC group to US group
Moved US group to a separate group
Moved European group to US group
Outliers moved to US group
Ireland, United Kingdom, Malaysia, Hong Kong,
New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore
Brazil, Canada, United States, Philippines,
Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan
Austria, Gennany, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey
Australia
Korea, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, India
Norway
Israel, Netherlands
old-fashioned clustering of countries around geopolitical areas may be slowly breaking
down, a precondition for harmonization.
Fig. 2 shows the dendrogram results of cluster analysis using DIANA for the total
score of the audit report for both pre-ISA 13 (totSOdata.matrix) and post-ISA 13
(tot90data.matrix) data. It can be seen from the dendrogram results for pre-ISA 13 data
that at an appropriate height in the hierarchy, say 2.6, there are three clusters consisting
of British Commonwealth (Australia, Ireland, United Kingdom, Malaysia, Hong Kong,
New Zealand, South Africa, and Singapore), Europe (Austria, Germany, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey), and the US-influenced
group (Brazil, Korea, Canada, United States, Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand), and a
number of countries who were classified in different groups in earlier studies (Hussein et
al., 1986), viz., Spain, France, Italy, Greece, India, and Pakistan. The Netherlands and
Israel are clearly outliers.
Based on the clustering results in Fig. 2, we identify in Table 6 core countries for the
three groups (British Commonwealth, US-influenced, and European). Core countries are
defined here as those that did not change clusters from pre-ISA 13 to post-ISA 13
regime. As can be seen from Table 6, the significant movements are of Australia to the
US-influenced group (from the British Commonwealth), Norway from the European
group to the US-influenced group, and the move to a new group (separate but closer
to the US group than to any other group), of countries (Korea, Spain, France, Italy,
Greece, and India) whose classification for the pre-ISA 13 regime differed from that
of earlier studies in Hussein et al. (1986), as can be visualized from the dendrograms in
Fig. 2.
To summarize the clustering results, we find some weak support for a gradual
breakdown of the pre-ISA 13 clusters as evidenced by a reduction in the DCs from 0.66
to 0.63. We also find, at the level of audit reports as a whole, some support for movement
of some countries (especially Australia and Norway to the US-influenced group, and the
movement of outliers, Israel and the Netherlands, also towards the US-influenced group).
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This result seems justified in liglit of the dynamics of international political and trade
relations.
4. Concluding observations
In this paper, we attempt to determine whether there is an association between the ISA
13 and the harmonization of the audit report standards and the audit reports issued, by
surveying IFAC members and analyzing the audit reports of 450 companies from 33
countries at two different points in time, pre- and post-ISA 13. Eighty-six percent of the
member countries who responded have harmonized their audit-reporting standards to ISA
13; the percentage is even higher (93%) for developing countries. The analysis of audit
reports suggests greater conformity with the ISA 13 for the post-ISA 13 regime.
However, when we compare the audit reports issued by Big-6/8 firms with those issued
by non-Big-6/8 firms, we find lower levels of harmonization for firms that switched from
Big-6/8 auditors to non-Big-6/8 auditors. This, in our view, reflects the role that the large
accounting firms play in the harmonization of the audit report. Cluster analysis was
performed to see whether the groupings found in the Hussein et al. (1986) study have
been impacted by ISA 13. The results suggest less cohesive cluster structure for the post-
ISA 13 reports. Based on this analysis, we conclude that the harmonization of the audit
report has increased since the issuance of ISA 13.
Harmonization is influenced by many factors. For example, the EC's Fourth Directive and
the increasing rate of global capital market activities may also have enhanced the increased
harmonization of the auditor's report. However, the presence of an international organization
(IFAC) makes harmonization more efficient by reducing duplication of efforts. Furthermore,
it provides a valuable service to developing countries that may not have the resources to
develop their own accounting and auditing standards.
Finally, the paper uses data from several sources, and employs a number of statistical
techniques, including cluster analysis. We hope these will be useful to researchers of
accounting and auditing harmonization.
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Appendix A. Summary of form for scoring extent of harmonization with ISA 13
Name of Company
Country
Year of Annual Report
Sales
Assets
Auditor's Name International Firm [ ]
Domestic Finn [ ]
1. Opinion* I J
Auditor's Report:
2. Title [ ]
3. Addressee [ ]
4. Report Indexed [ ]
5. Auditor's Signature L J
6. Auditor's Address Stated [ ]
7. Dateof Auditor's Report Stated []
8. Introductory, Scope & Opinion Paragraphs Separate [ ]
Introductory Paragraph:
9. Financial Statements Audited Identified [ ]
10. Entity Audited Identified []
1 1
.
Period Covered Stated [ ]
12. Financial Statements ~ Responsibility of Management []
Scope Paragraph:
13. Reference to Auditing Standards Followed I J
14. Audit Provides Reasonable Basis for Opinion [ ]
Opinion Paragraph:
15. Present Fairly or True and Fair View []
1 6. Conformity with Accounting Standards [ 1
17. Conformity with the Law [ ]
Note:
* Types of opinions include unqualified, qualified (inappropriate accounting method, inadequate disclosure,
and scope limitation) disclaimer of opinion, and adverse opinion.
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Abstract
This study investigates bank loan officers' use of financial infoitnation and reports, in particular,
cash flow information and the statement of cash flow (SCF), in making lending decisions. Subjects
were drawn from four groups of frequent users of financial reports-bank loan officers, auditors,
financial analysts and accounting academics. Each subject was presented with the annual reports of
two loan applicant companies to make two independent lending decisions based on the information
provided. The SCF of one of the companies was presented in the direct format, while the other was
presented in the indirect format. The indirect format of SCF was used as a surrogate for the ftmds flow
statement. Results show that, while cash flow was the second most used financial information, the
majority of the subjects obtained this information from financial statements other than the SCF,
notably, the balance sheet. In terms of financial report usage, notes to the financial statements, rather
than the SCF, was most frequently used. No subject made use of the incremental information provided
in the SCF presented in the direct format. The results suggest that loan officers do not use the cash flow
information provided by the SCF, but rely on the accounting information provided in the FFS and
accrual-based financial reports.
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1. Introduction and objective
In this paper, I present the findings of a study on the usefulness of the statement of cash
flows (SCF) in lending decisions, and whether the decisions are affected by the information
provided by the two different methods of SCF presentation.
Financial reports provide information to help present and potential investors, creditors and
other users in assessing, among other things, cash receipts from dividends, interest and
proceeds from the sale, redemption or maturity of securities and loans. Financial statements
have evolved to include a SCF, which, in many developed countries, displaced the statement
of changes in financial position (FFS). The displacement was viewed as necessary for several
reasons: (a) to create an obscure connection between income and cash flows for the average
user; (b) to allow the term "funds" flow to mean several types of flows, including cash flow;
and (c) to accommodate the general ambiguity of the purpose or use of the statement (Heath,
1978; Ketz & Kochanek, 1982; Sorter, 1982). At the same time that standard setters and
regulators were beginning to listen to the concerns of financial statement users about the
ambiguity of the FFS, academic researchers (Donleavy, 1992; Maness, 1989; Staubus, 1989)
examined these concerns. Others (e.g., Emmanuel, 1988; Mahoney, Sever, & Theis, 1988;
Zega, 1988) provided evidential support showing the superiority of the "cash fiow" statement
over the "fiinds" flow statement in terms of data reliability and usefuhiess.
SCF is of direct relevance for specific decisions in the commercial lending area (Basu &
Rolfes, 1995; Boyd, 2000/2001; Clarke, 1996; Egginton, 1982; Foster, 1986). Therefore, the
change in the presentation from FFS to SCF should be meaningful to commercial loan
officers because they need to perform additional steps to convert FFS to arrive at the net cash
flow from operations.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the extent to which commercial loan officers rely
on the information provided by net funds from operations while ignoring the information
provided by net cash flow from operations, which could convey the extra information. This
leads to the first hypothesis tested in this study. If decision-makers ignore the additional
information conveyed by the SCF, is it likely that some decision-makers make the adjustment
from FFS to SCF? If so, does this cognition leads to their making different decisions? The
two hypotheses tested in this study are:
Hypothesis 1: Commercial loan officers ignore the information in the SCF that is
incremental to that in the fiinds flow statement.
Hypothesis 2: Cognitively converting from the funds flow statement to cash flow
affects the decisions made by commercial loan officers.
The question of interest in this study is whether the form of reporting affects the evaluation
made by commercial loan officers. Thus, the task consists of asking loan officers to examine
client financial information, assess cash flow objectives and recommend a loan. The variable
manipulated in the study is the form of reporting-FFS or SCF. To accomplish the objective of
this study, internal validity must be ascertained so that the changes in the loan decision are
attributed to the change in the explanatory variable (FFS or SCF). Therefore, subjects were
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asked to "think aloud" so that a verbal protocol analysis could be performed to establish the
causal links between the explanatory variable and the decisions made (Bouwman, 1985;
Ericsson & Simon, 1984, 1993). This methodology should illuminate the reasoning process
used by the subjects in making their choice of accounting variables and ultimately, the action
they decide to take.
2. Literature review
The literature of relevance in this study relates to the use of the SCF, an issue of concern to
accounting standards and users: specifically, commercial loan officers' use of cash flow
information in lending decisions.
2.1. Research on cash and funds flow statements
The evolution of the funds statement can be traced from the end of the last century through
the issuance of Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board (APE) 3 and 19 to the
publication of SFAS 95 in 1987.
The funds flow statement existed in a primitive form prior to AICPA's official pronounce-
ment on the funds statement. APE No. 3 (1963) recommended the Statement of Sources and
Application of Funds as supplementary information in accounts, but it did not give a clear
defmition of the statement and its usefulness, nor did it make the statement mandatory.
As an attempt to rectify the confusion brought about by APE 3, APE 19 mandated the
statement of fiinds flow, or FFS, in 1973. APE 19 (paragraph 8) stated that the FFS "should be
based on a broad concept embracing all changes in financial position." It required that any
changes in the working capital component had to be reported as a source or use of funds
(paragraph 15), and also required the disclosure of financing and investing activities without
netting or combining (paragraph 13). APE 19, however, was also the target of criticism because
it inadequately defined the term "funds" and did not provide clear objectives for the statement
(Eryant, 1984; Clark, 1983; Ketz & Kochanek, 1982; Swanson & Vangermeersch, 1981).
In 1981, the FASE issued an exposure draft proposing a cash to a working capital focused
FFS. And, in 1982, APE issued a statement that allowed companies to change from a working
capital to a cash basis FFS without requiring a qualified audit report for breach of the
consistency principle. The increased use of the cash flow format for the FFS and the lack of
comparability between the working capital basis of funds flow and cash flow during the early
1980s acted as the primary forces that brought about the FASE exposure draft on the SCF in
July 1986 and SFAS 95 in November 1987.
Under SFAS 95, there are two methods of presenting the SCF. The direct method requires
the disclosure of major components of cash flow from operations, while the indirect method
allows the netting off of many items but focuses on the difference between net profit and cash
flow. Most countries' accounting standards recommend the direct rather than the indirect
format of the SCF presentation but allow the use of either approach (United States, SFAS 95;
Canada, CICA 1540; United Kingdom and Ireland, FRS 1 and FRED 10; Hong Kong, SSAP
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15; International Standards, IAS 7; among the others). As the indirect method requires no
more recording or ledger manipulation than that is provided in ordinary accounting systems,
it is used in countries where the direct method is not mandatory.
Many researchers favored the direct approach and criticized the indirect format as
indistinguishable in any important respect from the FFS. Drtina and Largay (1985)
demonstrated that cash flow from operations calculated by the indirect method is, at best,
an estimate of actual cash provided by operations, and Heath (1978) recommended that firms
be required to report cash flow from operations using the direct method. On the other hand,
various studies have failed to find general support that the cash flow information in the SCF
provides incremental usefiilness to the FFS (Bowen et al, 1987; El Shamy, 1989; Jacob,
1987; Jennings, 1990; Raybum, 1986).
In a recent study, Boyd (2000/2001) examined how to use the SCF to improve credit
analysis. He distinguished the information on a company's operating activities provided
under the accrual and the cash basis of accounting, i.e., the income statement and the SCF.
Cash flow from operations, he said, can give the analyst a better understanding of the quality
of the firm's earnings, and is generally subject to less distortion than net income. He also
considered reporting income on an accrual basis to provide a superior method for measuring
profit than does the matching of operating cash receipts and payments, and that the cash
effects of earning activities provide useful information to the financial analysts. The latter is
provided in the section on operating activities of the cash flow statement. Boyd described the
direct method as approaching the income statement from top to bottom, by making adjust-
ments beginning with revenues and then expenses, working its way down the income
statement. The indirect method approaches the income statement from the bottom, making
adjustments to net income. "Regardless of the method used, the end result is the same. Both
approaches aim to answer the question: How was cash generated and used?" (Boyd, 2000/
2001). Of the two methods of preparing the SCF, Boyd preferred the direct method. Boyd did
not investigate whether credit analysts actually use the quality information provided by the
SCF, and whether the preference of the direct over the indirect method is justified.
2.2. Research on lending decisions and verbal protocol analysis
This study examines commercial bank lending decisions. Compared to other loan officers
(mortgage and personal loans), commercial loan officers make more sophisticated use of
financial statements. They focus on the "five Cs," character of management, credit
worthiness, cash flow, credit history and collateral, to assess a would-be borrower's ability
to repay debt. Some of the processes that commercial loan officers adopt in making this
assessment involve ratio analysis, analysis of cash flow sources and analysis of the firm's
plans for using the proceeds from the loan (Basu & Rolfes, 1995; Clarke, 1996; Egginton,
1982; Fisher, 1982). Bernstein (1993) argues that cash flow analysis has three objectives: (1)
to supplement the statistical measure used to assess short-term liquidity by means of a short-
term cash flow forecast; (2) to analyze the SCF in order to assess the implications of sources
and amounts of cash on solvency (i.e., long-term cash flows); and (3) to discern cash flow
patterns over time.
A
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Few Studies investigated the use ofcash flow information by the lending profession using the
verbal protocol analysis method. Stephens (1980) examined how financial statement informa-
tion was used in bank lending decisions. His research had two purposes: (1) to study whether
and how bank lending officers use financial-statement information to provide data for those
concerned with setting accounting standards and (2) to increase the scope of decision process
research. Both the Delphi panel approach and the verbal protocol analysis method were used.
The protocols supported the findings of the Delphi panel study that bank lending officers:
(1) make initial determinations of information adequacy operationalized as "properly
prepared" financial statements; (2) exhibit a lack of preference between presently acceptable
inventory valuation and depreciation methods; and (3) exhibit a lack of preference for
inflation-adjusted financial statements.
Reither (1994) examined the decision processes of bank lending officers as they evaluated
the financial information of a loan applicant. The use of the SCF under SPAS 95 was
specifically studied. Eight subjects, four senior credit analysts and four loan officers from two
Dallas banks, were presented with a package containing the financial information and other
pertinent data of a commercial applicant applying for a working capital loan.
Results show no significant pattems emerged to signify that lenders used cash flow
information in any standard way. Only one subject failed to refer to or use the SCF during the
decision process. Of the seven subjects that used the SCF, only two recalled that information
during their final decision phase. One major finding is that lenders are not using SFAS 95
cash flow information in conjunction with other financial statement data. The lenders did not
compute any ratios incorporating cash flow data with itself or with other financial variables.
The banks' software systems did not provide any ratios incorporating cash flow data. It seems
that the SCF is being regarded as an independent financial statement.
3. The task
3.1. Subjects and instrument
While the subject of this study is to examine the decision-making process that goes into the
granting of a loan, the demands that verbal-protocol analysis (our method) imposes on loan
officers' time limited the number of commercial loan officers participating in the study.
Accordingly, other financially sophisticated users are also used as subjects. A total of 20
commercial loan officers, financial analysts, academics and auditors participated in the study,
five from each group. Each subject examined the annual reports of two firms applying for
loans, one firm reporting SCF and another firm reporting FFS. Thus, verbal protocol was used
to examine a total of 40 lending decisions.
The subjects who assumed the role of loan officers in this experiment are residents of Hong
Kong and are expected to be knowledgeable of the firms listed on the Hong Kong Exchange.
To avoid biasing the subjects' responses by prior knowledge, the two client firms chosen to
apply for commercial loans are fi-om New Zealand and South Africa. There are several
reasons why this choice was made. First, both New Zealand and South Africa follow
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accounting standards similar to International Accounting Standards, which is consistent with
the Hong Kong system. Second, these firms are unknown to the participating subjects, so
their knowledge of these firms as loan clients was limited to the information provided to
them. Third, the annual reports prepared by firms in New Zealand and South Africa are more
elaborate and provide more detailed disclosures than the annual reports of a comparable firm
in Hong Kong. Finally, and more important, firms in New Zealand and South Africa follow
different methods in reporting cash flows. South African standards allow the use of either the
direct or indirect method of presenting the cash flow statement (AC 118, 1996), although the
indirect method of cash flows is more frequently used for reporting. In contrast, accounting
standards in New Zealand mandate the use of the direct method of presenting the cash flow
statement (SSAP 10, 1987; FRS-10, 1992). The instrument, therefore, consisted of financial
statements with different methods of presenting cash flow: the direct method for the firm from
New Zealand and the indirect method for the firm from South Africa.
3.2. The experiment
The participants who acted the role of commercial loan officers were given actual,
unaltered, financial statements as attachments to the loan applications. Each participant
was given the experimental instrument in his office, which allowed each subject to talk aloud
without influencing the decisions of others. Before beginning the task, the method of verbal
protocol analysis was explained to the subjects. The use of tools such as calculators, personal
computers and other reference materials were allowed during the experiment. Additionally,
questions about the process were allowed. The researcher operated a tape recorder at each of
these 20 settings and prompted the subject to resume "thinking aloud" if he/she remained
silent for more than a few seconds. The researcher also took notes of any activity that might
not be vocalized, such as which financial report was being used at the time or when a different
report was consuhed to seek other data.
No time constraint was imposed; the subjects were told to take as much time as they
needed to reach a decision with which they would be comfortable. On average, the subjects
used about 90 min to complete the analysis and make a decision.
3.3. Coding the protocols
The integrity of the coding process is essential for successful analysis ofthe verbal protocol.
Thus, all recorded "thoughts" are coded in a meaningful way prior to analysis. Following the
recommendation of Ericsson and Simon (1984) and Todd and Benbasat (1987), a coding
procedure was developed prior to conducting the experiment and then all the verbalized
thoughts were strictly analyzed according to that coding scheme. This process avoids
contaminating the coding procedure with ex post knowledge of the results. Except for making
adjustments to accommodate the nature of the lending task, the coding scheme used in this
study is consistent with that used in prior studies (Biggs & Mock, 1983; Bouwman, 1983;
Klersey & Mock, 1989). The coding scheme (reported in Appendix A) allows for the
identification of (a) a component of financial reports (e.g., accounting policies, divisional or
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segment report, notes to the financial statements); (b) a component ofnonfinancial reports (e.g.,
auditor's report, the CEO's report or report to shareholders); (c) a particular information cue
(e.g. current ratio, net income numbers. . .); and (d) missing or bewailing cues, (i. e., unavailable
cues that subjects inquired about. Missing or ''negative" cues are technological or intangible
factors not evident in the body of the financial reports. Bewailing cues represent information
that the subjects considered important and useful to their making loan decisions but were not
provided in the financial reports. These cues help evaluate the validity of the study. Clustering
these cues provides an indicator ofthe degree to which the instrument was adequate for the task.
Because coders assume that the simple inferences they make fi"om listening to the verbal
protocol are equivalent to the inferences intended by the decision-makers (Ericsson & Simon,
1984), the quality of coding is crucial. To ensure that such inferences are harmonious, two
research assistants were given the coding schemes and asked to code each of the 40 cases
independently. The quality of coding is judged by the extent to which these two independent
coders arrive at the same inferences about all the verbalizations. To assess intercoder
reliability, the k coefficient of concordance (Cohen, 1960) was estimated using the results
of the two coders. A coefficient value of .664 was obtained for this study, which compares
favorably with the concordance results obtained in prior verbal protocol studies. Coding
differences were discussed with the two coders and most were resolved between them without
interference from the researcher. The researcher intervened only on those items that the two
coders could not agree on. The reconciled data were used for the analysis that follows.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Information cues
The information cues used by all participants are disclosed by type in Table 1 and by
function in Table 2. A total of 10,837 information cues were captured in the verbal protocols.
To reduce these to a more manageable number, information cues with low frequencies (under
1.5% of the total information cues) and those that were more or less similar were combined
under one common name. This resulted in reducing 673 1 cues to 89. The 89 cues are grouped
under the name of "others," a partial listing of which is shown in Table 1. Only four cues
under "others" were marginally over 1.5% in usage: "company," "financial statement/
accounts," "forecast data" and "management buyouts" (MBO).
Panel A of Table 2 shows that "business/industry" and "cash flows" are the two most
used information cues.
4.2. Comparing the use of various reports
4.2.1. The reports
The most used report is notes to financial statements (notes), which accounts for 14.3% of
the total reports used (Table 2, Panel B). The balance sheet ranks second at 12.2% and is
followed by divisional or segmental reports at 11.6%. SCF ranks fourth at 10.7%.
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Table 1
Partial listing of information cues, "others"
Information item codes Definition Frequencies
FS
GG
GO
GR
GW
IC
IF
IM
IR
IS
W
LA
LB
LE
LF
LI
LS
MA
MB
MP
NC
NI
NK
NO
OE
OG
OL
OP
OR
PC
PD
PE
PL
PM
PN
PT
RI
RK
RS
SA
SB
SC
SG
SH
SI
SO
Financial situation
Geography/country
Growth/growth rate
Gearing
Goodwill
Interest cover/coverage ratio
Inflation
Information
Interest rate/lending rate
Interest expense
Inventory/stock
Layout/format/structure
Liabilities
Leasing
Liquid fund
Listed
Loss
Macro/intemational/global
MBO
Management policy
Net cash generated from operations
Net income/net profit
Economy
Notes
Operating expenses
Organization structure/chart
Operating leases
Operation/operating
Operating revenue/income
Price/product price
Product/new product
Pension
Profit/loss
Profit margin
Production
Parent company
Ratio
Risk
Return on shareholders' ftind
Shareholder/stockholder
Short-term borrowing
Security
Segmental information
Share/stock
Shareholder's interest
Stock offer/share offer
29
162
98
106
34
86
104
140
68
70
77
82
103
21
74
37
64
9
226
32
131
111
97
45
15
13
6
30
23
86
139
23
43
233
27
48
107
128
66
139
91
155
69
145
50
26
H. Kwok / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 347-362 355
Table 1 (continued)
Information item codes Definition Frequencies
ST
su
sv
TE
TT
TX
vu
wc
XR
Stock
Subsidiaries
Saving
Technical
Trend
Tax
Valuation
Working capital
Exchange rate
11
108
1
10
55
71
138
26
131
Total 6731
Table 2 (Panel C) shows that the subjects referred to the SCF as the major source ofproviding
cash flow information. The balance sheet and notes were also used for cash flow information.
(The revelation that the subjects used other financial reports to obtain cash flow information is
possible because verbal protocol analysis was used.) Panel C shows that the subjects in 27 ofthe
Table 2
Information cues and reports used by participants (partial)
Panel A: Information cues used
Information cues Frequency %
1. Business/industry
2. Cash flows
3. Executive directors
4. Market
5. Long-term debt
825
360
330
260
241
7.6
3.3
3.0
2.4
2.2
Panel B: Financial reports used
Reports Frequency %
1. Notes to financial statements
2. Balance sheet
3. Divisional/segmental reports
4. Statement of cash flows
5. Long range, comparative summaries
6. Income statement
835
712
679
605
441
436
14.3
12.2
11.6
10.7
7.5
7.5
Panel C: Reports used to obtain cash flows information
Report Cases
Statement of cash flows
Balance sheet
Notes to the financial statements
Long range, comparative summaries
Income statement
27
19
16
11
3
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40 lending decision cases used the SCF. This does not mean that the subjects in these 27 cases
made use ofthe SCF report exclusively, i.e., they read or looked at the SCF during their review
of the financial reports. The subjects of the 13 cases that did not use the SCF were fi-om all four
professional groups: five fi^om CPA, three each from bank loan officers and financial analysts,
and two from accounting academics. Other reports from which cash flow information was
obtained are the balance sheet, notes, long-range summary reports and income summary.
Among these, the balance sheet and notes were used in 1 9 and 1 6 of the cases, respectively.
4.2.2. The protocols
An examination of the protocols confirms the results in Table 2 (Panel C) discussed above.
For example, rather than utilizing the SCF, one bank loan officer noted the increase in
borrowing from the company's balance sheet and inferred that had increased interest
expenses. In processing another company's accounts, the same subject obtained information
on investment in a subsidiary, cash from borrowings and net cash increase/decrease from the
notes. Another loan officer obtained cash flow information from the balance sheet through
changes in working capital, borrowings and acquisitions, equity structure, share issuance and
reserves. Similarly, one financial analyst explored the balance sheet for debt position, cash,
liquidity and depreciation to determine the cash position of the two borrowing companies.
Another financial analyst commented ". . .awful cash position" while reviewing the balance
sheet portion in the company's long-range summaries report, revealing that he was extracting
cash flow information from the balance sheet.
Results from the information cues, reports and protocols confirm that the subjects turned to
other financial reports, in particular, the balance sheet and notes to exfract cash flow
information. They also indicate that the subjects cognitively converted the information
provided in these reports to the cash flow information they required.
The indirect format of SCF was a surrogate for the FFS in this study. In the experimental
materials, the title or label of the SCF of the South African company (presented in the indirect
format) was changed to read "funds flow statement." This was to find out if the subjects
noticed the difference in the two reports (FFS and SCF) presented to them. The protocols
showed that only one of the subjects noticed the name change, but did not question or
investigate the reason; nor did he check to see if the statement was indeed a FFS. In addition,
none of the subjects made use of the exfra information provided in the cash flows from
operations part of the SCF (presented under the direct format).
Hypothesis 1 suggests that commercial loan officers ignore the information in the SCF that
is incremental to that in the statement of funds flow. The subjects' failure to distinguish
between the FFS and SCF and use the extra information provided in the cash flow from
operations part of the SCF confirms Hypothesis 1 as correct.
4.3. Missing (bewailing) cues
Bewailing or missing cues are those information cues that the subjects requested but were
not available in the materials provided. The verbal protocol method enabled the capture of
these missing cues. The researcher infers that the subjects placed a value on these missing
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Table 3
Missing (bewailing) cues related to cash flow information
Group subject Information required Reports being reviewed
1 A2
B3
C5
F3
F4
A5
B3
B4
C3
F2
F3
Future investment information
Cash flows projection
Investment and future operations
Pro-forma cash flows reports
Cash flows model or spreadsheet
Cash flows performance
Whether money from property market was
used to redeem liabilities or pay dividends
Detailed cash flows information
Overall generation of cash
Debt position
Breakdown of investment in subsidiary
to show the amount of cash paid
Directors' report
SCF
Chairman's report
Notes
Balance sheet
SCF
Accounting policies
A = Accounting academics, e.g., A2 is participant 2 from accounting academics; B = bank loan officers; C = CPA
or auditors; F = financial analysts.
Group 1 shows cash flow information considered by the subjects as usefiil, but such information is not provided in
the cash flow statement.
Group 2 shows the reports that the subjects reviewed in search of cash flow information, instead of turning to the
statement of cash flow for such information.
items of information. These cues also indicate that the subjects take their task seriously. If there
were no interest in the task, they would have been contented to use the information on hand.
The missing cues related to cash flow information fall into two groups (Table 3). Group 1
shows cash flow information that the subjects (A2, B3, C5, F3 and F4) found useful;
however, such information is not provided in these financial reports, not even in the SCF.
They indicate the inadequacies of the financial reports for making lending decisions. The
subjects under Group 2 of Table 3 (A5, B3, B4, C3, F2 and F3) either looked for cash flow
information in the wrong reports or were unaware that the information they wanted is
provided in the SCF. This shows that the subjects were unfamiliar with the SCF and suggests
that they lack training in using this report.
Table 4
Missing (bewailing) cues classified by direct and indirect format of presenting SCF
BS CF DI ET MG OT SH Total
Direct Count 21 32 9 290 7 25 40 424
Proportion 50 75 21 684 17 59 94 1000
Indirect Count 5 44 2 244 30 29 32 386
Proportion 13 114 5 632 78 75 83 1000
Total Count 26 76 11 534 37 54 72 810
Proportion 32 94 14 659 46 67 89 1000
BS = Balance sheet; CF = statement of cash flow; DI = divisional/segmental report; ET = extraneous data, e.g.,
environment data, industry information; MG = management/directors' data; 0T = others, e.g., format and layout of
reports; SCF = the statement of cash flow; SH = share data and statistics.
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Table 5
Missing (bewailing) cues classified by professional groups
Professional groups BS CF DI ET MG OT SH Total
Academic Count 3 21 2 171 11 16 41 265
Proportion 11 79 8 645 42 60 155 1000
Banker Count 11 37 2 171 6 10 21 258
Proportion 43 143 8 663 23 39 81 1000
CPA Count 2 13 1 71 15 12 114
Proportion 18 114 9 623 132 105 1000
Analyst Count 10 5 6 121 5 16 10 173
Proportion 58 29 35 699 29 92 58 1000
Total Count 26 76 11 534 37 54 72 810
Proportion 32 94 14 659 46 67 89 1000
BS = Balance sheet; CF = statement of cash flow; DI = divisional/segmental report; ET = extraneous data, e.g.,
environment data, industry information; MG = management/directors' data; 0T = others, e.g., format and layout of
reports; SH = share data and statistics.
The incidents of missing cues varied between types of reports and the profession of
participating subjects. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the largest proportion of missing cues falls
under "extraneous data," regardless of the profession of the participants. "Extraneous data"
are data not provided in the experimental material such as environmental data and industry
information. In comparison to CPAs or financial analysts, bank loan officers and accounting
academics asked for more information that was not presented in the experimental material.
The large number of bewailing cues shows that participants generally found that the
information provided in the reports was inadequate for making sound lending decisions.
5. Conclusion
The high usage of "cash flows" among the information cues (Table 2, Panel A) and the
relatively low usage of the SCF among the reports (Table 2, Panel B) indicate that, while the
subjects used cash flow information during their decision processes, not all this information
was obtained from the SCF. Results on the use of reports substantiate that the balance sheet,
notes and other reports are used to obtain cash flow information (Table 2, Panel C).
Analyses of the missing cues (Table 3) show that some subjects searched for cash flow
information in the wrong reports. Others asked for missing cash flow information even
though such information could be found in the SCF (Table 3, Group 2). This confirms
Hypothesis 1 as true: commercial loan officers ignore the information provided in the SCF
that is incremental to that in the FFS.
The results also show that while the subjects referred to cash flow information in the
decision processes, most of them did not make actual use of this infonnation. Nearly all
subjects merely looked at the SCF during the sequential reading of the financial reports. None
of them recalled cash flow information during the final decision phase when the reasons for
granting or refusing the loan applications were substantiated.
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All the subjects ignored the information provided in the SCF (presented under the
direct format), and tried to obtain cash flow information from the FFS and other financial
reports. In other words, the subjects had to cognitively convert the FFS to the SCF. As
the two reports do not provide the same information, the conversion was difficult, if not
impossible. And, in doing so, the subjects found some information to be missing or
distorted. This has an impact on the lending decision, as a loan officer would be less
likely to grant a loan to a company that does not provide sufficient infonnation on the
company. This validates Hypothesis 2: cognitively converting from the fiinds flow
statement to cash flows does affect the decisions made by commercial loan officers.
The fact that none of the subjects referred to the SCF or cash flow situation of the
applicant companies suggests that they were uncomfortable with the information in this
report.
A possible reason why the subjects relied on the balance sheet for cash flow information is
because the balance sheet has been around for decades while the replacement of the FFS with
the SCF was mandated more recently. Like the balance sheet and the income statement, the
FFS is based on the accrual method of accoundng and focuses on working capital while the
SCF is not.
Another reason for subjects not utilizing the SCF may be their lack of training in using this
statement. This is evidenced by the fact that none of the subjects noticed the difference
between the SCF and the FFS, or the direct from the indirect format of SCF presentation.
Moreover, none of the subjects made use of the extra information provided in the cash-flow-
from-operations section under the direct method. This lack of fraining is inevitable given that
the teaching materials of the banking industry (Basu & Rolfes, 1995; Clarke, 1996) place
little importance on the SCF and fail to explain fiilly how to utilize the information provided
in this report.
These results imply that the SCF is superfluous regardless of the claims of its usefulness
asserted by standard setters (SFAC No. 5, 1984; FASB ED, 1986; SFAS 95, 1987) and the
banking profession (Emmanuel, 1988; Hamm, 1996; O'Leary, 1988; Price, 1992). For
accounting academics and banking professionals, more emphasis needs to be placed on the
value of the information content of the SCF. New instructional materials should be developed
covering the use of the SCF for cash flow information and SCF ratio analysis. Standard-
setting bodies should reconsider mandating only the direct format of presentation and issuing
guidelines on the classifications in the SCF.
Appendix A. Coding scheme (partial)
A.l. Reports
A report code identifies the specific section in an annual report from which the information
item code is derived. The major reports in an annual report are the BS, the P&L, the SCF,
notes to financial statements, chairman's report and auditor's report. Depending on the
disclosure requirements, other statements or reports may be provided in the annual report.
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such as the directors' report, the segmental report, summary reports, etc. A two-lettered
notation is assigned to each report.
A. 1. 1. Report codes
Financial reports
AP
BS
DI
FS
LR
NO
P&L
SCF
ST
Nonfinancial reports
AU
CR
DR
ET
MG
MS
SH
accounting policies
balance sheet
divisional/segmental report
financial summary (2 years comparative figures)
long-range summaries (over 2 years comparative figures)
notes to financial statements
profit and loss accounts
statement of cash flows
statistics and processes of statistics (including calculations and ratios)
auditors' report
chairman's report, report to shareholders
directors' report, group financial review
extraneous data
management/directors' data and information
others (not sure which report or page)
share statistics
A. 1.2. Information cues
An information item code identifies the information item, or cue, that is used, or referred
to, by the subject, e.g., net income, sales, current ratio. One hundred and four information
item codes were used.
A. 1.3. Missing (bewailing) cues
These are negative or missing cues. They represent information that is considered
important to the decision task, but is not available in the annual reports. Examples include
information on the reputation of the company and its executives, and information relating to
the economic and technological environment. As these missing cues are vital and indispens-
able to the loan decision task, they are an integral part of the verbal protocols and have to be
captured. Missing cues are specifically created in this coding scheme to capture the missing
cues identified by the subjects during the experiment.
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Book reviews
Asset measurement bases in UK and lASC standards
By Christopher Nobes, Certified Accountants Educational Trust, London, 2001, 55 pp.
This report was commissioned by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, a
British-based body with many overseas members and international interests. The author uses
this spread of membership to justify his concentration on UK and lASC standards, but there
are times when greater reference to other sources of terms and concepts would have been
appropriate, particularly in the discussion of "fair value." The topic of measurement was on
the International Accounting Standards Board's agenda in June 2001 when staff was asked to
prepare an inventory of measurement bases used in International Financial Reporting
Standards. This report was designed to be of assistance in this task and in the subsequent
debate.
After a brief introduction, theoretical aspects of capital maintenance and asset measure-
ment are discussed in Chapter 2. This provides the basis for much of the analysis ofUK and
lASC requirements that are outlined in the following five chapters on tangible and intangible
fixed assets, investment properties, agricultural assets, inventories, and, finally, financial
assets. The eighth and last chapter provides a synoptic view of UK and lASC measurement
bases and outlines some suggestions for a way forward. In both Chapters 2 and 8, diagrams
are provided illustrating the different measurement bases for assets.
To the extent that the report provides a listing of the measurement bases adopted by UK
and lASC standards for the assets mentioned above, it provides a useful service. It is in the
theoretical and analytical discussion that statements are made which are at the very least
contestable and in some cases misleading. For example, in the discussion of capital
maintenance, no distinction is made between the concept of capital in the sense of net assets
and that of capital maintenance. The latter is concerned with how the opening balance,
allowing for additions and distributions, is to be adjusted (if at all) before comparison with the
closing balance to determine profit. This is far fi^om a matter of mere semantics. Nobes refers
to Chambers' model based on the use of net realizable values for assets (Chambers uses the
term ''current cash equivalents"). Nobes then states that "The capital maintenance concept
here is the current cash equivalent (adaptive capacity) of an enterprise's assets" (p. 10). In
fact. Chambers' concept of capital is based on the current cash equivalent of the enterprise's
assets (less the face value of its liabilities). His concept of capital maintenance is the general
purchasing power of the opening balance adjusted for additions and distributions. Chambers
actually charged a "capital maintenance adjustment" calculated in this way in the deter-
mination of net profit.
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This confusion pervades the whole report. For example, 'The point is that the capital
maintenance approach determines which things one is going to call gains and losses'' (p. 16)
and "Once it has been decided to value different assets using different models, the idea of
capital maintenance must be abandoned" (p. 18). With different valuation bases for different
assets, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to explain the concept of capital in use, but a
capital maintenance adjustment may still be made if desired.
Another example where I find Nobes' approach unsatisfactory is more contentious because
he has the support of Canadian and, to a more limited extent, US rules. His point is that,
"under historical cost accounting, no recognition of impairment is necessary unless the cost
cannot be recovered" (p. 22). Discounting of expected cash flows to determine recoverable
amount "is not appropriate under this model." Note the emphasis on recovery of cost under
this approach. This leads to nonsensical results and is inconsistent with the historical cost
reporting of financial assets and liabilities at expected future cash flows discounted at the rate
implicit in the original contract. In the absence of doubt about collection of proceeds, the
undiscounted amount expected to be recovered fi^om a financial asset will far exceed its cost,
but by discounting the cash flows at the rate in the original contract we will arrive at that
"cost."
In addition, I would argue that the historical cost system reports assets at their original cost
less amounts ab^eady charged against revenue except where some ill-defined concept of
"value" is below that residual cost. If it is accepted that some concept of "value" to the entity
is relevant, rather than an extraordinarily narrow concept of "cost to be recovered," then there
is no question that the expected future cash flows must be discounted. The old "lower of cost
or market" rule for the inventory of a continuing entity is adapted for fixed assets to be the
lower of unamortized cost and the best estimate of what the market value would be for this
asset as part of the sale of a going concern. In my opinion, an asset's value (however vaguely
defined) has clearly been impaired if the discounted cash flows expected fi^om its use and
eventual disposal are below its book value.
Another area where I believe that the reader may be misled arises with the discussion of
"fair value" in the report. "When the term is used precisely by the lASC or in the UK, it
means a current market value. However, it is neither an entry price nor an exit price because,
unlike replacement cost or NRV, no transaction costs are added on or taken off" (p. 11).
Nobes is absolutely correct in his literal interpretation of the definition, but if this is so, why
not just use the descripfion "current market value?" There is considerable confusion over the
term "fair value" in the accounting standards, and this must be recognized by readers, not
hidden from them. Nobes dismisses the confusion with a couple of throw-away sentences on
page 12: "Annoyingly, the literature sometimes uses 'fair value' as a generic term for current
value. In this report, the term will be used for the particular version of current value defined
above." The fact remains that sometimes the standards (not just "the literature") use "fair
value" in the vague sense of "what is a reasonable value to report," and IAS 32 gives
definitions for both "fair value" and "market value" as though there may be some difference,
although the definitions provided do not reveal it. The term "fair value" has been used in the
United States for many years, long before it first appeared in UK and lASC standards.
Unfortunately, there has been an equal lack of precision with regard to its meaning. In a work
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that aims to set forth the measurement bases in use in UK and lASC standards, it is a pity that
the different meanings attributed to "fair value" in specific standards are not referred to
expHcitly.
Chris Warrell'
PII: 50020-7063(02)00175-9
The Professional Accountancy Bodies and the Provision of Education and Training in
Relation to Environmental Issues
by Rob Gray and David ColHson, with John French, Ken McPhail, and Loma Stevenson, The
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scodand, Edinburgh, Scotland, 2001, xv+220 pp.
This book, a research report commissioned by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Scotland, focuses on the nexus between the various accounting professions in the UK, the
state of university education in the UK, and environmental issues. The central question of the
book is: "What do accountants need to know about the environment?" (p. 2). Following from
this is a subsidiary question: "How are accountants to acquire this environmental knowledge
and/or appropriate environmentally-related skills?" (p. 2). More explicitly, the authors state
that they have four aims that they wish to accomplish:
• to review the current state of envirorunental education and training in accounting and other
disciplines;
• to identify reasons for this current state of play;
• to explore the degree to which environmental issues need to be incorporated into
accounting education and training; and
• to suggest ways in which improvements to the present situation might be made.
In order to gather the material to fulfill these aims, the authors take a multimethod,
multiperspective approach to their inquiry, utilizing the following sources:
• conversations with accounting and nonaccounting academics;
• a questionnaire survey of accounting lecturers;
• a questionnaire survey of students over their choice of options;
• interviews with recruiters;
• a questionnaire survey of recruiters;
• interviews/conversations with senior members of the profession, key staff members of the
professional bodies and other "opinion formers";
' Mr. Warrell is a former member of Australian Accounting Standards Board and of the Department of
Accounting, The University of Melbourne, as well as former Senior Adviser Accounting to the National
Companies and Securities Commission.
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• reviews of the accounting and nonaccounting literature; and
• reviews of education documents from the professional bodies.
This material has been organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction
and an outline of the book. Chapter 2 looks at environmental issues, the concept of
sustainability, and how accounting is implicated in environmental degradation. Chapter 3
examines what is meant by education, the pressures on education, and the experiences of
other disciplines in the environmental area. Chapter 4 looks at accounting education in the
universities by referring to prior research. Chapter 5 builds on this by incorporating more
empirically focused material dealing with both student and academic perspectives. Chapters 6
and 7 turn to the perspectives of practitioners and professional bodies, with the former setting
the stage by reviewing the profession's relationship with academe and the environmental
agenda, and the latter incorporating empirical material. Chapter 8 draws the investigation
together and offers several conclusions. An addendum to Chapter 8 provides some very
practical suggestions about incorporating environmental issues into accounting syllabi.
It should be noted that, although the book focuses on UK data and the UK accounting
professions, there is a more broad-based literature review. Reference is made to the
accounting professions in the United States and Canada and, briefly, Australia. Very early
on, the authors acknowledge four separate tensions that propel their inquiry, and it is these
tensions and how they are dealt with that makes the book more appealing to a widespread
audience. The four tensions are: (1) the extent of environmental problems; (2) the role of the
profession; (3) the purpose of education; and (4) the need for relevant degrees. These tensions
are polarized to make their nature more evident. The first tension deals with the basic
question of whether our environmental problems call simply for better resource utilization
(i.e., eco-efficiency) or a dramatic restructuring of society. Discussion on this topic transcends
the UK setting and thus has an appeal to a diverse group of readers. Similarly, the third
tension, the purpose of education, is a question that cuts across all locales and all disciplines:
"Is university education primarily intended to prepare students for employment or is it about
developing independent, critical minds for the broader good of society" (p. vii). The second
tension, the role of the profession, is more limited in its appeal, as it is concerned with
whether the accounting profession exists to serve client needs or the public interest. The
fourth tension, relevant accounting degrees, will capture the narrowest reader interest, as it
relates specifically to the need for a degree for the various UK accounting professions and
whether or not a degree, if needed, should be an accounting degree.
The authors have not shied away from some very thorny aspects of their topic and have
done a good job of outlining the basic issues. Sadly, the multifaceted evidence that they have
gathered leads to three rather bleak conclusions. First, among accountants, there is little
understanding of sustainability and its implications. Second, accounting education is at best
training for employment and at worst irrelevant. Third, most members of the profession
(including teachers, students, and practitioners) see accounting as entirely driven by client
needs, having no independent life or values of its own.
Instead of seeing this situation as insoluble, the authors conclude with recommendations in
three areas, the first two relating to marginal changes and the third relating to structural
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changes. Under the heading of immediate concems is the integration of environmental issues
into the professional syllabi, something that is beginning to happen in the UK. The second
marginal change relates to client-serving issues. The authors suggest that there needs to be a
substantial vocational element in education and training that deals with client support and
encourages "a more pro-active, innovative frame of mind in accountants" (p. 158). Toward
this end, the detailed guidance in the addendum to Chapter 8 is provided. The recommenda-
tion dealing with structural change looks at long-term sustainability and states that it is
"absolutely essential that all accountants have a good, deep, well-informed understanding on
key issues" (p. 160). The most obvious are:
• accounting and the public interest;
• accounting theory and the nature of accounting;
• what is meant by sustainability and its implications for business and accounting; and
• the tensions between accounting education and training.
How achievable this is can be open for debate. As the authors themselves have pointed out,
other exhortations for change, such as those coming from the Accounting Education Change
Commission in the US, have been less than successful. How necessary this understanding of
key issues is can also be open for debate. Such debates would please the authors, for they
indicate that, as disturbing as the conclusions are, what is more disturbing is the lack of
informed discussion. Perhaps this book will go some way to fueling such a dialogue.
With that hope, I recommend this book to accounting practitioners and university
educators alike. Although the book deals specifically with environmental issues, it is
structured in such a way as to serve as a valuable framework for studying the education
and training of any key leading-edge issue. In the main, the authors have achieved their four
aims for the book, and the result is a publication that offers much to think about that is
applicable beyond the UK setting. Additionally, the book is well organized and very readable.
Rob Gray is known for his extensive work and passion in the environmental and social
accounting area. He and his coauthors have provided an even-handed, multiperspective
approach that makes the book truly accessible.
Nola Buhr
University of Saskatchewan,
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada
PII; 50020-7063(02)00176-0
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Analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings:
additional evidence
Huong Ngo Higgins*
Department ofManagement, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Road. Worcester, MA 01609, USA
Abstract
This article examines analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings during Japan's economic burst
period in the 1990s. Using the evidence of analyst earnings forecasts in the United States as a
benchmark, the article documents the following three findings. First, whereas the forecast accuracy of
U.S. analysts following U.S. firms improves over time, the forecast accuracy of U.S. and Japanese
analysts following Japanese firms does not. Second, whereas decreases in forecast errors of U.S.
analysts following U.S. firms are best explained by decreases in forecast bias of the analysts, increases
in forecast errors of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms are best explained by
increases in the fi^equency of losses experienced by Japanese firms. Third, Japanese analysts forecast
earnings less accurately than do U.S. analysts. These findings reflect the difficulty of producing
accurate earnings forecasts during economic downturns. They also suggest that Japanese analysts are
more bound than their U.S. counterparts by cultural ties that impede forecast accuracy.
© 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Analyst ability; Earnings-forecast error; Economic downturns; Forecast accuracy; Japanese analyst;
Japanese economy; Japanese forecast
1. Introduction
Several papers have examined earnings-forecast accuracy of Japanese firms. Such research
is important because analysts' forecasts play an important role in equity pricing in Japan,
which has the second largest capital market in the world (Elton & Gruber, 1990). Prior
Tel.: +1-508-831-5626; fax: +1-508-831-5720.
E-mail address: hhiggins(ai\vpi.edu (H.N. Higgins).
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research found that Japanese analysts' forecasts were very accurate, indeed more accurate
than those of U.S. analysts (Beckman, 1998; Conroy, Harris, & Park, 1993). The superior
accuracy of Japanese analysts was attributed to Japanese earnings being easier to forecast
(Conroy et al., 1993) and the greater ease with which Japanese firms can smooth earnings
(Beckman, 1998), rather than the differential ability of analysts (Conroy et al., 1993).
Additionally, Japanese managers' forecasts of their own firms' eamings contribute to the
accuracy of analysts following Japanese firms (Brown & Higgins, 2001).
This article builds on prior research by comparing earnings-forecast accuracy of U.S. and
Japanese sell-side analysts following Japanese firms. It is based on observational data of
Japanese firms' forecasts and is best viewed as a demographic study.' It contributes to the
literature by documenting some of the first evidence on analysts' eamings forecasts of
Japanese firms during the country's economic burst period in the 1990s and by documenting
new results that contrast with prior findings. The evidence in this article indicates a tendency
toward increasing forecast errors, which is best explained by the increasing frequency of
losses experienced by Japanese firms. The evidence also indicates that U.S. analysts are better
than Japanese analysts at forecasting domestic and Japanese firms during the period of
examination.
An important concern in studying eamings forecasts in one country relative to another
relates to differences in accounting for eamings, i.e., whether accounting differences make
eamings easier to forecast in one country versus another. Because accounting mles in Japan
allow for the creation of special reserves, eamings of Japanese firms are allegedly easier to
smooth and therefore are more predictable. Another concem is the difference in analysts'
familiarity with accounting mles in the two countries. Analysts arguably are more familiar
with domestic accounting mles. The third concem is the difference in the environment, which
is likely due to cultural and economic differences.
To address these concems, I group analysts' forecasts into three samples: (1) forecasts of
U.S. firms by U.S. analysts (USbyUS), (2) forecasts of Japanese firms by U.S. analysts
(JPbyUS), and (3) forecasts of Japanese firms by Japanese analysts (JPbyJP)." The yearly
means of forecast errors for the three samples are used to determine trends. Factors such as
firms' eamings volatility, firm size, frequency of losses, forecast lag, EPS magnitude, analyst
following, and GDP growth are used to explore possible explanations for the observed trends.
Cross-sectional regressions of forecast error against an analyst binary (1 if Japanese analyst,
if U.S. analyst) and other firm-specific variables are used to compare the forecast errors of
Japanese and U.S. analysts.
I find that whereas the forecast accuracy of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms improves
over time, the forecast accuracy of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms does
not. This trend reflects the eamings declines experienced by Japanese firms during the
examination period (1989-1998), one of Japan's worst recessions (Sherman & Babcock,
' In observational studies, data are collected on units that are available, rather than on units chosen according
to a plan.
Data on Japanese analysts following U.S. firms (USbyJP) were unavailable.
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1997). Beginning in 1992, Japanese corporate earnings fell short of analysts' estimates
(Conroy, Harris, & Park, 1998). Perhaps many large forecast errors occurred because analysts
erroneously expected a rebound in earnings, encouraged by positive statements from the
Japanese government and economic forecasts of Japan's output that underestimated short-
falls.^
I also fmd that the smaller forecast errors of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms are
associated with the decreased forecast bias of U.S. analysts and increased firm size, consistent
with increased surprise management (Brown & Higgins, 2001) and a better information
environment due to increased capitalization in the United States. On the other hand, increases
in forecast errors of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms are best explained
by increases in frequency of losses experienced by Japanese firms (Hwang, Jan, & Basu,
1996; Moses, 1990a, 1990b; Teikoku Reports). The larger forecast errors of analysts
following Japanese firms are also associated with factors reflecting Japan's declining GDP
growth, increases in eamings volatility, and analysts' forecast optimism. The analyses reveal
that many Japanese firms that perform poorly cease to be covered by analysts, which is
consistent with prior evidence in U.S. studies (Moses, 1990a, 1990b).
Finally, I find that U.S. analysts are better eamings forecasters than Japanese analysts.
Specifically, U.S. analysts are better at forecasting eamings of U.S. firms than Japanese
analysts are at forecasting eamings of Japanese firms. This finding confrasts with prior results
(Conroy et al., 1993) because I examine a more recent period, during which U.S. analysts'
forecasts of U.S. firms have improved markedly. Japanese analysts' forecasts of Japanese
firms for the same period have not. U.S. analysts are also better than Japanese analysts at
forecasting eamings of Japanese firms. This finding is consistent with the evidence reported
by Mande and Kwak ( 1 996) and the popular belief that Japanese analysts are more bound by
cultural ties, which impede their independence and accuracy than U.S. analysts.'*
Overall, the findings reflect the difficulty of producing accurate eamings forecasts during
economic downtums. The predictive failure of government and economic forecasters may
affect the views of financial analyst because corporate forecasts largely stem from economic
growth forecasts. At the firm level, slow economic growth is manifested through corporate
losses and failures, impeding analysts' forecast ability. The result is large eamings-forecast
errors, as documented in this case for Japan.
^ Many market observers noted that analysts counted on eamings rebounds that did not happen (Martin, 1991,
1999a). Analysts' beliefs may have been fostered by overly optimistic government reports. Government agencies
that produced such reports were politically motivated, and they were severely criticized in hindsight (Teikoku
Reports). Analysts' beliefs may also have been fostered by economic estimates that are flawed when applied to a
sustained slump (Krugman, 1998).
^ Based on 11 Japanese firms followed by both U.S. and Japanese analysts in 1989, 1990, and 1991, Mande
and Kwak (1996) found that Japanese analysts were more optimistic than their U.S. counterparts in all of these
cases. Non-Japanese analysts provide more realistic forecasts because they are freer than their Japanese
counterparts to use their own judgment and analyses (Martin, 1999b). They have no special ties to the companies
they follow. They are not members of any of the big Japanese business groups or keiretsu, which means they can
ignore who owns a stock, they have no obligations to financial institutions, and, as foreigners, they are not bound
by the cultural prohibitions against questioning Japanese shachos (company presidents).
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The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses Japan's economy
during the examination period, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the analyses
and results, and Section 5 concludes the article.
2. Japan's economy during the examination period
This section draws on studies of Japan's economy and Japanese economic forecasts to
establish that the economic conditions during the examination period were unprecedented and
earnings decline and bankruptcies were widespread throughout the period. However,
government and economic forecasting agencies failed to acknowledge these economic
problems. Inaccurate economic forecasts likely led to large earnings-forecast errors by
financial analysts. This section is important for the understanding of this article's results
because it sheds light on the context of the findings and helps contrast these findings from
those in prior studies. This section also helps interested academicians and professionals
develop hypotheses about the reasons for Japan's economic malaise.
2.1. Economic slowdown
The period we examine (1989-1998) covers Japan's economic slowdown, one of the
country's worst and potentially longest recessions in the post-war era (Sherman & Babcock,
1997). Following the phenomenal growth in the 1980s, a recession of this depth and duration
is virtually unprecedented for a major industrial country since World War II (Bayoumi &
Collyns, 2000).
Essentially, Japan's fiindamental potential for productivity, which was based on low
cost capital after the war, evaporated in the 1990s. Protectionism, which helped build
Japan's industrial miracle in the 1950- 1960s, became counterproductive beyond the 1970s
(Katz, 1998).^ Even at the height of its economy, Japan's productivity suffered because
inefficient industries were sheltered from domestic and foreign competition. Later,
economists would discover that Japan had compensated for its domestic inefficiencies
with overinvestments made possible by cheap capital (Katz, 1998; Sherman & Babcock,
1997).^ For a while, the cost of capital was effectively zero. Decades of success resulted
in huge cash build-ups on corporate balance sheets (Kester, 1997). Companies using
convertible bonds could repay their lenders with their highly priced stocks instead of cash
(Katz, 1998). Companies also enjoyed the support of banks that lent according to
industrial policies rather than according to the basic principles of risk management
(Arayama & Mourdoukoutas, 2000).
Katz (1998) discussed how protectionism built infant industries in Japan into export stars. At the very point
in the country's evolution when the "developmentalist" policies should have been loosened, they were reinforced.
By the 1 970s, when Japan matured economically, its industrial policies had turned counterproductive because it
had shifted from promoting winners to protecting losers.
^ Sherman and Babcock (1997) cited the results of Bank of Japan's Special Report No. 224.
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Japanese businesses increasingly faced larger cost of capital as previously passive share-
holders demanded greater returns (Sherman & Babcock, 1997). Pressure for greater returns
was aggravated by unacceptably low yields on Japan's pension assets, the aging population,
and competition from foreign investment firms (Field, 1997)7 Deregulation and financial
reform helped intensify competition from abroad (Alexander, 1997). The cost of labor also
increased substantially faster than sales and GDP growth (Levy, 2000). The hoUowing-out of
Japan's productive potential led economic growth to slow down. Since 1990, the rate of
slowdown was striking (Krugman, 1998). Data from hitemational Financial Statistics indicate
that Japan experienced rapid growth until 1991 at an average rate of 4.0% per year, then
slowed until 1997 at an average rate of 1.4% per year. In 1998, Japan's economic growth
turned from sluggish to negative, pushing the country into a true recession (Arayama &
Mourdoukoutas, 2000). The slump in investment demand and the dramatic drop in asset values
that ensued provided support for those who viewed the previous high prices as a "bubble" and
the subsequent decline as a "burst" (French & Poterba, 1991). This article's findings pertain to
the burst period, while most prior studies were based on the bubble period in Japan.
^
2.2. Earnings declines and bankruptcies
The burst period was characterized by prolonged earnings declines and widespread
bankruptcies. A broad cross section of Japanese companies suffered from earnings declines
and losses (Martin, 1991). Japan's major manufacturing corporations experienced a substan-
tial downtrend in profitability, yielding the lowest returns on investment in the post-war era
(Watanabe & Yamamoto, 1992). The eamings drought for Japanese companies became the
longest since the 1950s (Sherman & Babcock, 1997). Poor prospects of profits led to
persistent decreases in Japanese equity prices (Levy, 2000).
During this period, the number and size of corporate bankruptcies rose steeply to record
levels (Levy, 2000; Teikoku Bankruptcies Reports). Large bad debts resulting from the
burst in asset values pushed the banking sector into crisis and stressed the corporate sector
(Arayama & Mourdoukoutas, 2000). In the past, firms belonging to industrial groups could
count on the support of their main banks when facing distress, and bureaucratic efforts
prevented banks from failing.^ However, persistent slowdown, the deteriorated financial
standing of banks, and the weakening of corporate balance sheets changed this pattern.
Many banks failed, and the rate of bankruptcies by Japanese firms soared.
' Japan's aging society has helped to focus attention on the country's pension funding. Low investment returns
from both the private and pubhc pension schemes have led to the realization that without an improved return on
pension assets, Japan will face severely underfunded pensions in the next century.
^ Mande et al. (2001) investigated the optimistic bias of loss versus profit firms in the period 1988-1997.
They found that analysts' forecasts, for firms reporting loss, have much larger forecast errors and more optimistic
bias compared to firms reporting profits. Their results reflect the difficulty of forecasting negative eamings,
consistent with this paper's argument that during periods of loss, eamings forecasts are extremely poor.
^ For much of the postwar period, no bank failed. When one became insolvent, the banking bureau discretely
managed its absorption into a healthier bank. Banks did not need to maintain the usual protections designed to
minimize the impact of financial reserves.
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2.3. Failure by government and economic forecasters
Despite the drastic situation, government forecasting agencies and economists remained
overly optimistic about Japan's economy and the prospects of recovery for a long time. The
Economic Planning Agency (EPA), Japan's organization responsible for economic fore-
casts, issued highly optimistic projections during most of the economic slowdown ^^
(Brown, 1999). The agency often reassured the country that Japan's economy was enjoying
a slow but steady recovery, and so did a succession of officials from the Ministry of
Finance (Martin, 1997). This failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the economic
situation eventually disappointed the public and increased distrust in the government.
Economic forecasts seriously underestimated Japan's output shortfalls (Krugman, 1998).
Many ofthese estimates are based on economic filters that are severely flawed when applied to
sustained slumps (Krugman, 1998).'^ The failure to predict recessions is not unique to Japan.
In the United States, failures of economic forecasts are related to the incidence of contractions
in general economic activity (Fintzen & Stekler, 1999; McNees, 1991; Zamowitz, 1986, 1991).
Similarly, GDP forecasts from a large number of countries show that economists generally
underestimate the extent of slowdown (Loungani, 2001). Overall, the above studies show that
the predictability of recession is extremely low, worldwide. This predictive failure could arise
because economists lack the requisite information (real-time data or reliable models) or
because they lack the incentives to predict recessions. Furthermore, governments' tendency to
highlight economic developments may influence the views of economic forecasters.
The discussion on Japan's economy in this section highlights widespread corporate losses,
which resuh in large earnings-forecast errors according to prior research (Brown, 200 1 ; Hwang
et al, 1996). On the other hand, the discussion of Japanese economic forecasts contain serious
errors (Krugman, 1998), which affect analysts' sales and earnings forecasts and result in large
forecast errors. Consistent with the above discussions, the findings of this article show large
'° The EPA constitutes a bureaucracy captured by Japan's Ministry of Finance, a powerful administrative
system that oversees the budget-writing process and regulates the financial markets. The ministry and its policies
were highly esteemed by the Japanese population but have come under severe criticisms recently.
'
' Many of these estimates, notably those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are based on the
Hodrick-Prescott filter, which has severe disadvantages when applied to an economy that undergoes a sustained
slump (Krugman, 1998). The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a trend analysis approach that extracts trends using
statistical "smoothing" techniques called filters. Prescott (1986) provided an early discussion of this filter, which
is an econometric method to compute a smooth and flexible trend to establish output potential on the basis of
actual past events. First, Hodrick-Prescott imposes the assumption that average deviations fi^om potential output
are zero over a period, so that when the economy slumps, the filter automatically reevaluates earlier periods as
times of above-potential output, thus reducing the estimated shortfall. Second, any sustained drop in output is built
into the estimated potential growth rate. As a result, it systematically understates the actual shortfall fi-om potential.
Despite its drawbacks, the Hodrick-Prescott filter is widely accepted and commonly used by economists.
'" Loungani (2001) noted that economic forecasters of major international organizations such as the IMF, the
World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and those of private sectors
actually rely heavily on governments' projections. The reason is because forecasters lack either the information or
the incentive to produce their own forecasts. The tendency of many governments to showcase economic
developments results in overly optimistic forecasts in countries that experience downturns.
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earnings-forecast errors for Japanese firms, reflecting the impact of continuous declines in
corporate profitability and of inaccurate economic forecasts during the examination period.
3. Data
In this article, U.S. analysts are sell-side analysts located in the United States, working for
U.S. brokerage firms. Background information on U.S. analysts, such as name, brokerage firm,
and office location, were obtained from the Nelson s Investment Research Directory {\996, vol.
I). Japanese analysts are sell-side analysts located in Japan and employed by Japanese
brokerage firms. Background information on Japanese analysts was obtained from the Nelson s
Directory ofInvestment Research (1998, vol. II). Data on U.S. and Japanese analysts' forecasts
were subject to availability on Institutional Brokers Estimate System International (I/B/E/S).'^
Forecasted earnings are retrieved from the I/B/E/S Detail files and reported earnings from the
I/B/E/S Actual files. I/B/E/S attempts to put actual and forecasted earnings numbers on a
common footing, generally using earnings prior to special items (I/B/E/S, 1996). As forecast
and actual earnings data are from the same source, errors arising from database inconsistency
are limited (Philbrick and Ricks, 1 99 1 ). I/B/E/S is a more extensive source ofJapanese forecasts
than sources used by prior studies.''^ The use of the I/B/E/S Detail files allows fracing of a
forecast number to an individual analyst whose background (United States or Japan) can be
determined.
The forecasted earnings numbers used for each firm are the single most recent annual
earnings forecasts by analysts (identified from the I/B/E/S Detail files) that are dated before
the firm's earnings announcements. The advantage of using the most recent earnings forecast
is that it is more accurate than the consensus estimate (O'Brien, 1988), and forecast errors
based on it are more highly associated with stock prices than errors based on the consensus
(Brown & Kim, 1991). Using forecasts dated before earnings announcements eliminates
forecasts that are coding errors by I/B/E/S or that are unduly perfect because of hindsight. ' ^
'^ From manually collecting analysts' names, the analysts retrieved under the definition of Japanese analysts in
this article appear to be Japanese nationals.
'"* Conroy et al. (1993) used Japanese firms in the first section of TSE, which did not include newly listed and
smaller domestic Japanese stocks. Mande (1996) examined only 12 large Japanese firms listed in the U.S.
Beckman (1998) collected data from the Japan Company Handbook 1991 and 1993.
'^ Analysts who publish their forecasts after knowing the actual earnings can artificially achieve zero error.
Brown and Higgins (1999) showed that the number of forecasts that are exactly the same as the actual earnings
numbers of international fums increase over time. They discussed that many of these perfect forecasts are due to
analysts' self-reporting the actual earnings to I/B/E/S in earlier years. In this article, I address the self-report
problem by considering only forecasts made before the earnings announcements to mitigate the presence of
forecasts that are unduly perfect. Additionally, because perfect forecasts might be data errors that drive my results,
I examine the frequency of small forecast errors excluding perfect forecasts. This examination shows that the
frequency of small nonperfect forecast errors of Japanese firms have decreased over time, consistent with
deteriorating forecast accuracy for Japanese firms over time. Therefore, it is unlikely that the self-report problem
documented by Brown and Higgins (1999) drives my results.
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Table 1
Data samples
Number of analysts Number of firms Number of forecasts
Panel A: USbyUS
83 235
84 272
85 320
86 364
87 453
88 493
89 499
90 492
91 478
92 494
93 564
94 624
95 634
96 592
97 520
98 460
Total 7494
Unique analysts: 783
Unique firms: 6565
Panel B: JPbyUS
89 8
90 6
91 5
92 4
93 6
94 7
95 7
96 10
97 8
98 7
Total 68
Unique analysts: 18
Unique firms: 264
Panel C: JPbyJP
92 1
93 21
94 30
95 45
96 51
97 40
98 36
Total 224
Unique analysts: 56
Unique firms: 93
1
643
910
1079
1255
1593
1792
2152
2251
2292
2537
2826
3126
3289
3513
3319
2431
35,008
37
58
54
51
47
72
70
106
123
70
688
13
173
509
709
686
620
367
3077
1825
2765
3690
4345
6141
6911
7751
8036
8218
8672
9694
10,261
10,036
9681
8405
6086
112,517
41
63
60
55
52
73
79
116
131
70
740
13
180
551
757
800
695
415
3411
USbyUS: Sample of forecasts for U.S. analysts by U.S. firms; JPbyUS: Sample of forecast for U.S. analysts by
Japanese firms; JPbyJP: Sample of forecast for Japanese firms by Japanese analysts.
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Forecast error is measured as PCFEy^^KAE,, — FC/,)/AEy,|, where AE,, and FC/, are the
actual and forecast earnings per share for firm J in year t, respectively. Observations of
forecast error larger than 20 times the earnings are deemed outliers and excluded from the
analyses. Replications are performed on observations of forecast error truncated at one and
two times the earnings.
Years that have less than 10 forecasted firms are removed from the analyses. The resulting
samples span three periods, 1983-1998 (USbyUS), 1989-1998 (JPbyUS), and 1992-1998
(JPbyJP). As several tests involve comparing the mean forecast error among different
samples, an examination of the relative frequency of large errors provides more assurance
that a fair comparison is achieved after truncating outliers.'^ The percentages of large errors
in all three samples in this article are comparable. The percentages of forecast errors larger
than 20 times the earnings are 0.29%, 0%, and 0% for the USbyUS, JPbyUS, and JPbyJP
samples, respectively. Because the distribution of larger observations is similar and small for
all three samples, the cut-off choice is not likely to infroduce bias in the results. The
percentages of forecast errors in the range between 2 and 20 times the earnings are 3.16%,
2.38%, and 3.59%, respectively.
The sample of U.S. firms' forecasts by U.S. analysts (USbyUS) consists of 1 12,517 annual
forecasts of 6565 U.S. firms by 783 U.S. analysts over the period 1983-1998. The sample of
Japanese firms' forecasts by U.S. analysts (JPbyUS) consists of 740 annual forecasts of 264
Japanese firms by 18 U.S. analysts from 1989 through 1998. The sample of Japanese firms'
forecasts by Japanese analysts (JPbyJP) consists of 3411 annual forecasts of 931 Japanese
firms by 56 Japanese analysts from 1992 to 1998. A limitation of this study is that it may not
be generalizable, because there are only a small number of analysts in the JPbyJP and JPbyUS
samples. The data concerning analysts, firms, and forecasts are described in more detail in
Table 1.
4. Analyses and results
4.1. Did U.S. analysts improve their forecasts of U.S. firms over time?
Insight into the forecast error frend in the United States highlights the significance of that
frend in Japan as observed in subsequent analyses. Table 2 presents a temporal analysis of
U.S. firms' annual earnings forecasts by U.S. analysts (USbyUS) by providing the
distribution of forecast errors from 1983 to 1998. Forecast error measurements are truncated
or deleted at 20 times the earnings. The columns show the year, the number of forecasts in
each year, the forecast error mean, third quartile, median, and first quartile of forecast errors.
As corroborated by their significantly negative correlation coefficients with year, forecast
error measurements in the columns decrease significantly from 1983 to 1998. The pattern of
decreased forecast error is robust in a replication using truncation at one and two times the
'^ Conroy et al. (1993) truncated forecast error observations at 20. Mande (1996) truncated observations at 1
and 2. Brown (1999) winsorized forecast bias at 1.
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Table 2
Distribution of forecast errors for U.S. firms by U.S. analysts
Year A^ Mean P75 Median P25
83 1825 0.28 0.16 0.06 0.02
84 2765 0.26 0.17 0.05 0.02
85 3690 0.38 0.19 0.05 0.02
86 4345 0.44 0.44 0.09 0.03
87 6141 0.42 0.30 0.08 0.02
88 6911 0.36 0.21 0.06 0.02
89 7751 0.42 0.25 0.07 0.02
90 8036 0.38 0.26 0.07 0.02
91 8218 0.36 0.22 0.06 0.02
92 8672 0.36 0.19 0.06 0.02
93 9694 0.25 0.16 0.05 0.02
94 10,261 0.27 0.13 0.04 0.01
95 10,036 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.01
96 9681 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.01
97 8405 0.22 0.13 0.04 0.01
98 6086 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.01
Total 112,517
Average 0.32 0.20 0.06 0.02
Correlation with year -.55** -.51** -.61* -.71*
Forecast error is measured as PCFE,, = |(AEy, — FC/,)/AEy,|, where AEj, and FQ, are the actual and forecasted
earnings per share for firm /' in year t, respectively. The forecasted earnings numbers for each firm are the single
most recent earnings forecasts by sampled analysts before earnings announcements. Forecasted and actual
earnings data are retrieved fi^om I/B/E/S U.S. Detail and Actual files, respectively. N is the number of forecasts.
P75 and P25 are the forecast errors at the third and first quartiles, respectively.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
earnings. This finding is consistent with prior research using U.S. quarterly forecasts (Brown,
1997).
The correlation with year observed in Table 2 might be impacted by dependency among
forecast data. Dependency occurs because each firm may be forecasted by many analysts. As
all analysts' forecasts are included in the mean for the year, widely followed firms receive
more weight and the correlation might only reflect the pattern in which firms that are easy to
forecast attract more analysts over time. To avoid this "dependency" problem, I replicate
Table 2 by using only one forecast per firm by one randomly chosen analyst for each year.
'
The distribution of forecast errors thus observed also displays a significantly decreasing
pattern, corroborating the earlier resuU that U.S. forecasts of U.S. firms have improved over
time. This finding is consistent with the contention and evidence reported by Brown (2001)
and Brown and Higgins (2001) that U.S. managers manage analysts' earnings surprises to
avoid negative valuation consequences to their stock prices. The forecast error trend in the
United States serves as a benchmark to assess trends in Japanese analysts' forecast errors.
'^ The number of forecasted firms thus obtained are used in subsequent analyses described in Table 5.
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4.2. Did U.S. analysts improve their forecasts ofJapanese firms over time?
Table 3 presents a temporal analysis of Japanese firms' forecasts by U.S. analysts
(JPbyUS) by providing the distribution of forecast errors from 1989 to 1998. Forecast errors
are truncated at 20 times the earnings. The columns are as in Table 2. As indicated by
significantly positive correlation coefficients of the mean and the third quartile with year,
forecast error does not decrease but rather increases over time. This finding is robust to
truncation of forecast errors at one and two times the eamings, to a replication based on one
forecast per firm by a random analyst in each year, ' ^ and to partitions into consolidated and
parent-only forecasts. The overall evidence indicates that forecasts of Japanese firms'
eamings by U.S. analysts have not improved but rather have deteriorated over time.
4.3. Did Japanese analysts improve their forecasts ofJapanese firms over time?
To examine whether decreasing forecast ability also pertains to Japanese analysts. Table
4 presents a temporal analysis of Japanese firms' forecasts by Japanese analysts (JPbyJP)
by providing the distribution of forecast errors from 1992 to 1998. The columns are as in
the two previous tables and forecast errors are truncated at 20 times the eamings. Forecast
error measurements in the columns increase over time, as corroborated by high and
significantly positive correlation coefficients with year. This finding is robust to truncation
of forecast errors at one and two times the eamings, to a replication based on one forecast
per firm by a random analyst in each year, and to partitions into consolidated and parent-
only forecasts. The overall evidence indicates that the forecasts of Japanese firms' eamings
by Japanese analysts have not improved, but rather have worsened over time.
The combined findings in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that both U.S. and Japanese analysts
have become less accurate at forecasting Japanese firms' eamings. To shed light further on
these findings, the following analyses explore several firm and economic factors to seek
explanations for the observed trends.
4.4. WJiat factors explain the trends of U.S. and Japanese analysts' forecast errors?
Firms with high eamings volatility are inherently more difficult to forecast than those with
smoother, less volatile income streams (Imhoff, 1978; Kross, Ro, & Schroeder, 1990).
Compared to small firms, large firms have richer information environments, so there is less
information asymmetry between management and analysts, which leads to superior analyst
forecast accuracy (Bamber, 1987). Firms experiencing eamings losses are more difficult to
forecast than firms reporting profits (Brown, 2001; Hwang et al., 1996). Forecast error
measured as a percentage of EPS is smaller when the magnitude of EPS (the denominator) is
larger. Firms followed by more analysts are forecasted with less error (Brown, 1997). Analyst
bias affects forecast error (numerically, forecast error is the absolute measurement of forecast
'^ This was done to remove potential dependency from including firm forecasts by multiple analysts.
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Table 3
Distribution of forecast errors for Japanese firms by U.S. analysts
Year A^ Mean P75 Median P25
89 41 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.02
90 63 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.05
91 60 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.02
92 55 0.27 0.20 0.07 0.02
93 52 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.00
94 73 0.45 0.23 0.08 0.03
95 79 0.44 0.26 0.11 0.04
96 116 0.26 0.22 0.08 0.03
97 131 0.33 0.19 0.08 0.02
98 70 0.47 0.54 0.13 0.06
Total 740
Average 0.28 0.23 0.09 0.03
Correlation with year .71* .67** .37 .44
Forecast error is measured as PCFEy, = |(AE/, — FC;,)/AE/,|, where AE/, and FC/, are the actual and forecasted
earnings per share for fumy in year t, respectively. The forecasted earnings numbers for each firm are the single
most recent earnings forecasts by sampled analysts before earnings announcements. Forecasted and actual
earnings data are retrieved from I/B/E/S International Detail and Actual files, respectively. A'^ is the number of
forecasts. P75 and P25 are the forecast errors at the third and first quartiles, respectively.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
bias). Forecast lag affects forecast error because analysts become more informed about the
firm over time (Brown, Hagerman, Griffin, & Zmijewski, 1987; Conroy, Fukuda, & Harris,
1990; JCross et al., 1990). GDP growth represents the trend of national output, of which
Table 4
Distribution of forecast errors for Japanese firms by Japanese analysts
Year A^ Mean P75 Median P25
92 13 0.19 0.38 0.09 0.03
93 180 0.39 0.08 0.01 0.00
94 551 0.35 0.27 0.11 0.04
95 757 0.52 0.31 0.13 0.04
96 800 0.40 0.33 0.13 0.04
97 695 0.46 0.36 0.14 0.05
98 415 0.54 0.51 0.15 0.06
Total 3411
Average 0.41 0.32 0.11 0.04
Correlation with year .80** .59 .75** .77**
Forecast error is measured as PCFE/, = |(AE/, - FC/,)/AE/,|, where AEy, and FC/, are the actual and forecasted
earnings per share for firmy in year t, respectively. The forecasted earnings numbers for each fimi are the single
most recent earnings forecasts by sampled analysts before earnings announcements. Forecasted and actual
earnings data are retrieved from 1/B/E/S International Detail and Actual files, respectively. A' is the number of
forecasts. P75 and P25 are the forecast errors at the third and first quartiles, respectively.
* * Significant at 5%.
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corporate earnings are an important component. Correct expectation of GDP growth helps
analysts forecast corporate eamings more accurately; however, if GDP growth is forecasted
inaccurately, analysts' eamings forecasts deteriorate. Overall, eamings volatility, frequency of
losses, and forecast lag are expected to be positively correlated with forecast error, whereas
firm size, EPS magnitude, analyst following, forecast bias, and GDP growth are expected to
be negatively correlated with forecast error.
Panels A-C of Table 5 present the yearly means of the above factors for all firms in the
three samples. Measurements of real GDP growth are seasonally adjusted. Column 1 presents
the year, column 2 the number of firms in each year, column 3 the mean analyst forecast
error, '^ column 4 the mean random-walk forecast error, which is used to proxy for eamings
volatility,"^ column 5 the mean market capitalization (size), column 6 the frequency of firms
experiencing losses during the year,^' column 7 the magnitude of mean EPS, column 8 the
mean analyst following, column 9 the mean analyst forecast bias, column 10 the mean
forecast lag, defined as the number of days between the forecast date and the eamings
announcement date, and column 1 1 the real GDP growth. The correlations between the means
of these factors and forecast error are used to explain the frends of forecast error. All data are
retrieved from I/B/E/S, except for GDP data, which are retiieved from Datasfream.
Table 5 shows the correlations between the factors with year and with forecast error. In the
USbylJS sample (Panel A), the correlations with year indicate temporal increases in firm size
(.82), forecast lag (.81), analyst forecast bias (.66, denoting decreased optimism), and
frequency of losses (.55). The correlations with forecast error indicate that forecast error is
negatively associated with analyst forecast bias (— .83) and size (— .64). The signs of these
correlations are as expected. These results indicate that reduced analyst bias and richer
information environment due to increased firm size partly explain the frend of reduced
forecast errors during the period, despite the effects of increasing loss frequency and forecast
lag. The mitigated analyst bias is consistent with the evidence by Brown (2001), who showed
decreased bias in forecasts of quarterly eamings in the United States, and the contention by
Brown and Higgins (2001) that U.S. executives manage eamings surprises to avoid price
consequences to their companies' stocks. The increase in firm size reflects the increased
capitalization of the U.S. market during the period.
In the JPbyUS sample (Panel B), the correlations with year indicate temporal increases in
frequency of losses (.82), random-walk errors (.76), and EPS magnitude (.69), and temporal
decrease in GDP growth (— .60). The correlations with forecast error indicate that it is
associated with frequency of losses (.90), random-walk forecast errors (.71), and real GDP
growth (— .64). The signs of these correlations are as expected. The results indicate that the
increased frequency of losses and eamings volatility and reduced GDP growth partly explain
' Only one forecast per firm by a randomly chosen analyst is retained for each year. These are the firms
obtained for replicated analyses in Tables 2-4.
"
' Random-walk error indicates fluctuation of eamings from one year to another, and therefore is used as
proxy for eamings volatility (Kross et al., 1990).
"' The frequency of losses of U.S. firms determined in this article is similar to that reported by Brown (2001).
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the trend of increased forecast errors over time. The magnitudes of these correlations indicate
that the increase in forecast errors is most strongly correlated with the increased frequency of
losses.
In the JPbyJP sample (Panel C), the correlations with year indicate a trend of increasing
forecast lag (.82) and random-walk error (.77). The correlations with forecast error
indicate that it is associated with frequency of losses (.80) and analyst forecast bias
( — .69, denoting increased optimism). The signs of these correlations are as expected. The
results indicate that the increased frequency of losses and analyst optimism account for the
trend of increased forecast errors over the period. The magnitudes of these correlations
indicate that the increase in forecast errors is most strongly correlated with the increased
frequency of losses. The impact of forecast lag is near significance level and in the
expected direction.
It is notable that the forecast lags of Japanese firms are very high, especially in recent
years. Further examinations reveal that large forecast lags are due to forecasts made very
early in the year. Conversations with I/B/E/S staff suggest that these forecasts are dated
because analysts stopped covering them. Consistent with this argument, I find that the
percentage of "stopped" firms in JPbyJP increases steadily from 1994 to 1998 based on
data from the I/B/E/S Stop file. Many firms ceased to be followed in the year following a
large forecast lag. The percentage of stopped firms in JPbyUS is large in some years, but
does not follow any systematic frend. U.S. analysts are more likely to stop covering a
small cap firm, whereas Japanese analysts are more likely to stop covering a loss firm.""
Overall, forecast lags of many Japanese firms are large due to analysts' abandoning
coverage of firms that perform poorly. In the United States, analyst coverage declines
significantly for firms that subsequently fail (Moses, 1990a, 1990b). However, because
stopped coverage may also occur due to shifts in forecast processes and analyst incentives
or careers, future research is necessary to determine with more assurance the reasons why
many analysts quit following Japanese firms during the examination period. Future
research is also necessary to examine the linkage between corporate failures and eamings
forecasts in Japan.
The combined results from Panels B and C indicate that the trend of increased forecast
error of Japanese firms is best explained by their frequency of losses. Since loss firms are
more difficuh to forecast than profit firms because the frequency of loss firms increases
during the examination period, analysts' forecasts worsen. The lower forecast accuracy of
loss firms may result from managers taking large discretionary accruals (big baths) that are
unexpected by analysts, rather than analysts' skills. In the United States, firms take big baths
sometimes, resulting in large optimistic forecasts by analysts (Brown, 1997). However,
Japanese managers are strongly encouraged to forecast current annual eamings. According to
Brown and Higgins (2001), who found less large negative loss surprises in Japan than in 12
^^ I compare stopped versus nonstopped firms using a paired t test on yearly means and a pooled t test.
Stopped firms have significantly smaller market capitalization than do nonstopped firms in the JPbyUS sample.
Stopped firms have a significantly higher loss ft-equency than do nonstopped firms in the JPbyJP sample.
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Other countries, Japanese managers tend to reveal impending losses via their forecasts,
because their forecast accuracy may affect their reputation. Furthermore, Mande, Wohar, and
Ortman (2001) investigated but did not find that big baths cause large forecast errors for loss
firms in Japan. Therefore, it is unlikely that big baths drive my results.
The analyses reveal that many analysts stop covering Japanese firms during the examina-
tion period, consistent with poorly performing firms' efforts to deter analysts. The results also
reflect the impact of Japan's economic context in the examination period, where earnings are
volatile, GDP growth declines beyond expectations, and analysts are overly optimistic as they
erroneously look for economic rebounds.
4.5. Were U.S. analysts better forecasters than Japanese analysts?
Prior research has addressed the above question by comparing U.S. firms' forecasts by
U.S. analysts with Japanese firms' forecasts by Japanese analysts. Conroy et al. (1993) found
that Japanese analysts forecasted Japanese firms more accurately than U.S. analysts
forecasted U.S. firms. "^"^ There are three main differences between their study and mine.
First, they used Toyo Keizai and consensus I/B/E/S forecasts, whereas I use I/B/E/S Detail
forecasts for both Japanese and U.S. firms. Second, they used only the first section of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), which consists of larger Japanese firms than those on I/B/E/S.
Finally, their examination period was short and pertained to the bubble economy, whereas I
examine a longer time span within the burst period.
Prior research has also addressed the above question by comparing Japanese firms'
forecasts by U.S. analysts with Japanese firms' forecasts by Japanese analysts. Mande
(1996) found that, over 1987-1992, Japanese analysts provided superior forecasts of sales,
but comparable forecasts of earnings to U.S. analysts. He used 12 large Japanese firms
listed in the United States. Japanese analysts were those reporting in the Japan Company
Handbook, and U.S. analysts were those reporting in Value-Line Investment Surveys.
In the following, I compare U.S. and Japanese analysts' forecasts of firms in their
respective domestic countries (USbyUS versus JPbyJP) and their forecasts of Japanese
firms (JPbyUS versus JPbyJP). The comparisons are based on cross-sectional regression of
forecast errors pooled fi^om the compared samples against a binary variable representing
the analyst background (1 if Japan, if U.S.). For example, to compare USbyUS with
JPbyJP, I pool observations fi"om the two samples for a cross-sectional regression of
forecast error against the analyst binary. Then the binary coefficient is used to determine
which analyst group forecast more accurately. To ensure that the results are robust to
different matching schemes, the USbyUS and JPbyJP are pooled in two ways, (1) pooling
the total samples and (2) pooling the whole of JPbyJP and a number of randomly selected
observations from USbyUS so that each year has the same number of observations fi"om
^^ After comparing analysts' forecasts with random-walk forecasts from 1986 to 1988, the authors also found
that U.S. analysts provided more improvement than Japanese analysts. However, the larger improvement in the
United States might be related to the larger number of analysts using the U.S. consensus forecasts, which were
then compared to the single analyst forecast in Japan.
388 H.N. Higgins / The International Journal ofAccounting 37 (2002) 371-394
both analyst groups. To compare JPbyUS and JPbyJP, besides the above two pooling
methods, I use a third pool consisting of only firms that exist in both samples.
For completeness, I also compare U.S. analysts' forecasts of U.S. and Japanese firms
(USbyUS versus JPbyUS) by regressing forecast error against a binary variable representing
the firm's country (Japan 1, US 0). Factors that may impact forecast error presented in Table 5
are included in the regressions as covariates, with the addition of a binary variable
representing parent-only or consolidated earnings (1 if parent-only, if consolidated) to
reflect that parent-only earnings are easier to forecast (Beckman, 1998). Year is also included
to remove dependency fi^om repeats of data over several years. Japanese firms' market values
(size) are translated into U.S. currency based on fiscal year-end exchange rates when Japanese
firms are pooled with U.S. firms.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of comparing analysts' errors in forecasting firms in
their respective domestic countries (USbyUS versus JPbyJP). Numerous combinations of the
covariates are used in this analysis, yielding similar results. For clarity of exposition, I report
only the results of regressing the log of absolute forecast error against the log of firm size, a
parent/consolidation binary (1 if parent-only, if consolidated), the forecast lag, a loss binary
(1 if loss, if profit), an analyst binary (1 if Japanese, if United States), and year.^"^ The
coefficient of the log of size is expected to be negative, while the coefficients of forecast lag
and loss are expected to be positive, similar to the sign expectations for Table 5. The
coefficient of the parent/consolidation binary is expected to be negative to reflect lower
forecast errors for parent-only earnings. The coefficient of year may be negative to reflect
decreasing forecast errors over time if U.S. firms drive the results and positive or insignificant
otherwise. The coefficient of the analyst binary is used to determine which analyst group,
U.S. or Japanese, produces better forecasts. Panel A shows two ways of pooling the USbyUS
and JPbyJP samples. Pool 1 is based on the merging of the USbyUS and JPbyJP whole
samples. Pool 2 is based on the JPbyJP sample and US firms randomly selected fi-om the
USbyUS sample so that each year has the same number of observations fi^om both analyst
groups. The regression results fi"om both pools show that the coefficients of the covariates are
significant in the expected signs. More importantly, the coefficient of the analyst binary is
significantly positive, indicating that forecast errors by Japanese analysts are larger than are
those by U.S. analysts.
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of comparing analysts' errors in forecasting
Japanese firms (JPbyUS versus JPbyJP). "^^ Panel B has the same presentation and sign
'^ Following BoxCox transformations, I use the log of forecast error to improve normality (D=. 10). Then
normality is further improved by taking the log of firm size (D=.018). The coefficient of the analyst binary is
significantly positive in this transformed regression and in all other combinations, indicating that forecast errors by
Japanese analysts are larger than are those by U.S. analysts. The coefficients of the covariates are significant in the
expected signs in most combinations.
"^ The regression of forecast error yields a positive coefficient for the analyst binary, but the distribution of its
standardized errors indicates nonnormality (Shapiro- Wilk's statistic=.31). BoxCox transformations and various
transformations of the independent variables reveal that best normality is achieved by taking the log of forecast
error (Shapiro -Wilk's statistic=.98).
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expectations as in Panel A. Three ways of pooling the JPbylJS and JPbyJP samples are
shown. Pool 1 is based on the merging of the two whole samples. Pool 2 is based on the
JPbyUS sample and random selections from the JPbyJP sample so that each year has the
same number of observations from both analyst groups. Pool 3 is based only on firms
common to both samples. The results from all three pools reveal that the coefficients of the
covariates are significant in the expected signs. More importantly, the coefficient of the
analyst binary is significantly positive, indicating that the forecast errors of Japanese
analysts are larger than those of U.S. analysts. The results are consistent based on
numerous combinations of the covariates.
Panel C of Table 6 presents the results of comparing U.S. analysts' forecast errors of
Japanese and U.S. firms (USbyUS versus JPbyUS). Instead of an analyst binary, a firm
binary is used to distinguish between Japanese (1) and U.S. firms (0). The expected sign of
the firm binary is positive, to reflect that Japanese firms are more difficult for U.S. analysts
to forecast than are U.S. firms, especially during Japan's economic slowdown. The
remaining covariates and their sign expectations are as in previous panels. Three ways
of pooling the USbyUS and JPbyUS samples are shown. Pool 1 is based on the merging of
the two whole samples. Pool 2 is based on the JPbyUS sample and random selections from
the USbyUS sample so that each year has the same number of observations from both
country groups. Pool 3 is based only on analysts common to both samples. The resuhs
from all three pools reveal that the coefficients of the covariates are significant in the
expected signs. Not surprisingly, the coefficient of the firm binary is significantly positive,
indicating that U.S. analysts make larger forecast errors when forecasting Japanese firms
than when they forecast U.S. firms.
Overall, the results in Table 6 indicate that U.S. analysts are better forecasters than
Japanese analysts are after confroUing for several firm-specific factors. The finding that U.S.
analysts are better than Japanese analysts at forecasting their respective domestic firms
contrasts with prior research (Conroy et al., 1993) because I focus on a more recent period,
during which U.S. analysts have improved markedly whereas Japanese analysts have not.
U.S. analysts are also found more accurate than Japanese analysts in forecasting Japanese
firms. This confirms the evidence reported by Mande and Kwak (1996) and strengthens the
popular belief that Japanese analysts are more bound by cultural ties that impede forecast
accuracy.
5. Summary and conclusion
Three analyses are performed in this article. The first analysis, which serves as a
benchmark for comparative purposes, is a temporal examinafion of U.S. firms' eamings
forecasts by U.S. analysts. Insight into the pattern of decreasing forecast errors in the
United States highlights the significance of the pattern in Japan detected in subsequent
analyses. Consistent with Brown (1997), I show that U.S. analysts' forecasts of U.S. firms'
eamings have improved over time. Overall, the observed trend in the United States
indicates that the process of managing eamings expectations in the U.S. market has
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improved over time. Earnings volatility, size, frequency of losses, forecast lag, EPS
magnitude, analyst following, and GDP growth are examined as potential explanations
for the observed trend. I show that the decreases in forecast errors in the U.S. are possibly
due to a reduction in optimistic bias of U.S. analysts. The mitigation of bias confirms the
evidence of Brown (2001) and the contention by Brown and Higgins (2001) that U.S.
executives manage earnings surprises to avoid negative valuation consequences to their
stock prices. The decreased forecast errors in the United States are also associated with
increases in firm size, consistent with richer information environments in the U.S. due to
increased capitalization rate.
The second analysis is a temporal analysis of Japanese firms' earnings forecasts by
U.S. and Japanese analysts. I show that forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings by both
groups of analysts have not improved over time but, rather have worsened. By examining
several factors, I find that the tendency of increasing forecast errors in Japan is best
explained by the increasing frequency of losses reported by firms during the economic
burst period. Loss firms and failing firms are difficuh to forecast (Hwang et al., 1996;
Levy, 2000; Moses, 1990a, 1990b; Teikoku Reports). The increases in Japanese forecast
errors also reflect Japan's economic context of declining GDP growth, increased earnings
volatility, and forecast optimism. The results reveal that many analysts stop covering
Japanese firms during the examination period probably because of their poor perform-
ance.
The third analysis is a comparative analysis of U.S. and Japanese analysts' forecast
errors. I show that U.S. analysts are better at forecasting U.S. firms than Japanese analysts
at forecasting Japanese firms during the period 1992-1998. This finding contrasts with
prior research (Conroy, Harris, & Park, 1990), perhaps because I focus on a more recent
period, during which U.S. analysts' forecasts have improved markedly whereas Japanese
analysts' forecasts have not. I also find that U.S. analysts are better than Japanese analysts
at forecasting Japanese firms, confirming Mande and Kwak (1996) and the popular belief
(Martin, 1999b) that Japanese analysts are less free to use their judgment and analyses and
are more bound by cultural prohibitions than their foreign counterparts.
This article presents some of the first evidence on analysts' earnings forecasts of
Japanese firms during the country's current economic burst period. The case of Japan
represents a striking phenomenon relating to economic and earnings forecasts during
economic downturns. The political pressure felt by many governments to highlight
economic development leads them to deny problems and issue wildly optimistic projections
(Brown, 1999; Loungani, 2001). In addition, certain economic estimates published by
international organizations are unrealistically optimistic when applied to prolonged eco-
nomic slumps (Krugman, 1998). Inaccurate economic forecasts likely affect the accuracy of
financial analysts' corporate earnings forecasts. At the firm level, the economic impact is
manifested through widespread corporate losses.
The analyses in this article are exploratory. Future research is necessary to study more
thoroughly the factors driving the trend of forecast errors in Japan. The findings of this
article are confined to the years that cover the burst period and the limited data available.
Application of the time-series trends to a longer time fi^ame should be made with caution.
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The findings may not be generalizable because of the small numbers of analysts in the
JPbyUS and JPbyJP samples.
Several implications can be drawn from this article's results. For the practitioner, if the
trend of Japanese firms' earnings forecasts can be extrapolated into the fiiture, market
analyses of Japan should incorporate the effect of loss firms and adjust for potential optimism
in earnings forecasts. During economic downtums, forecasters should seek information from
all available sources and make adjustments to government forecasts and should revise their
own estimates often to mitigate optimism. Furthermore, forecasters should be wary of
economic indices that allegedly underestimate output shortfalls lest they affect firms' eamings
forecasts.
For the academic researcher, the issue of analysts' superiority ("Are U.S. analysts superior
to their Japanese counterparts?" and vice versa) should not be considered in the absolute, but
should be considered in conjunction with time and economic and firm conditions. Future
research should examine the forecasting process in Japan and the incentive and cultural issues
facing Japanese analysts, especially when they follow failing firms. Such research will benefit
the young and fast developing Japanese analysts' societies, investors in Japanese firms, and
academicians interested in eamings forecasts in Japan.
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Abstract
Our study investigates the relationship between the operating performances of Korean industrial
firms and the behavior of discretionary accruals during the period 1994-1997. We hypothesize that the
degree of earnings management will depend on the firm operating performances. We construct 10
"cash from operations (CFG)" portfolios to test if there are systematic differences in discretionary
accruals across portfolios.
Four test methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change
test) are used to investigate if operating performances affect discretionary accruals differently. We
compare three accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary accruals and total accruals) in testing
the eamings management hypotheses.
The results support the hypothesis that Korean industrial firms manage eamings. When operating
performance is poor, the firms tend to choose income-increasing strategies. In addition, when
operating performance is extremely poor, some firms tend to take a big bath, while some of the
exceptionally well-performing firms tend to select income-decreasing strategies.
© 2002 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Studies suggest that managers manipulate reported profits to fit their intentions by
selecting certain accounting policies, changing accounting estimates, and managing accruals.
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Earnings management has become a concern not only in Korea but also in other countries.
Arthur Levitt, US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman, recently stated that
the accounting profession needs to get out of the "gimmick" business. Levitt blasted a
process that has become "a game of nods and winks" among corporate managers, auditors,
and analysts. During a recent speech, he described key illusions including "big bath"
charges, cookie jar reserves, and revenue recognition that he felt were poisoning the financial
reporting process (Levitt, 1998). The SEC has concluded that too many publicly held firms
are abusing the financial reporting model and overly managing their eamings. Some firms
may be improperly boosting eamings by manipulating both revenues and expenses. Auditors
need a good understanding of their clients and business to recognize the warning signs of
fi"aud (Carmichael, 1999). The difference between eamings management and reporting fi^aud
may not be great (Brown, 1999).
The Korean Accounting Standards were first developed in 1958, after the Korea Stock
Exchange opened in 1956. For many years, the Korean accounting system copied the
Japanese system. In 1977, the Financial Supervisory Service, equivalent to the US SEC,
began operations. Before then, the Ministry of Finance regulated all financial policies
including the accounting system. Recently, after the financial crisis in 1997, a private sector
standard-setting body, Korean Accounting Standards Board (KASB), was created in 1999.
Now, the Korean accounting system in many respects follows the approaches for the US and
the Intemational Accounting Standards Committee (L\SC) systems. For example, the Korean
accounting system mandated a cash fiow statement from fiscal year 1995, while the statement
was adopted in the US in 1987. However, some of the US or L\SC GAAP are not adopted or
adopted much later.
The Korean economy has expanded very rapidly. The accounting system has not been
improved proportionately. For example, evidence that investors and creditors use financial
statements in a rational manner in their decision makings is not available. The Korean
accounting system can be characterized before 1997 as a system of low-transparency,
unreliable, and less-than-useful statements. Financial statements were believed to be part of
a ritual that firms should go through once a year. Firms were given wide latitudes in
selecting accounting choices to fit firms' arbitrary needs. For example, firms were allowed
to revalue their fixed assets and choose to report foreign exchange losses as either an income
statement item or as a capital adjustment item. Also, firms were allowed to estimate bad debt
provision at a minimal level even though they expected much higher actual bad debt
expense. In addition, corporate governance and various monitoring systems such as
independent auditors and financial analysts had not been developed fiilly since the focus
was on rapid growth and firm size expansion rather than on profitability or economic
substance."
^ For example, the number of KSE-listed firms as of the end of 1985, 30 years after the opening of the KSE,
was only 342. The number increased to 776 as of the end of 1997. In 1988 and 1989, 239 firms went public,
resulting in a 61% increase from 1987.
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Economic conditions have changed a lot since Korean firms experienced the financial
crisis in 1997. Now, efforts are being made to improve the transparency of financial reporting.
Some key measures include the launch of the KASB, the mandatory imposition on listed
firms of audit committee for which two-thirds of the committee members should be staffed
with outside directors, and the mandated preparation of combined financial statements by top
30 conglomerates.
Our study investigates Korean industrial firms to examine any systematic differences in
earnings management practices depending on their respective operating performances. Cash
fi-om operations (hereafter CFO) is difficult to manage unless cash accompanying revenues or
expenses are deliberately deferred or fi-ont-loaded. We hypothesize that the degree of earnings
management will depend on operating performances. We construct 10 CFO portfolios to
detect any systematic differences in earnings management practices across portfolios.
The study employs four methods (mean accrual difference tests, correlation tests,
regression analysis, and sign-change tests) to test the hypothesis that firms tend to manage
earnings when operating performances, measured in terms of CFO, are below or above their
acceptable range, hi addition, the study uses three different accrual estimation approaches.
The results of our study support the hypothesis that the earnings management practices of
the Korean industrial firms differ depending on their operating performances. When operating
performance is negative, the firms tend to take income-increasing strategies. When operating
performance is extremely poor, some firms tend to take big bath strategies. Some excep-
tionally well-performing firms tend to select income-decreasing strategies.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss previous research
that has been conducted in the earnings management area. Section 3 describes our test
methods. In Section 4, our results are presented. In Section 5, we discuss our conclusions and
possible limitations of our study.
2. Prior studies
Earnings management hypothesis can be decomposed into hypotheses related to income
smoothing, management compensation, ownership control or management buyout, and
political costs issues.
The income-smoothing hypothesis asserts that managers select accounting policies to
minimize the variance of reported earnings. More specifically, managers may decrease
reported earnings when operating performance is unusually high and increase reported
earnings when operating performance is unusually low. Moses (1987) used accounting
changes as a measure of discretionary accruals and found that smoothing is associated with
firm size, existence of bonus compensation plans, and divergence of actual earnings from
expectations.
The management compensation hypothesis claims that managers have incentives to
maximize their compensation by selecting alternative accounting procedures. Hence, under
this hypothesis, managers will attempt to increase reported earnings when earnings affect
their respecfive financial compensation. When operating performance exceeds the upper
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limit of bonus compensation, managers may have incentives to reduce reported earnings. On
the other hand, when operating performance is so low that managers cannot "manipulate"
earnings to exceed the lower limit of bonus compensation, then the managers may take so-
called "big bath" strategies. Therefore, under the management compensation hypothesis, the
variance of reported earnings may not be necessarily minimized because of the big bath
possibility. Healy (1985), for example, reported that accrual policies of managers are related
to income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts and that changes in accounting
procedures by managers are associated with the adoption or modification of their respective
bonus plans.
The ownership control or management buyout hypothesis infers that managers will either
increase or decrease, depending on the situation, reported earnings to protect the ownership
control of firms. For example, if managers plan to increase their ownership percentage, then
the managers may have incentives to decrease reported earnings. However, if managers are
confronted with a threat by a third party's attempt to control their respective firm, managers
will have incentives to increase reported earnings. DeAngelo (1986) hypothesized that
managers of firms going private would have incentives to understate reported income in
attempts to reduce the buyout compensation but failed to find support for this hypothesis.
Perry and Williams (1994), however, document evidence of earnings management by
increasing sample size for the same topic. DeAngelo (1988) discovered that managers of
firms in proxy contests exercise their accounting discretion to paint a more favorable picture
of their own performance to voting stockholders, and that, if elected, dissidents then tend to
take an immediate earnings bath. The managers typically blame prior management for the
previous poor operating performance.
Firms based on the political cost hypothesis may have incentives to manage earnings in
such a way that their relative political interests are well protected. For example, rate-
regulated firms will have incentives to decrease reported earnings when the firms want to
have a rate increase approved by a regulatory agency. In addition, firms that are unfavorably
affected by cheap imported goods may have incentives to decrease reported earnings when
they lobby their governments to take certain actions to curb import of competitive foreign
products. Cahan (1992) tested and found support for the political cost hypothesis that firms
investigated for monopoly-related violations would have incentive to use accounting
procedures that produce abnormally low level of income. Jones ( 1 99 1 ) developed a seminal
model to estimate discretionary accruals and applied the model to test if firms, by reducing
earnings, would benefit fi^om import relief attempts during import relief investigations by the
US International Trade Commission. The findings of her study were consistent with the
earnings management hypothesis. Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) found no evidence of the
earnings management hypothesis that managers reduce reported earnings during labor union
contract negotiations. Hall and Stammerjohan (1997), using the error component model,
document that managers of oil firms facing potentially large damage awards choose income-
decreasing nonworking capital accruals relative to managers of other oil firms. Han and
Wang (1998) showed that firms expecting increases in earnings resulting from sudden
product price increases used accounting accruals to reduce earnings and, thus, their political
sensitivities.
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3. Test methods
3.1. Portfolio construction
The study examines whether firms have different degrees of incentives to manage earnings
depending upon their operating performances measured in terms of CFO. As discussed
earlier, CFO is difficuh to manage unless firms intentionally front load or defer the
recognition of cash accompanying revenue or expense. Therefore, CFO should be a good
indicator of a firm's operating performance. A bad performer may have a strong incentive to
employ income-increasing accounting strategies, while a good performer in general may have
relatively weak incentives to employ income-decreasing strategies except for some extremely
good performers. Managers may have incentives to manage earnings to smooth reported
eamings, to boost stock price, to decrease income tax expense, to make firms look better, to
maximize managers' compensation, or to decrease political visibility.
With these underlying assumptions, we divided the sample firms into 10 portfolios based
on relative CFO rankings as McNichols and Wilson (1988) did in their study.^
5.2. Estimation of discretionary accruals
Total accruals (TA) are defined as NI less CFO. TA can be decomposed into discretionary
and nondiscretionary accruals. The discretionary component of TA is believed to represent
the degree of eamings management. A model is needed to separate the discretionary
component from TA. McNichols and Wilson (1988) provide a good discussion about
experimental design issues to separate discretionary accruals fi^om TA. They argue that
because both the discretionary and nondiscretionary components are unobservable, it is
impossible to separate measurement error fi-om a discretionary accrual proxy.
Some researchers including Healy (1985) utilized the random walk model. Jones (1991)
proposed a seminal model that has been widely used by other researchers. Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeny (1995) compared five accrual-based models (Healy model, DeAngelo model, Jones
model. Modified Jones model, and an Industry model) for detecfing eamings management.
They found that the modified Jones model exhibits the most power in detecting eamings
management even though all the models appear well specified when applied to a random
sample of firm-years. Kang and Sivaramkrishinan (1995, KS hereafter) argue that many of the
research methods used in previous studies were subject to simultaneity, errors-in-variables, or
omitted variable problems. KS proposed an accmal balance concept and an instmmental
variable approach (the generalized method of moments, GMM) that would avoid some of the
problems. Using a simulation technique, KS document that the instmmental variable model
^ McNichols and Wilson (1988) construct 10 CFO portfolios and investigate whether there is any systematic
difference in TA across CFO portfolios. It documents that CFO can be a very good partitioning variable for
accruals. Table 1 of their study reports that the rank correlation between CFO and TA is - .69. Raybum (1986)
documents that the correlation between CFO and TA is -.81. For our sample, the Pearson and Spearman
correlation coefficients between the two variables are — .77 and — .80, respectively.
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performs better than the Jones model. In this paper, we use both the KS model and the Jones
model. Furthermore, for comparative purpose, we also use a TA approach since TA should be
free of model-fitting errors.
The two models are described below:"*
The KS model
AB,-,/NTA,v_i = 7/^0 + ^,(<5„REV„)/NTA,_i + 7/'2((52,EXP„)/NTA„_i
+ 7/.3((53/GPPE,,)/NTA,,_i + V,. (1)
The Jones model
TA,,/NTA,,_, - ^o(l/NTA,,_i) + ^2(AREV„/NTA,,_,) + ^3(GPPE,v/NTA„_i) + 5„
(2)
where, AB,, = accrual balance = AR,, + INV/, + OCA,, — CL,, — DEP„; AR,, = receivables;
INV„ = inventory; OCA,, = other current assets than cash, receivables, and inventory;
CL/, = current liabilities excluding taxes and current maturities of long-term debt;
DEP/, = depreciation and amortization; REV,, = net sales revenue; EXP,, = operating
expenses (cost of goods sold, selling and administrative expenses before depreciation);
GPPE„ = gross property, plant, and equipment; NTA„ = net total assets; (5i, = AR„_i/
REV„_i; 62,-(INV„ i+OCA„_i-CL„_i)/EXP„_i; (53, = DEP„_ i/GPPE„_ i; TA„=
(NI„-CFO„)/NTA„_,.
The KS model implies that accrual balances will change in proportion to changes in REV
(sales revenue), EXP (expense), and GPPE (gross property, plant, and equipment). That is, the
second explanatory variable of the KS model can be expressed as "AR„ _ i x REV,,/
REV„_i." The expected balance of receivables at t is the previous year's balance of
receivables times changes in sales revenue. The third variable controls for changes in
operating expenses (excluding depreciation). The fourth variable predicts depreciation
expense for the current period using gross property, plant, and equipment. All the variables
in the KS model are deflated by the lagged net total assets.
The Jones model states that the changes in the accrual balance can be explained by the
changes in sales revenue and the balance of the current period's gross property plant and
equipment. Again, both variables are deflated by the lagged net total assets.
3.3. Examination of earnings management
Four test methods are used to examine the earnings management hypothesis.
'' For the KS model, we used a linear regression approach rather than the GMM approach in fitting TA to
explanatory variables because the linear model performs well.
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3.3.1. Mean accrual difference tests
Our study examines whether mean accruals are different between negative CFO firms and
positive CFO firms. Under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, the mean accruals
will be similar across the different portfolios. Under the alternative hypothesis of earnings
management, however, the mean accruals will not be the same across the portfolios. More
specifically, we expect to find positive mean accruals in the negative CFO portfolios. The
magnitude of mean accruals should be the highest for the lowest CFO portfolio. We expect to
see a gradual decrease in mean TA as we progress from the most negative CFO portfolio to
the highest CFO portfolio. However, if some of the negative CFO portfolio firms take big
bath strategies, then the mean accruals can be negative.
3.3.2. Correlation tests
We examine the correlation between CFO and NI for each portfolio. Under the null
hypothesis, we expect to find a positive correlation between the two variables since both
variables represent operating performance. McNichols and Wilson (1988), for example,
reported a positive correlation of .54 between the variables. However, when firms manage
earnings, we would not necessarily find this strong positive correlation. In some extreme
cases, we expect to find a negative correlation.
3.3.3. Regression analysis
The relationship between accruals and CFO can be more directly examined by projecting
the accruals on CFO and some control variables. When managers determine their final
reported earnings levels, managers may take into account intermediate performance indicators
such as CFO and operating profits (OP). Among others, CFO will be a major factor affecting
firm's accounting decisions. Under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, we
should not find any differences in the regression coefficients across different portfolios.
Under the strict application of no earnings management, we will not expect to find any
significant correlations between CFO and accruals. We project TA on OP, CFO, and a slope
dummy for CFO. The slope dummy takes on the value of 1 if CFO is negative and if
positive. When firms manage earnings, CFO will, in general, affect firms' accruals negatively.
OP, as an alternative performance indicator, will also affect firms' accrual policy. However,
unlike CFO, OP can be the object of earnings management. Therefore, OP may have a
positive relationship with TA, while CFO has a negative relationship with TA. We run the
following regression for the current study:
TA, = /3o + /3iOP/ + /52CFO/ + /33Z)*CFO, + e, (3)
where Z) is 1 if CFO is negative and otherwise. The difference in earnings management
across different CFO portfolios can be validated if we find a statistical significance for (37,.
We hypothesize that (32^02 will be negative since CFO will in general affect TA
negatively.
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3.3.4. Sign-change ratio test
Our study also examines the proportions of sign change across the portfolios. Negative
CFO firms may have incentives to report positive NI figures. Sign changes should be most
frequently observed in Portfolios 3 and 4 (see Table 6). Since the magnitude of negative CFO
will not be great for the firms in Portfolios 3 and 4, these firms can manipulate some
accounting accruals relatively easily so as to report positive earnings. The firms in Portfolios
1 and 2 will have difficulties finding large-enough accounting accruals to report positive
earnings since their CFOs are significantly negative. Hence, we expect higher sign-change
ratios for Portfolios 3 and 4 than for other portfolios. On the other hand, we do not expect to
find positive CFO firms reporting negative NI under normal circumstances. Managers should
normally select accounting policies that avoid reporting negative earnings. Therefore, we
expect a lower proportion of sign changes in the positive CFO portfolios. The sign-change
test is a nonparametric test.
3.4. Sample and test period
In 1995, the Korean Accounting Standards mandated a "cash flow statement" to be
included as part of the required financial statements. Early adoption of the statement was
encouraged for 1994. The cash flow statement requirement superseded the existing working
capital-based "statement of changes in financial position." The CFO information became
directly available from the cash flow statements for most companies starting in 1995. Our
study investigates publicly held Korean industrial firms for the period of 1994 through 1997.
Data for 663 firms were provided by the KIS-FAS' financial statement database. The final
sample of 2033 firm-year observations was selected as follows:
Industrial firms listed on the KSE as of December 31, 1997 663
Less: two-digit SIC code with less than five firms 28
SIC code change in firms over 1 2-year period 5
Firms with missing F/S information over 12-year period 84 (117)
Total final sample firms 546
Total final firm-year observations: 2033'' (an average of 3.72 years of data per firm)
Our study uses a panel data of 12 years (1986 through 1997) for each firm by each industry
to estimate the discretionary accruals. To get reliable regression coefficients, we included in
the sample only those two-digit SIC code industries that have at least five member firms so
that each regression could have at least 60 firm-year observations. Twenty-eight firms were
' KIS-FAS is the Korean counterpart of the Compustat Tape.
We further eliminated 57 outliers in net income and TA. We first eliminated 20 net income outliers at each
end and deleted 17 more TA outliers if they are less than - 0.4 or greater than 0.4 of beginning total assets. The
reason for the elimination of these outliers is that they distort the overall profile of the entire sample. If we do not
eliminate the 57 outliers, mean net income for the total sample is negative at - 0.0105 and the standard deviation
of net income is larger than that of CFO, 0.1591 vs. 0.1296. This indicates that there are some finns employing
severe big bath strategies.
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excluded from the sample for not meeting the first criterion. Five firms were excluded from
the sample because their SIC codes were changed sometime during the 12-year period of
1986-1997. Firms with missing financial statement information over the 12-year period were
also excluded. The 546 firms that met the three criteria were included in our final sample.
Approximately 85% of firms adopted the cash flow statement in 1994. We ended up with
an average of 3.72 observations per firm during the period of 1994 through 1997.
The panel data with 546 firms along with the 12-year time series data for each firm were
used to compute nondiscretionary accruals by applying the two altemative models. The
discretionary accruals are the residuals of the regression models. Since the KS model uses the
accrual balance as the dependent variable, the regression residuals represent discretionary
accrual balances rather than discretionary accruals. Therefore, we computed the discretionary
accruals from the KS model by taking a first difference in the discretionary accrual balance.
The first differences of the accrual balances provide us with the change in the accrual balance.
The accrual balance is a level variable while the accrual is a change variable. These
discretionary accruals are expressed as AKS in this paper.
The regression was fitted to each industry. Each industry should have at least five firms to
have sufficient observations (a minimum of 60 firm-year observations) to obtain viable
regression coefficients.'' Twenty-five industries satisfied the five-member requirement.
The estimation period of the discretionary accruals is 1986 through 1997. The test period
was 1994 through 1997.^
4. Results
4.1. Estimation of discretionary accruals
Table 1 reports the results of the two discretionary accrual estimation models: the KS
model and the Jones model. We report the coefficients in the upper line with / ratios for each
coefficient in parentheses in the lower line.
Table 1 indicates that the KS model is a reliable model in estimating the nondiscretionary
accruals for Korean firms. The three explanatory variables for the KS model are statistically
significant with the expected signs in most cases. The first two variables, REV and EXP, are
highly significant with positive relationships with the dependent variable. The last variable,
GPPE, does not appear to have as sfrong a relationship with the accrual balances as the first
two variables. However, the results for the third variable are still statistically significant with
the predicted signs most of the times. The adjusted R" for the 25 regressions are all quite high
at above 30% level with one excepfion (14% for SIC digit 6100).
' However, two industries originally having five firms in their membership lost one firm each in the sampling
process. As a result, we have two industries with 48 firm-year observations.
' Since there is an overlap in the estimation and test periods, the resuks can be biased. However, when we use
panel data, it is generally accepted that the overlappmg of the two periods does not impose a serious
methodological problem. Furthermore, use of TA is expected to mitigate the bias problem.
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Table 1
Comparison of estimation models: KS model vs. Jones model
SIC digit CS model
Constant REV EXP GPPE Adjusted
R-
Jones model
NTA^' AREV (3PPE Adjusted
1500 -0.111 0.815 0.754 -1.211 .60 0.949 -0.108 -0.109 .11
-6.91) (15.25) (23.98) ( -9.95) (3.83) (-3.30) ( -6.63)
1700 -0.105 0.884 0.869 -0.658 .56 0.177 0.046 - 0.046 .02
-7.59) (11.69) (24.60) ( -4.94) (1.18) (1.57) ( -3.77)
1800 -0.005 0.656 0.705 -0.770 .47 -0.313 0.058 -0.001 -.01
'-0.20) (7.06) (10.92) ( -1.32) (-0.84) (1.26) ( -0.02)
1900 0.037 0.538 0.748 -2.395 .61 0.580 -0.025 - 0.024 -.02
(1.08) (3.06) (8.05) ( -3.73) (0.91) (-0.58) ( - 0.48)
2100 - 0.040 0.564 0.554 -1.200 .49 0.062 0.072 -0.081 .08
,-2.15) (11.94) (15.65) ( -5.71) (0.42) (2.94) ( -4.90)
2300 -0.162 1.054 0.716 -0.288 .52 0.827 -0.166 -0.033 .19
-3.25) (7.09) (6.62) ( - 0.44) (2.35) (-2.93) ('-1.00)
2400 - 0.064 0.881 0.847 -1.125 .71 0.508 -0.051 - 0.049 .05
-6.35) (38.73) (33.13) ( -12.17) (5.35) (-2.47) (.-5.27)
2500 -0.020 0.508 0.633 -1.367 .42 -0.141 - 0.045 -0.035 .02
.-0.82) (5.16) (10.67) ( -5.03) (-0.43) (-0.81) ;-1.14)
2600 -0.135 0.628 0.416 - 0.798 .35 0.373 - 0.024 -0.068 .07
-6.73) (8.41) (12.36) ( -3.89) (1.97) (-0.65) '-5.78)
2700 -0.087 0.957 0.845 -0.887 .62 0.244 0.071 - 0.064 .04
'-5.87) (17.17) (24.51) ( - 6.34) (1.08) (2.50) :-4.01)
2800 - 0.005 0.596 0.698 -1.546 .43 0.104 - 0.003 - 0.069 .00
-0.13) (5.34) (9.95) ( -2.45) (0.42) (-0.05) (-1.58)
2900 0.012 0.579 0.737 -0.915 .61 0.004 - 0.077 0.038 .04
(0.63) (11.82) (19.64) .-3.79) (0.04) (-3.24) (1.77)
3000 0.064 0.305 0.628 -0.715 .41 -0.633 0.069 0.021 .07
(1.54) (2.68) (7.03) - 1.21) (-2.94) (1.75) (0.34)
3100 -0.028 0.756 0.828 -1.251 .48 0.127 -0.102 0.007 .05
[-1.09) (8.89) (13.32) ,-3.73) (0.70) (-2.97) (0.27)
3200 - 0.068 0.602 0.599 - 0.498 .41 0.289 -0.019 -0.069 .03
(-4.60) (10.40) (18.56) (-3.86) (3.49) (-1.30) ( - 4.24)
3300 -0.161 1.067 0.776 2.102 .61 -0.059 0.194 -0.032 .02
(-2.12) (5.21) (5.92) (1.17) (-0.23) (1.50) (-0.25)
3400 - 0.048 0.629 0.837 -0.830 .64 0.247 -0.119 -0.045 .10
(-2.51) (9.06) (22.44) (-5.72) (1.50) (-4.32) ( - 2.40)
3500 -0.117 0.633 0.804 -0.184 .63 2.082 0.001 -0.103 -.03
(-3.04) (4.50) (10.01) (-0.28) (0.94) (0.03) .-2.73)
3600 -0.025 0.763 0.772 - 1.493 .47 0.361 -0.055 - 0.049 .02
( - 0.74) (8.35) (8.82) (-2.27) (1.79) (-1.09) ,-1.23)
4000 -0.129 0.663 0.645 -0.520 .45 - 0.045 - 0.084 - 0.022 -.00
(-4.32) (4.67) (8.45) (-1.50) (-0.08) (-1.04) -1.13)
4500 0.026 0.642 0.544 -2.033 .32 1.220 -0.010 - 0.043 -.01
(1.79) (5.09) (15.86) (-4.27) (2.34) (-0.32) ,-0.87)
5100 -0.036 0.877 1.122 - 0.643 .70 -0.575 - 0.006 0.082 .02
( 1.09) (8.98) (26.11) (-1.00) (-2.01) (-0.78) (2.41)
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Table 1 {continued)
SIC digit KS model Jones model
Constant REV EXP GPPE Adjusted
R-
NTA"' AREV GPPE Adjusted
R-
5200 -0.155 1.073 0.738 -2.595 .80 -1.290 0.029 -0.151 .25
(-4.27) (8.21) (13.89) (-3.29) (-2.61) (0.56) (-5.77)
6000 -0.163 0.589 0.731 0.751 .35 1.240 -0.179 -0.033 -.05
(-4.33) (3.93) (6.31) (1.97) (2.25) (-1.39) (-0.77)
6100 -0.183 0.544 0.408 -0.536 .14 0.523 0.069 - 0.060 .02
( - 2.94) (1.19) (2.57) (-0.73) (0.28) (0.34) (-1.12)
For the Jones model, the third variable, GPPE, should have a negative relationship with the
dependent variable. However, the results of the regression estimation show that only 10 of 25
(40%) regressions have statistical significance with expected signs. By construction, the first
variable, which is the inverse of firm size, should not have a statistical relationship with the
dependent variable.^ However, in 9 of 25 cases, the first variable has a statistically significant
relationship with the dependent variable. The predicted sign of the second variable, AREV,
depends on the relative change of current assets and current liabilities associated with
operations. Therefore, we do not expect the signs ex ante even though the variable must have
a relationship with the accruals. The results support the alternating nature of the variable. In
spite of the sporadic statistical significance of some of the explanatory variables, the goodness
of fit of the Jones model seems to be significant for only one industry (SIC 5200). The results
indicate that we may have a serious misspecification problem when we apply the Jones model
to Korean firms. Therefore, the Jones model does not seem to be a reliable model.
4.2. Accruals by CFO portfolios
For the 2033 firm-year observations, 766 observations (37.7%) are negative CFO
observations and the rest are positive CFO observations. We constructed 10 portfohos based
on the CFO ranks. Four are negative CFO portfolios and six are positive CFO portfolios. The
negative CFO observations are equally allocated to each of the four negative CFO portfolios.
The positive CFO observations are assigned to six portfolios in a similar manner.
Table 2 presents the average NI, CFO, and accruals by portfolios with their respective
standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations for each portfolio is given in
parentheses in the first column of Table 2. By construction, the average CFOs for the first four
portfolios are negative and positive for the last six portfolios. Without earnings management,
the average NI should also show similar relationships. However, in the case of Portfolio 4, NI
is positive and its average is even greater than Portfolio 5—0.0053 vs. 0.0030.
As expected, the worst- and best-performing CFO firms seem to employ more earnings
management practices than the other firms do in Korea. Based on the results of the TA,
Econometrically, the correlation between .4,,/NTA,, _
i
and 1/NTA,, ] should be equivalent to the correlation
between Ai, and 1. Therefore, the correlation between them should be approximately zero.
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Table 2
Mean accruals by CFO portfolios
Portfolio (number of NI CFO Accruals
observations) TA Discretionary accruals
KS AKS Jones
1 (/7=192) -0.0827 -0.2159 0.1332 0.0030 -0.0100 0.0020
(0.0104) (0.0081) (0.0099) (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0127)
2 («=192) -0.0189 -0.0855 0.0666 0.0089 0.0021 0.0263
(0.0057) (0.0013) (0.0057) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0096)
3 (/?=191) - 0.0085 -0.0398 0.0312 0.0114 -0.0016 0.0217
(0.0045) (0.0007) (0.0045) (0.0079) (0.0106) (0.0077)
4(«=191) 0.0053 -0.0117 0.0170 0.0063 0.0069 0.0187
(0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0032) (0.0095) (0.0127) (0.0087)
5 (« = 211) 0.0030 0.0108 -0.0078 -0.0179 - 0.0270 - 0.0026
(0.0032) (0.0004) (0.0032) (0.0091) (0.0106) (0.0080)
6 (/7 = 211) 0.0072 0.0329 - 0.0257 -0.0176 - 0.0098 - 0.0056
(0.0031) (0.0004) (0.0031) (0.0085) (0.0115) (0.0091)
7 (« = 211) 0.0132 0.0551 -0.0419 -0.0232 -0.0193 -0.0103
(0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0082) (0.0111) (0.0079)
8 (/7 = 211) 0.0176 0.0793 -0.0617 - 0.0049 -0.0169 0.0068
(0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0106) (0.0169) (0.0079)
9(/7 = 211) 0.0234 0.1099 -0.0866 - 0.0349 - 0.0273 -0.0124
(0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0072) (0.0095) (0.0068)
10(/7 = 211) 0.0432 0.1883 -0.1451 - 0.0437 -0.0308 - 0.0254
(0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0086) (0.0118) (0.0696)
Negative CFO (n = 766) - 0.0263 -0.0884 0.0621 0.0074 - 0.0007 0.0172
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0049)
Positive CFO («=1267) 0.0179 0.0795 -0.0615 -0.0237 -0.0219 - 0.0083
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0033)
Total (77 = 2033) 0.0013 0.0162 -0.0150 -0.0120 -0.0139 0.0013
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0028)
(1) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) TA=(NI - CFO)/NTA, _ i
.
(3) KS = the regression residuals of the KS model.
(4) AKS = the first difference of the regression residuals of the KS model.
(5) Jones = the regression residuals of the Jones model.
Portfolio 1 increases NI by 13.32% of net total assets whereas Portfolio 10 decreases NI by
14.51% of net total assets. This is a highly significant result since some of the firms with
extremely poor performance may take big bath strategies. ^"^
The average TA by portfolios imply that the earnings adjustments are systematically
different between negative CFO firms and positive CFO firms. The average TA are positive
See the discussion about the results of the correlation tests.
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for the negative CFO portfolios, while the average TA are all negative for the positive CFO
portfolios. Furthermore, the average TA decrease as CFO increases.
When we look at the discretionary accruals, we get similar but less salient results." Two
discretionary accruals, KS and Jones, indicate that the negative CFO portfolio firms take
income-increasing strategies, while positive CFO firms take income-decreasing strategies.
However, there is one exception, in the case of Portfolio 8, to this general tendency when
discretionary accruals are computed using the Jones model. In the case of AKS, mean
discretionary accruals for the negative CFO portfolios vary while they are negative for the
positive CFO portfolios.
There seem to be no industry-clustering problems in each CFO portfolio. When we
scatterplot industry codes with CFO ranks (not shown), industry codes are almost evenly
distributed over CFO ranks.
4.3. Mean difference test
A positive discretionary accrual can indicate that the firm employs income-increasing
accounting policies. A negative accrual indicates that the firm employs either income-
decreasing policies or no earnings management policy since TA are normally expected to
be negative. Many of the industrial firms may have noncash-accompanying expenses
such as depreciation expense, amortization expense, bad debt expense, and pension ex-
12
pense.
The results of the mean accrual difference tests are summarized in Table 3.'^ An ANOVA
could also be conducted, but we believe that a t test is more appropriate. We only report the
mean differences in accruals between negative CFO firms and positive CFO firms.
Across all proxies, the mean accruals of the negative CFO firms are statistically
significantly higher than the mean accruals of the positive CFO firms. The difference is
most important or significant in the case of the TA. Even though the magnitude of mean
difference is not material as the TA, all three discretionary accruals of the negative CFO
" If we do not eliminate the 57 outliers in the sampling process, all the three discretionary accruals are
negative for Portfolio 1. This indicates that most of the outliers fall into Portfolio 1 and that they may employ big
bath strategies.
'- In Korea, firms pay one-time severance pay when employees retire instead of paying pension after their
retirement. Therefore, an account title "provision for retirement benefit allowance" is used for pension expense.
Retirement benefit liabilities in Korea are mostly unfiinded or underfunded. Hence, pension expenses are noncash-
accompanying expenses.
'^ If we partition the sample firm-year observations based on NI, we get negative NI firms' accruals are
smaller than positive NI firms' accruals. Mean TA are - 0.0382 and — 0.0079 for the negative and the positive NI
portfolios respectively, and the difference is statistically significant at a t ratio of -5.14. Mean values for the three
discretionary accrual proxies were also significantly lower for the negative NI portfolios than for the positive NI
portfolios. Since NI is the sum ofCFO and TA and CFO is highly negatively correlated with TA, it is expected that
NI be positively correlated with TA. For our sample, the Pearson correlation coefficient between TA and CFO is
-0.77 and the same between TA and NI is 0.18. Accordingly, it is quite natural that we get smaller accruals for
negative NI portfoho than for positive NI portfolio.
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Table 3
Results of the mean accrual difference test
Accruals Mean Variance / ratio P level
Negative Positive Difference Negative Positive
CFO firms CFO firms CFO firms CFO firms
TA 0.0621 -0.0615 0.1236 0.0096 0.0044 30.87 .000
Discretionary KS 0.0074 -0.0237 0.0347 0.0240 0.0159 4.70 .000
accrual AKS - 0.0007 -0.0219 0.0212 0.0312 0.0302 2.64 .004
Jones 0.0172 - 0.0083 0.0255 0.0184 0.0134 4.32 .000
portfolios are larger than the accruals of the positive CFO portfolios in a statistically
significant manner. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the poor perform-
ers, on average, tend to take income-increasing strategies as compared to the good
performers. The results are also consistent with the results of McNichols and Wilson
(1988) when firms are partitioned based on CFO, in that firms with unusually good CFO
tend to decrease accruals while firms with unusually poor CFO tend to increase ac-
cruals.''*
4.4. Correlation tests
If earnings are not managed, we expect the correlations between CFO and NI to be
strongly positive. Since both of the variables are supposed to proxy for operating perform-
ance, they should move in tandem under the null hypothesis.
The results of the correlation tests between NI and CFO are summarized in Table 4. The
results of both the Pearson product correlation and the Spearman rank correlation are
provided. The t ratios for each portfolio are provided for dual null hypotheses. The first
null hypothesis is that the correlation is between NI and CFO. The second null hypothesis is
that the null correlation is the population correlation coefficient, which in our case is
represented by the correlation coefficient of all the sample firms. We do not know ex ante
what the population correlation is for our sample. However, we can assume that there will be
a positive relationship between NI and CFO without earnings management because both
variables represent operating performance.
The results show that the correlation coefficients are quite low, ranging from — .0415 to
.4546 in the case of Pearson product correlation, and even negative for some portfolios
(Portfolios 4 and 9). The results also confirm that the extremely poor performers are quite
different from the other portfolios. Some of the Portfolio 1 firms apparently take big bath
strategies. When we look at the Pearson product correlation coefficients, the relationship is
highly significant (.4536 with a t ratio of 7.04). The relationships are not statistically
''* McNichols and Wilson's major finding, however, is that firms manage earnings by choosing income-
decreasing accruals when income is extreme.
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Table 4
Results of the correlation test between NI and CFO
CFO Subsample Pearson product correlation Spearman rank correlation
portfolio size
Coefficient t ratio
Ho: p = 0.0000 Ho: p = 0.4866
Coefficient t ratio
Ho: p = 0.0000 Ho: /9 = 0.3 123
1 192 .4546 7.04 -0.50 .1138 1.58 -2.75
2 192 .0829 1.15 -5.58 .0961 1.33 -2.99
3 192 .0512 0.71 -6.01 - .0057 -0.08 -4.38
4 191 -.0415 -0.57 -7.27 -.0164 -0.23 -4.52
5 211 .2287 3.40 -3.83 - .0008 -0.01 -4.53
6 211 .0065 0.09 -6.94 .1596 2.34 -2.24
7 211 .0363 0.53 -6.51 .0527 0.76 -3.76
8 211 .0153 0.22 -6.81 -.0142 -0.21 -4.72
9 211 - .0280 -0.40 -7.44 .1231 1.79 -2.76
10 212 .2055 3.04 -4.16 .3331 5.12 0.32
Negative 766 .4826 15.23 -0.13 .4892 15.50 5.61
Positive 1267 .2931 10.90 -7.20 .4525 18.05 5.60
Total 2033 .4866 25.10 N/A .3123 14.82 N/A
significant for the Spearman rank correlations (.1138 with a t ratio of 1.58). The
contrasting coefficients indicate that the Pearson product correlation for the first portfolio
may be plagued by some extreme figures. The parametric coefficients may be biased
because in these tests we estimate the coefficient in such a way that minimizes the squared
residuals.
When we test the assumed null hypothesis of the population correlation, every portfolio's
correlation coefficient is lower than the population correlation coefficient. Even though the
correlation coefficient for the entire sample is relatively high because of the increased degrees
of fi'eedom, the individual portfolio's correlation is so low that we can infer that most of the
firms select some earnings management strategies one way or another.
4.5. Regression analysis
Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis, which examines the relationships
of TA with OP, CFO, and a slope dummy for CFO. The regression analysis reveals that
TA are positively related with OP but negatively related with CFO. The two coefficients
are highly significant. The slope dummy for CFO is negative and statistically significant.
As discussed, the slope dummy takes on the value of 1 if CFO is negative and if
positive.
The results indicate that the negative relationship between TA and CFO is very strong
when CFO is positive, but the strength of the negative relationship decreases when CFO is
negative. This implies that good performers tend to decrease reported earnings while bad
performers tend to increase reported earnings. This is consistent with the results of the
income-smoothing literature.
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Table 5
Results of regression analysis
Variables Coefficients t ratios P level Adjusted R^
Constant - .0276
OP .6024
CFO - .9399
£>*CFO .2848
13.55 .000
31.55 .000
47.83 .000
9.59 .000
.7361
Model: TA, = /io + /5iOP, + /92CFO, + /33D* CFO, + e„ where D is 1 if CFO is negative and otherwise.
4.6. Sign-change tests
The test results of Tables 3-5 may be plagued by outliers that may have a significant
misleading effect on the results of the three parametric tests (the mean test, the correlation
test, and the regression analysis). The sign-change test is a nonparametric test in the sense that
outliers should not affect the results. A sign change implies that negative CFO firm reports
positive eamings figure (income-increasing strategies) or positive CFO firm reports negative
earnings figure (maybe income-decreasing strategies).
Table 6 shows the results of the sign-change tests. The sign-change tests clearly reveal that
a majority (62.7%) of negative CFO firms manage eamings so extensively that the reported
eamings are positive. Portfolios 1 and 2 firms may not be able to report positive eamings
without massive eamings management since these firms are experiencing severe negative
cash flows from operations. We believe these firms may employ various vehicles to manage
eamings including disposal gains on assets and insufficient provisions for discretionary
expenses. For Portfolios 3 and 4 firms, the firms may comparatively be in better positions to
employ readily available income-increasing strategies without being noticed by outsiders.
Hence, we expect gradual increase in sign changes as CFO increases. The result is consistent
with our expectations.
Table 6
Sign-change ratio test
CFO portfolio Subsample size Sign change z value (Ho: P=.32S)
Observations Ratio (%)
1 192 83 43.2 3.07
2 192 122 63.5 9.06
3 191 128 67.0 10.07
4 191 147 77.0 13.01
5 211 45 21.3 -3.56
6 211 44 20.9 -3.68
7 211 27 12.8 -6.19
8 211 31 14.7 -5.60
9 211 23 10.9 -6.78
10 212 16 7.5 -7.85
Negative 766 480 62.7 13.95
Positive 1267 186 14.7 -13.72
Total 2033 666 32.8 N/A
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By contrast, the tests show that the positive CFO firms generally do not report negative
earnings. We expected that a considerable proportion of Portfolios 5 and 6 firms might report
negative earnings without earnings management since TA are generally negative for industrial
firms. Industrial firms will have more noncash expenses than noncash revenues. Therefore,
these firms will generally have negative TA. Though the sign-change ratios for Portfolios 5
and 6 firms are relatively high within the positive CFO group, the ratios are much lower than
those of negative CFO firms. For other portfolios of the positive CFO group, the low sign-
change ratios are as expected since the firms do not, in general, have any reason to report
negative earnings.
The z values that are presented in the last column of Table 6 are somewhat arbitrary. We
arbitrarily picked a null sign-change ratio since the actual ratio is not known. More
specifically, the study assumed that the mean sign-change ratio (0.328) for the total sample
is the null ratio. This ratio is overstated since the majority of negative CFO firms report sign
changes. We do not know the null ratio ex ante. Therefore, the z values for the negative CFO
firms should be interpreted very strongly while those for the positive CFO firms should be
interpreted rather weakly. For example, z values for Portfolios 5 and 6 are significantly
negative and, therefore, these firms probably employ conservative accounting policies.
However, these firms are, in fact, managing their respective earnings. If we evaluate the
mean sign-change ratios of the positive CFO firms, then we may interpret the realities of the
statistical significance of the earnings management practices.
5. Conclusions
Our study investigated Korean industrial firms to determine if operating performances
affect the degree of earnings management. Based on the assumption that the degree of
earnings management will depend on operating performance, we constructed 10 CFO
portfolios to see if we can find any systematic differences in earnings management practices
across portfolios.
The final sample of2033 firm-year observations was selected for the period of 1994 through
1997. The study employed four test methods to examine the earnings management hypothesis.
As a measure of earnings management, we tested both discretionary accruals and TA estimated
fi^om two competing models. The two models were developed by Jones (1991) and Kang and
Sivaramakrishnan (1995), respectively. Our study found that the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan
model is more useful than the Jones model in estimating discretionary accruals.
The results of the study support the hypothesis that firms widely use earnings management
strategies. Negative CFO firms generally take income-increasing strategies. Furthermore, the
results imply that some firms with extreme performances in both directions tend to take
income-decreasing strategies. That is, not only the best performers but also the worst
performers often take income-decreasing strategies. On the other hand, less extreme negative
CFO firms tend to take income-increasing strategies.
Possible future research avenues could include a market study associating TA with stock
price reactions for the different portfolios. Another project could investigate such areas as IPO
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firms' earnings management practices and specific methods of earnings management
associated with certain type of firm-specific characteristics.
A major concem for our study is the appropriateness of the accrual proxies. The TA
approach does not separate discretionary accruals from nondiscretionary accruals. Other
discretionary accruals may suffer from a possible misspecification problem, especially the
Jones model. In our case, to compensate for the deficiency of the accrual approach, we used
three other methods (the correlation analysis, the regression analysis, and the sign-change
ratio analysis) to confirm our results.
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Abstract
This study tests whether the observed patterns in stock returns after quarterly earnings
announcements are related to the level of multinationality, a variable used to proxy for eamings
predictability. Our findings show that the level-of-multinationality variable is negatively correlated
with the observed post-armouncement abnormal returns. The findings suggest that the level of
multinationality as a proxy for eamings predictability underlies the predictability of stock returns after
eamings aimouncements.
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1. Introduction
The predictability of stock returns after eamings announcements (i.e., the post-eamings-
announcement drift) was first noted by Ball and Brown (1968). They reported that even after
eamings are announced, estimated cumulative "abnormal" returns continue to drift up for
"good news" firms and down for "bad news" firms. Explanations offered for the
phenomenon included (a) the inadequacy of the CAPM as a model of asset pricing (Foster,
Olsen, & Shevlin, 1984; Holthausen, 1983), (b) the market's failure to fully reflect the
attributes of the stochastic process underlying eamings (Bartov, 1992; Bemard & Thomas,
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1990; Freeman & Tse, 1989; Rendleman, Jones, & Latane, 1987), (c) the transaction costs
(Bhushan, 1994), (d) investor sophistication (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, & Krinsky, 2000), (e)
the use by market participants of a naive model to form earnings expectations and their failure
to incorporate properly the serial correlation in earnings (Soffer & Lys, 1999), and (f) analyst
experience (Mikhail, Walter, & Willis, 2000).
Our study further investigates whether drift is a manifestation of the earnings predictability
of the firm issuing the quarterly earnings by examining the relation between drift and the level
of multinationality. The position to be discussed in detail in the next section is that post-
eamings-announcement drift in stock prices will be most pronounced for firms with a low
level of multinationality whose earnings are more difficult to predict. ' An intuition for this
result is that stock prices reflect the performance of both domestic and international activities,
and consequently, the greater the level of multinationality of a firm, the greater the
predictability of its price (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Choi, Frost, & Meek, 1999; Errunza
& Senbet, 1981; Yang, Wansley, & Lane, 1985). The foreign profit/total profits variable is
used as a proxy for the level of multinationality.
We find that the level-of-multinationality variable is important in explaining both the drift
and the stock-price responses to subsequent earnings announcements. Drift is found to be
positively related to an earnings-surprise variable and negatively related to the multination-
ality variable after controlling for firm size (e.g., Foster et al., 1984).
The findings show that the magnitude of the post-eamings-announcement drift is more
pronounced in firms with a low level of multinationality. The level of multinationality appears
to be related to the predictability of stock returns after earnings announcements.
2. A multinationality perspective on drift
The predictability of abnormal stock returns was found in early work to last up to 2 months
after annual earnings announcements. Some of the cited conjectures and evidence of the
cause of the post-eamings-announcement drift in abnormal returns included misperception of
the time-series properties of earnings (Freeman & Tse, 1989), misperception of quarterly
earnings to be a seasonal variable random walk, while the actual process is a seasonally
differenced first-order autoregressive process with a seasonal moving-average term (Bemard
& Thomas, 1990), and market misperception of the process underlying eamings (Ball &
Bartov, 1996). The primary purpose of the current study is to evaluate and test the conjecture
that multinationality is a leading cause of the post-eamings-announcement drift in abnormal
Prior research on the market value relevance of the disclosure or foreign financial data on a firm's operations
relied on the return/changes regressions to examine the associations between annual abnormal stock performance
and changes in the firm's domestic and foreign incomes (Boatsman, Behn, & Patz, 1993; Bodnar & Weintrop,
1997; Prather-Stewart, 1995; Prodhan, 1986; Prodhan & Harris, 1989). Their results demonstrated a large
coefficient for multinationality, as measured by the level of foreign income, consistent with differences in growth
opportunities between domestic and foreign operations.
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returns. The idea that the drift is negatively related to the level of multinationality can be
supported by previous findings, including:
(a) Drift is inversely related to size (Bhushan, 1994) and bigger multinationality is
characteristic of large firms (Errunza & Senbet, 1981);
(b) Drift is a result of misperception of the earnings process by holdings of unsophisticated
investors (Bartov et al, 2000) and high multinationality firms are largely sought by
sophisticated investors in general and fund managers who specialize in large capitalization
stocks (Choietal, 1999);
(c) Drift is inversely related to share price and annual dollar trading volume as a proxy for the
inverse of direct and indirect cost-of-trading (Bhushan, 1994) and the growth of
institutional holdings in large multinational firms (Choi et al., 1999);
(d) Findings consistent with investors anchoring on the more efficient and more accurate
earnings expectations of high-multinationality firms, mitigating any resulting post-
eamings-announcement drift (Bodnar & Weintrop, 1997; Rivera, 1991; Rugman,
1977).
3. Description of the sample and the variables
The sample used in this study is comprised of all the firms included in the 1990-1999
Forbes' 100 largest U.S. multinationals. It consists of 3972 firm-quarter observations.
To test the hypothesis that the observed patterns in stock returns after quarterly earnings
announcements are related to the level of multinationality, we examine the association
between post-eamings-announcement drift and the level of multinationality, controlling for
the firm's standardized unexpected eamings (SUE), and for size shown in prior research to
affect the drift. Those variables are defined as follows.
For each observation, we calculate the firm's daily abnormal return as the firm's raw return
minus the return on the size decile portfolio to which the firm belongs as of the beginning of
the year. Those daily retums are compounded from / = to t = + 59 (where / = is the
quarterly announcement date from Compustat to obtain the cumulative abnormal return,
CAR60, for a firm at quarter t." The choice of the 60-day window reflects Bernard and
Thomas' (1989) finding that most of the drift occurs during this period.
SUE is computed as in previous research on drift (e.g., Bernard & Thomas, 1990). First,
SUE are measured as the difference between reported and expected eamings, where expected
eamings are estimated using a seasonal random walk deflated by the standard deviation of
forecast errors from this model over the most recent 20 quarters of data, beginning in the
quarter t — 2\ and going through quarter t— 1 (the estimation period). Second, SUE,, is
classified into deciles (DSUE,,), based on the sample distribution of SUE for each calendar
- Following Bartov et al. (2000), we eliminate observations in the extreme tails of the distribution of CAR60
by deleting 0.25% extreme observations from both tails of CAR60 distribution.
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year, with zero representing the smallest decile of the level of SUE and nine representing the
largest, and then scaled to range between and 1/
Multinationality (MULTY) for firmy at quarter, is defined as the ratio of the yearly foreign
profits/total profits. Our results are unchanged if multinationality was defined by either
foreign sales/total sales or foreign assets/total assets. Similarly to SUE, MULTY is categor-
ically classified as DMULTY
Size is measured by MV,,, the market value of equity for firm i as of the beginning of the
year in which the quarterly earnings announcement occurs. DMV is the ranked market value
of equity.
4. Regression results
The relation between drift and multinationality is analyzed using regression analysis with
CAR60 as the dependent variable. A first regression is used to replicate the documented
inverse relationship between drift and size as follows:
CAR60 - ^0 + ^iDSUE,, + bjDMYu + ^sDSUE,, x DMV„ + Ek. (1)
A second regression is used to estimate the relationship between multinationality and drift
after controlling for firm size as follows:
CAR60 = bQ^ biDSUEit + Z>2DMV/, + ^sDSUE,, x DMV,, + ^4DMULTY/,
+ bsDSUEi, X DMULTY,, + £",-,. (2)
In estimating both Eqs. (1) and (2), observations with studentized residuals greater than two
or Cook's D greater than one are eliminated. The results are insensitive to this elimination. If
our hypothesis is supported, we expect the coefficient estimate associated in the DSUE x
DMULTY to be reliably negative.
Table 1 provides the variable descriptive statistics and correlations between CAR60 and
the categorical classifications of the independent variables. As expected, the cumulative
abnormal return following the quarterly earnings armouncement (CAR60) is positively
correlated with the ranked SUE variable (DSUE) and negatively correlated with the ranked
firm size variable (DMV) and the ranked level of multinationality (DMULTY). This last
negative correlation indicates that the magnitude of the post-announcement drift is smaller for
firms with high multinationality.
Table 2 shows the result of the regression we use to examine if the conclusions hold after
we control for unexpected eamings, firm size, and level of multinationality. The first column
(Model 1) shows the results of regressing CAR60 on unexpected eamings. The magnitude of
the post-eamings-announcement drift in our sample is 2.32% (/ = 7.235, one-tailed P<.0\).
^ The categorical classification in our regression estimates as well as the ranking conversion are as discussed in
Bartov et al. (2000, footnote 5).
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Table 1
Variable descriptive statistics and correlations
(A) Descriptive statistics
Mean Median S.D.
Number of observations 3972
CAR60 0.0023 -0.0011 0.1321
SUE -0.7232 0.0532 15.265
MV 14,081.50 12,290.51 6232.50
MULTY 0.5321 0.4132 0.2232
(B) Correlation table
CAR60 DSUE DMV DMULTY
CAR60 - .0523 (.000) -.0326 (.013) -.0321 (.000)
DSUE - .0821 (.000) .0812 (.000)
DMV - .1325 (.000)
DMULTY -
Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the CAR60, SUE, MV, and MULTY, measured as yearly foreign profits/
total profits. Panel B provides Pearson correlations. DSUE, DMV, and DMULTY represent the ranked values of
SUE, MV, and MULTY, respectively.
The second column (Model 2) adds the interaction term between unexpected earnings and
the level of multinationality (DSUE x DMULTY) to Model 1. This interaction term measures
the incremental effect of the level of multinationality on the slope ofDSUE. As expected, the
Table 2
The association between post-eamings-armouncement drift and level of multinationality (Eq. (2))
Variable Predicted
sign
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
3972 3972 3972 3972
Intercept ? -.0131 -.0132 -.0133 - .0242
(-8.023)* (-8.231)* (-8.211)* (-8.212)*
DSUE + .0232 .0354 .0342 .0362
(7.235)* (8.229)* (6.231)* (5.231)*
DMV ? .0121
(2.425)**
DSUEx - -.024 -.0015
DMV (-4.231) (-2.119)**
DMULTY 9 .0135
(2.721)**
DSUEx — - .0080 -.0081 -.0013
DMULTY (-3.159) (-3.250)* (-3.521)**
Adjusted .42 .43 .61 .73
R~ (%)
F (72.320) (28.320) (25.301) (14.256)
The variables are defined in Table 1 . The t statistic is provided in parentheses after the estimated coefficient.
* One tailed P<.01.
** One-tailed /'<.05.
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coefficient on DSUE remains significantly positive (.0323, r = 8.229, one-tailed P<.Q\). As
predicted, the estimated coefficient on DSUE x DMULTY is negative and statistically
significant (- .0080, r=- 3.159, one tailed P<.01).
The third column (Model 3) shows that the negative association between CAR60 and level of
multinationality holds when the interaction term for firm size (DSUE x DMV) is added. The
interaction term is negative and statistically significant ( — .024, r = — 4.23 1 , one tailedP < .0 1 ).
Finally, the fourth column (Model 4) shows that the negative association between CAR60
and the level of multinationality holds after we include both intercept and slope for
multinationality and size."*
5. Concluding remarks
This study is another empirical examination of a potential explanation of observed post-
announcement drift in stock prices. Does the level of multinationality, a variable used for
earnings predictability, relate to post-eamings-armouncement drift? The findings are that post-
eamings-announcement drift is negatively related to the level of multinationality and that this
relation exists when firm size is controlled.
The findings may be related to prior research by stating that the misperception of the time-
series properties of earnings observed by Freeman and Tse (1989), the misperception of
quarterly eamings to be a seasonal random walk observed by Bernard and Thomas (1990),
and the market misperception of the process underlying eamings (Ball & Bartov, 1996) are
possibly reflecting the low level of multinationality that causes the post-announcement drift in
general.
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Abstract
The international diversity of firms' fiscal year-end is relatively unknown. However, this diversity
has practical implications for both accounting research and business comparability. In this study, we
examine the backgrounds of the diversity. We found that differences in tiny, supposedly unimportant
details in national legislation on fiscal year-end have a much stronger impact on fiscal year-end choice
than the generally assumed cause of seasonality. In the last decade of international harmonization, we
found only a few instances of fiscal year-end changes motivated by enhancing comparability.
Worldwide, a weak drift towards December was found.
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1. Introduction
The choice of fiscal year-end seems straightforward. The obvious balance sheet date seems
to be December 3 1 . In the literature, little attention is paid to it. Two of the few relevant
studies are Huberman and Kandel (1989) and Smith and Pourciau (1988). They examined
whether December and non-December firms differ systematically in characteristics such as
size and industry. They argue that researchers often restrict their sample selection to either
December or non-December firms. Generalizability in empirical financial accounting research
may therefore be affected by the presence of systematic differences between December and
non-December year-end companies.
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However, these studies do not address the causes of the international diversity in fiscal
year-end. It could be argued that since, both in practice and in the literature, little attention is
paid to the choice of fiscal year-end, this does not matter. However, both diversity and
uniformity in fiscal year-end have advantages and disadvantages in several areas.
The most prominent argument for a uniform fiscal year-end is comparability. When
comparing the financial performance of two firms with different fiscal year-ends, significant
changes in the business environment in the nonoverlapping period may hamper comparabil-
ity. In addition, when two firms merge, they have to align their annual reporting. This results
in short or long fiscal years, which hampers time series analysis.
On the other hand, diversity in the fiscal year-end provides a far more continuous flow of
economic business data. This would be beneficial for economic policy makers who can react
faster on recognized trends. In addition, external auditors could spread their workload better
over the entire year. This may reduce costs. In fact, there are auditing firms that offer
discounts to clients who close their books outside the "busy" season. In this study, we will
address the causes of international diversity in fiscal year-end, based on an analysis of
differences in the national legal environment of firms and large samples fi-om databases such
as Global Vantage. The samples will also be analyzed to explore whether changes in fiscal
year-end tend to harmonize towards an international uniformity.
2. Causes of fiscal year-end diversity
The best known explanation of non-December fiscal year-ends is the seasonal pattern of a
firm's business. The argument is that the fiscal year should end at the natural business cycle
of a firm. On the other hand, the choice of fiscal year-end may be determined by accounting
or fiscal legislation or customs in the industry or country. In many countries, firms are free to
choose the fiscal year-end they prefer. However, small differences in the way legislation is
stated may lead to large differences in practice when firms do not have a strong preference for
a particular balance sheet date. These small differences in legislation are illustrated by the
various approaches in continental Europe, the UK, and the US. In most continental European
countries in the European Union, the law assumes the balance sheet date to be December 3 1
,
unless the Articles of Association say otherwise. Therefore, if confinental European firms do
not have an explicit preference, the balance sheet date will be December 3 1 . The Companies
Act 1985 (Secdons 223 to 224) in the UK states that the first fiscal year normally ends the last
day of the month in which the anniversary of its incorporation falls. If the company was
incorporated before April 1, 1985, the Companies Act 1985 determines the fiscal year-end to
be March 31. All companies are allowed to alter their fiscal year-end (Companies Act 1985
section 225.) Therefore, if British firms do not have an explicit preference, balance sheet
dates will be scattered quite randomly over the calendar year, following the (coincidental)
founding date, with a skewness in March due to "older" companies. In many US states,
legislation requires that the Articles of Association explicitly mention the fi"eely chosen
balance sheet date. Therefore, founders of the firm are forced to pay attention to this choice.
They may select either the calendar year, the end of the business season, or the founding date.
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Thus, we also expect a diverse choice of fiscal year-ends for US firms. Finally, for some
countries, the fiscal year-end may be influenced by tax law. If tax law prescribes a certain
balance sheet date, the firm is likely to align its financial reporting to the tax period. However,
in most countries, the tax period follows the choice made for statutory accounts. In order to
examine whether balance dates are associated with national legislation or industry, we
selected data jfrom Datastream. The fiscal year-ends of 14,896 listed firms as per September
1999 were retrieved, sorted by country. The largest subset was of US firms (8744). For
Canada, the UK, and Japan, more than 1000 firms per country were selected. For most of the
remaining countries, the number of firms ranged between 200 and 750. The distribution of the
fiscal year-end per country is presented in Table 1
.
Table 1 shows that there are indeed international differences in the "popularity" of certain
balance sheet dates. Continental European firms have a strong preference for December, with
percentages for December about 90%. For the UK, fiscal year-ends are far more spread over
the year. Only 39% of the firms chose December. A similar pattem is found for the US and
Canada, although to a more limited extent. Japanese firms have a strong preference for
March, and the South Pacific countries, Australia, and New Zealand, often choose the end of
June. The pattems of continental Europe and the UK support the conclusion that fiscal year-
end choice is primarily based on the date suggested by national legislation. Apparently, firms
do not often attempt to enhance comparability by choosing a uniform balance sheet date. The
relative high uniformity in continental Europe is a simple effect of legislation. If a different
date is suggested, like in the UK, the pattem changes drastically, and no uniformity occurs.
Australia has a mandatory tax period ending June 30. Most Australian firms appear to align
their annual reporting to this mandatory tax period. In New Zealand, a distinction can be
made between private and public companies. According to a public accountant from New
Zealand (oral communication), "New Zealand's traditional balance date for most individuals
and private companies is 3 1 March. Most public companies have adopted June 30 to coincide
Table 1
Distribution of fiscal year-ends per country, in percentages
January February March April May June July August September October November December
France 1 3 1 1 2 1 91
Germany 2 5 10 2 78
Italy 2 98
Switzerland 2 1 1 4 91
Belgium 4 2 2 92
Netherlands 4 4 1 1 3 1 88
UK 3 3 22 5 4 7 2 3 9 2 1 39
US 4 1 6 2 2 9 2 2 7 2 1 62
Canada 5 2 7 2 3 4 3 5 6 3 2 60
Japan 1 5 84 1 1 1 1 6
Korea 13 5 3 1 78
Australia 3 1 74 5 1 2 14
New 1 21 4 43 4 6 7 1 13
Zealand
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with Australia. There is no other logic to it." Within Japanese standard setting, the national
government has the most significant influence on accounting, based on an implicit and
persistent belief that accounting should eventually contribute to the development of the
national economy as a whole (Walton, Haller, & Raffoumier, 1998) For this purpose,
alignment to the government's accounting period, which (traditionally) ends on March 31,
is important. The results show that Japanese firms indeed follow the government's accounting
period.
3. Association between fiscal year-end and industry
Although the findings of the previous section suggest that the choice of fiscal year-end is
mainly driven by national legislation, for some industries, the impact of seasonality may be
stronger. Note that this argument only applies for those industries that have a seasonal
business pattem. Therefore, we focus on department stores and clothing retail, the best known
industry with a typical seasonality, ending in the first months of the calendar year. From
Global Vantage, we selected all available firms in this industry from the US, the UK, and
continental Europe as per December 1999, and compared the relative distribution of fiscal
year-ends. The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the skewness in the first 3 months of the calendar year is the highest in
the US, while in Europe, the distribution is very similar to the average distribution of fiscal
year-ends of European firms. This suggests that in the US the fiscal year-end choice is more
sfrongly based on business characteristics, while in Europe, seasonality plays a minor role in
determining the fiscal year-end. Given the scope of Global Vantage, the focus is here on large
listed firms in one industry, so results may not be generalizable to smaller firms in other
industries. However, in the total data set, we did not find major industries with a stronger
skewness. Therefore, in some industries, the seasonal effect may be sfronger, but this has a
low impact on general practice. Also, large firms are often more diversified than small
Table 2
International comparison of fiscal year-end in department store and clothing industry (percentage)
US {/7=114) UK(« = 43) Continental Europe (n = 64)
January
February
March
39
3
1
April
May
June
2
2
3
July
August
September
October
3
1
3
3
November 1
December 47
28
5
16
7
7
5
2
7
2
21
5
84
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companies, which may neutralize the seasonality, if any, of individual segments on a
consolidated basis. Thus, small, nondiversified firms may have a stronger incentive to choose
a non-December fiscal year-end. We used the Dutch database, Elsevier's Financieel
Economisch Lexicon Top 5000, to expand the analysis to smaller firms. The database
contains the financial data of the top 5000 Dutch firms. Since the Dutch economy is relatively
small, its top 5000 comprises relatively small companies. When stratified on sales, we did not
fmd a significant change in the distribution of non-December firms. This suggests that size
does not affect the fiscal year-end choice.
4. Fiscal year-end changes
So far, we showed that fiscal year-ends differ significantly internationally. In this section,
we examine whether international accounting harmonization causes a drift in fiscal year-end
towards a worldwide equilibrium by analyzing patterns in fiscal year-end changes. Note that
harmonization of fiscal year-ends does not follow directly fi^om Intemational Accounting
Standards (IAS), since IAS do not elaborate on the choice of fiscal year-end. Therefore, a
harmonization of fiscal year-end would be driven by forces other than explicit standards.
Firms may change their fiscal year-ends for various reasons. They may decide to switch fi-om
their founding date-based fiscal year-end to a date that reconciles to their business seasonality,
or in the case of a merger, they may align with the balance sheet date of the firm with which
they have merged. Firms may also align their fiscal year-end with the common fiscal year-end
in their industry, in order to enhance the comparability of the financial statements. The latter
argument coincides with the aim of (intemational) accounting harmonization. From the total
set of the 13,503 available firms in Global Vantage, we selected all firms that changed their
fiscal year-end between 1990 and 1998. This resulted in a subset of 756 firms, implying that
in the 10 year period studied, 5.6% of the selected firms had a fiscal year-end change, i.e., a
half percent annually on average. There is a relatively high incidence of fiscal year-end
changes in the UK, the US, and Canada (0.9% annually). These are also the countries with a
relatively high variance in the distribution of fiscal year-ends. Relatively low incidences of
fiscal year-end changes occur in Japan (0.22%) and France (0.33%). The less stable choice of
fiscal year-ends in the UK and the US raises the question of whether the changes in fiscal
year-end are subject to a trend. We constructed migration matrices for the individual
countries. The migradon matrix summarizes all fiscal year-end changes "fi^om" (e.g., the
original fiscal year-end) to "to" (the newly chosen fiscal year-end). Since most of the fiscal
year-end changes (72%) relate to December (either the original fiscal year-end or the newly
chosen fiscal year-end), we focus on those fiscal year-ends only. The results are presented in
Table 3. For example, the upper left cell in Table 3 shows that six US firms changed their
fiscal year-end from January to December; the upper right cell says that in the total data set,
14 firms changed their fiscal year-end from December to January.
On the bottom line of Table 3, the trend is quantified by dividing the total number of firms
that changed their fiscal year-end to December by the total number of firms that changed their
fiscal year-end from December to another month. For example, in the US, the number of firms
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Table 3
Fiscal year-end changes from and to December
US
To From
UK Germany and France
To From
World
To From To From
January 6 5 3 4 1 18 14
February 9 1 4 3 20 6
March 22 7 14 6 1 5 81 45
April 13 2 1 1 28 2
May 5 3 10 11 3
June 35 3 4 5 10 90 34
July 5 1 2 1 11 4
August 9 1 1 1 22 4
September 22 19 12 3 10 9 67 38
October 5 3 8 1 2 17 9
November 6 1 1 1 11 7
Total 137 43 55 24 18 30 376 166
Ratio towards 3.2 2.3 0.6 2.3
December
that adopted December as the new fiscal year-end is more than three times (3.2) the number of
firms that traded their December year-end for another month. Again, we see contrary trends
between US and UK and between Germany and France. In the US and UK, the net effect of
fiscal year-end changes is in favor of December. In Germany and France, the popularity of
December slightly deteriorates. The relatively large portion ofUS and UK firms in the data set
is the reason for the 2.3 ratio towards December on a worldwide basis. Note, however, that
since the average rate of change is only a half percent annually, significant changes in
distributions of fiscal year-ends require many years. The resemblance of the current
distributions with those in earlier research (see Foster, 1986) confirms this slow rate of
change. To explore the underlying reasons for the change in fiscal year-end for 50 US firms in
the subset, the financial statements of the year of change were retrieved fi*om the EDGAR
database. The notes to the financial statements were reviewed to find the reason management
gave for the change in fiscal year-end. In 29 cases, the change in fiscal year was mentioned and
reasons were provided. In only four instances was the change of fiscal year-end made
explicitly to align the fiscal year-end with the industry, in order to enhance comparability.
In other cases, the change of fiscal year-end followed a merger or a major acquisition (eight
instances) or aligned the fiscal year-end with the seasonal business pattern (five instances). The
remaining four instances were diverse in nature. These findings suggest that enhancement of
comparability within the industry explains only a limited number of fiscal year-end changes.
5. Summary and conclusions
The choice of fiscal year-end does not attract much attention in either accounting research
or in practice. This paper shows that there is a great diversity intemationally in fiscal year-
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ends. In this paper, we focused on two determinants of the choice of the fiscal year-end,
national legislation, and seasonality. We retrieved large samples from public financial
databases. Although, in most countries, firms are free to choose any fiscal year-end, company
laws often provide guidance if the firm does not have a particular preference.
In the analysis of the association with industry, we found a stronger non-December effect
for department stores and clothing retail only, although, even for this industry, the impact of
legislation was very clear. In the period 1990-1998, some 0.5% annually of firms worldwide
changed their fiscal year-end. Only a small part ofthese changes was explicitly imposed by the
desire for comparability. The fiscal year-end changes have a "mean reverting" drift: Anglo-
Saxon firms tend to adopt a December fiscal year-end, and continental European firms tend to
change their December fiscal year-end to a non-December book year. Since fiscal year-end
changes occur relatively infrequently, it appears that international diversity will remain for a
long period. Since legislation on fiscal year-end appears to be merely a matter of (coincidental)
choice, it is worthwhile to rethink whether it would be relevant to pursue intemational
harmonization of the fiscal year-end. Individual firms should weigh the benefits of compar-
ability and auditor costs relating to either December or non-December fiscal year-end.
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Abstract
This study examines the accounting practices and the degree of adoption of international accounting
standards (lASs) by small and closely held companies in Bahrain. It finds that 86% (31) of the 36
companies responding to the questionnaire applied lASs and they considered lASs to be very relevant
for them. All firms prepare balance sheets, and the majority prepares income statements and cash flow
statements. They also duly audit these statements. The data collected also revealed that the quotient
influence on whether or not a firm adopted IAS was exerted by their external auditors. Extemal
auditors exerted the greatest influence on getting firms to adopt LASs. Banks and company partners
were the primary users of company financial statements; inventories, depreciation, disclosure on
financial statements, and the presentation of current assets and liabilities. The main lASs followed by a
majority of firms are those pertaining so. Some of the standards were considered totally irrelevant,
contrary to the prevailing idea that adoption of LASs creates an information overload for small and
closely held companies. The results of this study indicate that a majority of our respondents did not
find that it was costly to adopt or interpret LASs. Those few firms that experienced some difficulties
sought clarification fi^om their extemal auditors. About 84% of those who adopted LASs strongly
agreed that using lASs improves their organization's ability to financial assistance fi^om the banking
sector. Also, about 90% of the respondents fiilly agreed that lASs help to achieve the objectives and
improve the effectiveness of financial reporting.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, corporate financial reporting practices have undergone radical changes all
over the world. These changes in developing countries are particularly significant. Although
there is no agreement about the type of accounting system developing countries should use
(Wallace, 1990), the adoption of intemational accounting standards (lASs) has been suggested
as an appropriate accounting system to facilitate economic growth (Belkaoui, 1988). Belkaoui
(1994, p.75) suggests that
The best strategy available to the developing countries is either ofjoining the Intemational
Accounting Standards Committee (lASC) or some of the other intemational standards
setting bodies, and adopting their complete set of pronouncements. The rationale, behind
such a strategy, is to reduce the setup and production costs of accounting standards, joining
the intemational harmonization desire, facilitating the growth of foreign investment that
may be needed, enable the profession to emulate well established professional standards of
behavior, conduct and legitimize its status as a full-fledged member of the intemational
community. Some of the developing countries give more credibility to lASs, and other
standards than do the developed countries that have a dominant influence in the
preparation of such standards.
Choi, Frost, and Meek (1999, p.262) state that lASs are used as a result of either
intemational or political agreements, or voluntary (professionally encouraged) compliance.
Al-Bastaki (1996) found that the adoption of lASs is one of the most effective strategies for
enhancing the accounting profession in Bahrain. The application of the European Union's
(EU) accounting-related directives in developing nations generally results fi^om an inter-
national political agreement. When intemational and national accounting standards are the
same, there is no problem; but when they differ, national standards come first. Choi et al. cite
the following four main reasons for the wider acceptance of lASs. First, many countries use
them as the basis for national accounting requirements. Second, they are used as an
intemational benchmark. Third, the EU and other supranational bodies recognize them.
And, fourth, many stock exchanges (e.g., London, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Zurich, Thailand,
Hong Kong, Rome, and Amsterdam) and regulators accept financial statements that are
prepared in accordance with LASs. Research also shows that more than 56 out of 67 countries
surveyed by the lASC (1996) either used lASs as their national standards or based their
national standards on lASs.
Many developing nations are trying to achieve harmonization in reporting practices in
conformity with that of developed countries. Bahrain is not lagging behind. It adopted lASs
in 1994 in the absence of other local standards.' There is evidence that listed companies in
Bahrain are using lASs (Al-Bastaki, 1996; Joshi & Al-Bastaki, 1999). Also, nonlisted banks
and other business enterprises have started using lASs in the preparation of financial
statements. Previous research on Bahrain examined the adoption of lASs by large-sized
listed companies (i.e., the adoption of lASs is related to large-sized or listed companies only).
However, since the majority of firms in Bahrain are small, closely held unhsted firms
contribute about 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and provide employment to a
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large segment of the population, the adoption of lASs by these entities deserves to be
examined. This is the subject/objective of this paper.
The remainder of the paper reviews the relevant literature, presents the research
methodology used, and discusses the results. The summary and conclusion are followed
by statements about directions for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Financial statements and users
Studies have shown that the major reasons that small firms fail are poor financial
management and reporting (Berryman, 1983). With these findings in mind, McMahon and
Hohnes (1991) reviewed many studies dealing with the financial management and reporting
practices of small firms in North America and reached the conclusion that financial reporting
practices among small firms have not undergone significant changes over the preceding 15
years.
McCahey (1986) studied the financial reporting practices of 40 small Australian compan-
ies, the majority of which prepared financial statements. Owners and managers were ranked
the most important users of financial reports, followed by bank lending officers. In another
Australian study, McMahon (1998) found that 84.5% of small manufacturing companies
prepared both balance sheets and income statements, whereas only 79.6% prepared cash flow
statements.
Barker and Noonan (1996), Carsberg, Page, Sindall, and Waring (1985), and Page
(1984) surveyed directors and auditors of small companies in the United Kingdom asking
them to rate the importance of the uses of the annual reports. These studies suggest that
financial statements represent an important source of management information. Hussey and
Hussey (1997) published the results of a study of UK companies based on 89 usable
questionnaires. Their study indicated (a) that small- and medium-sized companies prepared
financial statements, and (b) that banks and company directors were the prime users of
these reports. Chauveau, Deartini, and Moneva (1996) and Moneva (1993) found that small
business financial reports were most relevant to internal (management) and extemal
(bankers) users.
' In 1 994, the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, through a circular, issued guidelines that said that
corporate sector companies could adopt lASs. However, neither a decree nor any provisions were incorporated in
the Commercial Companies Act (CCA) of 1975, which would have made it mandatory for corporate sector
companies to adopt LASs. CCA 1975, which regulates accounting rules, requires that all limited-liability
companies prepare an income statement, a balance sheet, and a statement of income appropriation, including a
Board of Directors report on dividend distribution, and then have those statements audited. The Act does not
stipulate that companies prepare their fmancial statements based on LASs, nor is there a penalty for not basing
fmancial statements on LASs. Only locally incorporated banks are required by the Bahrain Monetary Agency
(BMA) to produce a set of fmancial statements based on lASs. Although the adoption of LASs is not mandatory for
corporate sector companies, the trend has been in this direction.
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2.2. Adoption of accounting standards
The International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), the lASC, the World
Bank, the International Federation of Stock Exchanges, and Tetley (1991) beheve that the
adoption of lASs is appropriate for developing countries. Introducing lASs is often an
improvement over the existing systems: These standards provide low setup and production
costs for accounting information, add to intemational comparability, and attract intemal
investment (see Nobes & Parkar, 1995; Samuels & Piper, 1985; Wyatt, 1991; and Roussey,
1992).
Some evidence is available on the adoption of lASs in selected countries: Switzerland
(Dumontier & Raffoumier, 1998; Murphy, 1999), Germany (Leuz & Verrecchia, 1999; Maria
& Ana, 2000), and for rest of the world (El-Gazzar, Finn, & Jacob, 1999). Murphy (1999)
examined specific characteristics of Swiss companies that have voluntarily elected to prepare
financial reports using lASs. Using data from two sets of identical samples for 22 companies,
he identified some benefits of using lASs by comparing the differences between the
companies that adopted LASs and those that adopted local standards (Murphy, 1999, p.
121). Foreign activity variables, percent of exchange listings, and percent of foreign sales
were found to be statistically significant.
Barker and Noonan (1996) conducted a study on small companies in Ireland. They found
that over half of the respondents always comply with UK accounting standards and company
law, but the burden was too great for small firms. These respondents perceived that "Related
Party Transactions" were the only standard in which they faced difficulty. Additionally, 31%
of the respondents wanted to remove the audit requirements for small companies, 22%
wanted less disclosure, and 20% wanted company management to do more of the accounts
preparation.
In the same survey, 43% of the respondents stated that all standards should apply to all
companies when applicable and if the amounts involved were material. Standards relating to
value added tax (VAT), accounting policies, accounting for stocks, government grants,
depreciation, leasing, and accounting for taxation showed a high degree of applicability. The
survey further indicated that respondents' knowledge of the standards was dated.
Ramsay and Sutcliffe (1986) [for a sample of 423 unaudited (exempt) proprietary
companies in Australia] examined the extent of compliance with four approved accounting
standards: namely, profit and loss statements, valuation and presentation of inventories,
depreciation of noncurrent assets, and accounting policies for determination, application, and
disclosure. The results showed that exempt proprietary companies have a higher level of
noncompliance than do listed public companies.
Mutter (1993), in his study on the concept of disclosure, found that Jordanian companies
generally fulfill lASC minimum disclosure requirements. His research showed that there were
differences between the scope of disclosure required by the lASs and the practices of
Jordanian companies. Similarly, Saleem (2000) found that there were major statistical
differences between actual preparation and presentation of the financial statements by 33
Jordanian industrial companies made in response to the requirements of IAS- 1 (Preparation of
the Financial Statements).
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3. Methodology
This study examines the attitudes of professional accountants working in small and closely
held companies towards the adoption of lASs in Bahrain. The Directory of the Bahrain
Chamber of Commerce and Industry has a list of 567 small and closely held (family group)
companies. Of this list, a sample of 85 companies (15%) was selected at random. Many of the
selected companies had limited liability.
In the first phase of the study, a three-page questionnaire was mailed in January 1999 to the
Managing Directors/Heads of finance or accounting departments. The questions were based on
earlier literature (e.g., Abdel-khalik et al, 1983; Agarwal & Joshi, 1991; Barker & Noonan,
1996; Bamiv & Elitzur, 1989; Campbell, 1984; Carsberg et al, 1985; Chauveau et al., 1996)
and kept simple. The questionnaire was divided into three parts: general information about
respondents (Part I), adoption of lASs by small and closely held firms (Part II), and specific
questions relating to the relevance of lASs to small and closely held firms (Part III). Thirty-six
firms returned the completed questionnaires (a response rate of 42.4%).
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Characteristics of respondents
Table 1 shows that 16 firms were engaged in manufacturing and related activities. The
remaining 20 firms were engaged in trading and service activities. The number of employees in
most of the firms (61 .3%) was less than 100. Only 3 1 companies that claimed to have adopted
lASs provided sales data, and about 45% of those have sales of less than BD0.5 million.
All questionnaires were completed by accountants and finance managers/finance controllers.
The average age of the respondents was 35 years, ranging fi-om 26 to 54. The average length of
time in their present position in the company was 5.3 years. Additionally, of the 36 firms that
responded to the questionnaire, 3 1 claimed that they have adopted LASs and the remaining five
claim to use other accounting guidelines fi*om the UK or the US.
4.2. Types offinancial reports and their users
Table 2, which provides information about the financial reports prepared by small and
closely held companies, shows that all firms in the sample (100%) prepare balance sheets,
90.3% prepare income statements, 48.4% prepare statement of retained eamings, and 71%
prepare cash flow statements. Regardless of size, the results indicate that small and closely
held firms in Bahrain do maintain their accounts and prepare financial statements regularly.
Banks (as shown in Table 3) play an important role in creating this regularity because they
evaluate the accounts before granting loans.
Second, the study shows that most (30) of the firms have their accounts audited mostly by
both the Big Five audit firms and local accounting firms. These same firms have also adopted
LASs. The firms that did not apply LASs did not have audited financial statements.
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Table 1
Characteristics of the respondents
F %
a. Type offirm
Manufacturing 16 44.4
Merchandising 14 38.9
Service 6 16.7
Total 36 100
b. Number of employees
Less than 50 14 38.7
51-100 8 22.6
Over 100 14 38.7
Total 36 100
c. Sales
Less than BD 0.5 million 14 45.2
More than BD 0.5 million 17 54.8
Total 31 100
d. Job title of respondents
Accountant 24 67
Finance manager/Controller 12 33
Total 36 100
e. Adoption of standards
Firms adopting lASs 31 86
Firms adopting US/UK GAAPs 5 14
Total 36 100
4.3. Adoption oflASs
The magnitude of cross-border financing transitions, securities trading, and direct foreign
investments shows the need for a single set of rules for recognizing and measuring assets,
liabilities, and income. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) state that lASs provide answers to this issue
because financial disclosures prepared in compliance with lASs can facilitate comparison
Table 2
Financial statements prepared by responding firms
;; %
Statement
Balance sheet 36 100.0
Income statement 32 90.3
Statement of retained earnings 14 45.2
Cash flow statement 22 55.6
Audit of financial statements 30 83.3
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Table 3
Users of financial statements
Users n %
Partners
19a
37.3
Creditors T 13.7
Banks 25^ 49.0
^ Multiple responses were allowed.
across firms of diflferent nationalities as well as being indicative of more reliability. The
number of firms acknowledging adherence to US accounting standards has increased steadily
(El-Gazzar et al., 1999).
Table 4 reveals that 3 1 of the responding firms follow lASs in the preparation of their
financial statements, but only five firms follow US (8.3%) or UK (5.6%) GAAPs.
In addition to the banks, the Ministry of Commerce and the Bahrain Monetary Agency
encourage companies to follow lASs. This view is also held by the Big Five audit firms.
Of the 31 firms that claimed to have adopted lASs, 21 (67.7%) stated that they followed
LASs at the advice of their external auditor. Another source of influence (though lower) was
the firm's management (32.3% of the respondents) that sought more reliable sources of
management information.
4.4. Degree of adoption of specific lASs
Adoption of accounting standards in Bahrain is driven by institutional factors, which do
not include taxation since there is no corporate income tax in Bahrain. Table 5 shows the
specific accounting standards followed by small and closely held companies in Bahrain. A
number of standards listed in the questionnaire were considered relevant by the firms.
However, the degree of adoption varied considerably from one standard to another. All firms
adopted the following standards: IAS-4 (Depreciation Accounting) and LAS- 13 (Presentation
of Current Assets and Current Liabilities). This could be due to the fact that these two
standards actually relate to the most basic accounting practices and procedures followed by
firms of all sizes and sorts. Other standards in the "high adoption" category (80% or above)
include L\S-5 (Information to be Disclosed in Financial Statements) and IAS-2 (hiventories),
making a total of four in that category.
IAS-7 (Cash Flow Statement), IAS- 16 (Property, Plant, and Equipment), IAS- 18 (Revenue
Recognition), IAS-24 (Related Party Disclosures), IAS- 10 (Contingencies and Events Occur-
Table 4
Accounting guidelines followed
Accounting guidelines No. of companies %
lASs 31 86.1
US GAAPs 3 8.3
UK GAAPs 2 5.6
Total 36 100.0
31 (100.0) 1
31 (100.0) 1
28 (90.3) 2
25 (80.6) 3
23 (74.2) 4
22 (70.9) 5
22 (70.9) 5
22 (70.9) 5
19 (61.3) 6
18 (58.1) 7
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Table 5
Degree of adoption of specific lASs
International Accounting Standards n (%) Rank
High adoption'^
IAS-13: Presentation of Current Assets and Current Liabilities
IAS-4: Depreciation Accounting
IAS-5: Information to be Disclosed in Financial Statements
IAS-2: Inventories
Moderate adoption
IAS-1: Disclosure of Accounting Policies
IAS-7: Cash Flow Statement
LAS- 16: Property, Plant, and Equipment
IAS-1 8: Revenue Recognition
IAS-24: Related Party Disclosures
LAS- 10: Contingencies and Events Occurring after
Balance Sheet Date
L\S-19: Retirement-Benefit Costs 17 (54.8)
Low adoption'^
LAS-3: Consolidated Financial Statements
IAS-2 1: The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
IAS-23: Borrowing Costs
IAS-25: Accounting for Investments
IAS-27: Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting
for Investment in Subsidiaries
IAS-8: Changes in Accounting Policies Fundamental Error, etc.
IAS-26: Accounting and Reporting by Retirement-Benefit Plans
IAS-28: Accounting for Investments in Associates
IAS-1 7: Accounting for Leases
IAS-1 1: Construction Contracts
IAS-3 1 : Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures
IAS-14: Reporting on Financial Information by Segment
IAS-20: Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure
of Government Assistance
15 (48.4) 9
14 (45.2) 10
14 (45.2) 10
14 (45.2) 10
11 (35.5) 11
11 (35.5) 11
9 (29.0) 12
6 (19.4) 13
4 (12.9) 14
4 (12.9) 14
4 (12.9) 14
3 (9.7) 15
2 (6.5) 16
A standard is adopted by 80% or more of the companies.
A standard is adopted by between 50% and 80% of the co
A standard is adopted by less than 50% of the companies.
ring after Balance Sheet Date), and IAS- 19 (Retirement- Benefit Costs) fell into the moderate
adoption rate. The remaining standards were in the low adoption category (below 50%).
Respondents made the following comments about the benefits to be derived from using
lASs:
lASs were adopted to facilitate the management decision making process and to get full
knowledge of what exactly the business does. Additionally, limited liability companies
have to get their annual accounts audited. For that reason, lASs have to be adopted.
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Even a small business operates in a very competitive environment, which makes it
important to have highly efficient and consistent accounting principles to arrive at the
correct profitability, net worth of the organization as well as the working capital
position. The lASs are quite adequate to meet the above three needs and hence, it helps
a long way in decision making and drawing the business strategies in the immediate
and long-term future.
The results are consistent with those of previous empirical studies. The surveys carried out
by Ernst & Young (1993) and by the lASC (1998) showed that a number of corporafions fi-om
different countries have adopted lASs.
4.5. Nonadoption of specific standards
The Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Accounting Standards
and Reporting (2000) (UNCTAD, 2000) admitted that some lASs were relevant for small
companies, thus implying that others were not applicable. Contrary to expectations, the
standards relating to "Accounting for Changing Prices" (IAS-6), "Information Reflecting
the Effects of Changing Prices" (IAS- 15), "Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary
Economies" (IAS-29), "Accounting for Taxes on Income" (IAS- 12), "Accounting for
Business Combination" (IAS-22), "Research and Development Costs" (IAS-9), and
"Disclosure of Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions" (lAS-
30) were not adopted by many respondents. It is likely that these standards do not relate to
the business economy of Bahrain or to the business of the firms that responded to the
questionnaire.
4.6. Relevance oflASs to small and closely held firms
The study also examined an important issue that is fi^equently debated, i.e., the relevance
and suitability of lASs to small and closely held firms in terms of the cost-benefit criterion.
As shown in Table 6, several proxies were used to assess the relevance of adopting lASs.
The table shows that 25 of the firms stated that their accounting staff had the capability to
prepare and present financial statements according to lASs, but only 14 firms had trained their
staff to prepare financial statements under lASs. Twenty-two firms indicated no difficulty in
interpreting these standards.
Finally, 22 firms (85.2%) indicated that adopting and applying lASs is not very costly."
Computerized accounting systems, which a majority of these companies have, make it easy
to maintain accounting data without incurring much additional costs.
Twenty-six (92.8%) of the firms that applied lASs stated that the standards helped them
achieve the objectives of financial reporting. Furthermore, 25 emphasized that the adoption of
^ In certain cases, the incremental costs of compliance with lASs may go up when two sets of reports would
increase the cost to the firm. For example, in the case of certain foreign banks operating in Bahrain, there may be
some incremental costs if they prepare their financial statements using their countries' GAAPs and then they need
to translate them to LASs as per the BMA's requirements.
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Table 6
Relevance of lASs to small and closely held companies
Statement No. of companies No. of companies Total
who responded "yes" who responded "no"
n (%) n (%)
Capability of accounting staff 25(86.2) 4(13.8) 29
to prepare financial
statements based on lASs
Training of accounting staff 14(45.2) 17(54.8) 31
in lASs
Difficulties in interpreting 4 (15.4) 22 (84.6) 26
these standards
lASs are costly to apply 5 (14.8) 22 (85.2) 27 •
Adopting lASs achieves the 26 (92.8) 2 (7.2) 28
objectives of financial
reporting
Adopting lASs improves the 25 (86.2) 4 (13.8) 29
efficiency and effectiveness
of financial reporting
Adopting LASs improves the 26 (100.0) - 26
opportunities to obtain
financial assistance fi-om the
banking sector
lASs enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of financial reporting and improves the
opportunities to obtain funding from banks.
5. Summary and conclusion
After analyzing the data on the acceptability and adoption of lASs by small and
closely held companies in Bahrain, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• The present trend in Bahrain is to adopt lASs rather than the US or the UK GAAPs. A
majority of small and closely held firms have already voluntarily adopted LASs for various
reasons. Chief among them is the need to standardize the financial reporting process to
provide a common ground for comparison and analysis. In addition, respondents indicated
that their decision to adopt lASs was influenced by the expectation of improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of financial reporting plus achieving their firms' objecfives.
Other reasons included the influence of credit providers—mainly banks—and the desire to
improve their credit rating for purposes of obtaining external financing.
• The primary influences on the decision to adopt lASs were the extemal auditors, banks, and
management. The role of the Ministry of Commerce or other govemmental agencies was
negligible.
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• The degree to which each standard was relevant to the responding firms varied by firm size
and the nature of operations. However, there were a few standards that were judged to have
no relevance to the economy of Bahrain. A majority of the firms agreed that their
accounting staff had the capability and training to implement lASs and could comply with
the process without problems.
• The majority of the respondents did not find that the adoption of lASs was costly or that
they faced any major difficulty in interpreting them. The small number of firms that had
problems interpreting the standards sought clarification from their extemal auditors.
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Book reviews
Accounting in China in Transition: 1949-2000
by Allen Huang and Ronald Ma, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2001, xiv+122 pp.
This work examines the relation between Chinese accounting and its environment in a
historical context. Specifically, the book traces the economic, political, and social changes
between 1949 and 2000 in China and the parallel developments in accounting. Assuming that
accounting development mirrors changes in its environment, the book tries to demonstrate that
in order to understand Chinese accounting, one must understand the environment within which
it operates, and to predict the fijture of Chinese accounting, one has to appreciate its history.
The book divides the history under study into two periods: 1949-1978 under Mao
Zedong, and 1978-2000 under Deng Xiaoping. The Mao era was characterized by a series of
political and mass movements, whereas the Deng era has been characterized by economic
reforms aiming to transform a central planning system into a socialist market economy.
Following a brief introduction and an outline of accounting history prior to 1949, the book
devotes four chapters to accounting developments during the Mao period. These chapters
chronologically deal with the inirial establishment of a uniform accounting system based on
the Soviet model within the first few years after the foundation of "New China" (1949-
1957), the damage to accounting caused by the Great Leap Forward mass movement (1958-
1962), rebuilding the uniform accounting system during the economic recovery years (1963-
1965), and the collapse of accounting during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). This is
followed by four chapters on accounting reform in the Deng era. These chapters cover an
overview of the new political and economic environment, the recovery of accounting at the
beginning of China's economic reform with no clear objective (1978-1984), accounting
change under the dual track economic system [the so-called planned commodity economy
(1984-1991)], and accounting systems iimovation represented by the birth of China's
accounting standards following the stipulation of the development of a socialist market
economy as the goal of economic reform (1991-2000). The next chapter then analyzes the
themes and issues relating to the ongoing state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, hypothes-
izing that the future of China's accounting depends on the success of such a reform. The last
chapter provides a summary of previous chapters and a further analysis of several important
political issues involved in China's reform.
This work is a usefiil addition to the English literature on Chinese accounting. There are
akeady several texts on Chinese accounting (e.g., Blake & Gao, 1995; Ji, 2001; Lin, Yang, &
Wang, 1998; Liu & Zhang, 1996; Lou & Enthoven, 1987; Tang, Cooper, & Chow, 1996; Yang
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& Yang, 1999). However, this is probably the only English text on Chinese accounting that is
dedicated to demonstrating the relation between accounting development and the environment
of accounting in a historical context. Some other English texts touch upon such a relation or
provide a historical overview (e.g., Ji, 2001; Yang & Yang, 1999). However, a Chinese text
entiXlQd Accounting in New China: 50 Years On (Xiang, 1999) also analyzes this relationship
from a historical perspective, although it provides a much more detailed treatment ofthe topic.
The book's task is not an easy and trivial one. The period covered by the study witnessed
numerous political, economic, and cultural upheavals, many of which were dramatic and
revolutionary. Similarly, accounting underwent a series of major changes. Thus, being
selective is both inevitable and not inconsistent with the objective of the study. The book
is generally a success in including the main environmental and accounting changes.
Nevertheless, the omission of some historical events might have resulted in biased assertions,
and incomplete description or analysis. For example, the book omits the break-up between
China and Soviet Union in the late 1950s and the natural disaster in the early 1960s. The
former affected China's accounting development, and both events added to China's national
crisis in the early 1960s. However, the book appears to have attributed the crisis solely to the
Great Leap Forward campaign (see p. 36).
Similarly, the book neglects China's efforts to develop Independent Auditing Standards
since 1993, although it describes the development of the audit profession and accounting
standard setting. Thus, it is unable to assess the impact of auditing standards on the quality of
accounting information (Defond, Wong, & Li, 1 999). Other important omissions include the
disclosure standards issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, which represents
a significant development toward a market-oriented accounting and reporting regime.
While the authors should be congratulated for making a valuable contribution toward
understanding the relation between accounting and its environment in a Chinese context, the
book does have several limitations. First, the book appears to focus on accounting regulation,
and thus, there is scope for further studies of the impact of environmental change on other
aspects of accounting, especially accounting practice. Second, although the relation between
accounting and its environment is most likely to be two-way, this work focuses exclusively
on the impact of the environment and its change on accounting. It says little about the role of
accounting in constituting and shaping its environment (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, &
Hughes, 1980). Third, the work does not pay attention to the mechanisms and processes
through which environmental factors have an impact on accounting. In other words, the book
does not address the question ofhow China's accounting has become what it is today. Fourth,
while there are advantages to presenting environmental changes and accounting changes
separately (such as the ease with which the text is organized), this way of presentation betrays
a need for greater integration between the two types of change.
The book also suffers from several minor technical errors or omissions. These include (1)
Tan et al. (1992), cited on p. 27, is missing from the References; (2) Sino-foreign joint
ventures emerged as early as 1980, rather than 1984 (p. 63); and (3) the author of the last
entry in the References should be Zhou, Z.H. rather than Zhong, J.Z. In addition, the practice
of "accounting without books" (p. 43) needs some explanation. Otherwise, it could be
misleading, as in many cases, it meant replacing ledgers with documents, cards, or tables.
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It is plausible to hypothesize that the future of Chinese accounting depends on progress in
the reform of SOEs. The analysis of the SOE reform and related political issues in the last two
chapters is also informative. However, the book has failed to elicit the implications of this
analysis for fUmre accounting development. Rather, this task is left to the reader.
Despite these limitations, this is a valuable contribution to the English literature on Chinese
accounting. It is a concise, critical, and historical analysis of accounting transition fi-om the
Mao era to the Deng era, with an appropriate focus on environmental factors. It also sets the
scene for speculating on future accounting developments in China.
Jason Zezhong Xiao
Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
Jianxin Geng
Renmin University of China, Beijing,
People s Republic of China
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Observance of International Accounting Standards: Factors Explaining Noncompliance
By Donna L. Street and Sidney J. Gray, The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants,
London, 2001, 128 pp.
This ACCA Research Report by Donna Street and Sidney Gray is an empirical study of the
1998 financial statements of 279 companies that referred to the use of International
Accounting Standards (IAS) in those statements. The authors seek to identify the primary
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factors associated with the degrees of compliance with IAS practices. They argue that a fuller
understanding of these factors should help the International Accounting Standards Board
(lASB), the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the International Forum on
Accountancy Development (IFAD), and other interested parties overcome hindrances to the
worldwide acceptance of IAS.
Chapter I is a reminder of the recent achievements of the International Accounting
Standards Committee (lASC) and its restructuring as the LASB. It summarizes concerns about
IAS compliance as expressed by IOSCO and IFAC. It concludes (p. 9) by quoting the lASC's
view that departures from IAS in IAS financial statements are primarily a matter for auditors,
professional accountancy bodies, IFAC, national enforcement agencies, and supranational
bodies such as IOSCO.
Chapter 2 reviews prior research about the factors affecting the level of corporate
disclosure. The authors derive 1 1 hypotheses that form the basis of their statistical analysis
of factors explaining noncompliance with IAS. Seven hypotheses deal with company-specific
factors (listing status, size, profitability, industry, IAS reference, country of domicile, and
multinationality), one with the size of the company's domestic stock market and three with
the audit of the financial statements. Prior studies indicate that some of these factors, for
example, company size and listing status, are significantly associated with levels of
disclosure, while others such as profitability, industry, and audit firm reveal mixed results.
Street and Gray tested their hypotheses by comparing the IAS financial statements of their
sample of companies with a checklist of lAS-required disclosure and measurement/presenta-
tion practices. They computed compliance indices for each company both by averaging the
scores for each LAS (so giving equal weighting to each IAS) and on an unweighted basis.
Means and standard deviations were calculated for each of the indices, each disclosure LAS,
each measurement/presentation practice, and each of the dependent variable associated with
the 1 1 hypotheses. Stepwise regression was used to determine the factors associated with the
degree of compliance with IAS. The statistical analysis is disciplined and thorough, but it may
be undermined by the composition of the sample of companies and the limited scope of the
checklist of LAS-required practices.
The sample of companies was derived from the LASC's 1999 list of companies that
purportedly used IAS in their financial statements. The authors eliminated companies in the
finance, oil and gas, and not-for-profit sectors. They also eliminated 33 companies that did
not provide an annual report in English and 156 companies for which they could not obtain
annual reports (a problem familiar to many researchers of international company reporting).
The authors were also forced to eliminate 1 1 5 companies that did not refer to compliance with
IAS notwithstanding their inclusion on the lASC's list. After some other smaller adjustments,
they were left with 279 companies.
Almost 70% of the sample companies are Chinese, French, German, or Swiss. This is not
surprising given that these countries were among the major users of IAS in 1998, but it does
limit the conclusions that can be drawn about whether country of domicile is a factor affecting
compliance. Conclusions can be reached about China, France, Germany, and Switzerland but
no other single country. Companies from each other country are included in one of three
groups: Afi-ica, other Western Europe, and other (Middle East, Former Soviet bloc, and other).
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Another problem with the sample is that it (and the lASC's list from which it was derived)
include companies that refer to IAS for several different reasons. There are many companies
that have started to use IAS over the last 1 years as their primary reporting standards—these
companies ought to be the focus of the researchers. There are, however, other companies that
use domestic standards but responded to the lASC's call in the 1980s for disclosure of
compliance with LAS as well as with their domestic standards.' There are some Italian
companies that use IAS only in the absence of Italian standards." These latter two approaches
to LAS have little relevance today, and the companies concerned should, perhaps, be omitted
from the statistical analysis.
The limited scope of the checklist of lAS-required disclosure and measurement/
presentation practices is cause for a much greater concern. The checklist covers less
than half of the IAS that applied to 1998 IAS financial statements under review. The
disclosure practices cover only nine LAS (LAS 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 29, 32, and 33).
The measurement and presentation practices cover only 10 issues in seven IAS (IAS 2, 4,
8, 12, 19, 21, and 22). As a result, the checklist omits some significant IAS and IAS
practices, for example, the presentation of a cash flow statement and the measurement and
presentation of research and development, property, plant and equipment, leases, revenue,
consolidated financial statements, associates, and joint ventures. Furthermore, the checklist
deals with only some, rather than all, the disclosure, measurement and presentation
practices in each selected LAS. For example, the checklist does not deal with the IAS 21
and 22 requirements for:
• The franslation of the financial statements of subsidiaries other than those reporting in the
currency of a hyperinflationary economy;
• The reporting of foreign currency transactions and balances;
• The choice between the purchase method and the pooling of interests method in a business
combination; and
• The application of the purchase method (other than goodwill accounting).
The limited content of the checklist is understandable as a means of managing the scale of
the research, but it restricts severely the value of the conclusions. It is true that the checklist
focuses on IAS practices that prior research has identified as "problematic," but there is scant
evidence that these are the only "problematic" practices.
Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the results of the statistical analysis. The main
findings reveal "troubling levels of noncompliance with IAS." For example, the mean
' Many of these companies dropped the reference to IAS compliance after (or in anticipation of) the
introduction of 10 revised IAS in 1995. The lASC did not remove them from its list until 1999, which is probably
why Street and Gray found 115 companies on the lASC's list that did not refer to the use of LAS in their 1998
financial statements.
" In 1982, the Italian securities regulator asked listed companies to consider IAS in the absence of Italian law
and standards. The approach was probably helpfiil in the early 1980s, when IAS were much simpler and more
flexible and before Italy adopted the EU Fourth and Seventh Directives and started to develop its own standards.
The approach now has major shortcomings.
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indices for disclosure issues are 72% (each IAS weighted equally) and 74% (each item of
disclosure weighted equally). Put another way, on average, companies make only three-
quarters of the disclosures included in the checklist. The measurement/presentation results
are better: 89% when all practices are weighted evenly and 86% when each IAS is
weighted equally. Nevertheless, the results imply that, on average, each company is not
complying with at least one of the 10 IAS measurement/presentation practices included in
the checklist—and that is after the authors have given the benefit of any doubt to the
companies.
The purpose of this research is not, however, to measure the levels of compliance but to
identify the primary factors associated with those levels. From their statistical analysis, Street
and Gray find that compliance with lAS-required disclosures tends to be significantly greater
for companies that:
• Have a nonregional listing;
• Are in the transportation, communications and electronics industry;
• Refer exclusively to the use of LAS;
• Are audited by a Big 5 + 2 firms; and
• Are domiciled in China or Switzerland.
Compliance with lAS-required disclosures tends to be lower for companies domiciled in
France, Germany, and other westem European countries. These "headline" conclusions
should be—but are not
—
qualified by the limitations in the both the geographical composition
of the sample and the practices covered by the checklist. Would the results be the same if the
checklist were to have covered all—or even all the important—LAS-required disclosures? Are
companies in the transportation, communications, and electronics industry really better than
other companies at making lAS-required disclosures? Or are they simply better at making the
ones covered by the checklist?
Compliance with lAS-required measurement/presentation practices tends to be higher for
companies that make exclusive use of IAS, are audited by a Big 5 + 2 firm, and are domiciled
in China. Compliance with lAS-required measurement/presentation practices tends to be
lower in France and Afiica. Again, these "headline" conclusions should be—but are not
—
qualified by the limitations in the geographical composition of the sample and, most
particularly, by the fact that the checklist covers only 10 measurement/presentation practices.
Would Chinese companies come out on top if the assessment were based on all—or even a
majority of—the key measurement/presentation practices in IAS? Would Afiica have done as
badly if deferred taxes had not been one of the 10 issues in the checklist?
Chapter 6 suggests that these findings of the research highlight the importance of the
efforts of the lASB, IFAC, and IFAD to raise the standards of accounting and auditing
practices around the world. It also reviews regulatory efforts and the restructuring of IFAC
and the formation of IFAD. It suggests that the enforcement of IAS 1 Presentation of
Financial Statements (which requires full IAS compliance in IAS financial statements) should
be the first step in the enforcement of IAS and that the accounting firms should refuse to sign
an audit opinion on IAS financial statements that do not comply fully with IAS.
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Overall, this ACCA Research Report is a disciplined statistical study that is a useful model
for those who wish to carry out similar research and, therefore, a valuable source for those
interested in the use of LAS. However, the composition of the sample and the scope of the
checklist are serious limitations and receive insufficient attention in the executive summary
and conclusions.
The growing use of IAS, in particular the publication of LAS consolidated financial
statements by virtually all EU listed companies with effect from 2005, makes such studies
increasingly important. It is important, however, that researchers explain any limitations in
the sample and, even more importantly, use a more extensive IAS checklist. I am also
skeptical about placing too much reliance on the statistics, as there are many factors that
explain compliance and noncompliance. Street and Gray have provided some further
explanations; I would like to see them dig a little deeper.
David Cairns
London School ofEconomics and Political Science,
London, UK
PII: 80020-7063(02)00189-9
Corporate Financial Reporting
By Bhabatosh Banerjee and Arun Kumar Basu (Eds.), University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 2001,
vi+275 pages
The Universities Grants Commission, New Delhi, funded this publication through its
special assistance program. The book adds to the sparse literature on financial reporting from
an Indian perspective, and it consists of a collection of essays written by the academic staff of
the University of Calcutta. The essays cover a wide range of topics: the conceptual
framework of accounting, Indian company and accounting regulation, intangible assets,
foreign currency translation, cash flow reporting, segment reporting, environmental account-
ing, economic value added, electronic reporting, and accounting standard-setting in India.
There are 1 1 essays. Basu summarizes the concepts statements issued by the FASB and the
lASC and makes some interesting observations about the notion of a "true and fair view."
Chaudhuri explains the legal aspects of financial reporting in India, including the contents of
the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, the directors' report, and the auditors' report.
The author suggests that companies provide useful voluntary disclosures but does not give
any examples. Chakravorty discusses the regulation of accounting by multiple agencies, such
as the accounting profession, the securities regulator, etc. This essay partly overlaps with a
later one by Banerjee. Dandapat reviews the challenges in reporting intangible assets.
Although practice in this area is still evolving, Dandapat suggests a separate balance sheet
for intangibles as a form of supplementary information.
Bhattacharyya discusses foreign currency accounting in India, the US, and the UK. The
Indian accounting standard on the subject permits only the temporal method, and this has
created problems for some banks that have independent overseas operations. Dhar reports on
450 Book reviews
a survey of cash flow reporting in India and finds that the practices for classifying items into
the operating, investing, and financing categories vary across companies. Sen provides an
overview of segment reporting and compares lASC, US, UK, and Indian standards in this
area. Saha examines accounting for sustainable development but does not refer to any Indian
reporting practices or examples. He does not consider issues such as: Has the Bhopal gas leak
tragedy in 1984, which killed over 2000 people and maimed and disfigured many more, had
any effect on reporting on the environmental impact of the activities of Indian business
organizations?
Dhar outlines the idea of economic value added and its impact on the thinking of Indian
financial managers. Chatterjee discusses the implications of financial reporting via the
Internet and other electronic means of communication. Banerjee compares the institutional
mechanisms for establishing accounting standards in India with those in the UK and the US.
The author suggests dividing the task of enforcing compliance with standards between two
government departments and the securities regulator, according to the type of entity. This
could, of course, result in differing levels of enforcement in a country where the standards of
corporate reporting are already quite low.
The essays are mostly descriptions and analyses of professional pronouncements and
relevant research literature. There are gaps in the coverage, as the essays do not discuss the
influences on the development of accounting in India that include the following: substantial
ownership ofbusiness by families and government-owned financial institutions, a conservative
social climate, an inward-looking model of economic development, and a low degree of
globalization. Related to these are a number of special features of financial accounting and
disclosure. These include the mandatory disclosure of manufacturing capacity and output,
payments and earnings in foreign exchange, R&D activities, remuneration of highly paid
employees, energy conservation efforts, directors' remuneration, and payments to auditors for
nonaudit services. Again, the law specifies the minimum rates of depreciation for the various
types of assets.
A book of this nature is invariably ambitious and raises readers' expectations. The book
attempts to give a flavor of the accounting systems in India as well as the quality of work
being done by academics in India. More examples drawn fi*om the large number of Indian
financial reports would have made the book more lively and readable. Furthermore, there is
no discussion of the impact of the ongoing economic liberalization on financial reporting. For
example, several Indian companies have been listed overseas and many more are interested.
The financial reports of these companies are generally more informative.
India is a major emerging economy with great potential for economic growth. The book
will be of interest to those seeking insights into the state of financial reporting in India and the
scope for its improvement.
Malcolm C. Miller
The University ofNew South Wales,
Sydney, Australia
PII: 50020-7063(02)00195-4
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Global Financial Reporting
By John Flower with Gabi Ebbers, Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and
New York, NY, 2002, xxvii + 677 pp., £35. ISBN 0-333-79477-X.
The authors have selected a combination of a "country approach" and an "issues
approach" in describing international accounting, the former approach providing the richness
and diversity of accounting in the world, the latter approach providing a description and
analysis of topics and issues. Compared with other international textbooks, e.g. Nobes and
Parker (2002) or Walton, Haller, and Raffoumier (1998), the authors limit the country
coverage to only five countries, namely, the US, Japan, Germany, France, and Britain (the
Pentad). The concentration on these five countries is well motivated, considering the
influence that these countries have and have had on business development and accounting.
The historical path to today's global business envirormient is well laid out in the book. There
is a particular emphasis on the reporting of the larger multinational enterprises.
The book is intended for final-year undergraduate and postgraduate courses in accounting
and finance. The emphasis is, as the authors put it, on the "why" and not the "how" of
accounting, and consequently the authors aim at satisfying the curiosity of more mature
readers. In this respect, the authors are successful for the most part, but there are some
"whys" that are left unanswered. On certain issues, the authors express strong opinions,
usually well substantiated but sometimes not. In the latter cases, the presentation of
arguments supporting the authors' views as well as opposing views would have been
desirable, because the views are likely to influence uninitiated undergraduate students. This
criticism will be more closely specified in the coverage of the chapters.
The book is very lengthy (almost 700 pages), and about half the book covers the history of
accounting and the development and structure of international organizations. The presentation
of rules and issues starts on p. 332. The question is whether students have enough patience to
read all the background material first. The authors state this excellently themselves on p. 11,
"The global statistics presented in the previous two sections are certainly impressive but
rather dry." Each chapter contains objectives, a summary, and review questions that clearly
help in reading the text and comprehending important issues.
Chapter 1 deals with the globalization of the world economy. Usefiil statistics are
presented. The measuring unit in Exhibit 1.1 is unclear. A "why" not answered is the high
foreign direct investment (FDI) of Britain as compared to those of Germany and Japan (larger
economies). There is a consistency problem (p. 13) in that it is stated that "corporations are
obliged to follow the law of the country in which they are registered in drawing up their
annual accounts (both those of the individual corporation and the consolidated accounts)."
IAS and US GAAP have been allowed in Germany (France) and some other countries since
1998, as is correctly stated later in the book.
The causes of diversity in accounting are presented in Chapter 2. This presentation is
similar to those of Choi and Mueller ( 1 992) and Nobes and Parker (2002) and gives a most
relevant overview of the essential factors that have shaped the world of accounting. As in
international accounting textbooks of earlier dates, the effect of the law, which is intuitive, is
not clearly explained (specific example of effects would be useful). The issue of tax rates is
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somewhat superficially dealt with, in that more attention should have been paid to effective
tax rates. The advantages of making reporting to shareholders identical with the reporting to
the tax authorities are perhaps overemphasized as compared to the disadvantages (pp. 35-36),
specifically when keeping the thrust of the book. Global Financial Reporting, in mind; that is,
financial reporting today is largely capital market-driven and information serving investor
needs must given a high priority. In addition, the market values of major multinational
enterprises add up to much more than the state budget of many countries.
The description of the form of enterprise financing is well done. It would have been
desirable to mention that the globalization process is leading to a great reduction in the
differences in financing. Another issue is whether it may be an oversimplification to state
that "The surest way of deterring a take-over bid is to keep the market price. . .at a high
level. Financial reporting can make a major contribution to achieving this aim" (p. 44). The
strong influence that the accounting profession has had on financial reporting in the Anglo-
Saxon countries as compared to other countries is well presented.
Chapter 3 deals with regulation. The discussion of users and need for rules is
informative. The authors express a rather strong opinion in stating that "In fact there is
no incentive for managers to give any meaningful information at all in the financial
statements" (p. 67). In relation to agency-theoretical arguments, the statement is most
questionable. In addition, there is an inconsistency with, e.g., the arguments presented on p.
99, where, in describing accounting in Britain in the nineteenth century, the authors state
that, although there was no legal obligation to issue accounts or to appoint an auditor, most
larger companies did prepare financial statements for their shareholders, accompanied by an
auditor's report. "The reason was probably that this made it easier for them to raise capital
and to retain the support of the shareholders'' (emphasis supplied)
Chapters 4-8 provide a description of the historical development, the institutional
fi-amework, and the regulatory system of the Pentad countries. The description is of high
level, and specifically Britain is excellently presented. The contrast between the French and
Anglo-American tradition is particularly interesting. Although Japan of today is probably
familiar to most readers, the book sheds useful light on the earlier Westem influence (the
two revolutions) on Japanese accounting.
In Chapters 9-14, the European Union's interest in financial reporting and the background
and development of the Intemational Accounting Standards Board (lASB) are presented. The
controversy between Intemational Accounting Standards (lASs) and US GAAP is well
described and future scenarios well argued (Chapter 10). In describing the development and
structure of the lASB, the American (SEC) role/influence, specifically regarding the
composition of the board (experts versus representatives of different constituencies) could
have been mentioned (Chapter 11). In Chapter 12, the authority of lASs is discussed and the
authors provide an informative and accurate picture of the meaning of IOSCO 's IAS
"endorsement" (a contrast to some popular versions within Europe) as well as an excellent
description of EU accounting strategy. Differences in user needs are discussed in Chapter 13,
stating that they are different. However, it can be argued that the information needs are similar
in that they are all economic in nature but that they are different with regard to the extent of
information needed and type of decisions made on the basis of the information provided. The
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lASB's framework is rightly criticized for being inadequate on the issue of measurement and
unclear regarding the relationship of the discussion of capital maintenance with the rest of the
framework.
In Chapters 14-19, the financial statements, including their elements, are presented and
analyzed. The approach in presenting assets is very analytical, and the authors show in-depth
knowledge of the subject (Chapter 15). Some value judgments are imposed, e.g., in stating
that "for the market value is undoubtedly more relevant than cost for most decisions"
(p. 356).
Liability and equity are discussed in Chapter 16. A relevant discussion of the "abuse" of
provisions is provided and the possible problem of using the term "reserves." A major
confusion is caused by Exhibit 16.7 (p. 416) because of its contrast to the earlier, rather well-
established background discussion (Chapter 2) regarding equity versus debt financing, that is,
"As a general rule, it can be stated that, in those countries which are highly ranked by the
statistic 'Market capitalization as % of GDP' (notably the USA and Britain), equity is a
significantly more important source of finance. . ." (p. 42). Exhibit 16.7 (the world's top 50
multinational enterprises) warrants an explanation that the high debt figures for the US
enterprises are primarily caused by three of the four largest, namely, General Electric, General
Motors, and Ford, the fourth being ExxonMobil. Six of the 1 1 American multinationals
included in the top 50 multinational enterprises exhibit rather "expected" equity proportions.
In Chapter 1 7, the income statement is discussed, including the type of income statement
(by nature or function), revenue recognition, extraordinary/exceptional items, segment
reporting, and comprehensive income. Regarding the functional form of the income
statement, the authors criticize the reliability of the information rather sfrongly because of
the potential danger of allocations being arbitrary and not part of reality (p. 437). They are
naturally right in that the question is of estimates. However, the accuracy of estimates does
not always need to be that far from reality. Chapter 1 8 presents the cash flow statement. The
authors provide a highly relevant discussion regarding the definition of "cash" and the
classification of dividends and interest. Some opinions are expressed without hard evidence
(lack of rigor).
Chapter 19 deals with consolidated accounts, including the issue of control. The timing
of the book is a somewhat unfortunate, in that the recently issued US standards SPAS 141
and 142, which introduce significant changes on accounting for business combinations and
goodwill, somehow appeared after the authors completed their manuscript. A minor part of
the new American standards is still briefly touched upon, but the lASB response or
potential response to the issue is naturally not covered. A question to be raised is why some
EU countries (Finland and Sweden) are left out in certain presentations, e.g., Exhibit 19.6
(p. 521).
In Chapter 20, intangible assets are discussed. The authors include Johnson's and Petrone's
(1998) excellent analysis of the possible components of goodwill. Chapter 21 deals with
foreign currency translation, and the authors provide a good presentation of accounting for
foreign currency transactions and foreign currency franslation, including the historical
"competition" between the closing rate method and the temporal method. In Chapter 22,
an informative presentation of financial instruments is provided. The authors make an
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adequate remark in stating that IAS 39 is to be considered a temporary standard. Finally, in
Chapter 23 the disclosure of financial information is discussed.
To conclude, the textbook Global Financial Reporting represents a new type of
international accounting textbook, in that it provides an extensive in-depth description of
the historical development of international accounting, including discussions and analyses of
reasons behind the development/issues ("why"). In addition, it concentrates on the five
countries that have had the largest influence on international accounting (the Pentad). The
book may be seen as too lengthy by part of its target audience, mostly fmal-year
undergraduate students, and thus it is more suitable for post-graduate students and scholars.
Some inconsistency appears in the text, and the opinions expressed by the authors are not
always that well substantiated.
Pontus Troberg
Helsinki School ofEconomics,
Helsinki, Finland
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